

Valentina Bartolucci¹
University of Bradford (UK) and CERIS Sciences Po (Paris)

Communicating 'terrorism': The effects of the US governmental discourse on terrorism in creating a new global enemy

Introduction

The aspect of communication is crucial for whoever approaches 'terrorism'. Several scholars have indeed acknowledged its importance. Juergensmeyer (2000: 139), for instance, has argued that "without being noticed, in fact, terrorism would not exist". While in the mainstream literature a great deal of attention has been devoted to what 'terrorism' communicates, the question around how 'terrorism' *is communicated* is only marginally addressed. Nevertheless, the discursive dimension of 'terrorism' is of crucial importance (Bartolucci, forthcoming 2010).

This article concentrates on the importance of representing events through the framing of the 'terrorism' discourse re-created in the wake of the September 11, 2001 events. The focus here is on the governmental discourse chosen in the belief that within the US and especially in times of crisis the governmental elite has the greatest rhetorical power. This discourse, re-created and re-framed in the aftermath of the mentioned events, is not entirely new. Rather, it has incorporated already established definitions, narratives, unchallenged 'knowledges', common understandings and already deep-rooted assumptions (Jackson, 2006). What has made it new has been its pervasiveness and universal broad applicability.

The present analysis aims at uncovering covert meanings and assumptions, inter-discursive linkages and connotations between 'terrorism', 'Islamism', 'radicalism', and 'extremism' occurring in a discourse that enables to pursue hegemonic projects, such as regime maintenance, suppression of domestic dissent, and consolidation of domestic state power. Given the complexity of the discourse, the analysis here undertaken is only merely illustrative of the primary labels, assumptions, narratives, discursive linkages and connotations of the overall discourse. The analysis is carried out under the prism of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), a research agenda aimed both at providing an analysis of discourses and at discerning connections between language and other elements in social life that are often opaque (Fairclough, 2003).

Ultimate aim is to show how the US governmental discourse on 'terrorism', structured as an 'Othering' discourse and characterised by an essentialising binary opposition between 'our' good and 'their' bad manages to reinforce the American identity set in opposition to a new global enemy, identified in 'Islamist terrorist' and, by (linguistic) association, in every Muslim. The effects here analysed only related to the creation of a target group to be kept under control to preserve the 'American way of life'- Islamists and Muslims.

Terrorism: communication and discourse

The aspect of communication is crucial for whoever approaches the subject of 'terrorism' and it has been often emphasised in the mainstream literature on terrorism studies. According to Schmid (1989: 11), "terrorism ... can be seen as a form of violent and coercive communication". To Weinberg *et al.* (2004: 786), "terrorism [is] a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role". Laqueur (1997: 143) confirms the above point in arguing that "publicity is an essential factor in the terrorism strategy", and Zulaika and Douglass (1996: 7) beautifully write that "without television, terrorism becomes rather like the philosopher's hypothetical tree falling in the forest: no one hears it fall and therefore it has no reason for being".

Thus, while, as mentioned above, in the mainstream literature a great deal of attention has been devoted to what 'terrorism' communicates, only marginal attention has been devoted to decipher how 'terrorism' *is communicated*. Nevertheless, the discursive dimension of 'terrorism' is of crucial importance (Bartolucci, forthcoming 2010). One of the reason why the discursive dimension of 'terrorism' is largely neglected in the mainstream can be explained by the way 'terrorism' is prevalently theorised. 'Terrorism', indeed, is commonly assumed to have an "existence entirely independent of the viewing subjects' perceptions or values" (Jarvis, 2009: 14). In mainstream literature on terrorism studies, "terrorism is very rarely approached as anything other than a fully formed, extra-discursive object of knowledge" and as such it "is presumed to exist not as a social construction, performance or representation, but, rather, as an objective entity that is given not made" (Ibid.). Following such an understanding, it is hardly surprising that mainstream research has been rather oriented toward policy relevant analyses (Gunning, 2007). Academic responsibility has been

1 Contacts: bartolucciv@yahoo.it; v.bartolucci@bradford.ac.uk

thus detached from any notion of critical enquiry.² As such analyses on 'terrorism' are often not interested in the political agenda underpinning the use of the word 'terrorism' or on the implications that can derive from portraying an event as 'terrorism' or someone as 'terrorist'. Framing an event as 'terrorism', however, is never a natural act, nor it is neutral- it always results from a deliberate choice and not from an explication of the 'truth'.³

Nevertheless, language and discourse-based analyses on 'terrorism' and 'counter-terrorism', despite growing, are still marginal. In the great majority of analyses, in fact, an appreciation of its discursive dimension is at best relegated to the background and when at all present, the notion of 'discourse' lacks proper theorisation. The defining works on the discourse on terrorism remain Zulaika and Douglass *Terrorism and Taboo* and Jackson *Writing the War on Terror*. Although interest in the discursive formation of counter-terrorism is growing (Silberstein, 2004; Croft, 2006; Jackson, 2006 b, 2007), in comparison to the thousands of academic publications on the subject, the limited quantity of analyses devoted to the discourse on terrorism illustrates that much more work needs to be done.

Theorising the US governmental discourse on terrorism

'Terrorism' is a ubiquitous discursive construction which long-lasting effects impact on many aspects of the private and public lives of individuals, conditioning many dimensions of contemporary life (Bartolucci, 2010; Jackson, 2005). Discourse is here intended as "a practice not just of representing the world, but of signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning ... Discourse ... is more than *just* language use: It is language use seen as a type of social practice" (Fairclough, 1992 b: 28). Discourse and reality are considered interrelated in a dialectical way – discourse constitutes society and culture, and it is constituted by them.⁴ CDA seems to be an idea framework to address the importance of analysing the discourse on 'terrorism' and its implications. For CDA, there is a dialectical relationship between discourses and social structures: language is seen as a social practice and discourse as contributing to the construction of the social world. At the same time, discourses are seen as constituted by other social practices (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). Within CDA, discourses are seen not as neutral ways of describing the world, but as ways of reproducing or challenging relations of power and dominance in society.

The discourse production results in a (socially constructed) knowledge produced by the effects of power and spoken in terms of 'truths' (Carabine, 2001: 274). Indeed, 'terrorism' comes to be seen as "so 'real' that it requires no frame, so 'true', that no interpretation is necessary, so 'concrete' that no meaning needs to be inferred (Zulaika and Douglass, 1996: 5). As such the governmental discourse on 'terrorism' can be considered as having a *symbolic power*, intended as the power of creating things with the help of words. Following Bourdieu, symbolic power is understood as a power of consecration or revelation, it conceals or reveals things that are already there (1990: 139). This power, presupposes a recognition that can also be seen as a mis-recognition of the violence that is exercised through it (Bourdieu, 1991: 209). When ideas become powerful (*idée-forces*) it is not because they represent the 'reality' or the 'truth' but because they have not yet been proven false. They indeed become taken-for-granted beliefs, perceived as natural- they become *doxa*, common-sense.⁵ In front of those, dissent becomes not only inexpressible, but even unthinkable. This is what seems happened with regard to the representation of the September 11, 2001 events (and previous events such as the Oklahoma bombing and the 1993 Trade Center attack) as 'terrorism'- other possible framings (such as acts of international crime) have not been taken in consideration. Those attacks *were* terrorism, and a war against them had to be waged.

