

**THE LOCATION OF POWER IN SCOTLAND'S POST-
DEVOLUTION POLITICAL PARTIES: AN
EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS.**

ALISTAIR CLARK
DEPT. OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN
a.j.clark@abdn.ac.uk

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Although there has been a devolution-inspired proliferation of books on Scottish politics, it has nevertheless become commonplace to suggest that much of this output has neglected broader political science debates. Thus, James Mitchell, finding little evidence of the 'new evidence, new analysis and new methods' that Paterson et. al. argue is needed compares much of the literature that has been produced to the output of sports writers, or as he puts it, "fans with typewriters"¹. Similar criticisms are made by Neil McGarvey. In particular, both authors highlight the dearth of work that has been done on Scotland's post-devolution political parties. As McGarvey rightly notes, the national British parties are actors that could potentially inhibit the devolution process. As he puts it, "new research must also examine the role of the national UK parties and their own internal psychological and organisational responses to devolution"². This paper is therefore intended as a first step in examining the reaction of Scotland's main political parties to devolution. One way of assessing this is to establish where power lies in the four main parties. Whether the British parties have ceded decision-making power to their Scottish counterparts, or whether they retain that power for themselves tells us a great deal about how the devolution settlement is working in practice. Moreover, the extent to which power in the Scottish parties is located in elite leadership groups or diffused to different elements of the party gives us an indication of whether or not devolution has resulted in the more participatory 'new politics' that the pro-devolution camp promised. The paper proceeds in two sections. Firstly, theories of party organisation and intra-party power³ will briefly be addressed. In particular, by deploying the concepts of stratararchy and oligarchy it will be argued that, contrary to many common accounts, a spectrum of models of party organisation exists which can be utilised to categorise political parties. Secondly, the main part of the paper will attempt to fit each of the four main Scottish parties into that framework. Three areas will be examined for each party: their formal policy-making procedures; their procedures for candidate selection; and developments that have affected power within the parties since devolution.

From Oligarchy to Stratararchy: The Party Organisational Spectrum

The study of political parties has resulted in numerous models of party organisation. As Katz and Mair note, the development of these models is regularly presented as being a linear process that utilises the mass-party model as a standard by which future developments should be judged. However, given that the mass party is tied to an idealised model of democracy and social structure, they argue that any developments from the mass-party, for example Kirchheimer's catch-all party or Panebianco's electoral professional party, "suggests an end point from which the only options are stability or decay"⁴. Rather than decaying however, recent literature, including Katz and Mair's cartel party model, has been at pains to point out that parties are continually adapting to meet new challenges⁵.

An alternative way of conceptualising party organisation is as a dichotomy. This also has a lengthy history in political science. Perhaps the best known example of this approach is Duverger. He contrasts his mass party, with its formal rules, extensive network of branches and its efforts to integrate the working classes through its mass membership, with the relatively closed and informal cadre party, where 'members' are valued for their prestige and expertise in fundraising and electioneering⁶. On largely the same basis, Neumann distinguishes between

electorally focused parties of individual representation and the more extensive party of democratic integration⁷. Similar dichotomies are to be found, albeit often implicitly, in the work of Kirchheimer, Epstein, Wright and Panebianco⁸. This recognition that many of the classic works in party organisation have utilised a dichotomy to classify parties enables analysts to avoid unproductive debates about whether or not parties are in decline. Instead, it implies that a spectrum of party types exists. As Susan Scarrow puts it: "we can view organisational categories as endpoints on a spectrum of democratic party organisation". The benefit of this is that it presents a more accurate picture of party development where "party organisational change is not viewed as a ... conversion (from one party type to another) but rather as movement along a spectrum"⁹. Such a conception is compatible with Katz and Mair's assertion that the development of party organisational structures proceeds in a dialectical manner as parties continually adapt to changing circumstances¹⁰.

So what are the endpoints of the party spectrum? In an analysis of power in British Parliamentary parties, Brand suggests that they can be represented by the notions of oligarchy and stratararchy¹¹. As both concepts have different things to say about the location of power within parties, this is broadly the approach adopted by this paper. Oligarchy in political parties is most obviously associated with the work of Roberto Michels and his supposed 'iron law'. Michels argued that parties that set out with high ideals of integrating the masses through intra-party democratic procedures would, contrary to these democratic ideals, inevitably become dominated by a small elite¹². Three main reasons are evident. First, the masses are essentially apathetic and content to be led. This means that a self-selecting minority who participate more often than most begin to rise up the party until they form part of the leadership cadre. This process largely goes unchallenged by the members, thereby allowing leadership groups effective autonomy within the party. Second, there are organisational reasons for oligarchy. To integrate its members and work effectively, a party needs an organisation to, among other things, organise branch meetings, collect subscriptions, keep members informed of policy developments and, most importantly, organise campaigns. The result of this need for organisation is that parties become increasingly centralised and professionalised. In turn, this serves to reinforce the position of leadership groups. Finally, given that the objective of the party is to win office, the need for a leadership with freedom of manoeuvre unencumbered by concerns of intra-party dissent is paramount. In essence therefore, power is concentrated within central party leadership groups. Although Michels' law was not as iron-clad as he thought¹³, nevertheless the concept of oligarchy underpins a number of party models, not least those of the catch-all and electoral-professional parties.

The concept of stratararchy is most clearly set out by Eldersveld¹⁴. He argues that instead of a single elite group, parties instead have a plurality of relatively autonomous elites at different levels throughout their organisations. Thus the party leadership's position, and ultimately the success or failure of the party, is conditional on their support. This is for two main reasons. First, parties are voluntary organisations and party leaders need to encourage their members to participate, campaign and support the goals of the organisation¹⁵. Negative sanctions are, by and large, not an option because they are likely to lead to members either leaving or voicing their opinions in a manner that could potentially harm the party¹⁶. Second, the variety of local traditions and social structures that parties encounter in their quest for votes encourages party leaders to acknowledge that local sub-leaders are often better able to read the local electoral environment than the central party. This leads to a relationship of accommodation between different level elites and, in particular, a

"downward deference"¹⁷ from the leadership to the party at large. In other words, whether through formal mechanisms or not, the leadership must take into account the wishes of lower party strata. At the same time this deference is reciprocated by lower level elites who cherish, and wish to preserve, their autonomy¹⁸. Compromise between different elements of the party is crucial to avoid a breakdown of this system¹⁹. Unlike oligarchy, where power is concentrated in top leadership groups, stratarchy is therefore essentially a pluralist model where power is dispersed between various different party strata.

Recent works on political parties have attempted to develop additive scales in order to quantify both the influence of sub-national party groups and the centralisation or otherwise of parties²⁰. In short, they attempt to develop schema to measure whether parties are oligarchic or stratarchic. While these approaches have considerable merit, and will to an extent be drawn on in what follows, they can nevertheless fail to account for intangible items like informal influence. The remainder of the paper therefore uses a largely interpretivist approach to analyse the location of power in Scotland's post-devolution political parties. It is with the Labour Party that discussion begins.

