

All the Shades of Red: Examining the Radical Left's Euroscepticism

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Introduction

This paper aspires to contribute towards ways of understanding the opposition to European integration by the European radical left, by relating the literatures on Euroscepticism and radical left parties. Its aim is two-pronged: 1) firstly geared towards assessing the congruence in European radical left parties' outlooks on European integration, in turn illuminating larger questions about the particularities and trajectories of radical left party ideology; 2) secondly, aiming to contribute to the debate on the main factors conditioning radical left party outlooks on European integration.

First of all, however, let us deal with two basic questions. *Why* are the responses of radical left parties to European integration worth studying? The answer has, more or less, become commonplace, since a surge of publications has emerged on this subject in recent years. Firstly, the EU has replaced the USSR as an area of socialisation for radical left parties in Europe, whereby policies, tactics and affiliations are structured accordingly. In turn, elements of policy co-ordination and increased inter-party cooperation at the EU level are now necessary, insofar as these parties are thought to have common beliefs and considering that Europeanised politics, policies and political have major commonalities in terms of both source and outcome. Secondly, notwithstanding ideological and programmatic similarities that have proven sufficient for these parties to form distinct groupings within the European Parliament (EP), European integration as an issue has divided the radical left for decades; in the mindsets of both partisans and analysts this has mostly been a result of the division between revolutionary outlooks and reformist ones. As Duphny (2004) says, in summing up academic and political debates on the left, the dispute between 'maximalists' and 'minimalists', 'reformists' and revolutionaries', 'is one of those perennial disputes that is as familiar to anyone who has ever been involved in leftwing politics as their favourite old woolly jumper' (see later). Thirdly, the EU also serves as an example of salient, externally imposed change, that is as multi-faceted as the broader theme of the capitalist system itself, and in turn as a case of ideological adjustment, which in accordance with, we can specify the empirical evidence but still reach wider conclusions that shed light on various aspects of a party's or a party family's broader identity.

Of course, amidst a flurry of literature on the relations of parties to European integration, in recent years, the next (derivative) question would be *how* to study radical left parties' responses to European integration. The concept of Euroscepticism offers a valuable tool for this avenue of research, since it first of all differentiates itself (or, at least should) from the looser concept of EU-related discourse that is used in inter-party competition (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008: 9; 2003: 18-19). Euroscepticism therefore has to do with outlooks and not the salience attributed to the EU. Outlooks allow for a clearer picture of ideological differences and similarities, in so far as they allow a sharper examination as to whether ideology is substantively diluted (by strategic concerns, or otherwise) and not simply, downplayed tactically and temporarily. They also offer a more basic template upon which to measure congruence within the radical left, as part of the broader, ongoing attempts to understand existing policy and networking agreements/disagreements.

The following two sections introduce the two classificatory frameworks by Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak (2002; 2004; also Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008) and Petr Kopecky and Cas Mudde (2002) and explain their analytical capacity, as well as assess their relevance to diachronic debates in the radical left party movement and especially the communist one before it. The next section discusses recent typologies of the radical left and is followed by a qualitative analysis of the outlooks of thirteen radical left parties (housed in the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) grouping of the EP) towards European integration, during the 1990s and beyond. Its ultimate purpose is to place each party in one of the frameworks' categories. Empirical evidence is drawn mainly from congress decisions and official party statements such as election manifestos, in order to grasp the authoritative and collective stance of (potentially) divided parties (e.g. Budge,

2001), as well as their more long-term visions. Secondary literature that draws upon Congresses and manifestos is also used. The fifth section discusses the results comparatively and assesses congruence within the radical left as a whole and each of its (identified) sub-sets and whether it is ideology, strategy or a mixture of both that structure radical left parties' outlooks on European integration. The conclusion lays out some thoughts which attempt to rationalise the findings and point the way for future research.

The framework(s) of analysis...

The first framework of analysis that will be employed as a tool for the categorisation of radical left party Euroscepticism is that by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002; 2004) and Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008). The two authors' definition of Euroscepticism is based on Taggart's (1998) earlier argument that, the concept in its widest sense, 'expresses the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration'. The authors build on this suggestion and identify three different positions: pro-EU, soft Eurosceptic and hard Eurosceptic. They identify soft euroscepticism where there is not a principled objection to European integration or EU membership, but where policy or national concerns lead to the expression of contingent or qualified opposition to the EU (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008: 8; 2004; 2002). Contingent or qualified opposition is, therefore, not incompatible with principled support of the European project. Hard Euroscepticism's working definition is where there is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and can be seen through opposition to membership, or support for withdrawal from membership, or through policies 'that are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived' (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008: 7; 2004; 2002). As a result, the membership factor is a crucial test for a party's placement in one of the two categories, in so far as a soft-Eurosceptic is necessarily not against membership, at least in principle. Due to various criticisms, the two authors later revised their suggestions, arguing, among other things, that the 'ultimate litmus test' should not be the membership factor (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2003: 6). However, since their framework has been widely used in its original form and because the membership factor is not a crucial test in our second framework, in this paper we use the original Szczerbiak and Taggart framework. The significance placed on the membership factor also allows us to observe whether, the congruence between radical left parties' outlooks towards European integration, or the lack thereof, as well as any potential overall shifts in outlooks, can indeed be ascribed to membership considerations or not.

The second framework is that by Kopecky and Mudde (2002). The two authors draw upon David Easton's distinction between different forms of support for political regimes (Easton, 1965: 124ff.) to distinguish between 'diffuse' and 'specific' support for European integration. In turn two dimensions/axes are identified. The first dimension is labeled 'support (for the ideas/values) of European integration'. Across this dimension, the authors distinguish between the Europhiles and the Europhobes. Europhiles believe in the key ideas of European integration underlying the EU: 'institutionalised cooperation on the basis of pooled sovereignty (the political element) and an integrated liberal market economy (the economic element)'. The belief in such ideas exists independent of how the EU is realised in practice. On the other hand, Europhobes do not support (or, oppose) one or more of these ideas.

The second dimension of the framework is 'support for the European Union', where the authors distinguish between EU-optimists and EU-pessimists. EU-optimists are those who believe in the current trajectory of the EU or are hopeful about it. A critical attitude towards a certain EU policy does not exclude the party from this category, as long as its attitude overall is judged to be positive. In contrast, those parties that are critical or pessimistic of the EU's current trajectory are the EU-pessimists. According to Kopecky and Mudde, this category does not necessarily include

membership objections, as long as EU-pessimist parties support the ideas of the integration process and are hopeful about making the EU a closer reflection of them.

These two dimensions lead to four categories of party positions on Europe, graphically illustrated in the 2X2 matrix of Figure 1. *Euroenthusiasts* combine Europhile and EU-optimist positions. *Eurosceptics* combine Europhile and EU-pessimist positions. The *Eurorejects*, are Europhobes and EU-pessimists and the *Europragmatists*, are Europhobes and EU-optimists. Parties that are skeptical about the values of the integration project but support membership for country or constituency interests are automatically included in this last category (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002: 303). Overall, in addition to the different categorisation process of the Kopecky and Mudde framework, with membership not playing a fundamental role, one more category is introduced: that of the Europragmatists. It is in this category that the membership factor appears important and not overall.

