

Differential Euroscepticism among the Nordic Christian Parties: Protestantism or Protest?

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The four Christian parties of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden represent the full range of stances on European integration from solid principled opposition through soft contingent opposition and moderate support to enthusiastic advocacy of participation in both the EU and EMU. The fact of these contrasts between parties belonging to the same party family – even the same branch of that family – and the close comparability of the four states concerned provides an almost ideal case for investigating the bases of Euroscepticism as well as filling a gap in the literature on the Nordic Christian parties themselves. The four parties are generally assumed to belong to the Christian Democrat party family but the divergence of their approaches to European integration – itself a virtual talisman of the more established Christian Democratic political traditions on the Continent – indicates that this assumption may require qualification if not revision. The present piece examines the differences in the stances taken by the four parties on European integration, and reviews rival approaches to explaining them, in particular historical-cultural as against ‘rational choice’ approaches.

European integration is often in its origins seen to have been a distinctively Christian Democratic project. Thus, according to Marks and Wilson, ‘Christian Democratic parties have been more closely associated with the founding of the European Union than any other party family.’¹ Hanley points to their ‘longstanding attachment to European integration as a means of overcoming nationalism.’² In Irving’s words the Christian Democrats ‘have been untiring advocates of European integration’,³ while Pridham notes that the German and Italian parties shared a ‘strong ideological attachment to [the] values’ associated with European integration.⁴ The supporting historical evidence is strong. ‘It was the leaders of the three main Christian Democrat parties, Adenauer, de Gasperi and Robert Schuman, who, together with the technocrat Jean Monnet, brought the European Community into existence. And to this day it is the Christian Democrat parties of Europe who push hardest for the creation of

¹ G. Marks and C.J. Wilson, ‘The Past in the Present: A Cleavage Theory of Party Response to European Integration’, *British Journal of Political Science*, 30, 433-459 (2000), p.451

² D. Hanley, ‘Introduction: Christian Democracy as a political phenomenon’ in D. Hanley (ed): *Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective* (London, Pinter, 1994), p. 8

³ R.E.M. Irving, *The Christian Democratic Parties of Western Europe*, (London: RIIA, 1979), 234.

⁴ G. Pridham, ‘Christian Democracy in Italy and West Germany: A Comparative Analysis’ in M. Kolinsky & W.E. Paterson (eds) *Social and Political Movements in Western Europe*, (London, Croom Helm, 1976), p.151

something resembling a common European state.⁵ The Christian Democratic parties at the time of the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community were in government in all six of the original member states, providing the Prime Minister in four.⁶ They alone of the party families voted unanimously in all six legislatures for ratifying the Treaties of Paris and Rome in 1951 and 1957, any reservation they had arising from the sense that the treaties did not go far enough politically.⁷ Throughout the 1960s the Christian Democrats of the Six continued to press for greater economic integration within the Community, for strengthening the Community's institutions, and for enlarging its membership, albeit largely without success because of the opposition of President de Gaulle. Latterly, the commitment to European integration has ceased to be a distinguishing mark to the same extent as other types of party have moved to support the project but Christian Democratic attachment to the cause has remained undimmed.⁸ When the European People's Party was created in 1976 to bring together the Christian Democratic parties of the member states Leo Tindemans, its first president, announced that the 'major task of our new party will be to breathe new life into the idea of European union; to fight to ensure that European unity is eventually achieved'.⁹ The EPP has moreover remained loyal to this task to the frustration of Eurosceptics.¹⁰

There are a number of problems with the thesis that links Christian Democracy umbilically with the European integration project however. The project itself long pre-dates the emergence of Christian Democracy as a major party family after the Second World War; Pan-Europeans and Federalists with only incidental links, or none, to the fore-runners of Christian Democracy had propagandised for it through most of the inter-war period. Its progenitors and champions once it began to get underway also included figures from other, contrasting political traditions, particularly of the centre and left such as Paul-Henri Spaak. It can even be argued that the Christian Democrats' commitment to integration was less heartfelt than *faute de mieux*, the product, that is, more of the need to have something to stand for when 'Christian principles' and 'democracy' seemed insufficiently distinctive or determinative to mark a separate political brand.¹¹ Or alternatively it might be speculated that European integration is not so much a project of Christian Democracy as such, more a project of Continental political Catholicism – by no means the same

⁵ N. Malcolm, 'Conservative Realism and Christian Democracy' in K. Minogue, *Conservative Realism: New Essays on Conservatism*, (London: Harper, 1996), pp.60-1.

⁶ E. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 153.

⁷ Pridham does point out that in the late 1940s and early 1950s Gronchi's group in the DC deviated from support for integration and took a neutralist stand (ibid, p.152) but by 1957 this deviation had been abandoned.

⁸ D. Hanley, 'Introduction: Christian Democracy as a political phenomenon' in D. Hanley (ed): *Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective* (London, Pinter, 1994), p.4: allegedly distinct features of CD doctrine, such as belief in an integrated Europe, are much poorer guides to the specificity of CD politics, not least because they are nowadays so widely shared by other families, esp liberals and social democrats.

⁹ R.E.M.Irving, *The Christian Democratic Parties of Western Europe*, (London: RIIA, 1979), p.249. The new party federation's statutes committed it to achieve this aim by championing the creation of a Federal Union of Europe.

¹⁰ Refer to most recent progs – and spats with the Conservatives (Jansen)

¹¹ (Irving: xix, See also G. Pridham, 'Christian Democracy in Italy and West Germany: A Comparative Analysis' in M. Kolinsky & W.E. Paterson (eds) *Social and Political Movements in Western Europe*, (London, Croom Helm, 1976) p.147

thing.¹² The speculation is made the more plausible by fact that Protestant Christian Democracy, such as it is, has tended to be ambivalent about European integration. Among the only major Protestant populations of the original member states, those of the Netherlands and Germany, there were early on (and in part remain) significant pockets of resistance; thus, when Erhard, Schröder and von Hassel, all CDU Protestants, dominated the making of German foreign policy in the mid-1960s they were criticised as more Atlanticist than European and in the Netherlands to this day the three-party Coalition of Orthodox Protestants maintain a staunch Eurosceptic stand.¹³ More significantly however there is the case of the other distinctive strands of European Christian Democracy, including the Scandinavian.¹⁴

Scandinavian, or rather Nordic, Christian Democracy is distinctive in a number of ways.¹⁵ It has tended to be politically more marginal than its Continental counterpart; the parties have generally been of relatively recent date and small or modest in size, although this feature has been counterbalanced by the premium put by bloc politics in the Nordic countries on the role of small centrist parties that are eligible for coalition.¹⁶ All four of the Nordic Christian Democratic parties have enjoyed government office in recent years and the current Norwegian prime minister is the leader of the Christian People's Party as well as an ordained clergyman. It can be argued that the parties tend to be more 'religious' than their Continental counterparts insofar as their electorates tend to be restricted to religiously active minorities and their electoral appeal tends to be more religiously accented; in what are historically rather secular environments, where for example church-attendance has long been very low, 'the Christians' are seemingly much more self-conscious of their separate identity and stick out more from the rest of society.¹⁷ Curiously, in societies which are overwhelmingly mono-confessional Lutheran, the parties tend also to be multi-confessional (though still overwhelmingly Protestant), bringing together religiously active people from a range of denominations as well as from the revivalist traditions within the national churches. The Nordic Christian Democratic parties are also however distinctive in displaying a wide variety of stands on the issue of European integration when it has arisen as an issue of domestic politics— in Denmark

¹² Pridham (1976: 147) points out that Christian Democracy 'aimed beyond the scope of traditional "political Catholicism"' and in Germany constituted only one of four main partisan currents, albeit the strongest one.

¹³ G. Pridham, *Christian Democracy in Western Germany*, (London, Croom Helm, 1977), p.150

¹⁴ See below p. X The British strand identified by Fogarty is not looked at further here – unlike the other two it does not take the form of a separate party but of a presence within all three established parties. M. Fogarty, *Christian Democracy in Western Europe 1820-1953*, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957). On the British Christian Democrats who did aspire to form a separate party see J. Keating, 'The British Experience: Christian Democracy without a Party' in D. Hanley (ed) (1994)

¹⁵ J.T.S.Madeley, 'Scandinavian Christian Democracy: Throwback or Portent?', *European Journal of Political Research*, 5, (1977). L. Karvonen, "Christian Parties in Scandinavia: Victory over the Windmills?", in D. Hanley (ed.), *Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective*, (London, Pinter, 1994)

¹⁶ See J.T.S.Madeley, 'Reading the Runes: the religious factor in Scandinavian electoral politics', in D. Broughton and H-M. ten Napel (eds), *Religion and Mass Electoral Behaviour in Europe* (London, Routledge ECPR, 2000)

¹⁷ 'One major difference between the continental and the Nordic Christian parties is that economic issues tend to be predominant compared to particular religious issues in the former parties, while religious issues take precedence over economic issues in the latter parties.' B. Aardal, 'The Religious Factor in Political Life in the Nordic Countries' (Unpublished paper given at 15th Nordic Conference in Sociology of Religion, Oslo, August 2000), p.7

and Norway from the early 1960s on and in Sweden and Finland since approximately 1990.