Scottish Labour

Policy-making in the Scottish Labour Party is formally devolved from the national party²¹. While the Scottish conference remains the sovereign policy-making body for Labour's Scottish Parliament manifesto, in reality it has little influence over policy formulation. Instead, since 1998 it has been the responsibility of the Scottish Policy Forum (SPF) to develop policy. The SPF runs on a rolling two-year programme. In the first year, policy proposals are circulated within the party and submissions invited from regional policy forums, constituency and branch parties, affiliate and external associations. This culminates with a debate on the results of this consultation process at conference. During the second year, formal policy proposals are drawn up and presented by the SPF to conference. This presentation may include majority and minority positions and conference decides whether or not to adopt these proposals as policy.

Patrick Seyd is critical of Labour's National Policy Forum (NPF) and the argument that it allows lower party strata to influence policy²². As the NPF process is the same as that of the SPF, these points are worth revisiting here. First, there is a clear desire, evident in the *Partnership in Power* documents from which the SPF/NPF structure originated²³, to minimize the potential for damaging splits at conference. Second, an imbalance of power exists between well-briefed ministers who frame the policy documents for consultation and the lower strata in the party who are invited to comment. Third, policy forum discussions are guided by facilitators who then produce reports on proceedings which are the basis for final policy positions. As these facilitators are senior party personnel, there is considerable interpretative power here which is unlikely to challenge the leadership²⁴. Fourth, because the SPF meets in private, it is harder to mobilise opposition to leadership policy proposals. Fifth, the format of the policy forum, small group discussion and dialogue, is likely to be dominated by middle-class professionals thereby excluding certain elements of the party. Finally, Webb also observes that the consultation process gives the leadership ample time to dilute or address criticism²⁵.

How has this worked in practice? Labour claims that 11,000 individual members have been involved in formulating the policies discussed at their Scottish

Conference in February 2002²⁶. In the first full year of policy consultation (1999-2000), 50 Scottish CLPs are claimed to have taken part in local policy forums, while other branches and affiliate organisations held meetings and submissions were received from a range of other sources²⁷. The number of submissions in three policy areas, transport and the environment, social inclusion and education, enterprise and life long-learning is reported in table 1. The report on first year consultation on education enterprise and lifelong learning suggests that this has had an immediate

Table 1: Policy submissions 1999-2000²⁸

	Environment/Transport	Social Inclusion	Education/Enterprise
Submissions	54	20	21

effect on policy; a review of the Enterprise Network was announced by Henry McLeish after input from the party²⁹. In other policy areas, the consultation reports suggest that there has been a lively intra-party debate; local parties clearly favour a more interventionist 'Old' Labour approach to transport, the environment and social inclusion than the original policy documents³⁰.

It is however questionable how much influence these debates have had on policy. Despite criticism of, among others, PFI, bus deregulation, and the lack of emphasis on equality, each of the three consultation reports suggests that lower party strata are in general agreement with the proposed policy. Although certain Unions mounted a rearguard action against PFI at the 2002 Conference, the leadership won through by successfully appealing to individual members and voters and exploiting divisions within the Trade Union movement itself³¹. Moreover, despite the number of CLPs taking part in the consultation process, reported in table 2, there does seem to be some weight to Seyd's assertion that only certain sections of the party will contribute to the process. For instance, 17 CLPs, or 24%, were not involved in making submissions to the SPF. Finally, ministers and representatives of the Scottish

Table 2: Contributors to the 1999-2000 Policy Process³²

LPFs	CLPs	Branches	Other party units	Affiliates	External
9	56	6	4	5	1

Executive Committee have been dominant in the process of drafting these policy documents³³, thereby restricting the possibility of more wide-ranging debate.

A further source of intra-party controversy is evident in the role of the leadership in the candidate selection process. This is discussed by Bradbury et. al.³⁴. Decentralised selection was the norm until Labour's 1988 Govan by-election candidate performed poorly. To prevent a repeat, the role of the central party in selecting candidates was extended. Through the 1990s, this led to both the development of a centrally approved panel of candidates and the adoption of a process of 'twinning' constituencies in order to achieve gender parity. Both processes were used in the run up to the 1999 Scottish parliamentary elections. In creating the approved panel applicants were interviewed by a selections board appointed by the Scottish Executive Committee. At this stage, a number of nationalist-left candidates were rejected. Four main criticisms were made of the interview stage: that an ideological 'new' Labour test was applied; that the selection board chair was a leading Blairite and therefore biased; that certain candidates were steered towards hostile panels; and that MPs of one wing of the party were sitting in judgement on MPs of

another faction. Indeed, 25% of Bradbury et. al.'s survey of selected candidates believed that the interview process had been neither fair or democratic³⁵. Criticisms were also made against the board that selected candidates for regional lists, in particular that the leadership placed favoured candidates at the top of lists. Bradbury et. al.'s survey showed that a considerable majority felt this undemocratic and unfair³⁶. Finally, CLPs accused the centre of using the 'twinning' process to prevent them selecting nationalist-left candidates. Similar themes have resurfaced as current Westminster MPs jostle to be accepted for the remaining seats in the aftermath of the forthcoming boundary reallocation.

Some analysts also saw the hand of London Labour in the contest to succeed McLeish, with Wendy Alexander touted as the 'Brownite' opponent to the 'Blairite' McConnell³⁷. While national Party Chairman Charles Clarke warned against any such manipulation, in the end such concerns were rendered irrelevant when Alexander decided not to stand for ostensibly personal reasons. McConnell's backbench support, 33 out of Labour's 55 MSPs nominated him, gave him a considerable advantage over any would-be contender³⁸. Given that his power-base is therefore firmly rooted in the Scottish Labour Party, this means that he does not owe his position to Blair even if he does share a similar outlook³⁹. The downside of this independence from Millbank is however that the Scottish Party is being expected to fund the 2003 Scottish Election campaign without any assistance from London⁴⁰. Although that may have longer-term effects, perhaps of more immediate importance for intra-party power relations is the fact that, Wendy Alexander excepted, he replaced all McLeish's Labour cabinet ministers with those that had supported him. There are two ways of looking at this. First, given that they include a number of left-wingers, their capacity for mischief-making is circumscribed because they are now bound by collective responsibility. Moreover, McConnell is seeking to ensure backbench loyalty by introducing the post of ministerial parliamentary aide to Holyrood⁴¹. Second, on the other hand, McLeish's frontbenchers now languish on the backbenches and are capable of causing embarrassment. Susan Deacon has recently been critical of McConnell's lack of progress, while the election of Murray Tosh as Deputy Presiding Officer over the First Minister's choice, Cathy Peattie, was reported as a backlash against his treatment of 'Team McLeish'. However, the proximity of the 2003 Scottish elections is probably enough to ensure that McConnell will not be challenged to any great extent from the backbenches. This may change if Labour perform poorly in 2003.