The present attention towards the US is justified by the role that America plays at the international level in framing issues of (international) security and by the fact that the September 11, 2001 events, considered a "symbolic marker of change" (Zerubavel, 1995: 9) took place there. The discourse here chosen is the governmental one for the reason that the (re)creation of the discourse surrounding the events that took place on September 11, 2001 in America was undoubtedly an elite project. Especially in situations of 'crisis', political elites have the greatest rhetorical power. As Croft (2006: 10) has noted "political leaders are empowered in times of insecurity. And thus, as a source for understanding the nature of the narrative, to comprehend the essence of the discourse, the statements of the political leadership are vitally important". Furthermore, as pointed out by Zarefsky (2004: 607) "a key function of presidential rhetoric is to define social reality", thus setting the limits of debates and 'reality'. The data are constituted by all Presidential

2 This is not to say that critical analyses do not exist (see George, 1991; Rogers, 2007; Silke 2004; Jackson, 2005, 2006, 2007 a, b; Croft, 2006; and more generally analyses carried out by Critical Terrorism Studies' scholars).

3 Furthermore alternative framings are always possible and importantly they can lead to different effects. It is necessary to point out that in the case of 'terrorism', however, for a series of reasons starting from its 'immoral' connotations, alternative framings have been proved very hard to emerge. With regard to the September 11, 2001 events, for instance, debates existed, but interestingly only in terms of the appropriate response, types of tactics, or modes of intervention, but not on the initial framing. For everybody, such an event was clearly *terrorism*.

4 'What a discourse is' is far from being agreed upon. It is not possible here to provide an overview of all different notions of discourse established in divergent paradigms and a short definition of discourse would be insufficient to capture the complexities of the notion as approached in CDA. Indeed, within CDA, succinct definitions of discourse are difficultly given, as the whole discipline constitutes such definition (van Dijk, 1990).

5 For instance, it has become common-sense to think that children must go to school, that people must work in order to have the money to buy their food, that a President must protect his/her country and that the September 11, 2001 are 'terrorism'.

speeches under the Bush administration (2001-2008) retrieved by the web-site "The American Presidency Project" hosted by the University of California (<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/>).

Analysing the US governmental discourse on terrorism

The US governmental discourse on terrorism, (re)constructed in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 events can be analysed as an 'Othering discourse', a discourse in which 'our' positive attributes are contrasted with the negativity of 'theirs'. Such a discourse is characterised by a binary opposition between 'good' and 'evil'. Through an analysis of the naming practices and lexical choices used to 'describe' the events, it emerges that the September 11, 2001 events are primarily represented in terms of violent encounters between 'evils', 'enemies of freedom', 'terrorists', and an innocent civilised country- America. In such a moment of national crisis, building an understanding of what happened on that day was of crucial importance to help people cope with such a trauma. The framing of those events as 'acts of terrorism', 'terrorism' or 'terrorist attack' was not obvious, natural, nor based on some objective standards of common-sense. In fact, such a framing was part of the attempt of making 'comprehensible' apparently senseless episodes in giving a 'description' of what happened, who did it, against who, and why, to then 'describe' the reaction to those.

To function such a discourse had to be based on particular understandings of the events occurred on September 11, 2001 in New York- as 'terrorist attacks' of such proportions that nothing would have been the same, nowhere in the world. The new 'truth' was that September 11, 2001 was the day that changed not only America but the entire world, and set the future agenda of the 'civilised' nations. The following remarks by Bush are reported as example:

- I think every civilized nation in the world recognizes that this was an assault **not just against the United States but against civilization** (15/9/01, Maryland).

- This is **a new era...everything changed** on that morning (14/2/03, CTI).
The world changed on that day (14/8/03, Miramar).

This representation of the events as a 'terrorism' of such exception proportions to be able to 'change the world' implicitly created a 'before' and 'after' that makes of September 11, 2001 what Zerubavel has labelled in a different context a 'symbolic marker of change' (1995: 9). In the discourse, the events were firstly cautiously characterised as 'an **apparent** terrorist attack' (11/9/01, Sarasota). The initial doubt surrounding such characterisation, however, was short lived. Few sentences later, indeed, the 'fact' that it was a 'terrorist attack' had already been fully established.

Today we've had a national tragedy. Two airplanes have crashed into the World Trade Center in **an apparent terrorist attack on our country**. I have spoken to the Vice President, to the Governor of New York, to the Director of the FBI and have ordered that the full resources of the Federal Government go to help the victims.... **Terrorism** against our Nation will not stand.

In the above extract it is possible to see the passage from hedging devices (see the word 'apparent') to committed language ('terrorism') in a very limited number of sentences. Through the omission of 'apparent' and the subsequent repetition of the noun 'terrorism' the labelling of the events becomes established. All the way through the Presidential speeches from September 11, 2001 to the end of 2008, this initial framing- 'terrorism'- is consistently maintained and the terrorism threat remains a central concern of the Bush administration.⁶ Implicit in an act of labelling, there is the silencing of alternative framings. Cancelling the initial doubt, the framing becomes (overly) direct: what happened on that day is *terrorism* and '9/11' ('erasing' all historicity of the date) came to represent the worst terrorist attack never happened on US soil, if not in the entire world.⁷

Thematic representations of terrorism

In the governmental discourse on terrorism, the September 11, 2001 events are described as:

heinous acts of violence perpetrated by faceless cowards upon the people and the freedom of the United States (11/9/01, 7461).

evil and despicable acts of terrorism (12/9/01, Letter HR).

unbelievable, despicable act on America (13/9/01, TC).

brutal attacks (13/9/01, 7462).

series of despicable acts of war (13/9/01, 7462).

deliberate and massive cruelty (14/9/01, ND of Prayer).

barbaric acts; barbarism (15/9/01, Maryland;16/9/01, WH).

senseless violence and **senseless** murder (1/4/02, Pataki).

6 It is also worth mentioning that the various military interventions that have occurred since then have been invariably characterised as part of a 'war against terrorism'- and not just 'wars'. Thus, while the attention has often focused on the representation of the events as 'war', it is here not considered as the most important element of the discourse. Rather, it is here argued that the most important element of the discourse is the framing of the events as 'terrorism'- from there all subsequent rhetorical moves have been made possible, including waging a (metaphorical) war.

7 Croft (2006) wrote about the silencing of other possible meanings of '9/11', such as "a revival of the obligation of jihad worldwide" and other 9/11s, such as the Chilean 9/11 or the Irish 9/11 or the 'first American 9/11'). For more, read pp. 16-17.