Three broad questions therefore arise regarding the Nordic Christian parties' positions European integration. First, is there a distinctly Nordic or Protestant pattern of Christian party-based Euro-scepticism? Second, do differences in the type of Protestantism that forms the basis for the four Nordic parties explain the variations in their approaches to European integration? And third, why have some of the Nordic Christian parties changed their stance on their country's participation in European integration? The paper addresses these questions by first analysing the parties' policy preferences on Europe, then reviewing explanations which rely at least in part on religious factors, and finally examining the tactical incentives which the different parties face and which might explain why they to adopt pro- or anti-European stances and sometimes change them.

1. The Nordic Christian Parties – Four Different Points of Departure

In addition to their own differences over the issue of European integration the Christian parties of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden differ in many other ways from their continental namesakes to the extent that the question is raised whether they should be conceived of as belonging to constituting a single party family.¹⁸ Although they share common points of reference not least in their Christian nomenclature, it can be argued that at least four historically significant types of Christian Democracy can be identified – the Continental, the Anglo-Saxon, the Scandinavian (or Nordic) and the Eastern Post-communist.¹⁹ Each of these branches of the Christian Democratic party family differ with respect to their genesis, the religious traditions they articulate, the cleavage structures that they translate into politics, their position in the party systems, their electoral appeal and their approaches to the holding of government office. Here we restrict ourselves to the salient contrasts between the Continental and the Scandinavian, or Nordic, patterns.

Table 1. The Nordic Christian Democratic Parties (in chronological order of their foundation)

Norway:	<i>Kristelig Folkeparti</i> (Christian People's Party, founded 1933)
Finland:	<i>Suomen Kristillinen Liitto/ Finnlands Kristen Liga</i> (Finland's Christian League, fd. 1958) : (from 2001) <i>Kristillisdemokraatit/ Kristdemokraterna</i> (Christian Democrats)

¹⁸ K. von Beyme, *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, (Aldershot, Gower, 1985); D. Hanley (ed.), *Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective*, (London, Pinter, 1994).

¹⁹ On the contrast between the Continental and Anglo-Saxon patterns see Fogarty, *Christian Democracy in Western Europe*. The idea that Scandinavian Christian Democracy should be seen as a third type see J. Madeley, 'Scandinavian Christian Democracy: throwback or portent?', *European Journal of Political Research* 5, 3: 267-286. For the Eastern post-communist type see N. Sitter, 'Cleavages, Party Strategy and Party System Change in Europe East and West', *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 3:3 (2002), 425-451.

<p>Sweden: <i>Kristen Demokratisk Samling</i> (Christian Democratic Rally, fd. 1964); (from 1991:) <i>Kristdemokratiska Samhällspartiet</i> (Christian Democratic Social Party); (from 1996) <i>Kristdemokraterna</i> (Christian Democrats)</p> <p>Denmark: <i>Kristeligt Folkeparti</i> (Christian People's Party, founded 1970)</p>

First, whereas the fore-runners of the Continental West European Christian Democrats represented church-based opposition to a pre-socialist liberal left in the nineteenth century, the Scandinavian Christian parties articulated a cultural-territorial protest against secularising tendencies of the left, centre and right of the political spectrum, which was based less on the church than on revivalist dissent within and outside of the state churches. In the Norwegian case the party's political roots actually lie in the nineteenth century pre-socialist liberal Left party, which depended in part on its representation of religious, linguistic and moral traditions particularly in the south and west of the country. In the Swedish, Danish and Finnish cases, the parties' origins also lie in protest against the main left, centre and right parties' purported lack of Christian values, although they do not resonate the sort of long-standing centre-periphery tensions, which have additionally characterised Norwegian politics. Second, the religious and cultural settings within which the parties developed and which have marked them since birth were quite distinct. Most importantly all of the Continental parties developed in societies where Catholicism was a major presence in society (even where, as in Germany and the Netherlands, they only constituted a minority) and in each case the Catholic element has been to the fore. In the Nordic countries by contrast Catholicism was eradicated at the time of the Reformation and to this day has only a marginal presence; the Nordic parties are accordingly the products of societies and cultures, which have historically been mono-chrome Lutheran Protestant. Within this context significant sets of religious and cultural-religious cleavages have developed which have diversified the picture both internally to each country and between the countries. Third, whereas their counterparts on the Continent came to represent the main opposition to social democracy along the right-left dimension, the Scandinavian parties have developed or emerged as competitors which focus on a cross-cutting dimension.²⁰ Rather than shape the main socio-economic dimension of politics, their policies and electoral appeal draws on territorial and/or cultural politics, permitting these parties to occupy a centre-right position to the left of the main conservative party. Whereas the continental Christian democrat parties of the centre or right contribute to define the left-right dimension, the Nordic parties cross-cut this dimension. Fourth, consequently and again in contrast to their Continental counterparts, these parties can hardly be described as catch-all parties. Although each of them has a wide class profile, and the Norwegian party has at times come close to challenging the Conservatives' position as the leading centre-right party, the Nordic parties are still seen by many commentators as special interest 'moral protest' parties.²¹ Fifth, their coalition politics have been more open than the leading continental Christian Democrats.²² The Norwegian party has participated in (and three times led) both centre-right and centre coalitions and the Danish party in centre-left

²⁰ J. Sundberg, "The Enduring Scandinavian Party System", *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 22:3 (1999), 221-241.

²¹ They are all included within the purview of F. Mueller-Rommel and G. Pridham, *Small Parties in Western Europe: Comparative and National Perspectives* (London: Sage, 1991)

²² The Netherlands constitute an exception, due to the long-standing consociational system. See A. Lijphart, "From the Politics of Accommodation to Adversarial Politics in the Netherlands: A Reassessment", *West European Politics*, 12:1 (1989), 139-153.

coalitions as well, while the Swedish and Finnish parties have participated only in centre-right coalitions.

Nevertheless, as has already been mentioned, despite the common features which comparison with their Continental counterparts highlights, the Nordic Christian parties differ from each other considerably on the European question, to the extent that, until recently at least, there has been little common ground. Table 2 displays the results of an expert survey on party positions on the issue of European integration as they apply to the Nordic Christian parties. It shows that in 1996 these parties spanned positions from nearly complete opposition (the Finnish party) to nearly complete support (the Swedish party) at least at leadership level. It also indicates that in 1996 the importance of the issue for the parties was higher in Finland and Sweden, where the relatively 'extreme' positions were adopted, than was the case in Denmark and Norway. In all of the countries it had become more important between 1984 and 1996, in Finland rising from being an issue of very little importance to being 'an important issue for the party', while in Denmark (which was an EU member throughout the period) the rise was modest. Also worth noting is the fact that in all four parties there had been an increase in the amount of internal party dissent surrounding the issue; modest in Finland but involving a doubling in Sweden from a level suggesting only very modest dissent (and that on an issue which in 1984 was only a minor issue to the party) to a level suggesting more serious internal problems on what had after all become an important issue for the party.²³ The variety of the parties' stands on European integration cannot then be explained by the issue being of low salience and little importance and therefore being somehow randomly derived.²⁴

Taking Taggart & Szczerbiak's distinction between 'soft' (contingent or qualified opposition to European integration) and 'hard' (outright rejection of integration) Euroscepticism as a starting point, the four parties can be seen to reflect the full range from hard Euroscepticism, through soft opposition and soft support to hard support.²⁵ Whereas the Continental Christian Democrats provided the main original driving force behind European integration in the six founding member states, the Nordic parties have developed their positions on European integration in reaction to policy initiative first taken up by the main centre-right or centre-left parties.²⁶ Until recently, the Finnish Christian League (SKL) was easily the most hard-line Eurosceptic of the four parties. Arguably this place has now been taken by the somewhat softer Eurosceptic Norwegian Christian People's Party (KrF(N)), the only one of the four that operates in a non-EU member state, as the SKL has recently changed both name and stance on European integration. Re-named the Christian Democrats (KD(F)), the

²³ The mean score for internal dissent in parties of all 18 nations involved in the survey was 1.88. See Ray, *op cit*, p.293.

²⁴ Schou does imply that this might have been the case in the 1960s in Norway on the other hand. She argues that the EEC issue was peripheral to KrF(N)'s core concerns with religion and morality and after the first phase the latter were rarely referred to in Storting debates. Furthermore when they were brought in both pro- and anti-membership speakers deployed them. See T.L.Schou, *Norge og EF*, (Copenhagen: Inst for Samfundsfag, 1980), ch. 6

²⁵ P. Taggart & A. Szczerbiak, "Parties, Positions and Europe: Euroscepticism in the EU the Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe", *Sussex European Institute Working Paper no.46, Opposing European Research Network Working Paper no. 2* (2001).

²⁶ See L. N. Lindberg & S. A. Scheingold, *Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community*, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970), Chapter 1; E. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1958), chapter 4.

party proceeded to adopt a stance that no longer rejects Finland's EU membership. Denmark's Christian Peoples Party (KrF(D)) has long taken a more mixed approach, which includes a negative stance on Economic and Monetary Union, while the Swedish Christian Democrats (KD(S)) favour not only EU membership but also participation in EMU.

Why, when Christian Democrats on the Continent have been such strong supporters of European integration, should the Nordic Christian Democrats take such varied stances? And why should the responses in Finland and Norway be so negative? It cannot be that the parties merely follow the general trend in each country since in Finland there was a relatively strong majority in favour of EU membership in 1994 while the party swung strongly against. Speculative questions arise. Is it perhaps a matter of the religious mix of the parties – some drawing from more fringe, even 'fundamentalist', Protestant groups than others? Is it perhaps that the Nordic countries despite a superficial reputation for being individually and collectively homogeneous in matters of religion are actually very different, at least in terms of the character of the minority of their populations that are religiously active? Put another way, are there significant differences in the cleavage systems of the Nordic countries which underlie their superficially rather similar party systems and which are reflected in the varied stances of the Christian parties? Or are there perhaps factors which have to do with the age and development of the parties; is it, for example, a coincidence that the two most Eurosceptic parties are the two oldest?