In summary, although Scottish Labour displays strata elements, for instance formally incorporating lower party strata into the policy process, discussion of its policy-making and candidate selection procedures nevertheless indicate that it is essentially oligarchic in nature with power residing primarily with the Scottish leadership. Indeed, the marginalisation of the Trade Union protest over PFI at Conference in February suggests that the strata elements of Labour's organisation have in effect strengthened the leadership's position, not weakened it⁴². The next section turns to Labour's main challengers, the Scottish National Party.

The Scottish National Party

Unlike the other main parties in Scotland, there is no question of power being located outwith Scotland for the SNP. Nevertheless, the nature of intra-party relationships within the SNP is still relevant for, as argued earlier, they give us an insight into the extent to which Scottish parties are providing the more participatory 'new' politics that many proponents of devolution advocated.

While some authors conclude that the SNP is an essentially oligarchic party⁴³, Bennie et. al. argue that "considerable power is devolved to ordinary members and a highly decentralised structure exists which has made effective leadership difficult at times"⁴⁴. Its Annual Conference, held each September, is the party's main policy-making forum and delegates are sent as representatives of their branch or constituency association (CA). In addition to policy-making, the powers of Conference are substantial. For instance, Conference elects the party's National Executive Committee (NEC) which comprises senior office-holders and ten 'ordinary members'. Conference can also mount a challenge to the National Convenor should it wish to do so. Between Conferences, the party holds quarterly National Council meetings. These have the authority to make policy and are also attended by branch and CA delegates. National Council members are also elected by Conference delegates.

There is some evidence to support this formal picture. The number of submissions made to the SNP's Annual Conference in September 2001 by various party strata are reported in table 3. Out of a total 109 submissions, by far the most, 47 in total or 43%, came from party branches. When combined with the 17 submissions made by Constituency Associations, local level submissions accounted for 59% of the resolutions and amendments considered by conference. By contrast, MSPs and the party NEC submitted only 32 resolutions and amendments, or 29% of the total. While

Table 3: Submissions to SNP Conference 2001⁴⁵

National Council	MSPs/NEC	CAs	Branches	Associated Groups
2	32	17	47	11

most motions were uncontroversially approved, it nevertheless appears that the leadership are generally unafraid to hold controversial policy discussions during conference. For instance, after a motion by four branch parties and amendments by three others, a debate on the party's traditional opposition to joining NATO was scheduled for conference and was only dropped due to the sensitivity of the topic in the aftermath of September 11^{th46}. Moreover, an attempt by the SNP Trade Union Group to get the party to campaign against housing reorganisation in Glasgow was only narrowly defeated by 167 votes to 138 after intense debate⁴⁷.

However, a number of contradictory points are noteworthy. First, the 'ordinary' members of the party's NEC are anything but; they include two former national convenors and six MSPs, the majority of whom are sympathetic to the leadership⁴⁸. Intra-party democracy in this case seems therefore to reinforce the leadership's position. Second, Conference debates are tightly controlled. The leadership appoints the chair of each session. Contributions are limited to five minutes for movers of motions and three minutes for movers of amendments and other speakers. The chair's decision is final and defiance of the chair can lead to exclusion from the session and other party decision-making bodies⁴⁹. Finally, certain CAs and branches account for more submissions than others. For instance, Glasgow Anniesland, Tweeddale, Ettrick and Lauderdale and Kilmarnock and Loudon CAs account for 10 of 17 CA submissions while Dingwall and District, Edinburgh Leith, Cumbernauld North East and Avendale branches account for 20 of the 47 branch submissions⁵⁰.

Candidate selection within the SNP shows a somewhat mixed picture. The SNP have tended to rely on tested methods of selection which allow constituency parties to select their own candidates from a shortlist approved by the party's selection committee⁵¹. Where only one branch was involved in selection, OMOV would be

used, while if more than one branch party was involved a local conference would be convened to choose between prospective applicants⁵². In 1999 the SNP again employed an approved candidate procedure in which approximately 300 applicants were whittled down to between 150-175. This is being repeated for 2003 with candidates undergoing weekend residential assessments⁵³. Procedures for constituency selection were essentially those outlined above. For list selection, regional conferences and hustings were held with delegates from constituency, branch and sub-branch levels providing the selectorate. There were claims of the approval process being used to favour 'pragmatists' over 'fundamentalists'. Moreover, despite a special party conference rejecting proposals to achieve gender parity by 'zipping', informal leadership influence was used to achieve gender balance⁵⁴. Nevertheless, Bradbury et. al. note that the majority of selected candidates felt that the selection process was essentially democratic and, despite a small minority arguing otherwise, that there was no undue leadership influence⁵⁵. While it is therefore necessary to note the influence that the leadership can have over candidate selection, the judgement that the SNP's approach reveals "a strong continued respect for constituency activist power, both in constituency selection and ... list selection"⁵⁶ retains considerable relevance.

What of post-devolution developments? The most significant development was Salmond's decision to stand down and Swinney's election as party leader. In a party famously divided between independence 'fundamentalists' and devolution 'pragmatists', the outcome of the leadership contest seemed to signal the dominance of the 'pragmatists'; Swinney defeated Neil by 547 votes to 268, while Cunningham defeated MacAskill by 457 to 323 in the vote for senior vice convenor. However, with the SNP failing to make a lasting impression on Labour in the polls, Swinney is facing a challenge from the independence wing of the party. Indeed, despite Swinney appointing 29 of the SNP's 35 MSPs to either his shadow cabinet or deputy spokesperson positions, this has done nothing to buy their loyalty; 24 list MSPs have been reported to be involved in internal campaigning for independence while a number of challengers are beginning to position themselves for a leadership contest in the event of election failure in 2003⁵⁷. Consequently, Swinney has changed tack and embarked on a long campaign to talk up the benefits of independence.

Contrary to those who suggest that the SNP is a centralised party, consideration of its policy-making and candidate selection procedures and of post-devolution developments indicate that instead the leadership is responsive to lower party levels. While Lynch rightly notes an increasing professionalisation, his assertion that the party is a mix of grassroots and elite elements, while factually correct, tells us little⁵⁸. The party's structure, with constituency level input into policy-making and candidate selection, not to mention the inability of the party to call on the large donors that the British parties can draw upon⁵⁹, means that there is a 'downward deference' and a process of accommodation within the SNP which is typical of the stratarchic party model outlined above. The next section considers the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party.

The Scottish Tories

Unlike the SNP and Labour, grassroots members have little direct formal influence into the policy process of the Scottish Conservative Party. Although constituency associations have the right to submit motions for debate at conference, these are submitted to a screening process by the party's Policy Forum and it is the

Committee of Conferences that decides the agenda⁶⁰. Moreover, Scottish Conference decisions have only advisory status for the leadership⁶¹. While this could be interpreted as giving a degree of support to Kelly's argument that party activists have informal influence at conference⁶², even if he is correct this still leaves formal decision-making power in the hands of a small leadership elite. Indeed, traditionally the party's principles have inclined it to invest policy-making authority in small leadership groups, and in particular the party leader. For instance, Agasoster notes that during the eighteen years of Conservative government between 1979-97, it was the Secretary of State for Scotland who was responsible for writing the Scottish manifesto in consultation with both the Scottish Party Chairman and President, the Scottish Executive Committee and advisory groups for different policy areas⁶³. This was done in co-operation with the Prime Minister and government ministers, thereby giving an important power of veto to the British party leadership.