Kopecky and Mudde's (2002) framework was devised on the basis of identifying and removing certain weaknesses to Szczerbiak and Taggart's (original) classificatory tools. Firstly, they argue, soft Euroscepticism can be taken to include disagreements with any policy decision of the EUⁱ. Concurrently, the criteria that are used to distinguish between 'soft' and 'hard' Euroscepticism remain unclear. Thirdly, through the pro-EU-soft-hard trichotomy, one cannot adequately emphasise the significant distinction between the idea of European integration and the EU as the current embodiment of this goal, resulting 'in the over- and underestimation of the strength of the phenomenon' (ibid.: 300).

Figure 1. Framework of Analysis (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002)

		Support for European integration	
		Europhile	Europhobe
S u p p o r t f o r t h e E U	EU-Optimist	<i>Euroenthusiasts</i>	<i>Europragmatists</i>
	EU-Pessimist	<i>Eurosceptics</i>	<i>Eurorejects</i>

....And their relevance

Both frameworks make the fundamental distinction between process/values and trajectory (although in the case of Szczerbiak and Taggart, opposition to membership is essentially considered as an expression of these values' rejection). This distinction, however perceived, makes the frameworks historically relevant for radical left parties, since it reflects an axis of discussion over which the West European communist movement has been diachronically divided. A large body of research lends us support that this distinction not only underlies the historical divisions in the attitudes of communist parties towards European integration but also the core of their post-WWII ideological development. The Eurocommunists and later the members of the Unitary European Left group in the EP, for example, argued that EC institutions should be used as an avenue for anti-capitalist struggle, necessarily involving gradualism and a certain degree of cooptation with the EU's underlying values (at least, supranationalism). While the more orthodox parties chose a (sometimes) tacit but clear opposition to the EU and all that the process of constructing it stood for. Further, intra-party disputes over the prospects of accepting European integration, were also present throughout (e.g. Dunphy, 2004: 53-71; Bell, 1996; Heywood, 1994: xviii)ⁱⁱ.

Through the Kopecky and Mudde framework, arises also the potential for a corollary avenue of research, concerning the ongoing debates on the factors conditioning outlooks on European integration and more specifically the disagreements that exist between those ascribing ideology as the main driver of attitudes (e.g. Kopecky and Mudde, 2002) and those ascribing strategy (that is, short-term and party system related considerations) (e.g. Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2002; Sitter, 2001). This debate brings to the fore another central question underlying the historical divisions in the attitudes of radical left parties towards European integration and capitalist liberal democracy more broadly. That is whether they should prioritise their ideological beliefs or, give emphasis on specific policies or electoral goals that are the best alternative at a given point in time, in a given party system? Whether they should balance ideology with an approach that embodies the way of thinking of capitalist liberal democracies and is necessary for office and/or votes and/or policy, or, leave it untouched? (Bale and Dunphy, 2007:1; Bell, 1996: 223-4; Machin, 1983: Introduction; Gatti, 1978)

Kopecky and Mudde's (2003:320) contention is that consistency on the horizontal axis would point to ideology as the prime factor determining outlooks on the process European integration, since a horizontal move would 'almost certainly' be time-consuming and electorally costly. On the other hand, strategy can play an important role in explaining a party's support for the EU. By applying this rational, we can preliminarily discern the significance of ideology. At the same time, we can double-check this rational, since one would expect the members of a party family (or, at least of each of its sub-sets) to be placed on one side of the framework's horizontal distinction, if ideology is to be granted most of the causal weight in regard to 'support for European integration' (ibid.:p.321).

Typologies of European radical left parties

Within the context of the present endeavor, one must not forget the complications that present themselves as a result of the various existing typologies of European radical left parties' ideologies. Overall, there is an unclear picture, as to which terms and categories should be used to describe, understand and analyse the radical left. On the one hand, there is a good case to be made that the radical left can be categorised as one party family. March and Mudde (2005:25) have explained this rationale by arguing that firstly, the radical left shares a (radical) rejection of the underlying socio-economic structure of contemporary capitalism and its values and practices, and the advocating 'of alternative economic and power structures (involving a major redistribution of resources from existing political elites)'. Secondly, they share a (left) pursuit of social justice 'in political and

social arrangements', while espousing 'collective economic and social rights as their principal agenda', being more consistently anti-capitalist than anti-democratic and promoting internationalism, as an instrument of both networking and emphasising the global nature of national and regional problems. Others have also examined various radical left parties, seeking similarities and differences under the (sometimes implicit) assumption, that the common denominator of the radical left, is at least as clear as that of other commonly perceived party families (see, Backes and Moreau, 2008; Dunphy, 2004; Hough and Handle, 2004; Botella and Ramiro, 2003).

At the same time, many authors have differentiated between radical left parties. Although the term 'radical left', has been put into systematic use after the end of the cold war, earlier studies distinguished between communists and others who were positioned to the left of social democracy. For instance, classifications by Seiler (1980) and Von Beyme (1985) identified differences between communist parties and workers' parties and protest parties of the left, although acknowledging their common origins. More recent justifications of intra-family differentiation have arisen as a result of the 1989-1991 events being a crossing point in their trajectories. Accordingly, it is no longer fruitful to regard all of the above parties as one 'family' or to study them under a common framework (Bull, 1995). Radical left parties are therefore divided at least between those that kept their communist identity and especially (some parts of) its teleological aspect (the Greek KKE, the Cypriot AKEL, the Portuguese PCP, the French PCF, the Spanish PCE, the Italian Rifondazione and PdCI and from east central Europe the Czech KSČM, among a couple of others with parliamentary representation) and those of the post-communist (and sometimes also red-green) rubric (the Finish VAS, the Swedish V, the German PDS (and Die Linke), the Greek SYN), which at the least, do not share the communist label and at the most, downplay even the analytical dimension of Marxism (Bull, 1995; 1994; Bell, 1993:13). Other authors, place more attention on the variability of radical left ideology and distinguish between the orthodox (Marxist-Leninist) (AKEL, KKE, PCP, KSČM), red-green (SYN, VAS, V) and reformed/post communist parties (PCE, PCF, Rifondazione, PdCI, PDS/Die Linke) (Backes and Moreau, 2008)ⁱⁱⁱ. Still, others content that there appear to exist enough ideological differences to conceive these parties as far left, and in turn distinguish them into radical left and extreme left parties (e.g. the KKE and the PCP), on the basis of the latter's distaste of liberal democracy and their ultimate goal of transcending any form of market economy, and further into (the cross-cutting categories of) reform communists (AKEL, Rifondazione, PdCI, PCE, PCF), conservative communists (KKE, PCP), democratic socialists (VAS, V, SYN), social populist^{iv} and populist socialist (Sinn Fein, PDS/Die Linke) (March, 2008; also see, March and Mudde, 2005).

If we take as a prominent message that the radical left is both ideologically divided and homogeneous, then the most reasonable hypotheses would not exclude the possibility of either congruence or incongruence, at least at the level of the radical left as a single party family. However, the quest for congruence has to take into consideration the contented divisions within the radical left; firstly, for the purpose of adding validity to the findings; secondly, in order to present a more refined picture of exact ideological differences/similarities within the radical left, on the European question; thirdly, for the purpose of carrying out a more general assessment of the typologies themselves. In this vein, the present study will discuss the findings with reference to both the radical left as a distinct party family and the various sub-sets of the radical left that have been identified by the recent literature. The analysis that follows is structured according to the distinction between contingent/trajectory-centered and principled/value-centered opposition to the EU. Since the membership factor is crucial for the first framework and the Europragmatist category of the second framework and additionally relates to the radical left's attention to national interests (*vis a vis* its attention to class interests), discussion will also revolve around this issue.

