

Supporting Political Party Development in War-torn Societies¹

Krishna Kumar and Jeroen de Zeeuw

Draft for discussion [please do not quote]

Paper presented at the 57th PSA Annual Conference
University of Bath, 11 – 13 September 2007

Jeroen de Zeeuw
Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Politics and International Studies
University of Warwick (UK)
E-mail: j.a.p.de-zeeuw@warwick.ac.uk

Abstract

In the context of its support for the organization of post-conflict elections in countries like Afghanistan, Bosnia, El Salvador, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone the international community has recently become involved in supporting the development of political parties. This paper takes a closer look at the different types of international support for political party development in these and other war-torn societies. After a brief review of the state of political parties at the end of civil wars it discusses the nature as well as the strengths and weaknesses of three main types of international support, namely support for party regulation, assistance for strengthening political parties, and assistance for transforming former rebel movements into political parties. It concludes that post-conflict party support has strengthened the technical capacities of parties as organizations, as electoral competitors and as key parliamentary actors, but has been incapable of changing the political problems of parties and the environment in which they operate. Arguing that post-conflict party development plays an important role in (future) conflict prevention and democratization and therefore deserves further international attention, several suggestions are provided to improve the political impact of international assistance.

¹ This paper is part of a larger research project on political party regulation in conflict-prone societies by International IDEA, United Nations University (UNU/Tokyo), and the Centre for Democratic Institutions (CDI). The findings of this project will be published in an edited volume by Ben Reilly and Per Nordlund in late 2007/early 2008.

Introduction

This chapter focuses on international support for political party development in a subset of conflict-prone societies, i.e. societies recovering from violent intra-state conflicts. In such 'post-conflict' or war-torn countries, the established political order is seriously undermined by intensive and often prolonged violent conflicts. Examples of such situations include Angola, Bosnia, Burundi, Cambodia, East Timor, El Salvador, Guatemala, Liberia, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone. Many of these societies were under authoritarian or semi-authoritarian rules during and prior to the conflict. Whatever little institutional infrastructure for democracy existed in these countries was undermined during the conflict. Personnel in state-level institutions, such as the judiciary, the legislature or the civil service were killed and infrastructure destroyed. The few civil society and media organizations that existed were closed down or demolished. Opposition political parties that existed prior to the outbreak of conflict were usually banned or morphed into armed resistance movements.

In many of these countries international actors were instrumental in brokering a peace agreement between the warring parties and supporting the country's post-conflict peace-building and recovery process. In the belief that, at least in the long run, a democratic political system is crucial in preventing future violent conflict, the international community promoted democracy in post-conflict societies.¹ In practically all recovering war-torn societies, free and fair elections, were perceived as the first step towards establishing a multi-party democracy.² The international community generally supported post-conflict elections and provided assistance to conduct them. It gave technical and financial assistance to establish a legal framework for elections and build a functional electoral administration that can organize elections freely and fairly. It also helped the newly created or reformed electoral administration to frame rules and regulations for elections, recruit and train necessary staff to supervise polling, and to acquire the necessary equipment. More importantly, it facilitated the national and international monitoring of elections to prevent fraud and political manipulation. And the international community exerted political pressure on losing political parties to accept the election outcome.³ Although its efforts did not always succeed in ensuring the integrity of elections, there is little doubt that without international support and engagement, most post-conflict elections would not have been held or at least would not have gained credibility and acceptance.

It was in the context of holding post-conflict elections that the international community became aware of the need for assisting political parties. Recognizing the instrumental role that political parties could play in conflict management and democratic peace-building, it also realized that political parties lacked the capacity and in some cases also the skills to effectively participate in elections. They often needed assistance to draft party rules, recruit candidates, write election manifestoes and mount elections campaigns. Moreover, opposition parties were at a serious disadvantage vis-à-vis incumbent parties in many cases, and therefore needed outside help. This was the case, for example, in Mozambique.⁴ Finally, it often found that a legal and regulatory architecture for a multi-party political system did not exist and a set of minimum rules and regulations had to be developed to facilitate political competition. As a result of this awareness, the international community started designing and implementing political party assistance programmes in various war-torn societies. In fact, many of the party assistance programmes in these countries during the nineties were demand-driven; international agencies engaged in assisting post-conflict elections responded to the demands from local political parties as well as their field staff. Once the elections were

over, party assistance programmes often continued, albeit at a reduced scale and as part of more conventional party assistance and democracy promotion programmes.⁵

This chapter takes a closer look at international support for political party development in war-torn societies. It begins with a brief discussion of the state of political parties at the end of civil wars and then discusses the various forms of international assistance for party development. The chapter also draws a number of conclusions and provides several suggestions for future support to political party development in post-conflict societies.

Political Parties at the End of Conflict

The landscape for political parties differs from country to country in the aftermath of conflict. For example, the political party system in El Salvador was quite different from that which existed in Cambodia or Mozambique after their peace agreements. Conditions were quite different again in Rwanda where the political party responsible for the genocide was militarily defeated by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), with its leaders and followers seeking refuge in neighbouring countries. Also factors such as the socio-cultural history of a country, its level of economic development, the presence of pluralistic and democratic institutions, ethnic cleavages, political and economic devastation wrought by civil wars, and the like vary per country, and affect the nature, growth and functioning of political parties. Therefore caution is necessary in making generalizations about the nature and functioning of political parties in recovering war-torn countries. With this caveat in mind, a few general conditions of political parties and the environment in which they operate can nevertheless be identified.

First, practically all war-torn societies have seen the emergence of multiple political parties. During and prior to the conflict, many countries had authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes. For example, countries such as Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Uganda were virtually under one-party rule. In many cases, there was no distinction between the ruling political party and the state. This dominance was undermined with the signing of peace accords, which invariably provided for the establishment of a multi-party political system. With the recognition of opposition parties and groupings, incumbent political parties lost some of their authority and legitimacy. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) and the Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO) are all examples of long serving ruling parties which saw their power and influence gradually waning prior to postconflict elections. Even when incumbent parties remained dominant in the political arena because of their control over the state machinery and access to economic resources, they no longer enjoyed their pristine glory and power.