This essentially remains the case post-devolution. While Agasoster rightly concludes that "with Scottish devolution, the Scottish party has obtained a far more important role in policy-making"⁶⁴, the policy-making autonomy that the Scottish Conservative leadership has enjoyed has been at the discretion of the national party leader. William Hague, for example, was willing to allow McLetchie to develop Scottish Conservative policies for Scottish circumstances. Two cases in point are the Tories' endorsement of free care for the elderly and the abolition of student tuition fees. However, the party's relatively poor showing in the 2001 General Election has weakened McLetchie's position; despite winning a seat back from the SNP, the Conservatives still came fourth in Scotland behind the Liberal Democrats. Although senior Conservatives have been at pains to stress that they retain the same policy-making autonomy under Duncan Smith⁶⁵, it is evident that he has taken a more active role vis-à-vis Scotland than his predecessor did; McLetchie has been 'invited' to attend shadow cabinet meetings on a more regular basis and Duncan Smith has been more in evidence in Scotland than Hague ever was. The inference that most take from this is that Duncan Smith is asserting his authority over the Scottish party⁶⁶.

On the face of it, candidate selection within the Scottish Conservative Party demonstrates a more complex picture than policy-making. Bradbury et. al note that although the party had long-established pre-selection procedures, local activists were nevertheless given the right to choose their constituency candidates from a central shortlist⁶⁷. Moreover, constituency associations had switched to OMOV ballots for candidate selection by the 1992 General Election. Even where this was used merely as a rubber-stamp for the candidate chosen by Constituency Executives, this still meant that, where candidates were successful, the nature of the parliamentary party would be decided by decisions made at local level. Constituency parties therefore had considerable power within the party⁶⁸. These procedures, taken from the party's practice at Westminster, were adopted for the 1999 Scottish Parliament Elections. Moreover, with list candidates being selected from among those already approved by constituency associations, the party could argue that this actually constituted an extension of intra-party democratic procedures⁶⁹.

The central party did however take a sizeable role in candidate selection procedures in the run up to 1999. For instance, it prescribed that a minimum of two candidates be put forward for selection by constituency associations. Paradoxically, this was done in the interests of intra-party democracy, the intention being to prevent local parties from only putting forward favoured candidates for affirmation⁷⁰. The list ordering process was also controversial. Two main criticisms were made. First, the process was overly controlled by the central party. Bradbury et. al. describe how list

ranking was undertaken by a core group from the central party comprising the Chair and Deputy Chair of the party alongside the President and Chair of the Selection Board. This core group was supplemented by regional groups comprised of constituency chairmen from each region⁷¹. Second, that only those already selected as constituency candidates were considered for list placings restricted openness and perhaps prevented good candidates who had been unsuccessful at constituency level from standing⁷². This created a degree of dissatisfaction within the party. While most selected candidates felt that selection at both constituency and list level had been democratic and 98% thought leadership influence over constituency selection was about right, a quarter of Conservative candidates in Bradbury et. al's survey thought that leadership influence over list selection was too great and 38% thought that list selection had been to some extent undemocratic⁷³. This controversy continues in the run up to the 2003 elections with unsuccessful candidates for Westminster claiming that they are now being denied the right to challenge sitting MSPs for list seats despite an earlier commitment by McLetchie to allow open competition for list placings⁷⁴.

Arguably the most important post-devolution developments for the Scottish Tories have been a consequence of the party's disastrous showing in the 2001 General Election. As has already been argued, Duncan Smith's accession to the British party leadership has seen McLetchie's room for manoeuvre considerably reduced for two main reasons; the free rein that Hague gave the Scottish party failed to lead to a Tory comeback in Scotland and McLetchie's policies have been argued to be too left-wing for the national party. Consequently, McLetchie has been the subject of a whispering campaign both among his backbenchers and senior party members at a national level. One instance of this was the resignation of Nick Johnston MSP who claimed that McLetchie was aloof and surrounded by cronies⁷⁵. Although McLetchie has earned some breathing space by playing a large part in Henry McLeish's downfall, one problem for the Tories is that they are failing to engage voters whose 'natural home' is the Conservative Party⁷⁶. As Mitchell puts it, "McLetchie appears to be suffering from what might be called William Hague Syndrome; outwitting political opponents in the Chamber but failing to connect with the public"⁷⁷. A further, arguably central, difficulty is that the party continues to be seen as anti-Scottish⁷⁸. If this continues, a poor showing in 2003 is likely to see McLetchie enduring a sustained leadership challenge.

The Scottish Conservative Party most closely resembles the oligarchic party model outlined above. Although constituency parties have formal powers over candidate selection they have no such powers over policy-making and must therefore rely on informal influence. Moreover, the Scottish leadership have demonstrated a willingness to exert central control over the list ordering process to achieve their desired ends. While the leadership is the dominant element of the Scottish Conservative Party, it nevertheless must be noted that it depends upon the national party leadership for its freedom of manoeuvre to react to specifically Scottish circumstances. It is to the second party of government, the Liberal Democrats, that the next section now turns.

The Scottish Liberal Democrats

Duncan Brack argues that at the national level, Liberal Democrat policy-making "represents a balance of power between five elements: the party leader, the parliamentary party, the Federal Policy Committee (FPC) and its policy working groups, the Federal Conference Committee (FCC) and the Federal Conference"⁷⁹.

Although the Scottish party has a separate constitution, this structure is essentially replicated at Scottish level. The twice per year Scottish Conference is the supreme policy-making body for the Scottish Liberal Democrats. Between these spring and autumn conferences, the party's Scottish Policy Committee (SPC) is responsible for developing policy to be presented to conference while the Scottish Conference Committee (SCC) is responsible for setting the conference agenda⁸⁰. In keeping with the party's participatory ethos, this structure is internally democratic. Constituency party members can both attend Conference as non-voting observers and elect their conference representatives. These Conference representatives have voting rights and can elect five members to the SPC, six members to the SCC and ten members to the Scottish Executive Committee (SEC)⁸¹. Moreover, various party strata, from constituency parties to the SEC, have the right to submit motions to Conference. From these motions, the Conference Committee selects a preliminary agenda and invites amendments, before drafting a Final Agenda⁸². Finally, although the Federal Party takes precedence on some policy issues, defence and budgetary allocation for instance, there is Scottish representation on all Federal policy-making bodies.