Seen in a wider perspective these questions connect with issues of significance for the whole of Europe and provide in addition a test of alternative approaches to explanation in political science. Since the parties either are, or have at some time been, more Eurosceptic than the great majority of their principal European counterparts, is this a reflection of the fact that they are overwhelmingly Protestant in their leadership, membership and support? If so, what characteristics of Protestant religious traditions and/or cultures predispose to Euroscepticism? Or is the dispersion of party positions perhaps nothing to do with religion at all but a reflection of and a tactical or strategic response to political circumstances relative to the different national electorates and/or to the possibilities of achieving office? In attempting to address these questions this paper attempts to test the plausibility and cogency of rival types of explanation, in particular explanations which rest on alternatively cultural-historical and 'rational choice' factors. Insofar as arguments about Protestantism in its local varieties and its impact on the parties seems to hold the former are supported; insofar as the various stands seem to relate to strategic considerations arising from electoral competition or bargaining for office the latter would seem to hold. This is not a distinction merely between distal (long-term historical and/or cultural) and proximate (present in the pay-off matrices of particular tactical situations) although it may be in part.²⁷ Nonetheless counterposing these two types of factors might be

²⁷ Put differently, both sets of factors actually relate to contingent circumstances; it is not the case that the former relate to perennial features such as might, by analogy, be seen as almost genetic and inherited, while the latter relate to history- and culture-blind calculations of advantage as of the moment. Parties' genetic or inherited features are themselves virtually chosen (by 'founding fathers', manifesto writers and periodic conference decisions, for example) and unsuccessful choices are attended by negative consequences, which constitute lessons to be learnt or ignored. Equally, rational-choice calculations of advantage will usually take account of reputation and the need for at least minimal consistency as well as of 'inherited' programmatic commitments.

expected to illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of the rival approaches, based as they are on the privileging of one or the other type of evidence.

Four related parties – four different answers to the European question

The Norwegian party, the oldest of the four, brought with it into the debate on European integration in the second half of the twentieth century a set of values rooted in the religious and political traditions of Norwegian Lutheran revivalism. It was established as a regional party in Hordaland in 1933 by dissidents from the Liberals (the old left) and developed into a national party after WWII. Its origins lay in a combination of opposition to the administrative centre in Oslo and its representatives in the rural areas, in particular the ministers of the established church and an attempt to impose revivalist values on the church and thereby on Norwegian society as a whole. It combined a focus on temperance and traditional values with a *Gesellschaft* approach to national democracy, which treated society as though it were bound in substance by its constitutional commitment to upholding Lutheranism. It is telling that the term invoked by Eurosceptics tends to be *folkestyre* (roughly: people-rule or self-rule), with connotations both of national rule and of participatory democracy, rather than the imported word *suverenitet* (sovereignty). In the 1960s during the debate on European integration that took place prior to De Gaulle's two vetoes on UK membership (and thereby enlargement), the party developed a Eurosceptic position, which resonated deep-lying cleavages identified by Rokkan as characteristic of many of the conflicts of the previous century.²⁸ From the early 1960s on the party was itself divided along some of these cleavage lines remained so during the two referendums of 1972 and 1994.²⁹ In the early 1970s KrF leader Lars Korvald stuck to a wait-and-see formula until the party conference adopted a 'No' stance in April 1972, although it now appears he had declared himself privately for the 'Nos' the year before.³⁰ According to one author '[t]he EC conflict of the last half of the twentieth century, like the struggle for parliamentary government in the nineteenth, pits the territorial and cultural periphery against the urban elite of the centre', and although the KrF grew out of the former, this division was also reflected within the party.³¹ While the leadership was evenly divided in 1972 its members and voters opposed EU membership by a four-to-one margin and some of its MPs were defying the party line in votes on Europe.³² The issue has remained the single most significant barrier to co-operation among the non-socialist parties since, and the current coalition with the Conservatives and Liberals contains a 'suicide clause' that will come into effect if the question of EU membership is put on the agenda. The party's current programme reiterates opposition to EU membership, although the party has supported the EEA

²⁸ S. Rokkan, "Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism", in R. A. Dahl (ed.), *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966).

²⁹ See Schou, *Norge og EF*, T. Bjørklund, *Mot Strømmen: Kampen mot EF 1961-1972* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1982).

³⁰ E. Rimehaug, *Midtbanespilleren: Kjell Magne Bondevik og Kristelig Folkeparti*, (Oslo, Luther Forlag, 1997).

³¹ B. F. Nelsen, "The European Community Debate in Norway: the Periphery Revolts Again", in B. F. Nelsen (ed.) *Norway and the European Community: The Political Economy of Integration*, London: Praeger, 1993, p.45.

³² O. J. Sæther, "Kristelig Folkeparti og den nye Europa-debatten", in B. B. Knudsen (ed.), *Den Nye Europa-debatten*, (Oslo, Cappelen, 1989).

(European Economic Area) and been somewhat reluctant to provoke crises over Norway's untested veto on the application of new EU legislation to the country.³³

Finland's Christian Democratic League was once notorious (or famous) for its extreme Euroscepticism. Founded in 1958, the Finnish Christian League (SKL) drew on what Arter has called the 'moral rearmament lobby' concerned with secularisation and was reinvigorated by the anti-secular backlash that followed the communists' post-war growth and was reinforced by the advent of the centre-left government in 1966.³⁴ This was combined with an anti-alcohol stance dating back to inter-war prohibition, reminiscent of the Norwegian party, from which it drew considerable inspiration. Karvonen describes its first programme as 'more or less a verbatim translation of the corresponding Norwegian document'.³⁵ The party won its first seat in parliament in 1970. As the issue of EU membership first arose in 1990, the party adopted a Eurosceptic stance. Its leader even attempted to filibuster the parliamentary decision to accede to the Treaty in 1994 (CHECK --- this was when the party was in government?!), and it was one of only two parties which unanimously opposed membership. It left the coalition over opposition to EU membership in 1994. Since Finland accession it has vigorously opposed further instalments of integration, while conceding that EU membership itself has to be accepted. Renamed the Christian Democrats in December 2001, the party move to a pro-EU stance. Its criticism of EMU is limited to suggesting that the convergence criteria should include unemployment.³⁶ It has gone through the greatest metamorphosis of the four, from hard Eurosceptic at the time of the 1994 referendum to favouring continued EU membership in 2002.

The Danish party, which entered parliament in the 1973 'earthquake' election that set off the debate on increasing electoral volatility and the purported decline of established parties, has taken a more ambiguous stance toward European integration. Sauerberg has described it as a party that has 'vacillated between pro-European and conditional-European attitudes', although it favours membership.³⁷ The party leadership has gradually been reconciled to the country's membership, with the party memberships divided over new increments of integration represented by, for example, the Single European Act and the Treaty on European Union. On the TEU a split opened up between the party's parliamentary group and the national organisation, with the latter opposing the treaty alongside almost half of the party's voters in the 1992 referendum. Following party leader Sjurksen's lead, the party congress voted 196-111 to recommend a 'No' in the 2000 referendum on EMU, invoking defence of sovereignty.³⁸

By contrast, the Swedish Christian Democrat party (KD(S)), which finally gained representation in the Riksdag in 1986 after more than twenty years' effort, takes the most pro-EU stance of the four parties inasmuch as it endorses full EU

³³ KrF draft programme, *Programmforslag til Program for Kristelig Folkeparti 2001-2005*, produced August 2000.

³⁴ D. Arter, *Politics and Policy-Making in Finland*, (Sussex, Wheatsheaf books, 1987).

³⁵ L. Karvonen, "Christian Parties in Scandinavia: Victory over the Windmills?", in D. Hanley (ed.), *Christian Democracy in Europe*, (1994), p.124.

³⁶ *Kristdemokraternas Europa-program*, undated.

³⁷ S. Sauerberg, 'Parties, Voters and the EC', in L. Lyck (ed.), *Denmark and EC Membership Evaluated*, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992), p.46.

³⁸ KRF press release, 20 May 2000.

participation including the adoption of EMU.³⁹ Yet, as already noted, its formal position masks a degree of internal dissent, as the party remains somewhat divided over what has been called a new ‘cleavage’ generated by accession to the EU.⁴⁰ Its formal position in favour of EU membership was adopted in 1990, following a three-year debate but in the 1995 European Parliament elections L. Sacrédius gained his seat by moving up the list on personal votes after a personal campaign on an anti-EU platform.⁴¹ In fact the internal party press became increasingly dominated by the European question after 1987, with the clear intention of building up membership opinion in support of the leadership’s stance.⁴² However internal dissent remains; while during the EU referendum campaign the Christian Democratic Rally, as it was then called, was an enthusiastic supporter of membership at least at leadership level, its membership proved almost equally divided and remains so.