From the fragments above, it is possible to see that the events have been 'described' in supreme criticism, as deliberate, cruel and horrendous. Emotive terms such as 'horror', 'tragedy', 'anger', and 'sorrow' are constantly reiterated in the discourse. Terrorism, nominalised, is represented as senseless evil, barbaric in nature, brutal and cowardly.⁸ Similarly, the idea of an 'endless terrorism threat' is established very quickly (together with the narrative of a 'global phenomenon')- on September 20, 2001, Bush said: "Some speak of an age of terror" (AJS). The framing of the events as 'terrorism' did not come about alone, but with all sets of assumptions and hidden narratives that usually accompany it. Indeed, in front of such framing- a 'senseless', 'barbaric terrorist attack', the best expression of 'evil', first manifestation of an endless series of attacks of mass cruelty planned against the 'civilised world', 'freedom' and all 'our' deepest values- a military response becomes the only realistic and necessary response. As already mentioned, the discourse under analysis, is characterised by a principal binary opposition between 'good' and 'evil'. Van Dijk's notions of 'positive self-presentation' and 'negative other-presentation' are particularly useful here. In the majority of the official political speeches approaching the issue of terrorism, the polarisation between US (Americans, 'civilised Western nations') and THEM (terrorists, Arabs, Muslim fundamentalists, etcetera) is prevalent. The following statements are illustrative:

Americans are asking, why do **they** hate **us**? **They** hate what we see right here in this chamber - a democratically elected government. **Their** leaders are self-appointed. **They** hate our freedoms - **our** freedom of religion, **our** freedom of speech, **our** freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other (20/9/2001, AJS).

These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life. With every atrocity, **they** hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking **our** friends. **They stand against us**, because **we stand in their way** (20/9/2001, AJS).

The following sub-sections concentrate on the description of 'us' and 'them' respectively.

Perpetrator/s (them)

Initially, no information is given about the perpetrators of the acts. Starting with his first speech proclaimed on September 11, 2001, Bush mentions that he "ha[s] ordered that the full resources of the Federal Government go to ... conduct a full-scale investigation to hunt down and to find **those folks who committed this act**" (11/9/01, Sarasota), adding, "**Somebody** is going to pay" (cit. In Sammon, 2002: 101).

The day after the events, for the first time the 'enemy' is described although vaguely as a different enemy than we have ever faced.

This enemy hides in shadows and has no regard for human life. This is an enemy who preys on innocent and unsuspecting people, then runs for cover (12/9/01, NST).

Some of the words most commonly used in the discourse to describe the 'terrorists' actions' are reported below. Their actions are invariably denoted as brutal and destructive, and the perpetrators invariably 'de-humanised'.

Verbs	Nouns and Adjectives to describe the enemy	Nouns (Actions)
to hate	coldblooded killers	atrocities
to disrupt	a faceless coward	Violence; murder
to end a way of life	Terrorists, they have no heart, no conscience	attacks
to kill, to kill without mercy, to murder	evildoers; evil people... evil folks	acts of war
to attack	terrorists... evildoers who hate freedom; enemies of freedom	cruelty hatred
to hunt (down)	a group of barbarians	death

⁸ It is worth noting that the vilification of the 'other' occurring in the discourse here analysed, is mirrored in Bin Laden's discourse. Bin Laden represents America as the supreme incarnation of evil and his discourse is driven by an inflated sense of American responsibility for the Middle Eastern disorder. A corrective to the narrow focus of this article would also include an analysis of Bin Laden's discourse.

Hyperboles abound in the discourse and are very effective in enhancing that the 'other' is evil (van Dijk, 2006).

In many fragments of the discourse, the enemy is characterised by its only desire of spreading violence and hate:

I think terrorists will **kill** innocent life in order to try to get the world to cower. I think – these are **coldblooded killers**. I mean, they'll **kill** innocent people to try to shake our will. ... They have not only **killed** in Spain; they have **killed** in the United States; they have **killed** in Turkey; they have **killed** in Saudi Arabia. They **kill** wherever they can (16/3/04, Netherlands).

The terrorists' only influence is violence, and their only agenda is death. (24/5/04, Army War College).

This terrorist enemy will never be appeased, because **death is their banner and their cause** (18/3/04, Kentucky).

The nature of the terrorist enemy is evident once again. We see their contempt -- their utter contempt -- for innocent life. **They hate freedom. They hate free nations.** Today, once again, we saw **their ambitions of murder.** The **cruelty** is part of their strategy (20/11/03, PNC Blair).

Their barbarism cannot be appeased, and **their hatred cannot be satisfied** (15/5/04, PR).

The vilification of the enemy is constantly reiterated in the speeches under analysis through the device of over-lexicalisation.

Victims (us)

While the enemy is de-humanised, the 'victims' are idealised. In contrast to the enemies' guilts, stand the American values.

Americans' qualities	Terrorists' guilt	American 'fabulous values'	Terrorists' message to the world
innocent; generous and kind, resourceful and brave; dedicated and honorable; good-working people	guilty, insidious, violent thugs; successors to Fascist, to Nazis, to Communists; evil people; barbarians, parasites	freedom, liberty; justice, courage; spirit of sacrifice and patriotism; defiance	barbarism, cruelty, cowardice; evilness; violence, murder, death
freedom defenders; peaceful; determined, patient, steadfast, resolved	enemies of the civilized world; forces of murder and chaos, coldblooded killers; with 'no regard for the sanctity of human life'	Growth; trade; democracy	Envy; resentment; anger

Opposite to the 'enemy' 'barbarism', 'cruelty', 'cowardice', and 'evilness', stand the American 'fabulous values' (see table above). While the goal of the terrorist is "to expand the scale of their murder, and force America to retreat from the world" (11/9/04, PR), "America is engaged in a **noble cause** ... [America] will defend freedom" (4/10/01, DSE); **By offering a hopeful alternative to the terrorist's ideology of hatred and fear, we are laying the foundations of peace** for our children and grandchildren (13/8/05, PR). Indeed, America is 'a wonderful nation, full of kind and loving people everywhere' (8/11/01, Atlanta), 'a strong nation...a fabulous land' (27/9/01, Airline Illinois). The binary opposition's device is very effective: by emphasising differences, it perpetuates them and at the same time strategic silences are maintained.

Reaction

If it is 'terrorism', the only 'real' possibility is to fight against it, with no room for negotiation, in order to protect America and the freedom-loving countries. Furthermore, the events acquire from the beginning the value of a divine test to be fought on behalf of the entire world. America, discursively represented as at the

pinnacle of civilisation (e.g. 'We are the greatest Nation on the face of the earth'; 17/10/01, Travis) must take the leadership in that 'mission'.

The resolve of **our great Nation is being tested**. But make no mistake: We will show the world that **we will pass this test** (11/9/01, Louisiana).

We will lead the 21st century into a shining age of human liberty (11/9/2006, WoT).