How does this work in practice? First, underlining a point that Brack and Deacon have made about the Federal and Welsh parties, it seems that the SPC is the dominant actor in developing and framing Scottish policy⁸³. Despite conference electing five members of the SPC, this could have the potential to restrict policy debate at conference, particularly since Brack claims that lower party strata have pressures on them other than discussing policy⁸⁴. The role of conference is therefore reduced to either accepting or rejecting policy, not necessarily formulating it. Input from members may also be further circumscribed by Wallace's intention to hold a series of policy forums in the run up to 2003 with external, albeit sympathetic, interest groups⁸⁵. Second, on the other hand, it does seem that Scottish Liberal Democrat conferences are not afraid to debate and pass policy that is critical of the party leadership. Thus at Glenrothes in Autumn 2001, Conference passed a motion calling for the abolition of the Council Tax and its replacement with a local income tax, while at Pitlochry earlier that year Conference criticised both the lack of an overall integrated strategy and the absence of benchmarks and targets to tackle environmental degradation⁸⁶. Both are key Liberal Democrat policy areas that the leadership has been unable to deliver in office. Third, the party allows local parties considerable leeway to develop their own policies for fighting local elections⁸⁷. Fourth, while rebellions by backbenchers sensitive to local issues, for instance on the fisheries compensation package, can embarrass the leadership, the aforementioned criticisms by conference suggest that the parliamentary party and party leader can also act as a brake on some of the party's more radical policy ideas if for no other reason than they must now accept the constraints of office⁸⁸.

Candidate selection procedures within the Scottish Liberal Democrats are also relatively democratic. These are well described by a number of authors⁸⁹. Although the central party runs a pre-selection approval process, the intention seems to be to encourage members to stand. While Agasoster notes that potential candidates can apply on their own initiative and without nominations, Bradbury et. al. also observe that in 1999 the Liberal Democrats' central selection process had no deadline and gave initially sub-standard candidates extra training until they passed⁹⁰. Indeed, of 200 Scottish candidates, only 30, or 15%, failed. Selection is then the responsibility of constituency parties who shortlist candidates and hold hustings on the basis of OMOV. Agasoster suggests that these selection meetings have a high level of participation⁹¹. Bradbury et. al. indicate that list selection was also decentralised and

democratic with the main issue being whether or not to 'zip' the lists in order to achieve gender balance. Despite the wishes of the central party however, this was rejected by Conference with both constituency and list selectors instead agreeing to work towards gender parity wherever possible⁹². This remains an issue in the run-up to 2003; on the grounds that it is illiberal, a special members-only Conference in February 2002 rejected by a considerable margin central party proposals to amend the Scottish party constitution to allow twinning or zipping procedures to be adopted. The continued stand-off between the central party and conference over this issue notwithstanding, Bradbury et. al.'s survey demonstrates that the vast majority of candidates thought that Liberal Democrat selection procedures in 1999 had been both democratic and had the right amount of leadership influence⁹³.

Mitchell argues that devolution has been good for the Scottish Liberal Democrats⁹⁴. Not only did they force the Conservatives into fourth place in Scotland in the 2001 General Election, but they have also performed consistently in the polls. However, Curtice has pointed to a tendency for support to drop in places where it has previously been strong. For instance in the August-November 2001 period, this lost it one council seat in Fife, even though this was compensated for elsewhere by winning two other seats from Labour⁹⁵. Although it is difficult to see a challenge to Wallace emerging if the party remains consistent, nevertheless such a loss suggests that the Liberal Democrats are in a tricky strategic position. On the one hand, with the 2003 election approaching there will be grassroots, and consequently backbench, pressure for the party to distance itself from Labour, particularly since McConnell's initial enthusiasm for PR in local government seems to be dimming. On the other hand, the Liberal Democrats will be keen to run on their record in office. This strategy was successfully adopted in 2001. Given that Wallace has ruled out coalition with any party except Labour, this means that any talk of splitting the coalition early, such as that noted by McGarvey, is unlikely to happen if the party wants to form part of the next Scottish Executive⁹⁶. Instead, what is more probable is that the Liberal Democrats will again adopt a 'dual strategy' whereby different party strata are allowed to campaign on different issues. For instance, constituency MSPs and parties will be given a free hand to campaign on local issues while the leadership will concentrate on national issues⁹⁷.

The adoption of such a strategy underlines what has been otherwise implicit in this discussion of the Scottish Liberal Democrats; power within the party is stratarchically organised. In other words, no section of the party is dominant over the others. Not only is a process of accommodation necessary between formally empowered sections of the party, but the leadership in practice exercise a 'downward deference' to lower party strata which is both the result of the party's participatory ethos and of its dependence on its membership for essentials such as fundraising and volunteer work.

Conclusion

Given the dearth of political science oriented works on Scotland's political parties, this paper set out to examine the reaction of the main Scottish parties to devolution. In particular, it was suggested that the examination of power within the parties would tell us a great deal about how the devolution settlement is working in practice. Such an examination has been undertaken by arguing that a spectrum of party models exists, with the ideal types of oligarchy and stratarchy on either side of the spectrum. In short, oligarchy is where power is concentrated in top leadership

groups. By contrast, stratararchy involves a dispersion of power between different party strata. This necessitates a process of accommodation which recognises the value of party members and local traditions and accords them an active role within the party.

Through analysis of the parties' policy-making procedures, candidate selection arrangements and post-devolution developments, each of the four parties has been placed within this framework. Two of the parties, the Liberal Democrats and the SNP, exhibit stratarchic organisation and intra-party power relations, while the other two parties, Labour and the Conservatives, each exhibit a degree of oligarchic organisation. Although it is therefore the SNP and Liberal Democrats that best live up to the participatory rhetoric that accompanied the devolution campaign and referendum, this judgement does not necessarily mean that Labour and the Tories do not value their grassroots. Indeed, it has been noted that both parties empower their members to differing extents. Instead, it demonstrates that the ideal types of oligarchy and stratararchy are not mutually exclusive concepts but can interact to produce unique patterns of intra-party power relations.

Insofar as independence from the national parties is concerned, the Scottish element of two of the three British parties, Labour and the Liberal Democrats, can now be said to be largely autonomous, even if this is a relatively recent occurrence for Labour which coincided with McConnell's accession to the leadership. While the Conservatives have until recently been accorded a considerable amount of autonomy, this has been dependent on the tolerance of the national party leadership. That Duncan Smith is now keeping a close watch on the Scottish party in the aftermath of its poor performance in the 2001 General Election suggests that this autonomy is being steadily eroded. A word of caution is however necessary when considering the autonomy of the Scottish parties from their national counterparts. Like the British government itself, it is the national parties that retain overall control of budgetary policy. This of necessity circumscribes the ability of the Scottish parties to make policy, even if they do retain responsibility for the Scottish manifesto and are otherwise independent.