Radical left party attitudes towards European integration

Cyprus

Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL)

Within the larger context of ideological and organisational renewal, which was finalised by 1990, the AKEL changed its stance on Cyprus' EU membership five years later (in 1995). The main argument for changing its stance was that EU membership would provide more security to the Republic of Cyprus and could act as a catalyst for the resolution of the Cyprus Problem (always considering Turkey's EU membership aspiration), underpinned by the consideration that the international scene had become unipolar (Charalambous, 2007: 437-39). While being highly critical of the anti-popular character of the EU's current policies – especially in economic and foreign policy matters – and positioning itself against every single Treaty so far, consistent references to the positive aspects of Cyprus' EU membership are made, including administrative modernisation, the promotion of environmental awareness and the EU's potential role in the Cyprus Problem resolution attempts (Katsourides, 2003).

Regarding the ideas of European integration, the AKEL is difficult to classify, because its analysis of European integration (as of most things) is not theoretically advanced and the party itself does not enter ideological debates with other parties or sustain a culture of much theoretical reflection (Charalambous, 2007). Yet the most appropriate inference from its official statements is that the 1995 change also signified a broader ideological re-conceptualisation of the European integration project. Its basic thesis of European integration has remained the same - an advanced form of capitalist integration, in the interests of big capital (AKEL, 2006: 43) - but no explicit, negative mention either of liberal economies or, of pooled sovereignty is made as such. And although, AKEL's 1990 ideological manifesto, which envisages a 'renewed socialism', still stands after the 1995 shift (AKEL, 1995), no subsequent Congress elaborates on this and most of all, this manifesto's elaborations are unspecific enough (Charalambous, 2007: 433-37) to be applicable within the EU. Indeed, the AKEL's Leninism is mostly a characteristic of its organisational structure and anti-imperialist character, rather than a clear trait of its overall socio-economic vision. In this case, therefore, the post-1991 period and the membership factor led to a broader change on the values of European integration as well. The AKEL has moved from hard-to soft-Euroscepticism, in regard to the first framework and from Eurorejectionism to Euroscepticism, in regard to the second framework.

Czech Republic

Czech Communist Party (KSČM)

The KSČM's classification in regard to the two dimensions of our framework is made difficult by the divisions that exist within the party over its European orientation (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002; Hough and Handl, 2004). A substantial part of the party leadership and membership, distaste the capitalist and liberal values of the integration process and approach it as a tool of multinational capitalism and German domination; hence, the official, vague call 'for an alternative democratic form of European integration and a common project for a socialist Europe', which should involve socialisation that goes far beyond the confines of the EU. Officially, however, the party is in favour of a loose form of integration that would guarantee economic efficiency, the internationalisation of politics, the Czech Republic's interests and cultural enrichment; it accepts the need for a Social Charter, an EU environmental policy and aid programmes for regional development, among other supranational initiatives (KSČM, 2009; Dauderstädt, 2005: 58). Its programme for socialism favours a large and active state sector and is largely inspired by communist values that appear to

differ substantially from those that currently dominate in the EU. Yet, it also dismisses central planning, accepts a multi-party system and as in the case of AKEL, is vague enough to be applicable within the EU (KSČM, 2008). Further, the party has placed itself as a proponent of a confederal or ‘moderately federal’ EU and in an earlier policy document, where explicit reference was made to European integration as a process, the party appeared broadly positive (Handl, 2005:133; Hanely, 2002:9).

Of course, the party rejects the EU in its current form, largely incorporating a nation-centered critique, covering most policy areas. Officially, it also stood against Czech membership in the EU. In the 2003 referendum campaign, although slightly ambivalent, it eventually opposed membership, partly arguing that the terms negotiated by the government were unfavourable, but in the past decade, it has also been following a constructive approach of not simply dismissing but also counter-proposing and more broadly treating the EU as an inevitable reality (Hough and Handl, 2004; Handl, 2005; Hanley, 2000). Since 2004, therefore, the KSČM has not been opposing Czech membership in principle (Riishoj, 2007; Handl, 2005) and mostly uses this opposition as a strategic weapon (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002). Its arguments center on the Czech Republic’s limited benefits due to the government’s mishandling of the accession and the EU’s current character, echoing Szczerbiak and Taggart’s argument that hard-Eurosceptics project a more adamant and ideological opposition to membership, with soft-eurosceptics throwing much of the blame on the government (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2003:8). Albeit internal confusion and disagreement, the categorical no to membership is no longer dominant in the party. Overall, the KSČM previously portrayed a hard-Eurosceptic stance (largely due to the membership factor) and currently it is following a soft-Eurosceptic stance, in regard to the first framework. In regard to the second framework’s more value based approach, it is a former Euroreject and a current Eurosceptic. In the first case, the KSČM’s shift can be loosely traced in 2004, while in the second framework the shift can be loosely traced in the late 1990s.

Finland

Left Alliance (VAS)

The VAS was an entirely new party formed from the two wings of a deeply-divided communist movement, together with many of non-communist members (Arter, 2002). A turn away from communism and towards a red-green, ‘third left’, was consolidated by the mid-1990s. Due to its internal ideological heterogeneity, the issue of European integration has never enjoyed full agreement. Yet, the elaborations of official party documents, since 1993, point towards the acceptance of supranational governance, the acceptance of a market economy (regulated in a ‘Scandinavian style’ fashion) and a positive attitude towards the strengthening of the EU’s powers in a substantial number of areas; especially in employment and taxation matters (Dunphy, 2004: 142; Raunio, 1999: 152-153).

Regarding the EU’s trajectory, the party has been less stable. Until the mid-1990s it followed a very critical stance, arguing against both the current form of the EU and Finnish membership, under the claim that sovereignty, neutrality and the Scandinavian welfare model would be undermined in the existing EU. The issues of EU (1995) and EMU (1999) membership were the cause of major internal upheaval and on both occasions, the VAS followed an office-seeking strategy, in order to be taken as a credible government force (Dunphy, 2007; Arter, 2002: 8). Essentially, it did not reach a clear decision on the referendum for Finnish membership in the EU and soon after its leadership changed its evaluation. Similarly, the EMU was opposed in the 1996 Euroelection but eventually EMU membership was approved (through a party caucus) and linked to the party’s government participation (Dunphy, 2004: 144; Arter, 2002: 8). Overall, the VAS appears to be critical of the EU’s current trajectory in the sense that it ‘wants to reform the European Union in

such a way that it supports the development of society on the basis of the Nordic model of solidarity' (VAS, 2007). The VAS can be classified as a former hard-Eurosceptic and current soft-Eurosceptic in regard to the first framework (again, largely because of the membership factor) and a Eurosceptic, in regard to the second framework.

France

French Communist Party (PCF)

The official Marchais-led line inside the PCF has viewed the process of European integration, especially the economic aspect of the free circulation of goods and services, as inherently capitalistic, particularly arguing against the negative effects of free trade on workers and the threat of foreign dominance (partly led by German capital) over French democracy and sovereignty. The turning point for the PCF came in the mid-1990s (under the leadership of Robert Hue) and especially once the party's participation in a left-wing government was under way in 1997. The PCF has not altered its views on the values of European integration, but simply its discourse in inter-party competition, partly in response to the attempt of not undermining the government (Dunphy, 2004: 101). In its 1999 Euroelection manifesto, for instance, the PCF argued in favour of European construction, but only in the form of a pluralist network of social movements which goes against the very nature of the integration project as we know it, concurrently criticising cooperation in crucial policy areas (e.g. single European currency) (Evans, 2000: 540). Ten years later, it was demanded that 'France withdraws its signature from the Treaty of Rome and that it launches a major debate across the European people for a new basic treaty, ratified by referendum, freeing Europe from its policies and its liberal institutions' (PCF, 2009).