In addition, politico-military or 'rebel' groups that had waged wars against incumbents were expected to transform themselves into political parties. By signing peace accords, they agreed to participate in the democratic process, giving up their violent struggle. However, in most cases the process of transformation tended to be slow and painful and its success was not always assured. A politico-military group could renege on its commitment, as was the case with the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. In other cases, such groups failed to transform themselves because of leadership and structural barriers. However, some did succeed: the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) are good examples of rebel groups that managed to change themselves into viable political parties.⁶ In any case, the essential point is that recovering war-torn countries often have new political parties composed of ex-militia and rebel forces.

In those countries where conflict was triggered or influenced by identity issues related to religion, race, linguistic or tribal affiliations, ethnic political parties emerged. Such parties mobilized people on the basis of ethnicity rather than a cross-cutting ideology, and their goals usually centred on the narrow interests of a single ethnic group rather than broader-based societal interests.⁷ For example, when Yugoslavia disintegrated because of its failure to accommodate the aspirations of different ethnic groups, war and bloodshed did not undermine ethnic loyalties of political parties; instead it consolidated them. Since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord in 1995, ethnic parties have continued to dominate the political scene in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This has been true in Kosovo as well.⁸ Finally, many war-torn societies saw the emergence of a host of smaller, new political parties. Some of these are founded by special interest groups, while others are established by (diaspora) intellectuals and democrats disillusioned by the existing state of affairs. Moreover, in some cases political entrepreneurs have formed parties with the aim of gaining short-term political and economic advantages. Many of these new post-conflict parties do not have strong roots in society, have limited political experience and draw their support mainly from urban areas. The Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) in Cambodia and the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) in Uganda are cases in point. Thus we find that different kinds of parties tend to populate the political landscape of recovering war-torn societies.

Second, the political and governance situation in societies emerging from conflict is hardly conducive to the growth of political parties. Despite the end of war, the law and order situation continues to be grim. Gangs composed of criminals, unemployed and uneducated youth and ex-combatants roam around the country, particularly in former war zones. The state has little or no presence in many parts of the country. Law enforcement agencies tend to be both ineffective and corrupt, further compounding the situation. A subculture of impunity can exist for many years in post-conflict societies, eroding the legitimacy of public and political institutions. The lack of security in remote and rural areas restricts movements of political parties and further hinders their capacity to recruit and educate members or mount election campaigns. Worse, in many cases, local parties become dependent on the mercy of criminal elements.

A third common condition of recovering war-torn societies are the severe economic problems they face. Wars tend to have devastating effects on the physical and institutional economic infrastructure of countries. Economic resources are diverted from productive to destructive use during the conflict. Whatever economic development programmes were launched prior to conflict are halted or disrupted. It is estimated that gross domestic product is typically reduced by 15% in post-conflict societies as compared to non-conflict countries.⁹ Recovering war-torn societies invariably face high inflation, widespread unemployment and budgetary deficits for many years to come. It takes time for the economy to recover. Under such conditions, corruption is rampant and public disillusionment remains high. But for the vast humanitarian and development assistance from the international community, many of these societies cannot survive. Poor economic conditions also adversely affect the prospects for the institutionalization of political parties. Because of the scarcity of resources, many parties find it difficult to establish local offices or take part in expensive electoral campaigns. Some political parties become captive of powerful economic interests.

Finally, many war-torn societies suffer from widespread social disorganization. The traditional bonds of family, kinship and community are adversely affected by prolonged war and bloodshed. Social and political trust across ethnic groups is eroded. The situation is undoubtedly worse in the countries that underwent ethnic conflict. In such societies, vast residues of hatred, resentment and anger exist among the people.¹⁰ In

addition, because of the neglect of education and limited employment opportunities, a sub-class of frustrated youth emerges, which has limited stakes in the existing socio-economic and political systems. Finally, the return of refugees and internally displaced persons puts an additional burden on community resources. The cumulative result is that the civic values of trust, mutual understanding and willingness to discuss differences, which are essential for the development of multi-party democracies, are often deficient in war-torn societies.

International Assistance for Post-conflict Party Development

It is against the backdrop of these harsh realities that the international community has given assistance to strengthen political parties in post-conflict countries and to improve the legal and regulatory environment in which they operate. The overall objective of this type of international assistance is to initiate and even consolidate the nascent democratization process that often begins at the end of conflict. However, in the past, international actors have not followed a coherent and comprehensive strategy for party development in post-conflict societies. Instead, their approach has been rather ad hoc and opportunistic. Interested donor governments, international agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have selected specific areas of assistance depending on the perceived local needs, available resources and their own specific mandates and interests. The international community has particularly focussed on (a) constitutional and legal provisions for political party development, (b) organizational strengthening and functioning of political parties, and (c) the transformation of rebel movements into political parties.

International Support for Party Regulation

Party laws refer to the constitutional and legal provisions concerning the legal status of political parties, including their organization and activities. They define what constitutes a political party, lay down the requirements for a party organization and explain what a political party can or cannot do. Kenneth Janda defines party law as “the body of state-based regulations that determines the legal status of political parties and often specify what constitute party membership, how parties must be organized, how they should campaign, how they must handle party funds, and so on”.¹¹ Broadly speaking, party laws cover three aspects: party registration and organization, election and campaign laws, and regulations for political party financing.

Some post-conflict societies already had constitutional provisions permitting the formation and functioning of political parties before the outbreak of civil war. This has been the case, for example, in El Salvador, Guatemala, Liberia and Nicaragua. In other cases, constitutions were revised prior to the signing of peace accords to permit the establishment of a multi-party political system. For example, Mozambique revised its constitution in 1990 to abolish the one-party political system that had existed in the country before. Still in other cases, the new constitutions made explicit reference to political parties to ensure that political parties are not banned by the incumbent political authority. The constitutions of Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, and Rwanda recognize citizens’ right to form political parties. In many of these post-conflict countries, the international community has provided legal and technical assistance to institute party laws and regulations, often in the context of constitutional reforms. In the early 1990s, in post-conflict countries like Ethiopia, Cambodia and Mozambique, multilateral and bilateral agencies funded teams of legal and constitutional experts to advise interim or

elected governments, usually at the specific request of the new governments. Such teams helped local experts in crafting new constitutions or amending existing ones.