One interesting finding of this paper is that it is the two parties who are most reliant on their members that most closely exhibit stratarchic models of organisation. In other words, because the SNP and Liberal Democrats cannot rely on the large donations and professional help that Labour and the Conservatives are able to attract, they have to be responsive to their members and offer incentives to entice them to undertake fundraising and other voluntary work. It will be interesting to see whether Labour's fundraising difficulties, with Millbank unwilling to fund the 2003 Scottish election campaign and the unions threatening to withhold funding because of the PFI issue, mean that it will begin to be more responsive to its members and constituent elements than it has been in the past. Moreover, will the Scottish Tories adopt more participatory procedures in an attempt to 'market' the party to a sceptical electorate?⁹⁸ Although the answers to these questions will not necessarily become apparent until after 2003, and after considerably more research has been done into the Scottish parties, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the dynamic nature of intra-party power will see some movement on the party organisational spectrum suggested in this paper.

- ¹ J. Mitchell, 'The Study of Scottish Politics Post-Devolution: New Evidence, New Analysis and New Methods?', in *West European Politics*, Vol. 24, No. 4, (October 2001), p216-223.
- ² N. McGarvey, 'New Scottish Politics, New Texts Required', in *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol. 3, No.3, (October 2001), p431.
- ³ I use the two terms interchangeably.
- ⁴ R. S. Katz & P. Mair, 'Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party', in *Party Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (1995), p5-8
- ⁵ For representative examples of this literature, see the collection of papers in: R. J. Dalton & M. P. Wattenberg (eds.), *Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
- ⁶ M. Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, Third Edition*, (London: Methuen, 1964), p17-27 & p63-71.
- ⁷ S. Neumann, 'Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties', in S. Neumann (ed), *Modern Political Parties: Approaches to Comparative Politics*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p404-405.
- ⁸ See: L. D. Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, (London: Praeger, 1967). O. Kirchheimer, 'The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems', in J. LaPalombara & M. Weiner (eds.), *Political Parties and Political Development*, (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), p177-200. Wright is cited in A. Widfeldt, *Linking Parties With People? Party Membership in Sweden 1960-1997*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), p14-15. A. Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organisation and Power*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
- ⁹ S. E. Scarrow, 'Does Local Party Organisation Make a Difference? Political Parties and Local Government Elections in Germany', in *German Politics*, Vol. 2, No.3, (December 1993), p378.
- ¹⁰ R. S. Katz & P. Mair, *Op. Cit.*, p6.
- ¹¹ J. Brand, *British Parliamentary Parties: Policy and Power*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p89.
- ¹² R. Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*, (New York: Dover Publications, 1959).
- ¹³ Even McKenzie, regularly cited as providing evidence from the British Labour and Conservative parties which supported Michels, argued that "the 'law of oligarchy' is certainly not an 'iron' law". R. McKenzie, *British Political Parties, Second (Revised) Edition*, (London: Heinemann, 1963), p644. For additional discussion see: D. Kavanagh, 'Power in British Political Parties: Iron Law or Special Pleading?', in *West European Politics*, Vol. 8, No. 3, (July 1985), p5-21.
- ¹⁴ S. J. Eldersveld, *Political Parties: A Behavioural Analysis*, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), p9-12.
- ¹⁵ Implicit in this is the idea that middle-level activists have a different goal structure to those of party leaders. For elaboration see: J. D. May, 'Opinion Structure of Political Parties: The Special Law of Curvilinear Disparity', in *Political Studies*, Vol. 21, No.2, (1973), p135-151.
- ¹⁶ See the famous distinction between exit, voice and loyalty in: A. O. Hirshman, *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations and States*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).
- ¹⁷ S. J. Eldersveld, *Op. Cit.*, p10.
- ¹⁸ For a recent assertion of this position in their Cartel Party model, see: R. S. Katz & P. Mair, *Op. Cit.*, p21.
- ¹⁹ Brand argues that compromise between two or more elements of a party is necessary if a course of action is to be followed. J. Brand, *Op. Cit.*, p89.
- ²⁰ A. Widfeldt, *Op. Cit.*, p90. B. Agasoster, *Party Cohesion and Local Agendas: A Study of Variations in Local Campaign Strategies in Scotland*, (University of Aberdeen: Unpublished PhD Thesis, 2001), p115-144.
- ²¹ For a summary see: Scottish Labour Party, 'How We Make Policy', www.scottishlabour.org.uk/how.html, [17/12/01].
- ²² P. Seyd, 'New Parties/New Politics? A Case Study of the British Labour Party', in *Party Politics*, Vol. 5, No.3, (1999), p392-394.
- ²³ Seyd quotes a lengthy passage from *Partnership in Power* to underline this. P. Seyd, *Op. Cit.*, p393.
- ²⁴ For the reason that their positions are appointed by the party leadership. L. Bennie, J. Brand & J. Mitchell, *How Scotland Votes: Scottish Parties and Elections*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), p48.
- ²⁵ P. Webb, *The Modern British Party System*, (London: Sage, 2000), p204.
- ²⁶ Labour Party, 'Building Towards the Scottish Elections', 20th Feb 2002, www.labour.org, [21/2/02].

²⁷ Scottish Labour Party, 'Scottish Policy Forum Report 2000', www.scottishlabour.org.uk/forum.html, [20/12/01].

²⁸ Scottish Labour Party, 'Result of First Year Consultation: Education, Enterprise and Lifelong Learning', www.scottishlabour.org.uk/edRes.html, [21/2/02]. Scottish Labour Party, 'Result of First Year Consultation: Transport and the Environment', www.scottishlabour.org.uk/transEnvRes.html, [21/2/02]. Scottish Labour Party, 'Result of First Year Consultation: Social Inclusion', www.scottishlabour.org.uk/socIncRes.html, [21/2/02].

²⁹ Scottish Labour Party, 'Result of First Year Consultation: Education, Enterprise and Lifelong Learning'.

³⁰ Scottish Labour Party, 'Result of First Year Consultation: Social Inclusion', & Scottish Labour Party, 'Result of First Year Consultation: Transport and the Environment'.

³¹ D. Fraser, 'McConnell Faces Down Unions', in *The Sunday Herald*, 24th February 2002, p2. Manipulating the Unions is of course a classic tactic exploited by Labour leaders who wish to get their own way. R. McKenzie, *Op. Cit.*, p640.

³² Scottish Labour Party, 'Scottish Policy Forum Report 2000'. The figure of 56 CLPs comprises the 50 CLPs that participated through their Local Policy Forums and 6 CLPs that made independent policy submissions to the SPF.

³³ Scottish Labour Party, 'Scottish Policy Forum Report 2000'.

³⁴ J. Bradbury et. al., 'Candidate Selection, Devolutions and Modernization: The Selection of Labour Party Candidates for the 1999 Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly Elections', in P. Cowley et. al. (eds.), *British Elections and Parties Review Volume 10*, (London: Cass, 2000), p151-172.

³⁵ J. Bradbury et. al., *Op. Cit.*, p158-159. Rejected candidate Mark Lazarowicz is cited as attacking the 'centralisation of control' which involved 'a restriction rather than a broadening of democracy'.

³⁶ J. Bradbury et. al., *Op. Cit.*, p166. See also: K. Farquharson, 'Revealed: Blair's Bid to Bar Rebels from Holyrood', in *The Sunday Times*, 3rd February 2002, p1-2.