In regard to the EU's current trajectory, it should be emphasised that, during the 1990s and beyond, the PCF voted against all EU Treaties and argued for a wholesale redefinition of the Constitutional project. Nevertheless, since the mid-1990s the PCF has also accepted the EU as a potential level of political action necessary to attain necessary goals, as well as to challenge American hegemony, subsequently expressing a (later revised) positive attitude towards participation in the EMU as well (e.g. PCF, 2009; PCF, 2007; also, Ladrech, 2001:41). This also explains the absence of any official preoccupation as to whether France must leave the EU or not. The party's general thesis stabilised at fighting the EU from within, under the aspiration of changing it radically. Benefits from EU membership are acknowledged and despite a strict and very prominent class perspective, utilitarian calculations, that have national interests and the fear of accusations for isolationist attitudes as their main axes, have prevailed. Again, due to the acceptance of membership, the PCF is categorised as a former hard-Eurosceptic and current soft-Eurosceptic, in regard to the first framework and (also because of the membership factor) a former Euroreject and current Europragmatist, in regard to the second framework.

Germany

Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) and The Left (Die Linke)

Die Linke was founded in 2007 as a merger of the PDS and the protest movement WASG (Electoral Alternative Labour and Social Justice) and from its founding Congress, European integration has been a dominant issue. Its critique, as in the case of the reformed PDS before it, is not based on either of European integration's fundamental values but on neo-liberalism as a severe limit to democracy (Die Linke, 2007; PDS, 2005; 2003; Hough, 2002: 176-181). Die Linke, like the PDS, has never rejected the necessity of EU policies and institutions in any domain of social and economic life, has acknowledged benefits in the common market, supported the single currency in principle, and recognised in the European Constitution, the progress made in comparison to the

Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, thereby being one of the most active promoters of an alternative Constitution, in the debates of both 2004 and 2007 (Hough and Handl, 2004: 333). The PDS's explicit message of being a Europhile is that 'We affirm European integration and understand an extended European Union to be a further step towards securing peace and stability on our continent' (PDS, 2005).

As a direct consequence of its belief that many problems can only be solved supranationally, Die Linke does not see an option which is better than continuing German membership in the EU. Yet its criticisms and counter-proposals for European measures span the whole policy spectrum: for example, a logic of pacifism in CFSP, a change in the guidelines of the ECB, more power to the EP, the incorporation of employment in EU-wide policy making, the restructuring of tax systems and a fundamentally more sensitive immigration policy (Die Linke, 2007). Because of this clear contingent opposition, Die Linke is a soft-Eurosceptic, in regard to the first framework and a Eurosceptic, in regard to the second framework.

Greece

Communist Party of Greece (KKE)

The Greek Communist Party (KKE) is the most clear and representative example of hard Euroscepticism/Eurorejectionism from a communist perspective and more broadly of liberal distaste. It has followed a more or less consistent trajectory of criticising European integration as both a process and outcome, within a broader ideological context of rejecting bourgeois democracy. With a brief interlude between 1987 and 1991, this attitude has existed since the 1960s and was one of the reasons of the 1968 split between the KKE – interior and the KKE – exterior.

The arguments of the KKE - that the EU and European integration are imperialistic, undemocratic and deeply counter-revolutionary - have not really changed throughout the 1990s. A result of this tradition is also the party's rejection of supranationalism and its highly sceptical attitude towards EU-level activity, in so far as this tempers party autonomy. According to the party, the EP serves only three purposes: to promote its policy programme, communist ideals and the development of a mass anti-imperialistic fight; to reveal the capitalist and exploitative character of the EC/EU; and to promote the coordination and struggle in favour of the EU's collapse (KKE, 2004). The KKE also remains the only Greek party which argues in favour of withdrawal from the EU.

Coalition of the Left, Movements and Ecology (SYN)

After the 1991 partition Congress of the KKE, the SYN's identity has become largely antagonistic to that of the KKE^v; foremostly, it defined socialism in very different terms, accepted many mechanisms of the free market and sought a European federalist realisation of its vision (SYN, 1996). SYN voted in favour of the Maastricht Treaty and declared its 'presence' during the consideration of the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties. It has further argued in favour of a single currency, a common European security and defense policy, (given that this will be autonomous from and not complementary to the role of NATO) and enlargement as an antidote to nationalism (Tsakatika, 2009; Dynphy, 2005: 111). Overall, as Tsakatika (2009) notes, 'the SYN approaches economic and political integration as a continuous field, where political integration must complement and counterweigh economic integration'. While proclaiming its distaste to the 'conservative' character of the EU, the SYN has projected a strong belief that European integration must go forward, with Greece as part of it. Nevertheless, this does not make the party Euroenthusiastic or fully pro-EU, since it has invariably characterised the unification process' character as conservative, neo-liberal and too monetarist and at times, US-dominated (e.g. SYN, 1999; 1996: 11-14).

Since the late 1990s, the party has shifted to a more critical rhetoric, overall. The main indications have been its votes against the Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon, as well as the 'present' vote on the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties. At the programmatic level, as Tsakatika (2009) shows, it has incorporated more criticism, on the role of the USA, the way that the EMU is being implemented in the member states and the social aspects of the EU's economic and employment policy. Further, it has not been promoting a federalist vision, it has been emphasising the economic aspects of European integration and it has become indistinct on issues pertaining to the EU's institutional structure. Characteristic of its growing pessimism in regard to political integration would be the last Congress: 'The ruling political world wants European political integration as a version of absolutism, as a state or inter-governmental structure which will always defend the interests of capital' (SYN, 2008). However, despite that the SYN's attitude becomes more pessimistic it continues to support a (regulated) liberal market economy, pooled sovereignty and Greece's EU membership. Its argument of more Europe but a different one essentially remains unaltered. In regard to the second framework, it remains a Eurosceptic (although it has travelled some distance away from optimism) and in regard to the first framework, a soft-Eurosceptic.