In the mid-1990s, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the international community mandated the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to oversee the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement, including the creation of a democratic multi-party system.¹² According to Carrie Manning, pressure from these institutions “produced restrictions on the means of party financing, on leadership recruitment and retention, and on the public espousal of political positions counter to the provisions or objectives of the Dayton agreement. (...) Rather than ban the nationalist parties outright, however, the High Representative used discretionary powers (...) to remove elected officials and candidates from public office or from their party functions if they were judged to be obstructing the peace process”.¹³ Despite this interventionist approach, the international community has not been able to stem the popular appeal of the main ‘nationalist’ political parties in Bosnia.

More recently, international actors played an important role in advising the government of Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan on the adoption of a new electoral and political party law in the run-up to the September 2005 elections for the Wolesi Jirga, the Afghan parliament. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), a key player in this regard, helped ensure that new political parties would be subject to a number of regulations (see box 1 below).

Box 1. Political Parties Law of Afghanistan (excerpt)¹⁴

Chapter Two. Establishment and registration of political parties

Article 4

Afghan citizens of voting age can freely establish a political party, irrespective of their ethnicity, race, language, tribe, sex, religion, education, occupation, lineage, assets and place of residence.

Article 5

Political parties can function freely on the basis of the provisions of this law, and have equal rights and obligations before the law.

Article 6

Political parties shall not: (1) pursue objectives that are opposed to the principles of the holy religion Islam; (2) use force, or threaten with, or propagate, the use of force; (3) incite to ethnic racial, religious or sectional violence; (4) create a real danger to the rights and freedom of individuals or intentionally disrupt public order and security; (5) have military organisations or affiliations with armed forces; (6) receive funds from foreign sources.

However, the international community could not ensure the implementation of the enacted party laws during the 2005 elections. Despite the provision that banned the association of parties and candidates with armed groups to participate in elections, several candidates with strong links to armed militias were elected to the Afghan parliament.¹⁵ There are indications that the political party law was actually undermined by the electoral law, which limited the use of political party lists in the elections, allowing only the participation of ‘independent’ candidates. Most international actors did not realize this until it was too late. Others deliberately overlooked it, fearing that listing political parties could cause further fragmentation of the political landscape and a potential loss for President Karzai.¹⁶

A few newly drafted constitutions and party laws in recovering war-torn societies have imposed strict restrictions on political parties to prevent the emergence of political parties which may ignite conflict by promoting ethnic and parochial interests. The Afghan party law mentioned above is a good example. The Rwandan constitution adopted in 2003 lays down arguably the most stringent requirements for political

parties. Article 54 of that constitution reads: “political organizations are prohibited from basing themselves on race, ethnic group, tribe, clan, region, sex, religion or any other division which may give rise to discrimination. Political organizations must constantly reflect the unity of the people of Rwanda (...).”¹⁷ While the government has defended the restrictions on party formation with reference to the traumatizing events of the 1994 genocide, some have argued that the restrictions do not allow the emergence of real opposition parties and thereby hinder the development of a democratic multi-party system.¹⁸ It is interesting to note that offers of technical assistance by the international community were rejected by the Rwandan Constitutional Commission. The civil society consultation process for the new constitution was financially supported by several international donor agencies, however.¹⁹ It is too early to tell the positive or negative effects of such restrictions in Afghanistan and Rwanda. Past experiences show that constitutional guarantees have not always prevented authoritarian governments or dominant parties from circumventing the growth and emergence of opposition parties. For example, in Cambodia and Ethiopia, ruling parties have circumvented legal and constitutional provisions to keep themselves in power. On a positive note, however, the government of Uganda has for a long time not allowed multiparty elections, but under public and international pressure its constitution was amended in 2005 to permit them.

In many war-torn countries, as in other transition nations, the international community has also supported the formulation of rules on the financing of political parties and electoral campaigns. Such regulations are usually designed to curb the influence of vested interests on public policies and limit the opportunities for corruption and fraud. In post-conflict countries, political finance problems can have more serious consequences than in transitional countries and are often related to funding from undesirable sources (e.g. criminals and antisocial elements involved in organized crime, drugs, unlawful depletion of natural resources), electoral violence, and unequal participation.²⁰ The international community has given technical assistance to political parties and governments to discuss the different regulatory options and identify the most suitable reform package(s). The proposed legislative remedies include limits on donations to and expenditures by political parties, and mandatory disclosure of party finances, including private donations and public subsidies to political parties. In this context UNDP, for example, has provided technical assistance to finalize laws on the status of political parties and their financing in the Republic of Congo.²¹ Similarly, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) has worked with the National Elections Commission on the drafting and implementation of campaign finance regulations in Liberia.²² International actors have also worked with local civil society organizations involved in educating the public (and politicians) about the new political finance regulations, particularly in order to improve their attitude towards political parties. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) has been one of the many international organizations involved in this work.

Assistance for Strengthening Political Parties

The international community has also designed and implemented modest programmes to strengthen the organizational base of political parties and enable them to participate in elections and legislatures. Some of the international actors involved in these forms of political party assistance work with only a few parties or sometimes only one party, usually focusing on those parties that share the same ideological background with the assistance provider. This ‘fraternal method’ of party aid is common to many European political party foundations that have a long history of providing assistance, in particular the German *Stiftungen* [foundations], such as the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS)

and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES). Other international actors offer assistance to all the main political parties in the country, or at least to all parties represented in parliament. This 'multiparty method' is being used by organizations like the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute, the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD), the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), and also by multilateral organizations like UNDP and the OSCE.²³ Generally speaking, party assistance by all these actors has focussed on four areas, including organizational development, (post-conflict) election campaigns, promotion of multi-party dialogue, and strengthening of parties in legislative bodies.