Table 3 – parties and summary of party platforms

Parties and last election results	1961 – 1972	1972 – 1989	1989 – 1995	Since 1995
Norway – KrF(N) 2001:12.4%	Uncertainty, leading to hard Eurosceptic	Divided, mainly hard Eurosceptic	Anti-EU, pro-EEA	Softer Euroscepticism, pro-EEA
Finland – SKL/KD(F)	Euroscepticism not salient?	Euroscepticism not salient?	Hard Eurosceptic	Turning pro-EU, Anti-Fed.
Denmark – KrF(D)	Na	Pro-EU	Pro-EU	Pro EU, Anti-Fed., anti-EMU
Sweden KD(S)	Na	Eurosceptic	Turning pro-EU	Pro EU, pro-EMU, Fed?

Euroscepticism and the Politics of Religion in Scandinavia – party identity and party strategy

The shorthand term ‘European question’ denotes a range of issues including both economic questions and less tangible positions on national identity, sovereignty and democracy. It is far more disparate than the divisions that are usually classified as cleavages.⁴³ Opposition to membership of the EU in the Nordic countries is often cast in terms of a combination of interests and values, where interest-driven opposition implies analysis of the economic costs and benefits, and value-based opposition is based on identity, concepts of democracy, self-rule and sovereignty and foreign policy.⁴⁴ In the Swedish case Miles identifies four key issues, its corporatist model

³⁹ KDS (draft) *Priciprogram 2001*, proposed January 2001.

⁴⁰ O. Ruin, “The Europeanisation of Swedish Politics”, in L. Miles (ed.), *Sweden and the European Union Evaluated*, (London, Continuum, 2000), p.64.

⁴¹ A. Widfeldt, “The Swedish Party System and European Integration”, in L. Miles (ed.), *Sweden and the European Union Evaluated*, (London, Continuum, 2000).

⁴² G. Gidlund, *Partiernas Europa*, (Stockholm, Natur och Kultur, 1992), p.161.

⁴³ D. W. Rae & M. Taylor, *The Analysis of Political Cleavages*, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1970); S. Bartolini & P. Mair, *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilization of European Electorates 1885-1985*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990).

⁴⁴ J. Saglie, *Standpunkter og Strategi: EU-saken i norsk partipolitikk 1989-1994*, (Oslo, Pax, 2002); M. Weber, *Schweden und die Europäische Union: Europadebatte und Legitimität*, (Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2001)..

and welfare state, economic interdependence, neutrality and integrative consensual democracy.⁴⁵ Euroscepticism is therefore perhaps better analysed as a broader term that “expresses the idea of contingent or qualified, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration.”⁴⁶ Hence the hard/soft dichotomy, which distinguishes principled rejection of supranational integration from contingent or qualified opposition. By this logic, soft Eurosceptic parties should be more open to change.

Starting from a definition of a political party as an organisation that seeks to propel candidates to elected office in pursuit of policy goals, four broad instrumental goals can be deduced: organisational survival, pursuit of policy, securing votes, and access to executive office.⁴⁷ The first two concern the party’s genesis and long term identity, a combination of its origin and its ideology and core policies. However, medium-term electoral strategy, particularly the choice between appeals to the party’s core constituency and efforts to expand beyond it, also shape parties’ incentives to focus on or play down the European question. This depends not only on the party’s core electorate’s preferences on the EU question, but also on other parties’ strategies and the views of any ‘floating voters’. Moreover, in the short-term, Euroscepticism may be played down during a party’s spells in government. Whether a party adopts hard or soft Euroscepticism therefore might be expected to depend partly on the party’s identity and core values, and partly on the extent to which other goals related to the quest for votes or participation in governing coalitions generate incentives for some moderation of Eurosceptic positions.

The question of genesis and party identity are inextricably linked. All four parties were established to some extent in protest against the mainstream parties, and represent minority strands in Nordic Protestantism. Yet they draw on somewhat different strands on Protestantism. As far as Euroscepticism is concerned, the central question is whether the parties perceive the nation-state as the actual (or potential) key defender of their interests and values, and European integration as a potential threat to this. Value-based Euroscepticism therefore depends partly on the party’s interpretation of the nature of the European integration project, and partly on the nature of the Christian parties’ fundamental values and attitudes towards international co-operation and national democracy. The policies and preferences that shape the Christian parties’ positions on European integration are somewhat easier to identify, inasmuch as Euroscepticism draws support from sections of society that face increased uncertainty under EU membership. Opposition to participation in European integration has been strong in the public and primary sectors, particularly among voters and parties concerned that globalisation and European integration might undermine the welfare state and/or subsidised sectors. In the Swedish and Finnish cases, Cold War neutrality effectively kept European integration off the agenda until 1989. Swedish Social Democrat Prime Minister Tage Erlander’s statement in 1961

⁴⁵ L.Miles, *Sweden and European Integration*, (Aldershot, Ashgate, 1997).

⁴⁶ P. Taggart, “A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary West European Party Systems”, *European Journal of Political Research*, 33 (1998), 363-388, p.366.

⁴⁷ See e.g. P. Pennings, “The Triad of Party System Change: Votes, Office and Policy”, in P. Pennings & J. E. Lane (eds.), *Comparing Party System Change*, (London, Routledge, 1998); G. Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis* (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1976); A. Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organisation and Power*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988).

that Swedish neutrality was incompatible with EU membership effectively settled the debate for three decades, although the Conservatives and Liberals maintained pro-integration stances and the debate was revived briefly in 1967 before De Gaulle's second veto. In Finland, the Cold War precluded any possibility of EU membership as clearly, of not more so. And in Norway the pro-NATO KrF has warned that developments in EU foreign, security and defence policy might undermine the Atlantic alliance.⁴⁸ However, for the Nordic Christian parties another key question is the relationship between their core concerns, such as restrictive approaches to abortion and alcohol laws, and European integration.

Figure 1. Party identity and perspectives on EU membership

Core policies	Values and identity	
	Heterogeneous base	Closed constituencies
EU membership not problematic	Potentially pro-EU	Idea-based Euroscepticism
EU impact potentially negative	Policy-driven Euroscepticism	Eurosceptic

However, as the Nordic Christian parties' programmatic positions on European integration indicate, party-based Euroscepticism has hardly remained stable (see tables 2 and 3). This is explained only partly by policy developments and changes in affiliation to the EU, such as acceptance of the status quo after membership, and has been driven more by parties' strategies for electoral competition and their efforts to join or break coalition governments. Parties' policy position on European integration can be linked to their positions in the party system, where the Christian parties have mainly operated on a dimension that crosscuts left vs. right competition between the conservative and social democratic parties.⁴⁹ In terms of electoral strategy, this means that the Christian parties face a choice between focussing on mobilising their core constituency and attempting to attract a broader catch of votes. To the extent that an expansionist strategy proves successful, it might of course affect the party's core identity. Coalition politics makes up the other side of more tactical shorter term incentives for or against Euroscepticism. In the four Nordic cases coalition politics has usually entailed co-operation with pro-European conservative, and in the Danish case Social Democrat, parties. This represents a considerable constraint on the scope for high-profile opposition to European integration, particularly if the country in question is a member state. The only two Eurosceptic coalitions have consisted of the Norwegian party and its two allies, the Liberals and Centre Party, which shares its roots in the nineteenth century old Left. Both were partially products of the referendums against EU membership in 1972 and 1994.

⁴⁸ K. M. Bondevik, *Det tredje alternativet: Kristendemokratisk politikk 'på norsk'*, (Oslo, Folkets Framtid, 1994); KrF "Politisk håndbok 2001" available at www.kfr.no.

⁴⁹ N. Sitter, "The Politics of Opposition and European Integration in Scandinavia: Is EuroScepticism a Government-Opposition Dynamic?", *West European Politics*, 24:4 (2001), 22-39.

Figure 2: Direction of parties' strategic incentives regarding Euroscepticism

Coalition government	Vote-seeking	
	Pro-EU electoral basis	Anti-EU electoral basis
Coalition politics/aspirations exerts moderating effect	Pro-EU or neutral	Play down EU question
Coalition politics/aspirations exerts little or no moderating effect	Pro-EU or neutral	Eurosceptic

The next two sections analyse the long and shorter term party identities and goals, and their evolution and change. The section on party identity below explores the roots of the four parties and the core policy preferences that these parties adopted. The Norwegian party was the only one that was long established when the question of EU enlargement first appeared on the agenda, however fleetingly, with the British application of 1961. The party therefore had to elaborate a stance on European integration that was shaped by its existing policy commitments, and sought to avoid openly taking a stance until the referendum was imminent one decade later. By contrast, the EU was at least in operation when the other three parties were formed, even if the membership question only slowly became salient in Sweden and Finland. The type of Protestantism that provided the bases for these parties and the policies that this entailed, and the implications for the parties' elaboration of their stances on European integration, are addressed below. The subsequent section turns to the incentives that the parties face in terms of electoral competition and their quest for office.