Ireland

Sinn Fein

Before the Nice Treaty referendums, 'the central plank of Sinn Féin's European policy was the belief that European integration was damaging to the democratic sovereign state', (Maillot, 2009). Its arguments centered on both the political and economic dimensions of European integration: the incompatibility between republicanism and the EU's lack of democracy and accountability, between economic centralisation and anti-capitalist thinking (although the free market was never rejected), between an imperialist logic and the pan-Irish value of neutrality (Fitzgibbons, 2007). The party's evaluation of Irish membership at the beginning of the 1990s still reflected the no vote and hard-core rhetoric of the 1970s. Until today the party remains critical of the EU, based on the three-fold logic of asking for the defense of 'positive' neutrality and sovereignty, for more transparency and accountability in EU institutions and for a more 'social Europe' (Maillot, 2009: 567). However, since the late 1990s, real change has been witnessed, revealing of its broader shift from the 'margins to the mainstream', including government participation (Frampton, 2005). The main characteristic of this turn has been the party's 'concession' that Ireland has to make the best out of the policy and institutional environment available. Indicatively, in its 1999 manifesto, Sinn Fein stated that the EU is 'a key terrain for political struggle and to advance national independence and economic and social justice' (Sinn Féin, 1999). In a similar appraisal, it stated that 'in the near future Ireland's economic and political life, are tied to a future in the EU' (Sinn Fein, 1999) and more broadly recognised the supranational arena as one where the party's objectives can be advanced (also, Gilland, 2004: 186). Furthermore, the party has conceded that membership at times carries with it various practical benefits, such as EU funds, the promotion of the all-Ireland agenda and the resolution of certain conflict resolution and human rights issues. Its late 1990s shift, signaled a less hostile attitude to anything supranational and a 'critical engagement' with EU membership and the EU's current trajectory. Sinn Fein is therefore categorised as a former hard-Eurosceptic and a current soft-Eurosceptic, in regard to the first framework and a former Euroreject and a current Eurosceptic, in regard to the second framework.

Italy

Rifondazione Comunista (Rifondazione)

Rifondazione was never against European integration *tout court*. The main line inside the party –

albeit one that has been consistently criticised by the Leninist and Trotskyist minority tendencies – has favoured political and social integration, while opposing its existing monetarist character. It accepts the idea of integration on a free market basis, arguing that it must be regulated in a neo-Keynesian sense and especially believing that it can form a counter-weight to American dominance. Even on the idea of federalism, Rifondazione's early nation-centered rhetoric has given way to attempts towards the elaboration of alternative forms of democratic participation, which would make the EU's institutional setting more democratic and transparent (e.g. Rifondazione, 2002). The party also declares ready to vote in favour of Europe's constitutionalisation, but it does not consider the current state of affairs, as one where the political aspect prevails over the deeply negative, economic situation (e.g. Rifondazione, 2005).

At the same time, the party has acknowledged many benefits from membership but most importantly, it has not really considered the option of withdrawal and it has changed its previously hostile stance on EMU membership (in 1996). Since underneath its criticisms, there remains an attachment to both the ideas of European integration and the necessity of a European Italy, Rifondazione can be categorised as a soft-Eurosceptic party, in regard to the first framework and as a Eurosceptic party, in regard to the second framework.

Party of Italian Communists (PdCI)

The PdCI emerged in 1998, when former Rifondazione President Armando Cossutta and a large number of central and municipal leaders split from Rifondazione, as a result of their disagreement with the decision to break with the Prodi government. Although Cossutta's circle represented a pro-Soviet tradition, its view of European integration had little in common with the former Soviet analysis. Indeed, most of those who departed from Rifondazione were less critical towards European integration than those who stayed. Indeed, the PdCI has been more willing than Rifondazione to forego sacrifices in the current shape and character of the EU, albeit strongly opposing its monetarist and foreign policy aspects. Such sacrifices were made in the name of this same element of political integration, which the party considered essential, especially *vis a vis* the inhumane and anti-social American model. One of its main arguments during the 2004 and 2008 debates on the proposed Constitutional Treaties, was that a no vote would reinforce American domination and favour 'economic Europe' at the expense of 'political Europe' (Quaglia, 2009: 77; Dunphy, 2004: 90). At the same time, the PdCI has been more vocal on the positive aspects of EU and EMU membership, as well (PdCI, 2007; 2001). The PdCI is placed in the category of soft Euroscepticism and Euroscepticism, respectively.

Portugal

Portuguese Communist Party (PCP)

The PCP has been championing Portuguese opposition, to the foundations of the European integration process, as well as the EU, for the past thirty years, voting against every single Treaty. It appears that it shifted to less rejectionist and aggressive rhetoric in the early to mid-1990s, primarily due to its attempt to attract more centrist voters or avoid electoral losses in European elections (Lobo, 2003). However, all of its Congress and other official statements portray a Europhobe stance, if only because its vision is much closer to communism than capitalism. In its last Congress of 2008, the party explicitly ascribes the role of an imperialist pole to the European Union, urges in favour of the fight against more federalism, which it identifies with neo-liberalism and militarism and warns that the EU 'cannot be reformed' (PCP, 2008).

On the question of the EU's current trajectory, instead of projecting an adamant opposition to membership, as it did in the mid-1980s, the PCP argues that the EU has had a vast negative effect

on the country, made more profound by the socialist government's policies (PCP, 2000: Chapter 1). Officially, however, it has retained its pro-withdrawal position. Specifically, the PCP continues to stress the ruin of vast sectors of the economy and the increase in unemployment and it continues to argue that membership has assisted monopolistic capitalism and has paved the end of the democratic regime; as well as that Portugal's national sovereignty (which should be non-negotiable) is slowly succumbing to imperialist policies (Lobo, 2003:107). Again, its last Congress is quite explicit: 'The European Union emerges as one of the main pillars of the class policy carried out in Portugal and as one of the main foundations and pretexts for the offensive against the social economic rights and conquests of the workers, which undermines the national interest and the project for patriotic and internationalist development enshrined in the Portuguese Constitution' (PCP, 2008). The PCP is placed in the hard Euroscepticism and Eurorejectionism categories, respectively.

Spain

Spanish Communist Party (PCE)

Initially, despite the fact that anti-Maastricht rhetoric made socialist-communist cohabitation in government impossible, the most indicative sign of the PCE's realist attitude towards European integration was the party leadership's recommendation for an abstention on the question of Maastricht in the Spanish parliament. EU citizenship, the project towards a single currency, the Social Charter, EU cohesion funds and a common foreign and security policy, among other things, have merited positive mention. In contrast to the PCP, the Spanish communists never identified federalism with neo-liberalism, arguing in favour of the former and against the latter and never averted the liberal market economy, under strict regulation.

As Dunphy (2004:126) argues, during the 1990s the PCE and IU followed a much more critical approach towards the implementation and impact of foreign/security and monetarist/economic convergence policies, blaming the Socialists for mismanaging Spain's membership and voting in favour of the Amsterdam Treaty, but against the Nice Treaty and both versions of the proposed Constitution. Nevertheless, the bulk of its outlook, that the EU 'is an essential tool to face the great economic and ecological challenges' (cited in Dunphy, 2004: 126), or that 'We are aware that there are no viable alternatives.....the reality of class struggle lies at the European Union level, and not specifically in each country' (PCE, 2005), has not been modified. This outlook carries with it a deeply held belief that Spain's absence from the integration project would be irreconcilable with the collective good of the Spanish people and the ideals of twenty-first century socialism. Therefore, the PCE remains a soft-Eurosceptic and a Eurosceptic, respectively.

Sweden

Left Party (V)

In all of its manifestos and congress decisions in the 1990s and beyond, the V has rejected both the current form and the ideas of European integration. It has opposed all Treaties and voiced its fierce opposition on the occasion of all related referendums that have taken place in Sweden, without any real ambivalence in its decisions and with a profound unanimity among members and leaders (Johansson and Raunio, 2003: 14). Although the V is not strictly anti-capitalist in the sense of accepting a certain degree of the free market, its greatest worry appears to arise due to the element of pooled sovereignty undermining Sweden's socialist tradition and the prospects for an even more socialist one. Instead, it has argued in favour of international cooperation between free and independent nations. According to the V, 'The EU does not meet the minimum requirements of a democracy' (V, 2008). Further, the V's status as a government support party between 1998 and

2006 has not caused any electoral decline or any real internal quarrels over its European policy. Indeed, the party's opposition to both European integration and the EU has underpinned its electoral success in the 1990s (Dunphy, 2004:152-3). The party's latest congress decision states, 'This means that the EU has to be dissolved.....the Swedish Left Wing Party is working for a Swedish withdrawal from the EU' (V, 2008). The V has consistently represented a fully hard-Eurosceptic/Eurorejectionist stance.