Since most political parties in war-torn societies lack strong organizational structures and capacities, a major focus of international programmes has been on organizational development. The goal of such endeavours is to put forward a vision of a functional organizational structure that is well-managed and has a democratic leadership. In some countries, international actors gave direct financial and material assistance to build party offices and strengthen party infrastructure. In East Timor, for example, UNDP helped to set up Political Resource Centres, which provided access to graphic designers, computers, internet connections and telephone lines.²⁴ A similar initiative has been undertaken in Bosnia, where the OSCE established Political Party Service Centres, aimed at providing all parties with free access to office equipment, a meeting space and relevant documentation. The international community has also funded numerous training seminars and workshops that focus on a wide variety of issues, including strategies to recruit members, development of suitable messages, improving internal communication within political parties, strengthening relationships between national, regional and local units, and working with outside groups. Training programmes have also focused on practical mechanisms to raise funds, organize special events and conduct opinion polls and research. Some organizations such as NDI and IRI have developed training manuals to provide parties general information about the role of political parties in a democratic system and to identify specific techniques and skills required to perform specific functions.²⁵

The second area of party strengthening assistance has focused on election campaigns. The primary objective of assistance in this area is to enable old or newly established political parties to mount an effective election campaign following democratic norms and practices, particularly in a country's first post-conflict election. Assistance programmes focus on topics such as strategic planning, candidate identification and selection, message/platform development, voter outreach, media relations, campaign funding and budgeting, voter mobilization, opinion polls, debates among candidates, poll watching and vote counting. For example, during the October 2005 elections in Liberia, NDI and IRI organized a presidential debate in Monrovia and several senatorial debates throughout the country to acquaint the electorate with the views and positions of the main electoral candidates.²⁶ International organizations have also organized meetings and seminars to inform political leaders about the laws and regulations governing elections. In addition, some bilateral donors have funded the services of outside experts to strengthen selected opposition parties in an effort to create a more level playing field after the conflict.

The promotion of multi-party dialogue has also been a focus of international attention. The main motivation behind this area of assistance has been to try and bridge the large gap of trust that often exists in war-torn societies, particularly between the main formerly warring parties, and also among the various opposition parties. In some countries, such assistance has been closely related to the ongoing peace negotiation process. For example, in the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo, NDI

established a technical secretariat in 2001 that offered technical assistance to various (non-armed) political parties in order to engage them in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and to facilitate consensus over the terms of the peace agreement.²⁷ Another internationally-supported effort in this area has been the organization and facilitation of a multiparty dialogue in Guatemala by UNDP in collaboration with the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD). Key aims of this initiative were to initiate dialogue between the parties and to strengthen the country's highly fragmented party system. With international support, a large number of Guatemalan parties eventually elaborated a Shared National Agenda, identifying the country's main post-war socioeconomic problems and formulating a vision to tackle them.²⁸ A similar type of dialogue process in Guatemala, the Forum of Political Parties, had been initiated by the Organization of American States (OAS) a few years earlier.

Finally, organizations like the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA), European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA), UNDP and USAID have promoted a wide range of initiatives to improve the performance of political parties in parliaments. Such programmes help prepare legislators to play an effective role in passing new legislation, exercising oversight over the executive branch and reaching out to their constituencies. They focus on participation in parliamentary committees, holding public hearings, and mechanisms for widening constituency outreach. Some seminars and workshops also discuss more substantive issues such as the role of the legislative branch, the constitutional relationships between the executive and legislative branches and the rights and responsibilities of parliamentarians. The international community has organized foreign study tours, held meetings and seminars, and even sponsored short-term training for legislators and their legislative staff. Although some of these programmes have for a long time been rather generic, recently international actors are making an effort to design programmes that cater more to the needs of parliamentarians in post-conflict settings. There, parliaments do not only suffer from severe personnel and administrative shortages, but they are also confronted with problems related to their legitimacy, limited experience in drafting legislation and/or keeping the executive in check, as well as their role in overseeing the difficult reconstruction and democratization process. Over the past few years, a number of special parliamentary capacity building programmes for post-conflict countries have been initiated. In 2005, UNDP co-funded a parliamentary capacity-building project for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) with the Italian government and the Department for International Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom, which aimed among others at training parliamentarians, administrative and technical staff and developing legislation covering the transition period.²⁹ Since February 2005, UNDP also coordinates the Support to the Establishment of the Afghan Legislature (SEAL) project, a US\$15.5million two-year project financed by half a dozen bilateral donors. USAID has funded a similar US\$10million project by the State University of New York (SUNY), NDI and IRI to strengthen Afghanistan's parliament.

Supporting the Transformation of Rebel Movements into Political Parties

As mentioned earlier, a major challenge for some post-conflict societies is to ensure that former politico-military groups or 'rebel movements' transform themselves into viable political parties. The experiences of former warlord militias in Afghanistan, the FMLN in El Salvador, RENAMO in Mozambique, the National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) in Burundi, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) show that many factors shape the success or failure of so-

called rebel-to-party transformations. These include the way the conflict ended, the terms of peace accords, if any, the organizational structure of the rebel group, its leadership, its political base and its previous experience in participating in political life. Engagement by the international community has been another important factor, which assisted the transformation process in many countries.³⁰

In addition to political pressure and influence, the international community has provided four kinds of direct and indirect assistance. First, it has given financial and technical assistance for disarming and demobilizing ex-combatants and their eventual reintegration in the society in countries like Mozambique, Cambodia, Sierra Leone and more recently the DRC and Burundi.³¹ The United Nations, the World Bank, the European Commission and USAID have been among the largest donors for such disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes. Although DDR programmes usually took more time than anticipated and the re-integration of ex-combatants was not always successful, such assistance proved vital to ensure peace in many post-conflict countries. In addition, these programmes also helped the rebel-to-party transformation as it absolved leaders of rebel groups from the responsibility of providing for their militias. This helped them to concentrate on the new organization's political activities, particularly in the run-up to the first post-conflict elections.

Second, the international community has provided financial assistance to former rebel groups to convert themselves into political parties. The most conspicuous example of such financial assistance is the US\$17million "RENAMO Trust Fund" established in Mozambique.³² The fund enabled RENAMO to launch a vigorous election campaign in addition to developing a political party apparatus.³³ Norway, Sweden and Spain provided similar assistance to the FLMN in El Salvador.³⁴ Many US organizations funded the Opposition National Union (UNO), which included rebel groups, in Nicaragua, while several Latin American and European countries helped the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN).³⁵ In Afghanistan, Junbesh-i Milli Islami received some monetary support from Turkey while Iran has reportedly provided some assistance to Hizb-i Wahdat.³⁶ However, most experts are against the provision of direct financial assistance to political parties for several reasons. First, it creates a bad precedent in which past misdeeds may be rewarded. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the funds would not be misused by party leaders for their personal gains. In addition, direct funding tends to help the established leaders to maintain their hold over the party as they use it to award patronage. And finally, cash hand-outs to rebel leaders can contribute to the rebel groups' continued dependency on foreign assistance. This has been the case with RENAMO in Mozambique.