America and the 'civilised nations' are not powerless in this battle against the 'evil'. Rather, they are destined to accomplish a 'noble mission' (17/10/01, Travis). They have a 'responsibility to history' (14/9/01, ND of Prayer), 'a noble and just cause' (5/12/01, Norway). In this 'global battle' (2/11/02, Nigeria), America is the leader 'supported by the collective will of the world' (7/10/01, Address Military Institutions). The stakes are high: 'It is a war to save the world' (4/10/01, Employees) and only one outcome is possible: 'we will win'. American's responsibility is huge: "Just 3 days removed from these events, Americans do not yet have the distance of history. But **our responsibility to history is already clear**: To answer these attacks and rid the world of evil" (14/9/01, ND of Prayer).

Terminological slippages and connotations (radicalism- Islamism- extremism- terrorism)

Terminological slippages and connotations, overlaps and collisions between terms and narratives are widespread at all levels of the US governmental discourse on terrorism. In the discourse under analysis, the 'terrorists' are depicted as 'blaspheming' their own God, 'perverting', 'defiling', and 'hijacking' Islam, having a false religion or no religion at all. In all speeches covering the issue of 'terrorism', the attention is exclusively devoted to the so-called 'Islamic terrorism', completely neglecting other 'terrorisms' and failing to acknowledge such problematic notions.⁹

The attention on the religious connotations of the 'enemy' follows the current dominant understanding of the 'new terrorism' as being no longer motivated by mainly political reasons but rather religious ones (Juergensmeyer, 2000).

- Al Qaida... a fringe movement that **perverts the peaceful teaching of Islam** (20/9/01, AJS).

- those **who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself** (20/9/01, AJS).

- This enemy **tries to hide behind a peaceful faith**. But those who celebrate the murder of innocent men, women, and children **have no religion** (8/11/01 Atlanta).

- The terrorists ... **cannot hide behind Islam** (10/11/01, GA).

- The terrorists despise other religions and **have defiled their own** (11/3/02, Sixth Month).

- in the name of some kind of **false religion** (1/8/02, Jordan).

- Our enemies don't follow **the great traditions of Islam. They've hijacked a great religion** (H. Aid Afghanistan, 11/10/2002).

- These terrorists are driven by an ideology that **exploits Islam** to serve a violent political vision (PR, 15/10/2005).

It is interesting to note that, in the discourse, the narrative of a 'distortion' from an idea of 'pure Islam' is constantly reiterated. Similarly to what happens with 'terrorism', other forms of 'radicalisms' and 'extremisms' are also silenced: extremism is 'Islamic extremism' and there is only one form of radicalism, 'Islamic radicalism'.

The terrorists practice a fringe form of **Islamic extremism** that has been **rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics** (20/9/01, AJS).

Islamic radicalism is more like a loose network with many branches than an army under a single command. Yet these operatives, fighting on scattered battlefields, share a similar ideology and vision for our world.¹⁰

It must be said that in several occasions the Bush administration distanced itself from 'anti-Muslim' and 'anti-Islam' statements, underlining that the enemy is not constituted by Muslims and reiterating that Islam is a religion of peace. See for example in the following examples:

...we must be mindful that as we seek to win the war, that we treat **Arab Americans and Muslims** with the respect they deserve. I know that is your attitudes as well; it's certainly the attitude of this Government, that **we should not hold one who is a Muslim responsible for an act of terror** (13/9/01, TC).

I also want to speak tonight directly to **Muslims** through the world. We respect your faith... Its **teachings are good and peaceful**, and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself (20/9/01, AJS).

...the teachings of **Islam** are the teachings of **peace** and **good** (26/9/01, MCL).

9 The very expression 'Islamic terrorism' is misleading. From a linguistic point of view, 'Islamists' differs from 'Islamic'. 'Islamist' is a direct derivative of 'Islamism' and refers to a politico-religious phenomenon linked to the events of the XX century. Rather differently, 'Islamic' refers to a millenarian culture and religion (Mozaffari, 2001). It is not a case if 'Islamists' call themselves 'Islamiyyoun' to differentiate themselves from 'Muslimum' (Muslims). The expression 'Islamist terrorism' to refer to 'terrorism' undertaken by 'Islamiyyoun' is probably more precise. In the US discourse, such a differentiation is not made.

10 Note that 'Islamic radicalism' is mentioned 6 times in this speech.

Reiterating the peaceful nature of the majority of Muslims had been proved to be particularly necessary especially after Bush defined the American 'mission against terrorism' a 'crusade', seeming to imply the renewal of Christendom's conquest of the holy lands by the US.¹¹ This was followed by the Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi assertion that "we must be aware of the superiority of our civilisation... in contrast with the Islamic countries", seeming to suggest that Muslims are nothing more than barbarians (RaiNews24, 2001)¹². Despite rhetorical attempts made by Bush and the majority of European political leaders to disconnect 'terrorism' from Islam, however, the two discourses have become conflated with the wider debate about security more generally. Indeed, as pointed out by Ahmed (2003:34),

The idea of Islam as an enemy was gaining ground in the West in spite of Western leaders insisting this was not true. From the beginning, bin Laden, who had threatened the United States with mass terror on several occasions, was widely believed to have been the mastermind of the attacks. If a Peruvian or a Japanese cult stepped forward and claimed that it had organised the attacks, it would have been hard to accept. In the public mind, Islam was to blame.

Analysing the discourse with regard to the representation of Islam, it can be argued that one of its 'nodal points' is the dissociation between a 'true Islam' versus a 'false Islam', reiterating once again the binary dichotomy 'good' versus 'evil'. That confirms the view that the most prevalent division seems to be done not between 'terrorists' and 'civilians' but within 'bad Muslims' and 'good' ones (Mamdani, 2002). Politicians such as Blair and Bush reiterated in many occasions the need to distinguish between the 'good' and the 'bad'.¹³ Although the US government repeated in various occasions to have nothing against Muslims as a whole, in the State Department list of countries whose nationals present a high security risk within the US, Muslims countries represent the highest percentage. Bankoff (2003: 421) reported that "as of July 2002, there were 35 organizations listed [as a Foreign Terrorist Organization] of which 86 percent were either based or mainly composed of individuals originating in developing countries...66 percent of all organizations had Islamic affiliations". Furthermore, the list of "states sponsor of terrorism" contains 10 states, 7 of which are "Islamic", thus "constituting [the] 70 per cent of those governments held responsible for harbouring international terrorism" (p. 422). Furthermore, in the list of "Specially Designated Global Terrorists", the "90 per cent [of individuals] have Islamic affiliation" (p. 422). Indeed, Muslims soon felt that the 'war on terror' was actually a 'war against Islam and Muslims' (Keen, 2006). Ahmed (2003:1) writes that:

After September 11, 2001 ... Muslim societies everywhere appeared to be in turmoil and Muslims felt themselves in the clock, accused to belonging to a 'terrorist', 'fanatic', and 'extremist' religion. Islam, it seemed, was under siege. The 'war on terrorism' that President George Bush declared after September 11 threatens to stretch into the century; for many Muslims it appears to be a war against Islam.