³⁷ See: J. Allardyce, 'Far Enough, Gordon', in *Scotland on Sunday*, 25th November 2001, p17.

³⁸ J. Mitchell, 'Political Parties', in The Constitution Unit, *Nations and Regions: The Dynamics of Devolution Quarterly Report*, (November 2001), p56.

³⁹ See: 'Jack the Cad', in *The Economist*, 17th November 2001, p34-37.

⁴⁰ B. Brady & J. Allardyce, 'Scottish Labour Faces £1m Election Bill', in *Scotland on Sunday*, 17th March 2002, p5.

⁴¹ Although those appointed to this position will apparently be given the freedom to act independently as backbenchers, this is the equivalent of the Westminster position of Parliamentary Private Secretary which is often used to guarantee a backbencher's loyalty in return for a 'first step' on the ministerial ladder. D. Fraser, 'McConnell Extends His Power Base With Eight Little Helpers ... Unpaid of Course', in *The Sunday Herald*, 23rd December 2001.

⁴² Put simply, McConnell's tactic was one of divide and rule. For the argument that the extension of democratic rights to members in the UK Labour Party has bolstered the position of Blair et. al., see: P. Seyd, *Op. Cit.*, p401. For a similar point see: R. S. Katz & P. Mair, *Op. Cit.*, p21.

⁴³ For a summary of these arguments see: R. Levy, 'Nationalist Parties in Scotland and Wales', in L. Robins, H. Blackmore & R. Pyper (eds.), *Britain's Changing Party System*, (London: Leicester University Press, 1994), p156.

⁴⁴ L. Bennie, J. Brand & J. Mitchell, *Op. Cit.*, p78-79.

⁴⁵ Scottish National Party, *Conference Agenda 2001*, (September 2001), www.snp.org/multimedia/agenda.pdf, [12/2/02]. There is some confusion within the agenda as to whether certain submissions came from Constituency Associations or branches with some CAs labelling themselves constituency branches. For the purposes of this paper, these have been classified as CAs.

⁴⁶ Scottish National Party, *Conference Agenda 2001*.

⁴⁷ Scottish National Party, *Annual Conference: Outcome of Business*, (September 2001), www.snp.org/conference/outcome.htm, [12/2/02].

⁴⁸ The former National Convenors are Alex Salmond and Billy Wolfe. Alex Neil MSP is perhaps the NEC member most critical of the leadership. The other 'ordinary' members 2001-2002 are Nicola Sturgeon MSP, Kenny MacAskill MSP, Bashir Ahmad, Gerry Fisher, Michael Russell MSP, Andrew Wilson MSP, and Fergus Ewing MSP.

⁴⁹ Scottish National Party, 'Standing Orders for National Conferences of The Scottish National Party', in Scottish National Party, *Conference Agenda 2001*.

- ⁵⁰ The figures for these CAs are: Glasgow Anniesland 4, Tweeddale, Ettrick and Lauderdale 3, Kilmarnock and Loudon 3. For these branches the breakdown is: Dingwall and District 6, Edinburgh Leith 5, Cumbernauld North East 4 and Avendale 5. Scottish National Party, *Conference Agenda 2001*.
- ⁵¹ J. Bradbury et. al., 'Innovation in British Party Candidate Selection: The Role of Government Decentralisation and Government Reform', Paper to the ECPR Joint Sessions, Grenoble 6-11 April 2001, p2-3. B. Agasoster, *Op. Cit.*, p135.
- ⁵² J. Bradbury et. al., 'Innovation in British Party Candidate Selection: The Role of Government Decentralisation and Government Reform', p2-3.
- ⁵³ These assessments include interviews, policy debates and current affairs discussions. N. Sturgeon, 'Gearing Up for 2003', in Scottish National Party, *Conference Delegate's Handbook*, (2001), www.snp.org/conference, [23/10/01], p4.
- ⁵⁴ For an outline of these claims see: J. Bradbury et. al., 'Innovation in British Party Candidate Selection: The Role of Government Decentralisation and Government Reform', p13-14.
- ⁵⁵ In a survey of selected candidates, they found that 96% thought drawing up the approval panel had been democratic, 100% thought selecting constituency had been democratic and 89% felt selecting list candidates was democratic. Insofar as leadership influence is concerned, 76% thought constituency selection had been about right, and 66% thought the same of list selection. 15% and 18% thought that constituency and list selection had too much leadership influence, while 9% and 17% respectively felt there had been too little leadership influence.
- There may be a bias here as unselected candidates are not surveyed. It would be interesting to see if these figures would be different if unselected candidates had been researched. J. Bradbury et. al., 'Innovation in British Party Candidate Selection: The Role of Government Decentralisation and Government Reform', p20-21.
- ⁵⁶ J. Bradbury et. al., 'Innovation in British Party Candidate Selection: The Role of Government Decentralisation and Government Reform', p14.
- ⁵⁷ See: D. Fraser, 'The Shadow Leader', in *The Sunday Herald*, 3rd March 2002, p11. Also: J. Allardyce & M. MacLeod, 'Time to Grasp the Thistle', in *Scotland on Sunday*, 3rd March 2002, p13 & I. MacWhirter, 'A Lack of Direction Threatens the SNP', in *The Sunday Herald, Seven Days Section*, 3rd March 2002, p13.
- ⁵⁸ P. Lynch, 'Professionalization, New Technology and Change in a Small Party: The Case of the Scottish National Party', in D. M. Farrell et. al. (eds.), *British Elections and Parties Yearbook 1996*, (London: Cass, 1996), p231.
- ⁵⁹ Lynch's discussion of fundraising within the SNP is interesting here and demonstrates how professionalisation can co-exist with a 'downward deference' towards members. Fundraising is all the more important given that Sean Connery's high profile donations have been outlawed by the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act resulting in the party having a considerable overdraft, £400,000 in May 2000. There are however moves afoot to reinstate Connery's donations. See: P. Lynch, *Op. Cit.*, p224-226. BBC Analysis and Research, *General Election Policy Guide 2001*, (London: BBC, 2001), p78. M. Settle, 'Connery Set for a Comeback as SNP's Top Donor', in *The Herald*, 4th March 2002, p1.
- ⁶⁰ P. D. Webb, *Op. Cit.*, p197.
- ⁶¹ B. Agasoster, *Op. Cit.*, p136.
- ⁶² R. N. Kelly, *Conservative Party Conferences: The Hidden System*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989). As Whiteley et. al. note however, the problem with Kelly's thesis is how can it be tested? P. Whiteley et. al., *True Blues: The Politics of Conservative Party Membership*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p35.
- ⁶³ B. Agasoster, *Op. Cit.*, p136.
- ⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p136.
- ⁶⁵ David Davidson MSP was at considerable pains to make this point in a seminar to Scottish politics students at Aberdeen University on 7th December 2001.
- ⁶⁶ See for instance: I. Swanson Queensberry, 'Will Duncan Smith Finish Off Scotland the Brave?', *The Evening News*, 20th Sept. 2001. Also: G. Bowditch, 'Mac the Knife? No, David the Defensive', *The Sunday Times, Ecosse Section*, 18th Nov. 2001, p5.
- ⁶⁷ J. Bradbury et. al., 'Innovation in British Party Candidate Selection: The Role of Government Decentralisation and Government Reform', p2-3.
- ⁶⁸ This is an argument that has also been made by Whiteley et. al. in their defence of the value of members to parties. P. Whiteley et. al., *Op. Cit.*, p6.
- ⁶⁹ J. Bradbury et. al., 'Innovation in British Party Candidate Selection: The Role of Government Decentralisation and Government Reform', p12.