Discussion of comparative findings

The five sets of figures below place the various parties of the radical left in one of the categories of the Sczerbiak and Taggart and Kopecky and Mudde frameworks. Figures 2 and 3 approach the radical left as a whole, while the four sets of figures that follow, are in accordance with each of the sub-set typologies identified earlier. Figure 2 shows, first of all that no party is pro-EU, in the sense of being either fully supportive of European integration and the EU or, having only minor and transient policy disagreements, although it can be said that this was intuitively known beforehand. Secondly, eight parties were by the mid-1990s hard-Eurosceptic and five parties were soft-Eurosceptic, but since then (and especially after 2004), only three are hard-eurosceptics, showing a moderating approach, on average. Figure 2, in combination with the empirical analysis, also tells us that the membership factor has indeed played a role in this moderating effect and therefore in the increase in congruence, witnessed in the post-mid-1990s period.

In figure 3, no party is Euroenthusiastic, three parties are currently Eurorejects and four remain on the Europhobe side, because they do not accept (in the long-term) a liberal market economy and/or pooled sovereignty under liberal capitalist conditions. The second framework's more specific categories also illustrate a moderating approach, on average, with the four parties that have changed position, moving either leftwards or upwards. Nevertheless, the category of absolute rejectionism comprised more than half of the party family, up to the mid-1990s, at which point, either membership, or overall reevaluations started setting in. Hitherto, the significance of the 1989-91 events proves not to be the only explanatory variable in visional changes, since immediate shifts are rarely the case. Importantly, the divisions that exist over the Europhile/Europhobe distinction suggest that differences in outlooks within the radical left are not only policy- or country-inspired, but deeper theoretical ones that concern the very essence of communism, socialism or anti-capitalism. In addition, it is worth noting from the empirical analysis, that in most cases, there are clear-cut divisions, or at least uncertainty, at the leadership levels. In no case, however, except perhaps that of the PCF and the KSČM, has a change of category occurred, because of a shift in the power balance between the 'flexible' and 'inflexible' 'currents'. Where shifts have been observed (in either figure), it is mainly the prevailing views themselves that seem to have changed.

Figure 2. Classification of radical left party Euroscepticism (according to the Sczerbiak and Taggart framework and the typology of the radical left as one party family)

Pro-EU	Soft-Eurosceptic	Hard-Eurosceptic
	AKEL (1995-2009) KSČM (2004-2009) PdCI PDS/Die Linke PCE (PCF/mid-1990s-2009) Rifondazione Sinn Fein (late 1990s-2009) SYN VAS (mid-1990s-2009)	AKEL (-1995) KSČM (-2004) KKE PCF (-mid-1990s) PCP Sinn Fein (-late 1990s) V VAS (-mid-1990s)

Figure 3. Classification of radical left party Euroscepticism (according to the Kopecky and Mudde framework and the typology of the radical left as one party family)

		Support for European integration	
		Europhile	Europhobe
S u p p o r t f o r t h e E U	EU-Optimist	<i>Euroenthusiasts</i>	<i>Europragmatists</i> PCF (mid-1990s-2009)
	EU-Pessimist	<i>Eurosceptics</i> AKEL (1995-2009) KSČM (late 1990s-2009) PCE PdCI PDS/Die Linke Rifondazione Sinn Fein (late 1990s-2009) SYN VAS	<i>Eurorejects</i> AKEL (-1995) KSČM (-late 1990s) KKE PCF (-mid-1990s) PCP Sinn Fein (-late 1990s) V

Another point would be that while in figure 2, there have been five shifts across the soft-hard distinction, in figure three there have only been three shifts across the Europhobe-Europhile distinction. More specifically, one party (the PCF) reevaluated its country’s membership while retaining an officially negative position on the process/values of European integration. The AKEL and the Sinn Fein changed their outlooks on both the membership question and the process/values of European integration, essentially in tandem, while the VAS and the KSČM (the second, for a period of almost ten years, despite the internal divisions) both had an officially positive outlook on the process of European integration, while retaining a negative outlook on membership. It should be noted that, the categories of the Kopecky and Mudde framework obtain more value, since membership-related and value-related change can indeed happen separately.

Figures 4 and 5 show that, once the typology changes to the dictum, communists and post-communists, differences remain within both sub-sets, although congruence is higher for the post-communists. In figure 4 only one post-communist party is currently hard-Eurosceptic, yet before the mid-1990s, there were two. In the case of the communists, three parties are hard-Eurosceptic and five are soft-Eurosceptic, while before the AKEL’s, the PCF’s and the KSČM’s change, the ratio was five (hard-Eurosceptic) to three (soft-Eurosceptic). In figure 5, communist parties differ between them on both axes and post-communist parties are all except V on the Europhile side. However, neither framework precludes Marxism-Leninism (or its absence) as a necessary condition for a certain kind of outlook, since those communists that are identified more with Leninism (the AKEL, the KKE, the PCP, the KSČM and partly the PCF) have all been (and two out of five still are) on the hard-Eurosceptic/Europhobe side.

Figure 4. Classification of radical left party Euroscepticism (according to the Szczerbiak and Taggart framework and the typology between communists and post-communists)

Pro-EU	Soft-Eurosceptic	Hard-Eurosceptic
	AKEL (communist/1995-2009) KSČM (communist/2004-2009) PCE (communist) PCF (communist/mid-1990s-2009) PdCI (communist) PDS/Die Linke (post-communist) Rifondazione (communist) SYN (post-communist) VAS (post-communist/mid-1990s-2009)	AKEL (communist/-1995) KKE (communist) KSČM (communist/-2004) PCF (communist/-mid 1990s) PCP (communist) V (post-communist) VAS (post-communist/mid-1990s)

Figure 5. Classification of radical left party Euroscepticism (according to the Kopecky and Mudde framework and the typology between communists and post-communists)

		Support for European integration	
		Europhile	Europhobe
		<i>Euroenthusiasts</i>	<i>Europragmatists</i>
S u p p o r t f o r t h e E U	EU-Optimist		PCF (communist/mid-1990s-2009)
	EU-Pessimist	<i>Eurosceptics</i> AKEL (communist/1995-2009) KSČM (communist/late 1990s-2009) PCE (communist) PdCI (communist) PDS/Die Linke (post-communist) Rifondazione (communist) SYN (post-communist) VAS (post-communist)	<i>Eurorejects</i> AKEL (communist/-1995) KKE (communist) KSČM (communist/-late 1990s) PCF (communist/-mid-1990s) PCP (communist) V (post-communist)

In figure 6 and 7, both extreme left parties have consistently been hard-Eurosceptic/Eurorejects, this time pointing, not only towards the importance of Leninism, but also that of a general nostalgia towards the model of Soviet socialism and that of a strictly anti-liberal attitude. The radical left was almost equally split between hard- and soft-Euroscepticism (in figure 6) before the late/mid-1990s

and currently only one party remains hard-Euro sceptic. In figure 7, two radical parties are Europhobes but only the V currently remains a Euroreject. Before the mid/late 1990s, however, five out of ten radical left parties were Eurorejects.