The US governmental discourse on terrorism- context and effects

The imprecise use of terms and concepts as 'Islam', 'Islamism', '(Islamist/c) terrorism' and 'clash of civilisation' and the conflation between them is not an exclusive feature of the governmental discourse on terrorism (re)created in the wake of the 2001 events in the US. Nor it is a novelty the perception of the Muslim world as a menace (Rodinson, 1987). The events of 11 September 2001 only exacerbated that. As Mozaffari (2001: 1) pointed out:

Subsequent to the tragic events of September 11th, we witness an impressive disorder and great confusion in the following terms and concepts 'War', 'Crusade', 'Jihad', 'Clash of Civilisation', 'Islam', 'Islamism', 'Islamic terrorism' and so forth and so on. This confusion could be misleading and to such an extent that it could lead to immeasurable and disastrous consequences.

While suspicion toward the Muslim world by Christian Europe can be found from the time Islam appeared (Hourani, 1991), it is only since the September 11, 2001 events, however, that the link between 'Islam' and 'terrorism' has emerged as the central concern of the Bush administration. Since then, "Islam has been invoked, written about, challenged, and defended in a variety of forms" (Lawrence, 2002: 485). As pointed out by Ahmed (2003:30),

After September 11 commentators on Islam were suddenly everywhere in the media. Much of what they had to say was racist and religiously prejudiced; it was hostility disguised as serious comment. Even the more scholarly voices were divided. Some woefully few,

11 It has to be mentioned that Bush's idea of a crusade met those of bin Laden, for long engaged in a 'holy war' against the Satanic America. Moreover, although Bush swiftly dropped the term in response to the negative media reaction, the idea that the war was indeed a crusade against Islam remained (Ahmed, 2003). Declarations of political leaders, such as Berlusconi in Italy, depicting Islam as the enemy of Western civilisation, coupled with the overtly aggressive statements by prominent religious leaders in the US and elsewhere, have helped in maintaining such a perception.

12 In the original: "Noi dobbiamo essere consapevoli della superiorità della nostra civiltà, il nostro è un sistema che ha garantito il benessere, il rispetto dei diritti umani e, a differenza dei paesi islamici, il rispetto dei diritti religiosi e politici." (RaiNews24, September 2001). Berlusconi's remarks about the superiority of Western civilisation have been denounced by the European Union (BBC News, September 2001).

13 Here, it is interesting to mention the following by Mamadouh 2003 (In Geopolitics) that noted that "American politicians (including the American president) have emphasised, for example, that Muslim and Arab Americans are full citizens and 'good Americans', but inevitably suggesting that there were numerous reasons to question their loyalty (after all, they did not state that Catholic or Chinese Americans are good Americans too)". p. 211.

wrote with sympathetic objectivity. Some even talked of Islam as essentially a religion of peace (...). Others were more dominant and aggressive; they spoke of Islam as a terrorist religion and as the main threat to the West in the clash of civilizations.

Political discussions around 'terrorism', initially associated with the widely cited, but increasingly discredited, *Clash of Civilizations* (Huntington, 1996), demonised Islam linking it to catastrophic images of incoming terrorist attacks. Later, that was followed by a modified and more precise line of argument emerged and resulted in understanding 'terrorism' not deriving from Islam generically, but rather from a particular interpretation of it, the one found in *Wahhabi Islam*, a strictly Sunny interpretation prevalent in Saudi Arabia (see for instance Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force 2004:20; and the Final Report of the 9/11 Commissions).¹⁴ Many observers have pointed out that "misperceptions, farfetched stories about Islam, and invented connections between Muslims and terrorism have been the guiding factors in shaping the attitudes of the American establishment toward the Muslim world" (Bulliet, 2003: 10).

The pervasiveness of these stereotypes has been present in all domains. Mamdani (2002) and Woods (2007) analysed the pervasive link between 'Islam' and 'terrorism' in the media coverage, but the association was widely echoed, far beyond media circles.¹⁵ In the academic world, influential scholars have written about Islam and Arabs with a recurrent negativity, in contrast with the 'Western exceptionalism'.¹⁶ In these writings, 'Western societies' are viewed as modern, marked-oriented, liberal, and democratic and set in opposition to Muslims societies described as being under ancient (uncivil) rules that hamper their modernisation and acceptance to the 'West', especially the US. Thus, a 'clash of civilisations' is prophesied (Lewis 1990, Huntington 1993, 1996). While this argument has been dismissed by several scholars, nevertheless Huntington's thesis is surely part of the intellectual context that allowed the (re)creation and establishment of the discourse under analysis. Keen (2006: 206) for instance has argued that "Huntington's orientalism has proven alarmingly seductive; his 'West is an Occident waiting to happen, and Bush and Blair are helping to fulfil the prophecy".

In his famous book entitled *Orientalism*, Said argues that Arabs and Muslims have been historically constructed in opposition to a superior 'West' depicting them as 'strange', 'inferior' and 'aberrant'. The oppositional relation between the 'West' and the 'Orient' (Said, 1994: 64) is reproduced in Bush's depiction of the 'enemy' as 'uncivilised' versus a 'civilised West', 'barbaric' in opposition to the 'freedom-lover' America, and so on as well as prevalent stereotypes seeing 'Arabs' and 'Muslims' as 'bellicose', 'brutal', 'cruel', 'without conscience', 'faithfulness', and 'uncivilized'. In the discourse, 'Al Qaida terrorists' (compared in several speeches to 'the communist threat') replace the Soviet Communism to become the novel 'Other' necessary for the reinforcement of the American identity. Al Qaeda's terrorists and by (linguistic) association Islamic fundamentalists, radicals, extremists and more generally Muslims become the new 'global' enemy.

Bush's categorisation of those oppositions in a hierarchical order, in which everything representing the 'West' is of a higher value than the 'rest', is the result of the binary 'understanding' of the world divided between 'us' and 'them'. From this understanding follows the necessity for the 'West' to control the 'Other' in order to preserve itself. And given the 'non-human' nature of the enemy, any action can be tolerated, even extreme violence. In the analysis, the necessity to 'eradicate' the enemy is repeated again and again, up to the point that 'eradicating evil' becomes America's top priority (Der Derian, 2002: 178).

The representation of the September 11, 2001 events coupled by "the fact that all 19 of the hijackers were Muslims appeared to condemn by association every Muslim on the planet. Any expression of Muslim identity risked the fear of being suspected as 'terrorist' activity" (Ahmed, 2003: 24). Furthermore, as it has emerged from the above analysis, in the discourse the 'good Islam' is binary opposed to the 'bad' and 'false' version of it. The 'false' Islam is represented as a dictatorial faith demanding and receiving absolute submission from all adherents in contrast to Judaism and Christianity perceived as allowing free and individual experiences of faith for their adherents (Talal Asad, 2003). Thus, Muslims 'are' violent just in function of their faith constantly associated with violence and understood as antithetical to modern secular democratic systems. Woods (2007: 7) reported that "in the first days after the 9/11 attacks, many commentators and public officials framed the conflict in religious terms... By the mid-2000s, according to public opinion polls, the idea that Islam encouraged violence more than did other religions was supported by a large percentage of Americans". Labels and meanings, indeed, had become easily fixed. According to Palmer and Palmer (2004: 9), "adding to the perception that Muslims support terror were the seemingly endless television portrayals of Muslim groups cheering bin Laden and desecrating the American flag". Official statements also seemed to

14 For a very short introduction on *Wahhabism* and *Salafiyya* enlightening the main concerns of the US government, see Blanchard, CM (2008) *The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya*. CRS Report for Congress. The Library of the Congress. Code RS1695.