2. Predisposing Factors: Party Origins and Identity

Despite the broad religious similarities between the Nordic countries, which constitute a historically mono-confessional Lutheran bloc in the North of Europe, the Christian parties of the four main countries actually serve different religious constituencies.⁵⁰ They tend not unnaturally to include the religiously active member of the national populations but their structure and distribution differ by virtue of contrasting histories of religious revivalism in the context of divergent national church responses. In broad terms the parties' constituencies can be distinguished in term of relative openness and in this connection it might be hypothesised that those with relatively closed constituencies would be more Eurosceptic than those with relatively open religious constituencies. A continuous measure of religious openness would be the degree to which parties include members, candidates and officials of dissident religious traditions and the variety of such traditions so represented. A simpler dichotomous test of openness which might be equally useful would appear to be the prominence, presence or absence of representatives of Pentecostalism, the most recent and in some

⁵⁰ A Christian party has never established itself in Iceland, although an unsuccessful attempt was made at the 1995 election.

respects the most ‘radical’ of the Protestant revivalist movements which have marked the contemporary religious landscape of the Nordic countries.⁵¹

The two parties with Lutheran pietist origins, the Norwegian and Finnish parties, turn out to be the most Eurosceptic. They represent traditions of religious protest against what they see as the temporising and trimming leadership of the established churches which have typically failed to uphold the integrity of the faith. Membership of the Finnish party in its early days was overwhelmingly drawn from the state church, with some free-church support, while according to one author ‘The Pentecostal movement has on the other hand been rather passive when it comes to the question of Christian influence in political life.’ (Eino Pinomaa: 369) A study of the religious affiliations of the party’s membership conducted in 1987 indicated the centrality of a ‘new pietism’ movement within the Lutheran state church.⁵² In the Norwegian case the party’s origins as a political project launched by prominent representatives of ‘radical’ lay mission organisations (both ‘inner’ and foreign) in Vestlandet in the early 1930s is well-attested.⁵³ Representatives of other groups and traditions did join up in 1945, when the party launched itself nationally for the first time. Among these were a number of prominent representatives from the Oxford Groups, or MRA, and others. According to one writer, ‘[a] completely new generation and a completely new type of Christianity began to make an impact – a new generation with a more ‘cross-church’ (*felleskirelig*) character’.⁵⁴ The impact helped to make the party more representative of the nation as a whole; it brought in urban middle-class Christians with a wider, more tolerant approach to high culture as well as supporters from free-church, dissenting traditions. Among the latter were some Pentecostals, one of whom, Martin Ski became an important party official. It is perhaps more than a coincidence that in 19XX he resigned from KrF and joined the Conservatives largely because of the former’s negative, and the latter’s positive, stand on the question of EEC membership.

The party that was from the first most clearly associated with free-church dissenters was Sweden’s, Christian Democratic Rally, as it was called until the 1990s.⁵⁵ KD(S) began life in 1964 as a largely Pentecostal enterprise under the wing of the Pentecostal leader Lewi Pethrus with his newspaper, *Dagen*, as an important source of support, even though its first leader Birger Ekstedt was actually an ordained minister in the state church.⁵⁶ Pethrus and the paper had been involved in a number of campaigns protesting what was seen as the rapid and progressive ‘de-christianisation’

⁵¹ Pentecostalism came to Europe from America via Norway in the first decade of the twentieth century. See B. Wilson, *Sects and Society* (London, Heinemann, 1961), pp. 31-2. It is characterised in particular by ‘speaking in tongues’ and faith healing

⁵² D. Arter, ‘Die bürgerlichen und konservativen Parteien Finnlands: Zentrumspartei, Nationale Sammlungspartei, Schwedische Volkspartei und Finnischer Christliche Bund’, in H.-J. Veen (ed.), *Christlich-demokratische und konservative Parteien in Westeuropa 4* (1994), pp. 253-4

⁵³ A.R.Lomeland, *Kristelig Folkeparti blir til* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1971)

⁵⁴ O.S.Hove, *Kristen-demokratiske partier in Europa* Special Issue of *Idé: Tidsskrift for Kristen Demokratisk Samfunnsdebatt* 6: 4 (1972), pp. 339-40:

⁵⁵ The connection with free church dissent and pro-Europeanism might also in part explain the stand of the Swedish Liberal party, the party which until the 1990s at least had attracted disproportionate support from Sweden’s longer-established free-church traditions. See A. Mellbourn, ‘Varför tappade Folkpartiet frikyrkoväljare?’, *Frisinnad Tidsskrift* Special Issue: ‘Vart tog väljarna vägen?’ (1994), p.13.

⁵⁶ G.V.Johansson, *Kristen Demokrati på Svenska: Studier om KDS tillkomst och utveckling 1964-1982*, (Malmö: Gleerup, 1985)

of Swedish society; one such involved a petition against reducing or diluting religious education in the secondary schools which managed to attract as many as 2.1 million signatures. The party's leader since 1973, Alf Svensson, is also Pentecostal by background and he has been responsible for 'transforming the party from a narrow evangelical band to an all-inclusive party based on non-dogmatic caring-Christian values'.⁵⁷ In the nineties the party has made a point of including Muslim and Jewish candidates on its electoral lists and openly appeals for anyone regardless of their religious affiliation to vote for it if they agree with the party's principles, values and/or policy goals. The process of opening the party up has, as has been noted above, been associated with a shift from mild Euroscepticism to a strong endorsement of European integration, despite internal tensions over the issue.

In Denmark the original religious constituency of the KrF were, as in Norway, within the national Lutheran church, particularly among the adherents of the pietist Inner Mission.⁵⁸ Unlike in Norway and Finland however non-pietist Grundtvigian Christians were also involved and the first elected party leader, Jens Møller, was in fact a Catholic.⁵⁹ The relative openness of the Danish party from its earliest days accords with the party's moderately Eurosceptic line, which tends to track the national profile on this issue. Thus the party has gone along with continuing membership of the EEC/EU in June 1992 after protests against the party leadership's positive line but only 36% of KrF voters voted for Maastricht.⁶⁰

Despite differences in the points of origin of the parties relative both to religious structures and in time, there are a number of similarities in the circumstances which gave them birth. They all began as protest parties, protesting in particular against a perceived moral decline attendant on the established parties' overwhelming focus on class divisions driven by materialistic concerns. Disillusioned by the established parties' record, they each represented a protest against 'party' as such and looked for a rallying to the defence and promotion of Christian values in the expectation that this would transcend the conflicts of material interest and facilitate – even become the vehicle of – national moral regeneration.

In Norway, the events which precipitated the foundation of the Christian People's Party in 1933 included the repeal of prohibition, the production of a 'blasphemous' play at the National Theatre and a polemical assault on 'Christianity: the Tenth National Plague' by a prominent socialist intellectual; all these coincided to stiffen the resolve of leading revivalist circles in and around Bergen to desert the Liberals, and launch their own Christian People's Party.⁶¹ Their instant local success, which resulted in the election of a well-known leader of one of the more 'radical' revivalist Inner Mission organisations, was repeated at the following Storting election and before long plans were laid for a national launch. This was delayed by five years of war and occupation, but when it finally occurred in 1945, the unusual

⁵⁷ D.Arter: Swedish election report *Electoral Studies* (1999: 299)

⁵⁸ Eysell, M. 'Die Konservative Volkspartei, die Christliche Volkspartei und die Zentrum-Demokraten Dänemarks: Drei Wettbewerber in bürgerlichen Lager', in: H.-J. Veen (ed.) (1994) *Christlich-demokratische und konservative Parteien in Westeuropa 4: Schweden, Norwegen, Finnland, Dänemark*, (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1994)

⁵⁹ P.C.Andersen, *Kristen Politik: Kristeligt Folkeparti 13.April 21970-21 September 1971* (Odense: Universitetsforlag, 1975), p.90.

⁶⁰ M.Eysell, 'Die Konservative Volkspartei ...' (1994), p.460

⁶¹ A. Lomeland, *Kristelig Folkeparti blir til*, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1979).

circumstances of national liberation and a widespread revulsion against the totalitarian horrors of right and left extremes gave the party a fair wind.⁶² For at least a further decade the party refused to accept that it was into the business of party politics like all the others – or that it should be designated as belonging either to the left or right.

In Finland, where after the war the newly legalised Communist party took almost 25 per cent of the vote, the fear of domination by atheist political forces on the Left was to the fore when SKL was founded in 1958. Christian workers and smallholders saw little hope for the Centre and Conservative parties mounting an effective opposition against the perceived threat and banded together with others on the basis of membership in and kinship with the ‘new pietist’ movements.⁶³ As in Norway to which they looked for inspiration they combined their fear of the Left and their distrust of the Centre and Right with a characteristic evangelical distaste for lax controls on alcohol and salacious publications.⁶⁴

Eight years later in Sweden there were also concerns about promiscuity, particularly among young people, the length of time devoted to religious education in public secondary schools, the call for stricter film censorship and even a controversy about whether it was proper for the National Board of Social Affairs to advise against children attending certain Pentecostal meetings.⁶⁵ It was the extraordinary success of a petition campaign, attracting the signatures of over a quarter of the total population, in support of maintaining the number of hours devoted to religious education that provided the greatest encouragement to the new party’s pioneers.

In 1970, when the Danish Christian People’s Party was launched, the immediate precipitating events were two pieces of legislation: one introduced by a Conservative minister of justice in 1969 making for an almost complete removal of controls of pornography, the other a year later introducing abortion on demand. That the Conservatives and Liberals should endorse such an access of moral permissiveness led to the same sort of moral panic observed in the other Nordic countries and effectively kick-started the new party. Others associated with the new party were seemingly more concerned with issues of social policy and social justice but these soon lost out to those parts of the party more agitated by the moral agenda.⁶⁶

At the time of their foundation therefore each of the parties made great play of opposing the ‘de-Christianisation’ of society, campaigning against the relaxation of laws governing alcohol, abortion and pornography and fighting for the defence of Christian values and morals generally in national life. Their tendency to emphasise these ‘core issues’ (*hjertesaker*, as the Norwegian Christians call them) was what has distinguished them from all other parties to both left and right. It is clear that their

⁶² J.O. Saeter (ed), *Samling om Verdier: KrF’s historie I tekst og bilder 1933-83* (Oslo: Valo, 1985)

⁶³ D Arter: ‘The Finnish Christian League: Party or ‘Anti-Party’?’ *Scandinavian Political Studies* 3:2 143-162 (1980), p.158

⁶⁴ D. Arter, ‘Die bürgerlichen und konservativen Parteien Finnlands: Zentrumspartei, Nationale Sammlungspartei, Schwedische Volkspartei und Finnischer Christliche Bund’, in H.-J. Veen (ed.), *Christlich-demokratische und Konservative Parteien in Westeuropa 4* (1994), pp. 309-10

⁶⁵ L. Karvonen, ‘Christian parties in Scandinavia: victory over windmills?’ in D. Hanley (ed.) *Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective*, (London: Pinter, 1994), p.125. As already noted this was not a function of having a significant number of Pentecostals in the party however.