Figure 6. Classification of radical left party Euro scepticism (according to the Szczerviak and Taggart framework and the typology between extreme left and radical left)

Pro-EU	Soft-Euro sceptic	Hard-Euro sceptic
	AKEL (radical left/1995-2009) KSČM (radical left/2004-2009) PCE (radical left) PCF (radical left/mid-1990s) PdCI (radical left) PDS/Die Linke (radical left) Rifondazione (radical left) Sinn Fein (radical left/late 1990s-2009) SYN (radical left) VAS (radical left/mid-1990s-2009)	AKEL (radical left/-1995) KKE (extreme left) KSČM (radical left/-2004) PCF (radical left/-mid-1990s) PCP (extreme left) Sinn Fein (radical left/- late 1990s) V (radical left) VAS (radical left/-mid-1990s)

Figure 7. Classification of radical left party Euro scepticism (according to the Kopecky and Mudde framework and the typology between extreme left and radical left)

		Support for European integration	
		Europhile	Europhobe
S u p p o r t f o r t h e E U	EU-Optimist	<i>Euroenthusiasts</i>	<i>Europragmatists</i> PCF (radical left/mid-1990s-2009)
	EU-Pessimist	<i>Eurosceptics</i> AKEL (radical left/1995-2009) KSČM (radical left/late 1990s-2009) PCE (radical left) PdCI (radical left) PDS/Die Linke (radical left) Rifondazione (radical left) Sinn Fein (radical left/-late 1990s) SYN (radical left) VAS (radical left)	<i>Eurorejects</i> AKEL (radical left/-1995) KKE (extreme left) KSČM (radical left/-late 1990s) PCF (radical left/-mid-1990s) PCP (extreme left) Sinn Fein (radical left/-late 1990s) V (radical left)

Figure 8. Classification of radical left party Euroscepticism (according to the Szczerviak and Taggart framework and the typology between orthodox, reformed/post-communists and red-green)

Pro-EU	Soft-Eurosceptic	Hard-Eurosceptic
	AKEL (orthodox/1995-2009) KSČM (radical left/2004-2009) PCE(reformed/post-communist) PCF(reformed/post-communist/mid-1990s-2009) PdCI(reformed/post-communist) PDS/Die Linke (reformed/post-communist) Rifondazione (reformed/post-communist) SYN (red-green) VAS (red-green/mid-1990s)	AKEL (reformed communist/-1995) KKE (orthodox) KSČM (orthodox/-2004) PCF(reformed/post-communist/-mid-1990s) PCP (orthodox) V (red-green) VAS (red-green/mid-1990s)

Figure 9. Classification of radical left party Euroscepticism (according to the Kopecky and Mudde framework and the typology between orthodox, reformed/post-communists and red-green)

		Support for European integration	
		Europhile	Europhobe
		<i>Euroenthusiastics</i>	<i>Europragmatists</i>
S u p p o r t f o r t h e E U	EU-Optimist		PCF(reformed/post-communist/mid-1990s-2009)
	EU-Pessimist	<i>Eurosceptics</i> AKEL (orthodox/1995-2009) KSČM (orthodox/late 1990s-2009) PCE (reformed/post-communist) PdCI (reformed/post-communist) PDS/Die Linke (reformed/post-communist) Rifondazione (reformed/post-communist) SYN (red-green) VAS (red-green)	<i>Eurorejects</i> AKEL (orthodox/-1995) KKE (orthodox) KSČM (orthodox/-late 1990s) PCF (reformed/post-communist/-mid-1990s) PCP (orthodox) V (red-green)

The typology between orthodox, reformed/post-communist and red-green parties of the radical left (figures 8 and 9) leads to slightly more congruence, overall. In the orthodox sub-set, the AKEL and

the KSČM are soft-Eurosceptic/Europhiles, while the KKE and the PCP are hard-Eurosceptic/Europhobes. Again, however, Marxism-Leninism's significance as a differentiating factor echoes, since all four orthodox parties were hard-Eurosceptic/Europhobes before AKEL's and the KSČM's change. Indeed, as can be seen in figure 9, they were all Eurorejects. From the reformed/post-communist sub-set, all parties are currently soft-Eurosceptic and before the mid-1990s only the PCF was hard-Eurosceptic. From the red-green sub-set, only the V is currently a hard-Eurosceptic but before the mid-1990s, the VAS was a hard-Eurosceptic too. In figure 9, the situation is slightly different for the reformed/post-communist and red-green parties, with the PCF still being on the right side of Europhile-Europhobe distinction and with only one out of three red-green parties (again, the V) following a Europhobe stance.

Further along the typological break-down (figures 10 and 11) more congruence can again be observed. Differences do not exist for the conservative communists and populist-socialists (after the late 1990s). Divisions remain for the reform communists and for the democratic socialists (which are the same parties as in the red-green sub-set), although only one party from each of these two sub-sets is currently a hard-Eurosceptic/Europhobe. Figures 8,9 10 and 11 allow us to suggest that a more detailed typology and hence a more 'scholastic' break-down of radical left ideology, is a good reason for the slightly increased congruence and therefore a better template upon which to trace real existing ideological similarities and divergences.

Figure 10. Classification of radical left party Euroscepticism (according to the Szczerbiak and Taggart framework and the typology between reformed communists, conservative communists, democratic socialists and populist socialists)

Pro-EU	Soft-Eurosceptic	Hard-Eurosceptic
	AKEL (reformed communist/1995-2009)	AKEL (reformed communist/-1995)
	KSČM (reformed communist/2004-2009)	KKE (conservative communist)
	Rifondazione (reformed communist)	KSČM (reformed communist/-2004)
	PdCI (reformed communist)	PCF (reformed communist/-mid-1990s)
	PCE (reformed communist)	PCP (conservative communist)
	PCF (reformed communist/mid-1990s-2009)	Sinn Fein (populist socialist/-late 1990s)
	PDS/Die Linke (populist socialist)	V(democratic socialist)
	Sinn Fein (populist socialist/late 1990s-2009)	VAS (democratic socialist/-mid-1990s)
	SYN (democratic socialist)	
	VAS (democratic socialist/mid-1990s-2009)	

Figure 11. Classification of radical left party Euroscepticism (according to Kopecky and Mudde framework and the typology between reform communists, conservative communists, democratic socialists and populist socialists)

		Support for European integration	
		Europhile	Europhobe
Support for the EU	EU-Optimist	<i>Euroenthusiasts</i>	<i>Europragmatists</i> PCF (reformed communist/mid-1990s-2009)
	EU-Pessimist	<i>Eurosceptics</i> AKEL (reformed communist/1995-2009) KSČM (reformed communist/late 1990s-2009) PCE (reformed communist) PdCI (reformed communist) PDS/Die Linke (populist socialist) Rifondazione (reformed communist) Sinn Fein (populist socialist/late 1990s-2009) SYN (democratic socialist) VAS (democratic socialist)	<i>Eurorejects</i> AKEL (reformed communist/-1995) KKE (conservative communist) KSČM (reformed communist/-1990s) PCF (reformed communist/-mid-1990s) PCP (conservative communist) Sinn Fein (populist socialist/-late 1990s) V (democratic socialist)