Third, in many cases, the international community has given logistic support to rebel groups. Such assistance enabled RENAMO to move from its headquarters in Gorongosa to the Mozambican capital, Maputo.³⁷ In El Salvador such support enabled the FMLN to rent offices in the capital.³⁸ In addition, international organizations have given office equipment to rebel parties in El Salvador, Nicaragua and East Timor. These experiences indicate that commodity assistance is preferable over direct financial assistance, as chances of misuse are more limited.

Finally, the international community has sought the participation of all parties, including the newly formed political parties of former rebels, in its assistance programmes. For example, NDI, and to a lesser extent also FES and KAS, organized several workshops in Afghanistan for political parties which were also attended by the representatives of various parties controlled by warlords. One advantage of such multi-party training workshops is that representatives of former rebel groups are able to interact with other parties, which might help them become more aware of the workings

of multi-party politics. In Sudan, IRI has run a party and candidate development programme, which also included a seminar to discuss the transformation of the SPLM/A from a military movement to a political party.³⁹ And finally, mention should be made of the Burundi Leadership Training Programme coordinated by the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars. This programme, which focused on training for collaborative decision-making by a broad range of Burundian leaders, also included a leadership workshop for former army and CNDD-FDD rebel commanders.⁴⁰

General Findings and Conclusions

Because of the dearth of information on this topic and the problems of collecting reliable and accurate information in war-torn societies –particularly when it comes to assistance programmes that were carried out more than five years ago– it is difficult to come up with hard, general conclusions.⁴¹ Nevertheless, by complementing the limited literature available on this topic with information, project descriptions and personal views from country experts and practitioners involved in relevant party assistance programmes in the past, and one of the authors' own involvement in political party assistance, a few general conclusions can be mentioned here.

First, while the international community assisted many war-torn societies in amending existing constitutions or crafting new ones to permit the functioning of a multi-party democracy, it did not give much attention to specific party laws and regulations. Two factors explain the scant attention given to party laws in most international assistance programming. Prior to the first post-conflict elections, the international community has been primarily concerned with ensuring that people have the freedom to establish political parties, can vote in a secure and safe environment and that the ruling political party does not enjoy unfair advantages over opposition parties.⁴² How parties originate or how they develop their organizational structures generally received little attention. In addition, there is no unanimity among experts about the nature of party laws and regulations that are ideal for creating a multi-party democracy. Even in consolidated democracies there is a marked variance in the existing provisions for party laws.

While international experts advising post-conflict governments were concerned about the rise of parties that may reignite ethnic and regional conflicts, they were equally concerned that new constitutional and legal restrictions on political parties can give unscrupulous governments an excuse to undermine opposition parties. Thus they faced a dilemma which could not be easily resolved. While the international community in most cases did not have a coherent position on this issue, many experts sent by bilateral and multilateral agencies did voice their reservations about restrictions on political parties, for example with regard to the Rwandan and Afghan constitutions. However, as the above-described example of Afghanistan demonstrates their concerns were largely ignored as other interests prevailed.

Even in cases where regulatory reforms have been implemented successfully, the aspect of enforcement of these regulations has usually received little international attention. Much of the technical assistance provided in the field of party regulation seems to have focused on incorporating the status, organization, rights and responsibilities of parties into new or existing legislation, less on creating mechanisms ensuring that such legislation will also be enforced. Particularly in post-conflict countries characterized by a weak rule of law, this lack of (attention for) enforcement has been rather problematic.⁴³

Second, assistance to strengthen political parties as organizations, as electoral competitors and as key parliamentary actors has generally improved their technical capacities. Assistance for organizational development has undoubtedly benefited many new and emerging political parties. As many parties usually had no office space, access to communication technologies or relevant documents, the provision of housing and logistic material as well as the establishment of resource centres by international agencies enabled them to organize themselves and establish party structures. The more specialized training workshops that focused on improving skills in message development, establishing relationships with civil society organizations and fund raising were usually helpful. Assistance for improving parties' electoral preparations and election campaign skills has also been quite successful, in that large numbers of party activists have benefited from these trainings and that the quality of parties' campaign techniques in many countries is said to have improved over time.⁴⁴ The emphasis on women participation in political parties and the special workshops on the recruitment of women members also had a positive effect in some countries. This was the case, for example, in a tradition bound society such as Afghanistan, where women successfully contested the 2005 parliamentary elections. At the same time, there have a number of problems as well. Much of the organizational assistance provided has been short-term, usually concentrated around the first post-conflict elections. In countries like Ethiopia and Sierra Leone this has not contributed to the long-term organizational capacity-building of political parties.⁴⁵

Third, the overall impact of international assistance in rebel-to-party transformation has generally been limited. In Mozambique, timely and generous direct financial assistance combined with strong political pressure has been a critical factor in persuading RENAMO's leadership to give up its armed struggle and move into mainstream politics. To a (much) lesser extent this has also been the case with the FMLN in El Salvador. However, these positive examples of internationally-supported rebel-to-party transformations seem to be exceptions rather than the rule. Past experiences highlight many problem areas. Often DDR programs have not been effective in reintegrating ex-combatants in economic and social life. Moreover, conventional party assistance programmes, including workshops for political skills and leadership training, have not focussed on the specific needs, requirements and problems faced by rebel groups in transforming themselves into viable political parties. The examples from Mozambique, El Salvador and Burundi indicate that international actors focus mainly on securing the engagement of former rebel leaders to the peace process and facilitating the former rebel group's participation in the first post-conflict elections. However, a successful conversion into a political party also requires that the former rebel group develops an accountable party organization and a viable political programme. These latter aspects have often been ignored by international actors.

Fourth, anecdotal evidence indicates that in the political arena of post-conflict societies, regulatory reforms are necessary but not sufficient. In the absence of internal and external pressure, incumbent parties manage to manipulate the rules to their advantage. The problem is that the judiciary, civil society organizations, opposition parties and the media in these countries are not strong enough to monitor compliance, let alone take measures against non-compliance. These institutions are often dependent on the incumbent regimes and lack the resources to confront the dominant party. Moreover, in dominant-authoritarian systems many of these institutions are not allowed to exist. At the same time, with the passing of time and the formation of an elected government, the international community also loses its leverage and influence. The presence of international actors also declines. Moreover, many foreign powers are not

willing to spend their political capital on transgressions of laws and regulations designed to establish a democratic political party system. Often they are more concerned about political stability than adherence to democratic norms by the ruling party.⁴⁶ One only has to look at the experiences in Cambodia, Ethiopia or Uganda to see how many bilateral actors ignored the violation of democratic norms by these countries' governments.