⁶⁶ See Andersen, *Kristen Politik*.

emergence was associated with many Christian activists entering politics for the first time; even in the Norwegian and Danish cases, where the parties were in large part the product of splits from, respectively, the established Liberal and Conservative parties, they were greeted as providing a political home for activist (or merely active) Christians, who had previously felt -- or come to feel -- homeless. It seems likely that for these voters and members at least the new parties signified a turning from relative political quietism, of a sort often associated with Lutheran pietism, to relative political activism.⁶⁷ The core values that shaped all four parties predispose them towards Euroscepticism inasmuch as the free market element of European integration is problematic, notably with respect to restrictive alcohol policy. This is however more controversial for parties non-EU member states, that face a racial change upon joining, i.e. Sweden and Finland before 1995 and Norway today. Although EU membership only indirectly affects other core concerns, such as abortion or censorship, to the extent that the EU is perceived as a cosmopolitan project it has proven divisive.

These considerations raise the wider question of the character of Lutheran Protestantism in the Nordic area and to what degree, if at all, it is implicated in the Nordic countries' famous reluctance to engage with the project of European integration. This is a matter both of Nordic religious culture and of the impact that that culture has had over time on the formation of the wider culture including the political culture.

In terms of the religious culture, in all of the Nordic EU applicant countries in 1994 fringe Protestant sects and groups could be found arguing that the EU was a Catholic plot to undermine and destroy Protestantism, that the Catholic Church was the Whore of Babylon of the Book of Revelation which would be destroyed in the last days and that the only Protestant response to the question of EU entry must be a resounding NO! Rusama reported a characteristic example: 'Before the Finnish referendum on 16th October an earnest country pastor publicly preached of the dangers of Catholicism. He claimed that the Pope's role would become all too great and finally even the reading of the Bible would no longer be possible as it will be only the church, that is the Roman Catholic Church, that has the whole truth, meaning the sole right to teach about Christianity and interpret the Bible.'⁶⁸ None of the academic analyses of the outcome of the referendums credit these extreme, if colourful, views with any significance in affecting the outcome.⁶⁹ Views of this sort are, it would seem, much less prevalent even on the margin in the Lutheran Nordic cultures than is the case in the Calvinist Protestant subcultures of the Netherlands, the UK (including of course Northern Ireland, where Ian Paisley continues to propound them) and North America. And this despite the fact that in May 1994, four months before the

⁶⁷ J. Madeley, 'The antinomies of Lutheran politics: the case of Norway's Christian People's Party', in D. Hanley (ed.), *Christian Democracy in Europe*, (1994).

⁶⁸ J. Rusama: 'Europe and the Churches', *Finnish Institute Yearbook 1994*, p.87

⁶⁹ For Denmark and Sweden see for example Mathieu, *The Moral Life of the Party: Moral Argumentation and the Creation of Meaning in the Europe Policy Debates of the Christian and Left-Socialist Parties in Denmark and Sweden 1990-1996*. Lund: Dissertations in Sociology, 1999). For Norway see Schou, *Norge og EF*, (1980), ch. 6

referendums on membership in Finland, Sweden and Norway, the Catholic bishops of Scandinavia issued a declaration in favour of EU membership.⁷⁰

There is another argument linking Protestantism and Euro-scepticism, which does seem more applicable to the Nordic countries however. This relies less on the presence or prevalence of strange ideas or doctrines among minority religious groups than on claims about attachment to particular values among the Nordic populations as a whole, in particular values which might be seen as the deposit of half a millennium of Lutheran 'propaganda', in the original sense of the word. Thus Sundback:

'Protestant values such as freedom, individualism, rationalism and localism are often seen as opposed to Catholic [values] such as devotionism, solidarity and universalism Ultimately Catholic values can be seen as more supportive of EU central power, because the political centre is an analogy of the position held by Rome within Catholicism. The problem with Protestantism is simply that it is a culture, which fails both to serve legitimation of the union and solidarity between nationalities within it.'⁷¹

And Matlary links this with an observation about Norway which can be extended to the whole Nordic area:

'The attitude that Norway can be culturally separated from Europe is also common in religious circles. Christianity is not at all perceived as part of its common European heritage, but as something defined by the Norwegian state church and the many sectarian movements. Traditional anti-Catholicism has faded in urban, educated milieu[x], but this is not where the Christians are found. In the West and South fundamentalism and sectarianism are strong, and with it a pronounced anti-Catholicism. In the 1972 debate on the EC the Treaty of Rome was presented as having some connection with the Pope. The most important feature of this mentality is however not the primitive anti-Catholicism that is often to be found in fundamentalist Protestantism, but that the Norwegian brand of Protestantism as a whole allows for a sharp separation of Christianity from its historical roots. The institution of the state church further underlines the autonomy of the dogmatic basis – if any – of the church. In this perspective it becomes logical that the Christian People's Party opposes EC membership.'⁷²

Gstöhl's recent comparative study of the basis of Euroscepticism in Norway, Sweden and Switzerland also points up numerous connections between a Protestant-inflected national identity and latent anti-Catholicism in the Nordic countries. For example: 'For a long time, supranational integration threatened the successful record of the Swedish (or Nordic) model as well as Sweden's long-standing freedom from alliances (*alliansfrihet*) since the Catholic, conservative, and capitalist European Community

⁷⁰ While the established Lutheran church leaderships made no such declaration they were judged by Sundback to have been broadly positive to European integration while 'the free churches and revivalist movements within the Lutheran churches' were more fearful. S. Sundback: 'Religious Integration and the Idea of a European Soul. The pro-European orientation of the Scandinavian Lutheran Churches' Paper presented at Nordic Sociology of Religion Conference, Lund 1995, p. 16.

⁷¹ S. Sundback: 'Religious Integration and the Idea of a European Soul.',p.8. On the legitimation functions of religion in the context of European integration see O. Riis, 'Religionen og det europeiske felleskab', *Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift*, 12: 2 (1996), pp.95-112.

⁷² J. Haaland Matlary, "'And Never the Twain Shall Meet': Reflections on Norway, Europe, and Integration' in T. Tiilikainen and I.D. Petersen (eds), *The Nordic Countries and the EC* (Copenhagen: Political Studies Press, 1993)

(EC) countries pursued very different welfare policies and were members of NATO.⁷³

The Christian parties might be seen as the articulators and promoters of Protestant values of this sort, which it might be supposed are still latently present in the culture of societies which for four hundred years or more have been dominated by Lutheran churches committed to the inculcation of particular values. On the other hand they are not mere articulators of some kind of Nordic-Lutheran moral consensus; while they uphold in their own (Christian) terms the widely-shared emphasis on social morality they articulate it in a distinctive religious version and add to it the old stress on individual morality in matters of sexual relations, family values and temperance.

The point might be strengthened if the list of Protestant values is extended to include nationalism. The Reformation was an important watershed in the development of the modern nation-state which developed in northern and western Europe after the break-up of the international model of civilisation over which the Catholic Church had for so long presided. As a doctrine and a movement nationalism came much later and took many forms of course, but there is no necessary contradiction in the idea that it might take the form of defending 'freedom, individualism, rationalism and localism' on the grounds that they represent distinctive aspects of a national way of life. To the extent that particular values come 'wrapped' in this nationalist packaging they will tend to take on a communitarian coloration, which sits awkwardly with the values themselves.

All four Christian parties emerged on the back of protest movements which objected to the idea that politics was or should be about Right and Left. The extreme Left was always abhorred for its atheism but the Right and Centre were also rejected for providing no adequate defence of core Christian values, as these were construed by revivalist activists and their constituencies. Although the parties have staked out positions at the centres of the party systems, their *raison d'être* is inextricably linked to protest against or opposition to, if not rejection of, secular left-right politics. Not surprisingly, given this, none of the four parties qualify as catch-all or cartel parties.⁷⁴ They are to a certain extent immune from contagion from the social democratic left or conservative right. Whereas mainstream centre-left and centre-right parties across Western Europe have emulated each others' successful establishment of first mass party organisations and subsequently catch-all parties that focus less on ideology, the Nordic Christian parties have retained considerable focus on their target constituency.⁷⁵ In this sense the parties have resisted the evolutionary pressure toward

⁷³ S. Gstöhl, *Reluctant Europeans: Norway, Sweden and Switzerland in the Process of Integration*, (London: Boulder, 2002), p. 25. In the early 1950's the Schuman plan was presented in Sweden as marked by four, not three 'C's' – the three mentioned in the above quotation plus 'Cartels'. Gstöhl, *Reluctant Europeans*, p.53.