The last five sets of figures, taken together, also offer the opportunity to assess the hovering question of whether radical left party outlooks on European integration can be explained by the differentiation between ‘maximalists’/‘revolutionaries’ and ‘minimalists’/‘reformists’. If we consider those parties espousing the underlying values/process of European integration (hard-Eurosceptic/Europhiles) as more or less reformist and those rejecting the process as a whole (soft-Eurosceptic/Europhobes) as more or less revolutionary, then this dichotomy applies to the radical left as a whole, as well as to all sub-sets of radical left parties, except the extreme left/conservative communists and populist-socialist. And this distinction is cross-cutting most sub-sets, whether we consider membership as key or not. This precludes a certain historical strand of radical left ideology, as the main differentiating factor between revolutionary and reformist attitudes towards European integration. Rather, for each separate ideological strand, sub-set or even party, there is a distinct internal differentiation between reformists and revolutionaries. Marxism-Leninism may be a more powerful indicator of revolutionary attitudes, than other types, yet, since some non-Marxist-Leninist parties, such as the V are Europhobes and since the AKEL and the KSČM, which are officially Leninist, are currently not hard-Eurosceptics or Europhobes, Marxism-Leninism cannot stand on its own.

Lastly, let us turn to the question of causality. Our initial assumption was that consistency and congruence among the party family, or at least within each sub-set, on the horizontal axis of the second framework, would indicate the importance of ideology-driven outlooks on the ideas of European integration. Three out of twelve parties under question have moved along the horizontal axis (the AKEL, the KSČM and the Sinn Feinn), indicating a very high (but not absolute) level of

consistency. However, it emerges from the analysis that the Sinn Fein has been influenced in its horizontal shift from its participation in government and more broadly from a more mainstream-looking path. Thereafter, strategy can be ascribed even a minor role, on the horizontal axis as well. Further, the fact that there is not absolute congruence on the horizontal axis, either within the radical left as a whole, or within most of its sub-sets, except from the cases of the extreme left, conservative communists (which are the same samples) and populist socialists (after the mid-1990s), casts doubt upon the view that official outlooks and outlook change on the underlying ideological foundations of the European integration process are conditioned only by ideology, if the typologies used are to be ascribed equal value. In addition, strategic considerations play a further role. Those parties that have changed their outlooks, within the spectrum of contingent opposition to the EU (and more importantly on the membership factor) have been deeply affected by government-opposition dynamics (the PCF, the Sinn Fein and the VAS) and more specifically by the attempt to move further into the mainstream spotlight.

Conclusions

This paper has attempted to shed light on the patterns and dynamics of opposition to European integration among radical left parties, by employing two relevant and widely used frameworks of the literature on Euroscepticism. Its more specific purpose has been to explore the congruence of radical left party outlooks on European integration, or the lack thereof and to assess these outlooks' causal mechanisms. Congruence increases as typologies of the radical left become more specific. In retrospect, however, no typology of the radical left party family and/or its sub-sets has consistently shared a common category on the issue of European integration, throughout the period examined, except from the extreme left/conservative communists. Apart from one out of nine different sub-sets of radical left parties, there has been, at some point or another, incongruence in the post-1990 period, in regard to the fundamental distinction between the values/process of European integration and its trajectory, with membership-related and national considerations, being also a dividing line. In other words, without having to consider the specifics of particular policy areas, we can see more basic disagreements, spanning the whole period and most sub-sets. At one level, these patterns, if employed carefully, may turn out to account in part, for intra-GUE/NGL disagreements over EP legislation (e.g. Bell, 1998), inter- and intra-party arguments over the role and status of the European Left Party (ELP) and other international aggregations of the radical left (e.g. Van Hullen, 2008), as well as disputes over more recent matters, such as the EU's constitutionalisation. To this end, a definitive point of departure would be that, the reformist-revolutionary distinction, by its own, is no longer enough to decipher the radical left's opposition to European integration, or indeed, that of radical left ideology itself. Another would be to look more closely on the teleology of each party's anti-capitalist critique and examine thoroughly if and how practical matters can be traced to theoretical debates within the Marxist tradition.

On a more technical level, the incongruence observed may appear as a methodological puzzle, considering that typological attempts constitute a constant point of reference for scholars of radical left parties and keeping in mind that the ideology-based issues addressed when devising a typology are similar to those encompassed in the 'European question'. Four logics, that are not necessarily mutually exclusive, may be put forward to explain this puzzle. One would be that existing typologies are not adequate to address the real ideological differences, *vis a vis* European integration, that exist between radical left parties. Indicative of this would be the absence, or downplaying, of the Marxist-Leninist/anti-liberal category, which has appeared to be important from the above analysis (and has been used in only one of the typologies). Surely, as suggested above Marxism-Leninism cannot explain by itself the divergences observed. Since European integration spans the whole of the policy spectrum, more focus on the, more basic schools of Marxism, Keynesianism and Liberalism, as well as their variants and intersections, could also help

refine the picture presented by current divergences. The other, more academically vein, logic is that, beyond the strengths and faults of existing and future typologies, radical left ideology has (perhaps super-structurally and due to the complications of the European integration process itself) grown into a labyrinth, or an inter-mingling of previously clear historical strands of left-wing thinking, that by its very nature allows for significant diversification on the definition, the tools and the goals of anti-capitalist struggle, which can no longer be accounted for by an ideology-driven labeling process, without generating new and equally complex questions. Or, as Gaffney (1996: 4) put it, ‘the families perspective will always involve more exceptions than rules’. The fact that, strategic concerns dilute and alter ideology, in some cases more than others, may be thought to make typologies even more unfruitful.

According to a third logic, the problem can be said to lie not in the existing typologies of radical left parties, but in the classificatory frameworks employed in understanding opposition to European integration. Subsequently, Euroscepticism would need to be de-constructed as a concept in such a way that the study of its degree is even more subordinated to the study of its form, before we can conclude that congruence is truly lacking. In this instance, greater clarity can be placed on each dimension of the values/trajectory distinction (e.g. various combinations of Eurocentric and nation-centered visions; various combinations of the free market and regulation. etc.). The fourth logic, which is partly in line with the findings of the ideology-strategy examination and very prominent in the literature, regards the importance of domestic party system particularities in generating strategic change in outlooks, on both the ideas of European integration and the EU’s current trajectory. In this vein, it should be reminded that radical left parties are not simply genuine representatives of a transformatory ideology but also political actors, sucked into the system and paying as much attention to electorally-generated goals, as they do to strictly ideological ones.

Explanatory Endnotes

ⁱ See also, Riishoj (2007: 507).

ⁱⁱ Different viewpoints at the academic level have often reflected the ones at the political level. For a review, see Dunphy (2004: 3-19) and for different approaches on the left, see Gowan and Anderson (1997).

ⁱⁱⁱ Neither, Backes and Moreau (2008), nor Bull (1995; 1994) and Bell (1993) deal with the Sinn Fein. Since the samples are satisfactory, Sinn Fein is not categorised in accordance to their typologies, in order to avoid opening up new debates.

^{iv} The present paper does not consider this category, as only one party is categorised as socialist populist; the Association of Slovak Workers.

^v The Congress of 1991 saw the departure of the reformists and shortly after, the formalisation of SYN into a new structure. The disagreements that led to the split can be traced to the disagreements of 1968 and the subsequent aligning of the KKE-internal with the Eurocommunist line (see, Kalyvas and Maratzides, 2002).

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