Fifth, a major problem which the international community has faced in practically all war-torn societies is that the majority of political parties had little or no incentive to introduce internal reforms and to aggregate the interests of diverse groups. Most of them lacked a coherent ideology or clear political programme. Often, they were led by charismatic leaders who monopolize power and do not tolerate dissent. Many were urban based and lacked grassroots support in the more populated rural areas. In former 'single party states', the traditional ruling parties tended to be better organized, as they often had a nationwide network of party offices, possessed a cadre of party officials, and enjoyed access to power and resources to distribute patronage. But even they became weaker during and after the war and often lost much of their legitimacy, particularly if they were associated with human rights violations during the war. Most newly established parties of former 'rebel movements' possessed neither the organizational culture nor the experience to participate in a democratic system. Rebel movements are usually led by a single (military) leader or a coterie of leaders who favour secret decision-making, as in the case of RENAMO or the SPLM/A. Power within these organizations is concentrated in a few hands, while others are obliged to follow orders. In addition, their cadre is trained in military and guerrilla warfare rather than in democratic methods of discussion and compromise. Most mono-ethnic political parties are also none the better. Their leaders solidify their political base by referring to real or imaginary grievances of their sectional group and thrive in creating a sentiment of "us" versus "them" to mobilize their constituencies.⁴⁷ Against this background, international assistance has often had little impact. The leaders of political parties usually paid only lip service to the reforms suggested by the international community. And when they were faced by stronger external pressure, many parties embraced superficial reforms without undergoing real transformation.

Finally, international for post-conflict party development has tended to suffer from the same limitations that have plagued many international democracy assistance programmes. These include a lack of coherent intervention strategy, limited donor coordination at the policy level, short-term focus of donor agencies, bureaucratic delays and limited ownership of the host societies. These have been examined in detail by various authors and do not require further elaboration.⁴⁸ However, an additional problem with political party assistance has been the undue reliance on training seminars and workshops. For many of these events, it has proven difficult to recruit the senior representatives from political parties, who are in a position to take decisive action on the findings and recommendations. Often the people who attended seminars lacked the authority and prestige to push for change. In addition, many participants have often complained that the contents were too general, focusing on (outdated) Western models of mass-based political parties, and did not take into account the specific party context of war-torn societies. This was particularly problematic when workshops were given by trainers who were not familiar with the social and political conditions of the country or who did not speak the local language.⁴⁹ However, on this latter aspect it is fair to say that international aid practice has improved over the past few years. There are now a number of party aid organizations who make an effort to adapt their workshops to the local situation and make more use of local or regional trainers and experts.

Nevertheless, questions like whether training workshops are the right mechanism to stimulate party development, or how to best tackle the *political* problem of one-party dominance are often still not addressed in assistance programs.

Recommendations

Give Greater Attention to Political Party Development

While the international community has implemented a wide range of party assistance initiatives in recovering war-torn societies, the total volume of party assistance has been very limited. It pales in comparison to the resources spent on other areas of democracy promotion such as civil society, media development or elections. And it is dwarfed by the vast sums spent on post-conflict peacekeeping, reconstruction and state-building. In fact, much of the assistance provided to political parties has been a part of electoral assistance, and dwindled after the organization of the first post-conflict elections. Several factors explain such neglect. Political party assistance can be controversial. Political elites in recipient countries often entertain doubts about the intentions of donor countries. And because of the political sensitivities involved, many donor agencies are reluctant to venture in this field. Moreover, international agencies lack effective approaches and tools to promote political party development. They have mostly relied on training and workshops, which seem to have had limited impact on the functioning of political parties and the political environment in which they operate. And finally, international actors have not always taken into account the specific party conditions of post-conflict societies when engaging in new party assistance programmes.

Whatever the reason, the international community should pay greater attention to political parties, which have proven to be essential institutions not only for the functioning of a democratic system, but also for the prevention of violent conflict. They perform functions that cannot be duplicated by other political entities such as civil society or private sector organizations. In the past, many attempts have been made to develop one-party or even ‘no-party’ democracies. However, most of these experiments have failed to ensure political stability, civil and political liberties or accountable governance. Therefore the need for international assistance to political parties cannot be over-emphasized, especially in recovering war-torn societies. Based on the earlier discussion, a number of additional conclusions and recommendations can be made.

Focus on Party Laws from a Conflict Prevention Perspective

As indicated before, the international community has largely ignored the subject of party laws in recovering war-torn societies. It has been primarily concerned with assuring constitutional freedoms to establish parties to participate in a democratic system. While focus on such freedom is essential, it is not always sufficient in the conditions of war-torn societies where competitive elections and uncontrolled party growth can have adverse effects on the nascent transition from war to peace. Irresponsible political parties can aggravate existing social and political tensions, further dividing the already deeply divided society. Therefore, in addition to exploring measures such as electoral systems and power sharing arrangements, the international community should also discuss with host countries the design of party laws that can reduce tensions or at least do not aggravate them.

While advising recovering war-torn societies about establishing multi-party electoral systems, international experts should also examine the existing or proposed electoral and party laws from the prism of conflict prevention. They should identify those rules and regulations that may aggravate existing tensions, and present alternative

solutions for the consideration of the executive and legislative bodies. In addition, they should explore the possibility of presenting rules and regulations which create positive incentives for political parties to include women, ethnic minorities, and members from remote and distant regions.

Work Early on Rebel-to-Party Transformation

With the exception of the high-profile financial and political assistance to RENAMO in the early 1990s, there has generally been limited international attention for supporting rebel movements to become unarmed, and preferably democratic political parties. Even in cases where international actors have directly engaged with former rebel groups, such as in Burundi and El Salvador, their engagement consisted mainly of putting pressure on rebel leaders to keep them committed to the peace process.

There are several reasons why the international community has been reluctant to become more involved in rebel-to-party transformations. First, it is not always clear whether a rebel group has sufficient widespread popular support or is a major political force for it to deserve being supported and possibly legitimized by international assistance. Another reason lies in the political sensitivities of direct international engagement with non-state armed actors. In case international actors are not explicitly invited by the government of the country concerned, they risk being accused of interference in domestic affairs. Finally, there are several legal obstacles which limit international involvement in this field. For example, providing assistance to groups that are blacklisted as “terrorist organizations” or whose leaders are being accused of gross human rights violations has become increasingly difficult, even if that assistance is meant to contribute to peace-building.⁵⁰ However, despite the difficulties, in some war-torn societies where former rebel groups do become major political actors, international actors will just have to deal with the issue of rebel-to-party transformation, whether they like it or not.

