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The New Face of Turkey: Authenticity, Secularisation, and Public Opinion

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INTRODUCTION

The aim of our research is to identify influences of Kemalist Nationalism and Islamism on citizens' political attitudes towards salient political issues in Turkey. As a highly populated Islamic country with large geographical surface, which borders Europe and the Middle East, Turkey often appears as the bridge between the traditional Western countries with the traditional Islamic countries of the East. In this context, the discourse between authenticity and secularisation is taking place mainly in terms of the ideological differences between political Islam and Kemalist nationalism and their party advocates.

Authenticity refers to the preservation of the Islamic values and principles. Secularization refers to the marginalization of religion in the private field of life, away from the centre of the political scene. The efforts to keep the authenticity of the community on the basis of Islamic principles are contrasted with the secularization efforts that are oriented towards European (Western) principles (Heper, 1993; Helvacioğlu, 1996; Müftüler- Bac, 2006).

The struggle between authenticity and secularisation is often viewed as a struggle between the Turkish Kemalist nationalists and Islamist movements (Narlı, 1999; Yavuz, 2000; Sakallioğlu, 1996; Turam, 2004; Gülalp, 2001; Akgun, 2002). A number of studies examine how authenticity arguments impose barriers towards the progress of modernization in the national and international sphere (Lesser, 2004; Müftüler- Bac, 2006). A few studies also highlight secularisation and the struggle to Islamic authenticity focusing on their impact on electoral behaviour (Akgun, 2002; Gülalp, 2001; Sakallioğlu, 1996; Kalaycioğlu, 1997; Çarkoğlu, 1998; Taniyici,

2003). There are also some recent studies that focus on the change of the context of political Islam that took place in Turkey (Taniyici, 2003) and its effects on the political behaviour of its supporters (Başlevent et al., 2009).

In this paper, we take a different view. We focus on whether and how authenticity and secularization co-exist in the contemporary Turkish public opinion and aim to measure their shared impact on political attitudes. We argue that their interaction is a determinative factor for the country's future, with political Islam and Kemalist nationalism as the two basic pillars of the Turkish Republic. Recent developments such as the country's attempts to access the European Union as a full member, driven by the Islamist-based governing party (AKP) (Erdoğan, 2004; Gül, 2005); the Ergenekon case and the recent "Balyoz" (sledgehammer) coup plan¹ are often seen as evidence of the open struggle, between the Kemalist past of the Republic and its' main protector (the military) versus today's political Islam. It is important to understand the factors that affect Turkish citizen's political behaviour and electoral preferences in order to establish whether there is a continuous tension between political Islam and Kemalist Nationalism.

This study also bridges an academic gap. It expands current public opinion models developed in the West, to study societies that function within a different framework of historical background, tradition and political context. In addition it introduces to studies constrained within Turkish academia the detailed study of public opinion and electoral behaviour, offering a political-psychological understanding of the determinants of citizens' political choices.

THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

In this section, we offer a brief review of the clash between the forces of secularisation and Islamic authenticity. We provide the context of Turkey's transformation into a secular Republican state by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk along with the changes that occurred in the Turkish political system after the death of Atatürk and the struggle of secularism and Islamism. We also discuss current conditions, when Political Islam is on power and seeks the country's modernisation while strengthening the country's Islamic roots. We pay attention to the agenda changes that political Islam went through in order to stay in the government and be consistent with the country's basic pillars and principles. We also focus on the liberal transformation of political Islam and its differences with Kemalist Nationalism. In addition we present the main studies that focus on the Turkish political system and the determinants that shape citizen's public opinion.