- ⁷⁰ Ibid., p11.
- ⁷¹ Ibid., p12.
- ⁷² Ibid., p12. Although this observation should be qualified by noting that in one sole respect Conservative candidate selection was perhaps more open than that of the other parties; the Scottish Conservatives were most successful at selecting candidates with relatively little previous political experience. This is paradoxical because the Tories had been least inclined to take 'new politics' issues into account. It could also be accidental in that an unpopular party had to find able candidates from wherever it could, regardless of their political experience. L. Bennie et. al., 'Harbingers of New Politics? The Characteristics and Attitudes of Candidates in the Scottish Parliament Elections 1999', in J. Tonge et. al. (eds.), *British Elections and Parties Review Vol. 11*, (London: Cass, 2001), p31.
- ⁷³ J. Bradbury et. al., 'Innovation in British Party Candidate Selection: The Role of Government Decentralisation and Government Reform', p20-21. 97% thought constituency selection was either quite or very democratic, while 62% thought the same of list selection.
- ⁷⁴ D. Fraser, 'McLetchie Accused of Sitting MSP 'Stitch-Up'', *The Sunday Herald*, 12th August 2001.
- ⁷⁵ J. Mitchell, 'Political Parties', in The Constitution Unit, *Nations and Regions: The Dynamics of Devolution Quarterly Report*, (November 2001), p58-59.
- ⁷⁶ J. Mitchell, 'Political Parties' in The Constitution Unit, *Nations and Regions: The Dynamics of Devolution Quarterly Report*, (November 2001), p58. For Duncan Smith's views about the 'natural home' of Conservative voters see: C. MacLeod, 'Leader Backs Scottish Solution; Duncan Smith Tackles Free Care for Elderly Row', in *The Herald*, 1st Feb. 2002. .
- ⁷⁷ J. Mitchell, 'Political Parties' in The Constitution Unit, *Nations and Regions: The Dynamics of Devolution Quarterly Report*, (February 2002), p44.
- ⁷⁸ Ibid., p44. See also: N. McGarvey, 'Political Parties' in The Constitution Unit, *Nations and Regions: The Dynamics of Devolution Quarterly Report*, (August 2001).
- ⁷⁹ D. Brack, 'Liberal Democrat Policy', in D. MacIver (ed.), *The Liberal Democrats*, (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf/Prentice Hall, 1996), p97.
- ⁸⁰ Scottish Liberal Democrats, 'Party Organisation', www.scotlibdems.org.uk/sorg.html, [5/11/01].
- ⁸¹ Scottish Liberal Democrats, 'Party Organisation'.
- ⁸² Scottish Liberal Democrats, 'Conferences', www.scotlibdems.org.uk/conf/h_confs.html, [20/3/02].
- ⁸³ D. Brack, *Op. Cit.*, p97-98. R. Deacon, 'The Hidden Federal Party: The Policy Process of the Welsh Liberal Democrats', in *Regional Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 5, (1998) p475. L. Bennie, J. Brand & J. Mitchell, *Op. Cit.*, p89. B. Agasoster, *Op. Cit.*, p136-137.
- ⁸⁴ Brack argues that constituency parties are too busy fundraising and electioneering to have time for national policy debates. However, he seems to contradict himself later in his chapter when he argues that Liberal Democrat members are essentially motivated by policy. D. Brack, *Op. Cit.*, p99-102.
- ⁸⁵ J. Wallace, 'Speech to the Scottish Liberal Democrat Conference', 27th October 2001, www.scotlibdems.org.uk/press/0110272.html, [20/3/02], p5.
- ⁸⁶ Scottish Liberal Democrats, 'Policy Passed at the Pitlochry Conference 30th March-1 April 2001', www.scotlibdems.org.uk/policy/pitlochry01.html, [21/3/02], p6. Scottish Liberal Democrats, 'Policy Passed at Glenrothes Conference Autumn 2001', www.scotlibdems.org.uk/policy/glenrothes01.html, [20/3/02] p1.
- ⁸⁷ D. Brack, *Op. Cit.*, p95.
- ⁸⁸ Thereby replicating the formula noted by Brack and Deacon at Federal and Welsh level. Ibid., p97. R. Deacon, *Op. Cit.*, p475.
- ⁸⁹ S. Ingle, 'Party Organisation', in D. MacIver (ed.), *The Liberal Democrats*, (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf/Prentice Hall, 1996), p121-122. B. Agasoster, *Op. Cit.*, p134-135.
- ⁹⁰ B. Agasoster, *Op. Cit.*, p134. J. Bradbury et. al., 'Innovation in British Party Candidate Selection: The Role of Government Decentralisation and Government Reform', p12.
- ⁹¹ Although she cites no evidence to support this assertion. B. Agasoster, *Op. Cit.*, p135.
- ⁹² J. Bradbury et. al., 'Innovation in British Party Candidate Selection: The Role of Government Decentralisation and Government Reform', p12.
- ⁹³ Ibid., p20-21. 100% thought constituency selection had been democratic while 95% thought list selection had been democratic. 91% of constituency candidates and 85% of list candidates thought the leadership influence in the process had been about right.
- ⁹⁴ J. Mitchell, 'Political Parties' in The Constitution Unit, *Nations and Regions: The Dynamics of Devolution Quarterly Report*, (February 2002), p43.
- ⁹⁵ J. Curtice, 'Public Attitudes', in The Constitution Unit, *Nations and Regions: The Dynamics of Devolution Quarterly Report*, (November 2001), p33.

⁹⁶ M. Ritchie, 'Wallace in Body Blow to SNP', *The Herald*, 2nd Nov. 2001, p1. N. McGarvey, 'Political Parties' in The Constitution Unit, *Nations and Regions: The Dynamics of Devolution Quarterly Report*, (August 2001).

⁹⁷ MacIver gives the two elements of such a dual strategy the labels of 'community politics' and 'political co-operation'. D. MacIver, 'Political Strategy', in D. MacIver (ed.), *The Liberal Democrats*, (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf/Prentice Hall, 1996), p177-184.

⁹⁸ Although the 2001 General Election result suggests that such a strategy will not have inevitable benefits. For an outline of the Tory strategy at national level, see: J. Lees-Marshment & S. Quayle, 'Empowering the Members or Marketing the Party? The Conservative Reforms of 1998', in *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 72, No. 2, (April-June 2001), p204-212.

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