The challenge therefore for international actors is to identify creative ways to deal with the above-mentioned problems and design new assistance programmes focusing on rebel-to-party transformation. A first recommendation is to include the issue of rebel-to-party transformation in peace negotiations, and if possible in the final peace agreement. This not only ensures the recognition of a former rebel group as a legitimate political actor, but also enables assistance being set aside for its transformation into a political party. Second, new assistance programmes will have to be developed that take into account the unique problems of former rebel groups. For example, there are currently no special training courses for higher ranking soldiers who want to become politicians. Also, conventional party assistance training programmes are usually not accessible to groups who –directly or indirectly– still have access to weapons. And finally, leaders of major (former) rebel groups have to be included in discussions about the post-war political future of their countries, in order to enhance commitment towards their new democratic responsibilities as party leaders. The latter is not only a task of Western government, but mainly rests with domestic governments and regional organizations.

Create Positive Incentives for Parties and Party Leaders

In this internet age, the problem with most political parties is not their lack of information or even skills deficit. In fact, the leadership of many parties in war-torn societies is quite familiar with the norms and practices of a multi-political party system. The problem is the incentive. As mentioned earlier, many party leaders suspect that their own authority will be undermined if they introduce internal reforms which are suggested by the international community. Others are concerned that adherence to the

suggested party rules and regulations will curb their political effectiveness. Still others want to maintain their control over ex-militia forces even when peace has been established. Thus the major obstacle to the institutionalization of political parties that operate on the basis of democratic norms and practices is political rather than technical.

Therefore there is a need to create an incentive structure that rewards adherence to democratic rules and norms and punishes transgressions. The international community can do its part by supporting an egalitarian regulatory framework, assisting key civil society, media and judicial institutions, and exerting pressure on (dominant) parties to hold regular, free and competitive elections. However, the key to changing the nature of party politics lies with the electorate and political parties themselves. Probably the strongest incentive for parties to make such change happen is the realization that popularly responsive, accountable and non-corrupt party behaviour will ultimately provide them with the best chance to be elected into power.

* * *

This chapter has demonstrated that the international community has been supporting political party development in war-torn societies in a number of ways. It has given an overview of programmes' strengths and weaknesses, and suggestions for improvement. A fuller, more comprehensive account of the role of the international community in this subfield of post-conflict democracy promotion is urgently needed, but requires (a lot) more time and in-depth field research – both of which are neither available to us at this stage nor to most designers and implementers of party assistance programmes in volatile post-conflict settings. Here also lies a crucial paradox for improving our understanding and performance about party development in war-torn societies: for those researchers interested in learning more about how political parties develop, are regulated and/or internationally assisted, the research conditions of war-torn societies are usually far from ideal. Yet academic researchers are usually the only ones with the time and skills necessary for such painstaking analysis. For those practitioners wanting to improve their assistance programmes, the short time frames of the assistance bureaucracy and the quickly changing conditions of post-conflict societies hardly allow them to step back for a minute and reflect on their role and effectiveness of their programmes. The key to solving this paradox lies in *regularly* bringing these different groups together, and let them engage with local stakeholders and researchers. Only by combining analysis, programming and local understanding and interest, will the international community be able to make a real difference to political party development in war-torn societies.

Notes

¹ de Zeeuw, Jeroen and Krishna Kumar, eds., *Promoting Democracy in Postconflict Societies*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006.

² Reilly, Ben, "Elections in Post-conflict Societies", in Edward Newman and Roland Rich, eds., *The UN Role in Promoting Democracy. Between Ideals and Reality*, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2004, pp.113-134; Lyons, Terrence, "The Role of Post-Settlement Elections", in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, eds., *Ending Civil Wars. The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, pp.215-236.

³ Kumar, Krishna, ed., *Postconflict Elections, Democratization and International Assistance*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.

⁴ De Tollenaere, Marc, "Fostering Multiparty Politics in Mozambique", in de Zeeuw and Kumar, *Promoting Democracy in Postconflict Societies*, pp.83-84.