15 Also note that this is not limited to the US. Rather, as pointed out by Mamadouh (Mamadouh V. 2003 11 September and *Popular Geopolitics: A Study of Websites Run for and by Dutch Moroccans*. *Geopolitics* 8 (3): 191-216.) in talking about the Dutch media representation of September 11, "the mass media circles echoed serious problems with the position of Muslims in the Netherlands", p. 200.

16 Scholars who wrote about Islam as in a collision course with the 'West' include Akbar 2002, Armesto 1995, Benjamin and Simon 2002, Corbin 2002, Fukuyama 1998, Hiro 2002, Huntington 1993, Kepel 2002, Lewis 2002 and Spencer 2002. Among the few scholars that have written about Islam in non-negative terms the following must be quoted: Armstrong, K. 2002 *The Battle for God: Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam* HarperCollins: London; Esposito 2002; Fuller, GE (2003) *The Future of Political Islam* Palgrave: NY, Nasr, SH 2002 *The Heart of Islam: Enduring Values of Humanity* Harper SanFrancisco: NY, Rosen, L. 2002 *The Culture of Islam: Changing Aspects of Contemporary Muslim Life* University of Chicago: Chicago.

reveal a pattern of 'anti-Muslim' polemics. Several Muslim associations and civil right groups, for instance, have considered the Patriotic Act, initiated by the Bush administration, as anti-Muslim (Haddad, 2004: 104f).

As such, more and more often, Muslims- (linguistically) associated with the 'threatening' Islamists- became the target of suspicion, if not real harassment. Indeed, within the USA, the 'other' has soon been identified in the Muslim, and suspicion directed against Muslims and those resembling to them (wearing turbans or having beards). In the USA, terminological slippages and connotations between terms already occurred in the aftermath of the 1995 bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City firstly attributed to "Muslim extremists" then identified in an Arab American man- Abraham Ahmad (Crelinsten, 1998).¹⁷ That reinforced the idea that 'All Arabs are Muslims – All Muslims are Arabs' and thus 'terrorists'. Muslims, already vulnerable to racism and political discrimination, following the explosion, became even more targets of harassment in the United States: "in the following three days, more than 200 violent attacks against Muslim Americans were recorded" (Gerges, 2003: 80).¹⁸

Since September 11, 2001, the anti-Muslim bias has become even more pronounced (Bankoff, 2003: 422). Indeed, several observers have noticed that the 'Homeland Security' and 'Patriot' Acts have allowed unprecedented powers to conduct surveillance upon, detain, interrogate and search whoever suspect with 'terrorism' until the point of declaring martial law (Graham *et al.*, 2004; Van Alstyne, 2002). Writing immediately after the September 11, 2001 events, Van Alstyne (2002: 82) notices that:

another step taken in the domestic war against terrorism involves the racial profiling of people who are potential terrorists based solely upon their race and ethnicity. The investigation into the attacks has led to the detention of nearly one thousand people so far. Most of the people in custody are being held on immigration violations or charges unrelated to terrorism. Allegations of police abuse have also surfaced. In spite of President Bush's assertion, "The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends", coverage of racial profiling has been systematically uncritical.

Communities has ended up for being divided between 'moderates' and 'radicals', 'friends' and 'enemies', a problematic division for the reason that "in practice, the dividing line between 'extremists' and 'moderates' is not only context specific but also highly porous" (Jackson, 2007 b: 413).

In America, "in the public mind Islam was to blame" (Ahmed, 2003: 34). In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 events, according to public opinion polls, a large percentage of Americans supported the idea that Islam encouraged violence more than did other religions (Woods, 2007: 7). Reports of the "harassment of Muslims and attacks on mosques began almost immediately. In some cases, Sikhs were killed. They had been mistaken, because of their beards and turbans, for Muslims" (see also Stoddard and Cornwell, 2002). Following the 2001 September events, in the US "there were personal verbal and physical attacks against Muslims, Muslim Americans and those who 'looked' Arab or Muslim.... Distrust and suspicion were also cast on recent arrivals who entered the United States, legally or illegally, from Mexico, Bosnia, Somalia, Russia and eastern European countries... " (Brunn, 2003: 3). Anti-Muslim bias clearly emerged when "noted legal personalities advocated the official use of torture in dealing with Muslims" (Ahmed, 2003: 40).

Furthermore, Arabs have continued to be associated with Muslims. Brunn (2003: 4) reports that "the number of violent incidents against Arab Americans (or those perceived as such) was 172 in the year before 11 September and over 600 the following year", and Collins and Glover (2002: 5) point out that "by early November, the U.S. Government had arrested over a thousand people, virtually all of whom were either Arab or Muslim, in most cases without charges. This was the most significant detention of a racial group since the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II".

Merskin (2004: 157-8) has reached similar conclusions. She writes that after September 2001:

the political rhetoric of George W. Bush employed words and expressions - ... 'evil', 'those people', 'demons', 'wanted: dead or alive' - to characterize people of Arab/Middle Eastern descent... Consequently, the 'Face of Terror' is not only that of Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein but also all persons of Arab descent, evoking the simulacrum of all Middle Eastern-looking men as the face of terrorism.

That has had an impact not only for the people of Arab descent or Arab-look but also on the quality of life of the three million of Arab Americans living in the US and on those wanting to enter the US.

The creation of an 'other', of a target group to be kept under control is not something new. Rather, throughout American history, "an array of individuals, groups, beliefs, and behaviours have occupied the position of the Antichrist" and have been necessary to the reinforcement of American identity (Campbell, 1998: 133). Indeed, a discursive 'Self' to make sense of its identity necessitates of a discursive 'Other'.

17 It is worth noting that Islam started to be perceived as a threat to "Western" interests with the Iranian revolution. Labels as "extremist", 'terrorist', and 'fanatical' were applied to the Islamic revolution in Iran" (Gerges, 2003: 76). Indeed, "it was under the impact of the Iranian revolution, then, that Islamism replaced secular nationalism as a security threat to the U.S. interests, and fear of a clash between Islam and the West crystallized in the minds of Americans" (Ibid: 77). The fear associated with Islamists became stronger in the aftermath of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Centre that considerably damaged the Muslim image in the US to further worsen in the following years.

18 Gerges (2003: 79) reports data from a survey on American attitudes toward Islam taken immediately after the 1995 bombings resulting in the more than half of the respondents saying that "Muslims are anti-Western and anti-American".