⁷⁴ O. Kirchheimer, 'The Transformation of West European Party Systems', in J. LaPalombara & M. Weiner (eds.), *Political Parties and Political Development*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); A. Katz & P. Mair, 'Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party', *Party Politics*, 1/1 (1995), 5-28,

⁷⁵ M. Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State*, (London, Methuen & Co, 1954); D. Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, (London, Pall Mall Press, 1967); K. von Beyme *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, (Aldersgot, Gower, 1985); see G. Marks & C. Wilson, "National Parties and the Contestation of Europe", in T. Banchoff & M. P. Smith (eds.), *Legitimacy and the European Union: The Contested Polity*, (London, Routledge, 1999).

catch-all parties; even when, as most noticeably in Sweden in the early 1990's, the parties attempted to broaden the basis of their appeal, they continued to focus on their core values. In 1994, setting out his Christian 'third alternative' KrF leader Kjell Magne Bondevik emphasised that 'some hold that the Christian People's Party should be more like [the continental] Christian democratic parties. I do not believe this is the way forward.'⁷⁶ Therefore, although the party sought to broaden its appeal somewhat and modernise its image, including references to 'Christian democracy' in the 1996 programme, it remained a Christian confessional party and kept the religious requirement for membership.⁷⁷ The tension between its confessional focus and the potential reward of extending its appeal through a move to a catch-all strategy has thus so far been resolved in favour of the former. The party briefly began to use the English translation 'Christian Democratic Party of Norway' parallel to 'Christian People's Party' in the mid-1990s, but has since returned to its old nomenclature.⁷⁸ The other three parties have never come as close to catching up with their Conservative rivals.

3. Party Strategy: The Quest for Votes and Office

From a rational choice perspective the above questions of identity and core values (or policies) may be considered parameters rather than direct variables in explaining why Eurosceptic positions are adopted by the party leadership. If party identity and core concerns generate sufficient pressure for Euroscepticism, this would explain why a party adopts and maintains a Eurosceptic posture. In this case, a rational choice and cultural historical explanation would be compatible, inasmuch it is rational for the party leadership to remain committed to the party's core values. This of course holds even more if tactical concerns pull in the same direction. However, because Euroscepticism is both contentious and divisive, and because the context changes with developments in European integration, the shorter term incentives related to the pursuit of votes and office might well pull the party away from Euroscepticism. To the extent that this is the case, these strategic and tactical incentives warrant further analysis.

The two main incentives that Eurosceptic parties face are related to the quest for votes and office, and both of these are related to policy concerns. On one hand the Nordic Christian parties all face largely or partly Euro-sceptic core electorates, on the other they compete with pro-EU conservative and liberal parties for pro-EU voters. The nature of the party, its policy options and preferences and the dynamics of the party system all shape these incentives. To the extent that the party broadens its appeal beyond its core electorate and it appeals to a more diverse body of voters, the pay-off of adopting a principled stance against European integration may decrease. To the extent that EU (or in Norway's case EEA) membership limits the range of policy options, some of the policy positions associated with hard Euro-scepticism may no longer be realistic. To the extent that more hard-core Eurosceptics on the far left (or in

⁷⁶ K. M. Bondevik, *Det tredje alternativet: Kristendemokratisk politikk 'på norsk'*, (Oslo, Forlaget Folkets Framtid, 1994), p117.

⁷⁷ E. Rimehaug, *Midtbanespilleren: Kjell Magne Bondevik og Kristelig Folkeparti*, (Oslo, Luther Forlag, 1997).

⁷⁸ In 2002 its web-site features no English translation or version (<http://www.krf.no>), but the CPP name is used in the European People's Party context. <http://www.eppe.org>.

Norway's Centre Party) maintain uncompromising stances they may crowd out the Eurosceptic space, while cooperation in coalition with pro-EU parties is likely at least to lower the salience of Euroscepticism if not actually to moderate it.

Even if the Christian parties' core electorates may remain more sceptical to European integration, the parties' most promising electoral space features ambivalent or pro-EU voters. The Christian parties are in no position to compete with the left-socialists for the hard Euro-sceptic vote, and any move toward catch-all strategies they might embark on provides incentives to play down Euro-scepticism. The intermediate option of ambivalently playing down the European question has hardly been credible for the last decade, given the salience of EU issues and their recent high profile during referendums on membership, treaty change and Economic and Monetary Union. Even in the aftermath of the 1972 and 1994 referendums in Norway, KrF(N)'s manifestos were quiet on the EU issue, although there was no doubt as to the party's position.⁷⁹

As André Maurois once pointed out with regard to the French party system, the centre is the section where the yield of ministerial portfolios to the square metre is highest.⁸⁰ Yet because the Nordic Christian parties developed as a kind of protest party, this central position did not immediately translate into cabinet portfolios.⁸¹ Inasmuch as the Christian parties tend to seek participation in coalitions dominated by pro-EU parties, participation in government may also be expected to exert a moderating effect on Euro-scepticism. Norway's 1997-2000 coalition is the exception that, literally in this case, proves the rule. This reinforces a general tendency for parties to engage in more debates concerning strategy when in opposition than in government, and governing parties in EU states' tendencies to defend the compromises they take part in negotiating. Both tendencies decrease the scope for hard Euro-scepticism in government compared to opposition. The impact of factors on Nordic Christian party-based Euro-scepticism is explored further below.

The Norwegian party has maintained the most stable position on the country's participation in European integration. When the issue was first raised in 1961 the party adopted an ambiguous position, and its programmes were oriented towards maintaining the status quo. The party's official position against EU membership was not adopted until April 1972, five months before the referendum, and this decision owed much to the radicalisation of the party's youth wing in the late 1960s. Although the party leadership and parliamentary group was evenly split, 71% of its voters eventually voted 'No' in the 1972 referendum.⁸² This figure barely changed during the twenty-two years up to the next referendum. Aardal documents a considerable correlation between 'restrictive' (as opposed to liberal) religious attitudes and Euro-scepticism in the 1994 referendum.⁸³ In terms of policy, the efforts to integrate

⁷⁹ N. Sitter, "The European Question and the Norwegian Party System since 1961: The Freezing of a Modern Cleavage or Contingent Opposition?", forthcoming in Taggart & Szczerbiak... (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004?).

⁸⁰ Cited in M. Fogarty, "How Dutch Christian Democracy Made a Fresh Start", *Political Quarterly*, 66:3 (1995), 138-155, p.142.

⁸¹ L. Karvonen, "In From the Cold? Christian Parties in Scandinavia", *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 16:1 (1993), 25-48.

⁸² O.J. Sæter: *Samling om Verdier* (KrF 1933-83) (1985)

⁸³ B. Aardal, "Ideologi på tvers?", in A. T. Jenssen & H. Valen (eds.), *Brussel midt imot: Folkeavstemningen om EU*, (Oslo, Ad Notam Gyldendal, 1995).

Norway more closely with the EU that eventually produced the European Economic Area in 1995 provided an attractive compromise for KrF(N) as well as the divided Labour party. Unsurprisingly, KrF(N)-leader Kjell Magne Bondevik proved Labour's closest ally in these negotiations, whereas the Conservatives criticised the EEA as too limited and the hard Eurosceptic parties rejected it as going too far.⁸⁴ With about half the electorate opposing EU membership in the 1990s and the pro-EU parties polling some 70% in the 1989 election, KrF(N) faced few incentives to play down in its Euroscepticism. Yet it was potentially vulnerable to the hard Euro-sceptic Centre party, to which it is close on the left-right and centre-periphery dimensions. When the EU question becomes dominant, as in 1993, it is the Centre rather than KrF(N) which benefits. In 1997 the two parties and the Liberals made up the 'centre alternative', a third alternative to centre-left and -right coalitions. Unless it were to challenge the Conservatives for leadership of the centre-right, which it came close to considering after the 1997 election, the KrF(N) faces few electoral incentives to play down its opposition to Norwegian EU membership.

The government question has proven more problematic, but has affected the emphasis on EU questions rather than the KrF(N)'s position on European integration. The European question brought down centre-right governments before both referendums, the Borten government in early 1971 and the Syse government when the issue reemerged in 1990. Both times the crisis was precipitated by the agrarian Centre party's hard opposition to participation in European integration, with the KrF(N) caught between its two coalition partners. Norway got its first KrF(N)-led Eurosceptic (minority) government in 1972/73, and its second Euro-sceptic government, led by Bondevik and controlling barely a quarter of parliament's seats, 1997-2000. The first Centre-Liberal-KrF(N) coalition was short-lived, losing the 1973 election, and the second saw its European policy circumscribed by the pro-EU parliamentary majority. The lesson for both the KrF(N) and the Conservatives has been to defuse or freeze the European question whilst in office, hence the current 'suicide pact' that precludes discussion of EU membership for the 2001-2004 parliament (as long as the coalition survives). The stability of the KrF(N)'s position on European integration and its reluctance to engage in internal debate on this matter thus owes much to the lack of tactical incentives to moderation of its Euro-scepticism. The EEA arrangement has allowed the party to maintain a soft Eurosceptic position, and to avoid overt policy clashes with the Conservatives over key public policy issues since Norway is effectively a member of the EU's Single Market.⁸⁵ The party's target electorate is still considerably Eurosceptic and the party had decided to prioritise Euroscepticism over coalition-building, a choice that in the event did not prevent Bondevik's second prime ministership since 2001.