-
- ⁵ For an overview and analysis of the broader democracy promotion agenda, see Burnell, Peter, ed., *Democracy Assistance. International Co-operation for Democratization*, London: Frank Cass, 2000; and Carothers, Thomas, *Aiding Democracy Abroad. The Learning Curve*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C., 1999.
- ⁶ Lyons, Terrence, *Demilitarizing Politics. Elections on the Uncertain Road to Peace*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005.
- ⁷ Gunther, Richard and Larry Diamond, "Types and Functions of Parties", in Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther, eds., *Political Parties and Democracy*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001, pp.22-25.
- ⁸ Manning, Carrie, "Armed Opposition Groups into Political Parties: Comparing Bosnia, Kosovo, and Mozambique", *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol. 39, No. 1 (2004), pp.54-77.
- ⁹ Collier, Paul, *Post-Conflict Economic Recovery*. A Paper for the International Peace Academy, Oxford: Oxford University, 2006, p.2.
- ¹⁰ Horowitz, Donald, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2nd Edition, 2000.
- ¹¹ Janda, Kenneth, *Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and Practical Perspectives. Adopting Party Law*, Washington D.C.: National Democratic Institute of International Affairs (NDI), pp.3-4.
- ¹² Cousens, Elizabeth M., "From Missed Opportunities to Overcompensation: Implementing the Dayton Agreement on Bosnia" in Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens, *Ending Civil Wars*, pp.539-541.
- ¹³ Manning, "Armed Opposition Groups into Political Parties: Comparing Bosnia, Kosovo, and Mozambique", pp.60-61.
- ¹⁴ Downloaded on 5 March 2007 from: <http://www.cmi.no/pdf/?file=/afghanistan/doc/ACF8C.pdf>
- ¹⁵ Giustozzi, Antonio, "Political Parties or Militia Fronts?", in Jeroen de Zeeuw, ed., *From Soldiers to Politicians. The Transformation of Rebel Movements After War*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, forthcoming.
- ¹⁶ Based on e-mail correspondence on 21 and 26 February 2007 between one of the authors and Thomas Ruttig, Afghanistan expert at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin and former Deputy EU Special Representative in Kabul.
- ¹⁷ Downloaded on 4 March 2007 from: [www.chr.up.ac.za/hr_docs/constitutions/docs/RwandaC\(rev\).doc](http://www.chr.up.ac.za/hr_docs/constitutions/docs/RwandaC(rev).doc)
- ¹⁸ See Reyntjens, Filip, "Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to Dictatorship", *African Affairs*, Vol. 103, No. 411 (April 2004), pp. 177-210.
- ¹⁹ Yachat Ankut, Priscilla, *The Role of Constitution-Building Processes in Democratization. Case Study Rwanda*, Stockholm: International IDEA, 2005, p.25.
- ²⁰ Fisher, Jeff, Marcin Walecki and Jeffrey Carlson, eds., *Political Finance in Post-Conflict Societies*, Washington D.C.: IFES, 2006.
- ²¹ UNDP, *UNDP's Engagement with Political Parties*, New York: UNDP, 2005, p.9.
- ²² Downloaded on 22 February 2006 from: <http://www.ifes.org/elections-project.html?projectid=liberialeap>
- ²³ Carothers, Thomas, *Confronting the Weakest Link. Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C., 2006, pp.116-120. See also Burnell, Peter, ed., *Globalizing Democracy. Party Politics in Emerging Democracies*, London: Routledge.
- ²⁴ UNDP, *UNDP's Engagement with Political Parties*, p.15.
- ²⁵ See, for example, NDI, *Political Party Development Program: Party Training Manuals 1 and 2*, Washington D.C.: NDI, 2005.
- ²⁶ Downloaded on 26 February 2006 from: <http://www.ndi.org/worldwide/cewa/liberia/liberia.asp>
- ²⁷ Bryan, Shari, "Engaging Political Parties in Post-Conflict Parliaments", paper presented at the International Conference on Parliaments, Crisis Prevention and Recovery, April 19-21 April 2006, Brussels, p.6.
- ²⁸ Based on e-mail correspondence on 18 January and 1 March 2007 between one of the authors and Heleen Schrooyen, policy officer Central and South America at NIMD. See also: UNDP, *UNDP's Engagement with Political Parties*, p.19.
- ²⁹ Information from the UNDP DRC Country Office website. Downloaded on 5 March 2007 from: <http://www.undp.org.cd.ws017.alentus.com/Home.aspx?lang=fr>
- ³⁰ For a more comprehensive analysis on rebel-to-party transformations and the role of international actors, see De Zeeuw, Jeroen, ed., *From Soldiers to Politicians. The Transformation of Rebel Movements After War*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, forthcoming. Other recent studies on this topic include Manning, "Armed Opposition Groups into Political Parties: Comparing Bosnia, Kosovo, and Mozambique"; and Söderberg-Kovacs, Mimmi, "Fractions, Followers and Friends: The Fate of Rebels in Civil War Peace Processes. A Comparative Study of FMLN in El Salvador, Renamo in Mozambique,

RUF in Sierra Leone, and Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.” Ph.D. dissertation in Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University (Uppsala), forthcoming.

³¹ DDR programmes in DRC and Burundi are part of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) that currently takes place in seven countries of the greater Great Lakes region of Central Africa. See: <http://www.mdrp.org/>

³² Lyons, *Demilitarizing Politics*, p.126; De Tollenaere, “Fostering Multiparty Politics in Mozambique”, p.83.

³³ Manning, Carrie, “Mozambique: The Electoral Success of RENAMO”, in Jeroen de Zeeuw, ed., *From Soldiers to Politicians. The Transformation of Rebel Movements After War*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, forthcoming.

³⁴ Wade, Christine, “El Salvador: The Successful Transformation of the FMLN”, Jeroen de Zeeuw, ed., *From Soldiers to Politicians. The Transformation of Rebel Movements After War*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, forthcoming.

³⁵ López-Pintor, Rafael, “Nicaragua’s Measured Move to Democracy”, in Krishna Kumar, ed., *Postconflict Elections, Democratization and International Assistance*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p.44.

³⁶ Giustozzi, “Political Parties or Militia Fronts?”.

³⁷ Manning, “Mozambique: The Electoral Success of RENAMO” .

³⁸ Wade, “El Salvador: The Successful Transformation of the FMLN”.

³⁹ Downloaded on 9 March 2007 from: <http://www.iri.org/africa/sudan.asp>

⁴⁰ Wolpe, Howard and Steve McDonald, “Burundi’s Transition: Training Leaders for Peace”, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 17, No.1 (January 2006), pp. 132-138.

⁴¹ Applied research on the impact of international (democracy and party) assistance suffers from a number of practical and methodological problems. See: Green, Andrew T. and Richard Kohl, “Challenges of Evaluating Democracy Assistance: Perspectives from the Donor Side”, *Democratization*, Vol. 14, No. 1, February 2007, pp. 151-165.

⁴² See also De Tollenaere, “Fostering Multiparty Politics in Mozambique”, who argues that early international political party support in Mozambique was mainly motivated by the desire to conclude the peace negotiations and organize the first post-conflict elections.

⁴³ Fisher, Walecki and Carlson, *Political Finance in Post-Conflict Societies*, p.7.

⁴⁴ Carothers, *Confronting the Weakest Link*, p.185.

⁴⁵ Sesay, Mohamed Gibril, and Charlie Hughes, *Go Beyond First Aid. Democracy Assistance and the Challenges of Institution Building in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone*, CRU Working Paper 34, The Hague: Clingendael Institute, 2005, p.47.

⁴⁶ Partly based on telephone interview on 21 February 2007 between one of the authors and Renier Nijskens, former Belgian Ambassador to the DRC and current regional representative for Southern and East Africa at the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD).

⁴⁷ Large, Judith and Timothy D. Sisk, *Democracy, Conflict and Human Security. Pursuing Peace in the 21st Century*, Stockholm: International IDEA, 2006, p.164.

⁴⁸ See Burnell, *Democracy Assistance*; and Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad*.

⁴⁹ Kumar, Krishna, “Reflections on International Political Party Assistance”, *Democratization*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (August 2005), p.516.

⁵⁰ The international boycott of the Palestinian Islamist resistance movement, Hamas, and the indictment of Joseph Kony, the leader of the Ugandan Lord Resistance Army, by the International Criminal Court are cases in point.