Jackson (2006: 171) has argued that "discourses of danger are scripted by political leaders for the purpose of maintaining inside/outside, self/other boundaries- they write American identity- and for enforcing unity on an unruly potentially (dis)United States". The discourse on 'terrorism' is the discourse of danger *par excellence*. In the wake of the September 11, 2001, chaos and fear dominated. In that contingency, "Americans sought desperate comfort in the idea of nationhood, if only as defined by unity against a common enemy" (Bender, 2002: 1176). It is indeed believed that patriotism and nationalism increase in response to outside dangers and threats (Li and Brewer, 2004). The September 11, 2001 events indeed resulted in immediate increases in expressions of unity and national identification throughout the country. Furthermore, an external 'other' is beneficial for the reaffirmation of the identity of the 'Self'. America, a very diverse and diversified nation, has historically maintained and reinforced its unity through the sublimation of an external threat. The 'new' enemy attacking America was '(Islamist) terrorism' and everything and anything associated to that. In front of it, everybody *felt* American and *understood* that not everybody is the same- 'we' (civilised Americans) don't kill innocents; 'they' do.

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 events, the new common enemy, the new evil, the latest Antichrist was soon identified in (Islamist) terrorism and attention directed towards people of Arab and Middle Eastern descent. That proved that the that the enduring power of racial and ethnic stereotypes becomes even more powerful in the face of a threat (Volkan, 1994). Within the US, long time before 2001, mass media and popular culture have generated and sustained stereotypes of a monolithic evil Arab and Muslim and associate it with the "Face of Terror" (Merskin, 2004: 158). Arabs and Muslims linked to 'terrorism' became the national scapegoat. Schildkraut (2002) has reported data from polls taken shortly after the September 11, 2001 events that clearly show the amalgam between Arabs, Muslims and terrorists in the public mind. In a *Newsweek* pool, 32% of respondents said the US 'should put Arabs and Arab-Americans under special surveillance'; 31% of respondents in a *Time/CNN* pool said they would favour their government 'to hold Arabs who are US citizens in camps until it can be determined whether they have links to terrorist organisations'. In October 2001, 44% of interviewees in a *ABC/Washington Post* pool said they support giving to police the power to stop anyone 'who appears to be Arab or Muslim', 28% said being an Arab or Muslim should be an important part of the profile of a suspected terrorist (data cit. in Schildkraut, 2002: 525-6). Indeed, 66% of respondents have considered themselves favourable to ethnic profiling of 'people who are Arab or of Middle Eastern descent to see if they may be involved in potential terrorist activities' (Ibid.). In representing the 'other', 'our' identity- as Americans- is reinforced. The representation of the 'other', of the new Antichrist as the supreme existential threat to 'our way of life' tells America and Americans what to fear most - '(Islamist) terrorism'; what America is not - 'terrorist'; *what it is* - the beacon of freedom and democracy in the world; and what it has to do to remain *America*- to rid the world from that evil.

Conclusion

Although in an extremely simplified form, Bush's understanding of the world as structured in binary oppositions ('good' versus 'evil', 'freedom' versus 'terrorism', 'civilisation' versus 'barbarism', 'us' versus 'them') is not new. Arguably, the all enterprise of 'Western' thought has been founded on binary opposition, such as 'male' versus 'female', 'spirit' versus 'matter', 'light', versus 'darkness', and so on. Nor is a novelty the vilification of the 'Other' adopted to reinforce the identity of the 'Self'. As emerged above, in the discourse, 'Al Qaida terrorists' (compared in several speeches to 'the communist threat') replace the Soviet Communism to become the novel 'Other' necessary for the reinforcement of the American identity. Al Qaeda's terrorists and by association Islamic fundamentalists, radicals, extremists and more generally Muslims become the new global enemy.

The constant reiteration of the American goodness and its duty to 'moralise' the rest of the world bringing freedom and peace all around the world is necessary for the reinvention and legitimisation of American superpower identity built up an articulation of 'new' threats ('Islamist terrorism') and an aberrant 'other' (Islamists, and by association all Muslims). On November 10, 2001, Bush said: "We have a chance to write the story of our times, a story of courage defeating cruelty and light overcoming darkness. This calling is worthy any life" (Address to the UN). In the discourse, the 'morality' of US is constantly reiterated; its mission presented as approved and guided by God himself and depicted in contrast to 'their' willingness to destroy 'our way of life'.¹⁹

The 'terrorist', the new 'other', initially identified in the Islamist, soon becomes identified in a generic Muslim- by virtue of the linguistic association of Islam with anything related to 'terrorism'. That has occurred not only within the United States. Fekete (2004: 18), for instance, has noted a similar phenomenon occurring in Europe. She wrote that European "governments and security services fear the mosque where global injustices towards Muslims are discussed; they fear the influence that 'foreign imams', with their anti-western agenda, could have on disaffected youth; they fear anything and everything closely associated with

19 See for instance the following statement "**I trust God speaks through me**" (Bush in a private meeting. In Suskind, R. 'Faith, Certainty and the Presidency of George W. Bush' New York Times 17 October 2004)

Islam". Here, the attention has concentrated only on some of the effects the governmental discourse on 'terrorism' had in America, but similar research is needed for other contexts and different historical periods.

References

- Ahmed, A., (2003) *Islam Under Siege: Living Dangerously in a Post-Honor World*, Polity Press: Cambridge
- Akbar, M. J., (2002) *The Shade of Swords: Jihad and the Conflict between Islam and Christianity*. Routledge: London
- Armesto, F. F., (1995) *Millennium: A History of the Last Thousand Years*, Scribner: NY
- Asad, T., (2003) *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, Cultural memory in the Present*, Stanford University Press: Stanford
- Bankoff, G., (2003) *Regions of Risk: Western Discourses on Terrorism and the Significance of Islam*. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 26: 413-28
- Bartolucci, V., (2010, forthcoming) *Analysing elite discourse on terrorism and its implications: the case of Morocco* *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 115-31
- BBC News, (September 2001), "EU deplores 'dangerous' Islam jibe", BBC News, 27 September, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1565664.stm>
- Bender, S.W., (2002) *Sight, Sound and Stereotype: The War on Terrorism and its Consequences for Latinas/os*" *Oregon Law Review*, vol. 81, pp. XXX
- Benjamin, DK, and Simon, SA, (2002) *The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam's War against America*, Random House: NY.
- Bourdieu, P., (1990) *In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology* Polity Press: Cambridge
- Bourdieu, P., (1991) *Language and Symbolic Power* Polity Press: Cambridge
- Brunn, S. D., (2003) *11 September and Its Aftermath: Introduction*. *Geopolitics* vol.8, no. 3, pp. 1-15
- Bulliet, R. W., 2003 *Rhetoric, discourse and the future of hope*. *American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 588, pp. 10-7
- Campbell, D (1998) (rev. edtn) *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* Manchester University Press: Manchester
- Carabine, J. (2001) *Unmarried Motherhood 1830-1990: A Genealogical Analysis*. In M. Wetherell, S. Taylor, SJ. Yates, *Discourse as Data : A Guide for Analysis*, Open University Press: Milton Keynes, pp: 267-310
- Collins, J., and Glover, R., (2002) *Collateral Language. A User's Guide to America's New War*, New York University Press: NY
- Corbin, J., (2002) *Al-Qaeda, Thunder's Mouth*: NY.
- Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on Terrorist Financing. (2004) 'Update on the Global Campaign Against Terrorist Financing'. June 15.
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States REF.
- Crelinsten, R. D., (1998) *The Discourse and Practice of Counter-Terrorism in Liberal Democracies* *Australian Journal of Politics and History* vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 389- 413
- Croft, S., (2006) *Culture, Crisis and America's War on Terror* Cambridge University Press: Cambridge
- Der Derian, J. (2002) *9/11: Before, After, and In Between*. In Calhoun CJ., Price P. and Timmer A. (eds) *Understanding September 11*, The New Press: NY. Pp. 170-??
- van Dijk, T., (2006) *Discourse and Manipulation*, *Discourse and Society*, vol 17, no. 2, pp. 359-83
- Fairclough, N., (1992) *Discourse and Social Change* Polity Press: Cambridge