Like the Norwegian party, the Finnish SKL/KD(F) has long faced a core electorate that is more sceptical of European integration than the electorate as a whole. Until 2001 (?), this position was reflected in the party's hard opposition to participation in European integration. [However, Finnish polls suggest that opposition to EU membership has diminished considerably since the country joined the EU in 1995, in contrast to the more divided Swedish opinion. Even if the SKL/KD(F)'s core voters maintain more sceptical than the electorate as a whole, the question has

⁸⁴ G. H. Brundtland, *Dramatiske år*, (Oslo, Gyldendal, 1998).

⁸⁵ K. Eliassen & N. Sitter, "Ever Closer Co-operation? The Limits of the 'Norwegian Method' of European Integration", *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 26:2 (2003), 125/144.

declined in salience since the membership debate of the mid-1990s.] Perhaps more significantly, the policy alternatives have changed. Non-membership is no longer considered a serious viable policy alternative, particularly after Finland's accession to EMU.

The incentives associated with the quest for executive office are stronger in the Finnish case than the electoral incentives, at least since the party opted to enter coalition politics in 1991.⁸⁶ In 1994 the SKL resigned from the coalition led by the Centre party, in protest against the decision to join the EU. With even the Eurosceptic Centre party, which was split almost down the middle on the EU question, deciding to favour EU membership, the SKL's hard Euroscepticism rendered the party ineligible for participation in governing coalitions for the rest of the 1990s. The SKL was the only party apart from the party of the outgoing prime minister (the Centre) and the new Young Finns not to take part in the broad rainbow coalition formed in 1995. The SKL's scepticism toward the EMU project practically excluded it from a government from which preparation for EMU was a central priority.⁸⁷

The Danish party faces a core electorate that is more evenly divided than that of the Norwegian and Finnish parties. In the referendums on the Single European Act, Maastricht, Amsterdam and EMU the KrF(D)'s supporters have tended to come out against ratification further integration, even when the party leadership advocated as 'yes' vote, as it did in all referendums except the first (1992) Maastricht referendum when the party was split and when it opposed participation in EMU in 2000.⁸⁸ The party's soft Euroscepticism, expressed in occasional opposition to recent and new initiatives for further integration, thus sits well with its divided electorate.

Like the Norwegian and Finnish parties, the KrF(D) faces largely pro-EU potential coalition partners. It is therefore caught in a dilemma as to the relative weight attached to maintaining its mild Eurosceptic position and participation in coalitions. But unlike the KrF(N), the Danish and Finnish parties have no EEA alternative the may be employed to circumvent the EU question, or to procrastinate. The KrF(D) has joined forces with the pro-EU centre right (1982-1988) and the more divided but still pro-EU Social Democrats (1993-94). The party's apparent tendency to support EU initiatives when in power, and oppose them when in opposition – EMU in 2000 – reinforces this picture.

Finally, the Swedish party shares its Danish counterpart's mixed core electorate. Perhaps the key development for the Swedish party has been its considerable expansion in the 1990s, which took the party far beyond its core electorate and drew on a broad heterogeneous electoral base. This expansion may to some extent be compared to the dynamics of parties moving from ideological to catch-all parties, inasmuch as the party became a 'catch-all' party within a segment of the electorate. Arter has invoked this 'both-and' type of party for agrarian interest

⁸⁶ Karvonen, "In From the Cold? Christian Parties in Scandinavia".

⁸⁷ A.C. Jungar, "A Case of Surplus Majority Government: The Finnish Rainbow Coalition", *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 25:1 (2002), 57- 83.

⁸⁸ R. Buch & K. M. Hansen, "The Danes and Europe: From EC 1972 to Euro 2000 – Elections, Referendums and Attitudes", *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 25:1 (2002), 1-26.

parties that become rural catch-all parties.⁸⁹ The party's loss of three percentage points in the 1994 election, after exploding past the seven percent mark in 1991, has been attributed partly to voter disapproval with the leadership's strongly pro-EU stance.⁹⁰

Inter-party cooperation provides even stronger incentives against Euroscepticism in the Swedish case than in the other three. The party first gained electoral representation on a joint ticket with the Centre party in 1985, but dropped out of parliament when it ran alone in 1987, before securing 26 seats in 1991. Its participation in the centre-right coalition led by the conservative Moderates (1991-1994), when the party promoted its core issues linked to education and child care but otherwise aligned with the Moderates, precluded Euro-scepticism. EU membership was one of the key aims of the Bildt government, and a defining feature of the coalition. Moreover, after a long post-war period of Social Democrat dominance, excepting only the 1976-79 parliament, there was a considerable prize on maintaining coalition stability. In short, for the KDS/KD(S), Euroscepticism was hardly an option if it wanted to participate in government.

4. CONCLUDING PARAGRAPHS

Briefly, we conclude on the basis of the foregoing that there is a distinctive pattern to be discerned among the Nordic Christian parties and that their common record of various levels and intensities of Euroscepticism is associated with religious factors. These furthermore would seem to be part of the explanation for the warranted reputation of the Nordic countries as 'reluctant Europeans'. The distinctive values and identity of all four parties predispose them to more Eurosceptic stances than their Continental counterparts, while the relative openness of the parties makes for more openness on the European question. The two closed parties, in Finland and Norway, have featured the 'hardest' Euroscepticism, whereas the two more open parties have over time developed a 'softer' opposition to European integration. The Swedish and Danish parties would appear to have been more sensitive to incentives linked to the pursuit of votes and office. Both have moderated their Euroscepticism considerably, to the extent that they are now broadly pro-EU. The Norwegian party has, predictably, proven almost immune to such incentives. This 'immunity' is also connected with its potential coalition partners' range of views on the EU, as well as the feasible policy alternatives. In the Finnish case, the sustainability of hard opposition to European integration was undermined with accession to the EU and adoption of the Euro, and the fact that the party operates in a context where all its potential coalition partners approve of Finnish EU membership but are divided on the benefits of further integration.

Other, wider conclusions also seem to follow. According to Svåsand and Lindström '[k]nowing the ideological position of a party is normally a reliable cue to predicting its policies; but when parties confront Europe and the EU, ideology is a

⁸⁹ D. Arter, "From Class Party to Catchall Party? The Adaptation of the Finnish Agrarian-Center Party", *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 22:2 (1999), 157-180.

⁹⁰ I. Wörlund, "The Swedish Parliamentary Election of September 1994", *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 18:4 (1995), 285-291.

poor guide to prediction.’⁹¹ Taggart argues along the same lines: ‘knowing a party’s ideology is not necessarily a guide to its position on the EU. There is too much variance for us to reliably focus on particular party families.’ (p.379) Our review of the case of the Nordic Christian parties would however seem to indicate that ideology is maybe a better guide than these authors allow – especially ideology as culture, rather than as a mere shorthand for Left-Right positioning. We conclude that Protestant ideology/culture does predispose to Euroscepticism, to the extent that all the Nordic Christian parties with their overwhelmingly Protestant provenance either have at some time been or remain less than full-hearted in their support of the Continental Christian Democrats’ commitment to building a Federal Europe.⁹² The Protestantism of the Nordic parties is not however the established Protestantism of the state or ‘folk’ Lutheran churches which has tended to be supportive of EU membership. It is rather the Protestantism of dissident revivalism both within and outside the state churches. The presence of Pentecostalism as an important feature of a party’s religious constituency seems however (and somewhat paradoxically) associated with a more positive attitude to EU integration.

Taggart’s data shows that across Europe there is a significant minority of established parties that are Eurosceptic; six of the eleven (seven, ie 64%, if one includes the Democratic Unionist Party of Northern Ireland – Paisley’s party – as religious) turn out however to be Protestant religious parties, including the Norwegian and Finnish Christian parties.⁹³ His principal comment about the established Eurosceptic parties (the exceptions to his rule that established parties tend not to be, and cannot afford to be, Eurosceptic) is that although they count as established they should be seen as peripheral and/or minor. As such, he argues, they have no good reason to be pro-Europe and, rather, are well-positioned to use Euroscepticism in order to mobilise voters in their support. Maybe it is better to think of these parties as Old Protest parties or established Protest parties or, even – and not only in the interests of alliteration -- perennial Protestant Protest parties. There is a problem with the term peripheral insofar as it indicates distance from some centre, since as has been seen the Christian parties are classic parties of the centre. They are however peripheral relative to the key cross-cutting dimensions on which they locate themselves – whether as in Norway seen as a geographical centre-periphery tension or, as more generally in Scandinavia, expressing a moral-religious dimension which runs athwart the Left-Right dimension. On this cross-cutting dimension they occupy extreme positions far from the secular centre where most of the established parties against whom they compete continue to operate.

⁹¹ L. Svåsand & U. Lindström, ‘Scandinavian parties and the EU’, in J. Gaffney (ed), *Political Parties and the European Union* (London: Routledge,1996) p.216. They point out incidentally that the dispersion of parties on the EU issue is a general feature of the parties of the centre – liberal, agrarian and ethnic as well as Christian. Ibid.

⁹² This supports the conclusion of Marks and Wilson that the Nordic Christian parties constitute a distinct, Protestant subset of Christian Democracy. Marks and Wilson, ‘The Past in the Present’ *BJPS* (2000), p. 453.

⁹³ Taggart expands von Beyme’s categorisation of party families to distinguish between Protestant and Catholic Christian, calling the first Religious. This term he applies to the three Dutch parties of the Coalition of Orthodox Protestants but not to the Scandinavian parties, despite the fact that the latter however interconfessional they might advertise themselves can certainly not be described as Catholic. See Taggart, ‘A touchstone of dissent...’, pp.375-6