- Fairclough, N., (2003) *Analysing Discourse. Textual Analysis for Social Research*, Routledge: London
- Fairclough, N., and Wodak, R., (1997) Critical Discourse Analysis. In van Dijk (ed.) *Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction* Vol. 2 Sage: London, pp. 258-84
- Fukuyama, F., (1998) *The End of History and the Last Man* Bard: NY.
- George, A., ed. (1991) *Western State Terrorism* Polity Press; Cambridge
- Gerges, F. A., (2003) Islam and Muslims in the Mind of America. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* vol. 588, pp. 73-89
- Graham, P., Keenan, T., Dowd, AM., (2004) A call to Arms at the End of History: A Discourse Historical Analysis of George W. Bush's Declaration of War on Terror *Discourse Society* vol. 15, no. 2-3, pp. 199-221
- Gunning, J., (2007) 'Babies and Bathwaters: Reflecting on the Pitfalls of Critical Terrorism Studies'. *European Political Science* vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 236-243
- Haddad, Y., (2004) The shaping of a moderate North American Islam: Between 'Mufti' Bush and 'Ayatollah' Ashcroft. In Tehodore, G., Geaves, R., Haddad, Y., Smith IJ. *Islam and the West Post 9/11*, Ashgate: Burlington
- Hiro, D., (2002) *War Without End* Routledge: London.
- Hourani, A., (1991) *Islam in European thought* Cambridge Uni Press: NY.
- Huntington, SP. (1993) 'The Clash of Civilizations?' *Foreign Affairs*, summer, vol 72 (3).
- Huntington, SP. (1996) *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* Simon and Schuster: NY.
- Jackson, R., (2005) *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, politics and counter-terrorism*, Manchester University Press: Manchester
- Jackson, R., (2006) Genealogy, Ideology, and Counter-Terrorism: Writing wars on terrorism from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush Jr, *Studies in Language & Capitalism*, vol.1, pp. 163-93.
- Jackson, R., (2007 a) The core commitments of critical terrorism studies *European Political Science Symposium*, vol. 6, pp. 244- 51
- Jackson, R., (2007 b) Constructing Enemies: 'Islamic Terrorism' in Political and Academic Discourse *Government & Opposition* vol. 42, no. 3, pp. 394-426
- Jarvis, L. (2009) The Spaces and Faces of Critical Terrorism Studies *Security Dialogue* 1(40): 5-28
- Juergensmeyer, M., (2000), *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, University of California Press: Berkeley
- Keen, D., (2006) *Endless War? Hidden Functions of the 'war on terror'*. Pluto Press: London
- Laqueur, W. (1997) *The Age of Terrorism* Little Brown: Boston
- Lawrence, BB., (2002) Conjuring with Islam II *The Journal of American History* 89 (2): September, pp. 485-97.
- Lewis, B., (2002) *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response* Oxford University Press: NY.
- Li, Q., and Brewer, M. B., (2004) What Does It Mean to Be an American? Patriotism, Nationalism, and American Identity After 9/11, *Political Psychology*, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 727-39
- Merskin, D., (2004) The Construction of Arabs as Enemies: Post-September 11 Discourse of George W. Bush, *Mass Communication & Society*, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 157-75
- Mozaffari, M., (2001) *Bin Laden: Terrorism and Islamism*. Aarhus University: Denmark.

Palmer, M., and Palmer, P., (2004), *At the heart of Terror. Islam, Jihadists and America's War on Terrorism*. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, INC, Lanham

RaiNews24 (September 2001) "Berlusconi e la 'superiorità dell' Occidente', dure le critiche", RaiNews24, 27 September, available at <http://www.rainews24.rai.it/news.php?newsid=13709>

Rodinson, M., (1987) *Europe and the mystique of Islam*, London: I.B. Tauris

Rogers, P., (2007) *Why we are losing the war on terror* Polity Press: Cambridge

Said, E., (1994) *Orientalism* Ram House: NY

Sammon, B., (2002) *Fighting Back: The War on Terrorism from Inside the Bush White House*, Regnery Publishing Inc.: Washington

Schildkraut, D. J., (2002) The More Things Change.... American Identity and Mass and Elite Response to 9/11, *Political Psychology*, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 511-35

Schmid, AP., (1989) Terrorism and the Media: The Ethics of Publicity *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol.1, no. 4, pp. 539-65

Silberstein, S., (2002) *War of Words: Language, Politics and 9/11* Routledge: London

Silke, A., ed. (2004) *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures*, Frank Cass: London

Spencer, R., (2002) *Islam Unveiled: Disturbing Questions about the World's Fastest-Growing Faith* Encounter: San Francisco.

Stoddard, EW., and Cornwell, GH., 2002 'Unity'. In Collins J. and R. Glover (eds) *Collateral Language A User's Guide to America's New War*. New York University Press: NY; pp. 175-90

Asad, T., (2003) *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, Cultural memory in the Present* Stanford University Press: Stanford.

Van Alstyne, A. D. (2002) Freedom. In Collins, J. and Glover, R. (eds.) *Collateral Language. A User's Guide to America's New War*, New York University Press, NY, pp. 79-93

Volkan, V., (1994) *The need to have enemies and allies: From clinical practice to international relationships* (2nd edtn.) Aronson: Northvale

Weinberg, L., Pedahzur, A., Hirsch-Hoefler, S. (2004) The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16 (4): 777-94

Woods, J., (2007) What We Talk about When We Talk about Terrorism: Elite Press Coverage of Terrorism Risk from 1997 to 2005, *Press/Politics* vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 3-20

Zarefsky, D., (2004), Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 607-19

Zerubavel 1993 "The death of Memory and the Memory of Death: Masada and the Holocaust as Historical Metaphors" Paper presented at the 43rd Annual International Communication Association Conference, May 27- 31 Washington

Zoulaika, J., and Douglass, WE., (1996) *Terror and Taboo: the follies, fables and faces of terrorism* Routledge: NY