The rule of history: Authenticity and Islamism vs. Modernization and Kemalism

The theory of secularization is a child of the modernization process. The marginalization of religion in the social and political field brought to light the issue of religion's abatement in the private sphere of personal choice (Thomas, 2005; Haynes,

¹ The Ergenekon case begun in June 2007 when a coup plot against the AKP government was uncovered. What followed was the arrest of a large number of military officers, politicians, scholars, journalists, writers, and businessmen inferred as gang leaders. They were accused of planning illegal actions against the governing party and its advocates. They consider that AKP has a hidden Islamic agenda which goes against the secular basis of the Republic (Hürriyet, Friday, March, 19/2010). The recent "Balyoz" (sledgehammer) coup plan involved 49 military officers, was uncovered in March 2010, and led to the arrest of all the involved parts (The New York Times, March, 01-02/2010; BBC news, March 02/2010).

2007). The emergence of the theory of secularization meant the beginning of a new world order, and had great implications for societies like Turkey, which have placed religion in the middle of the socio-political life since the years of the Ottoman empire. Theories of modernization based on secularist assumptions set the rules and criteria for the identification of traditional or modern societies (Fox, 2001; Haynes, 2007). It was with the Iranian revolution of 1978-9 when religion and culture gained back their significance in the literature and the international stage replacing ideology as a source of identity (Haynes, 2007; Moyser, 2001). The belief that societies with the goal of modernization would inevitably secularize was replaced by the view that the resurgence of religion is a fact for the modernized Western and “traditional” societies and often the modernization process leads to the resurgence of religion. Since Western societies may have become more secular, the members of these societies seek personal support and security into the traditional value of religion (Kinvall, 2004; Kolluri and Mir, 2002).

Secularisation and Kemalist Nationalism

With the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, started the operations for the total Westernisation of the previous Islamic Ottoman Empire and the secular transformation of the new state (Heper, 1993; Liebesny, 1953; Al- Muhairi, 1996). The Kemalist development strategy composed of the six arrows: republicanism, etatism, nationalism, secularism, populism and reformism which constituted the base of the political, social and economic changes that constructed the new Turkish state (Heper, 1993; Zürcher, 2004; Mehmet, 1983; Dursun, 2006). The efforts to modernize the new-founded Republican Turkey were supported by its only party until 1946, the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Republican Peoples’ Party) (Taniyici, 2003).

The process of modernisation and particularly secularization were top priorities for the Turkish state and the influence of Islam on politics, economics, education and culture was seen as the most significant barrier towards the modernization progress (Mellon, 2006). This “top- down” or as it is more commonly called the “state- led” nationalism aimed at the unification of the population under one Turkish culture and extended the creation of a powerful united Republic in the international stage (Çolak, 2003; Mehmet, 1993).

The Kemalist nationalism opposed the religious forces that asked for the return to the old days of the Ottoman Empire in order to take back and keep their economic power and social status. It used secularization procedures to put an end to the domination of those religious forces and their institutions (Narli, 1999; Çolak, 2003). Nevertheless Kemalist nationalism and secularization did not oppose the Islamic roots and the Islamic tradition (Çolak, 2003; Narli, 1999; Heper, 1993).

This transformation of the Ottoman Empire into the Turkish Republic was the starting point for the tensions between Islamism and Kemalist nationalism. The “sacrifice” of the domination of religion into the public sphere was the price that Turkey had to pay in order to get transformed under the rule of modernization. And this is precisely the reason why religion and the level of secularization of the society are at the base of the tensions between Islamism and Kemalist nationalism (Dursun, 2006). Secularization is still at the centre of attention at the Turkish Republic while the Kemalist view of the Turkish Republic remains alive and being political expressed by the party that Ataturk founded, the CHP. Atatürk’ s inheritance is obvious in the numerous monuments and the flags in the official dates in every public place, but also

in the citizen's heart and minds, even to those that are opposed to its view for the Republic.

Authenticity and political Islam

Islamism in Turkey grew as the opposition to the Kemalist nationalist view of modernization and assumed the preservation of the Islamic values and principles (Dursun, 2006). Islamists viewed the Turkish identity as predominantly Islamic and saw modernization as leading to the loss of the traditional Islamic values and principles. The Islamic revivalism viewed the limitation of the role of religion in the private sphere supported by Kemalism as undermining the Islamic originality (Mellon, 2006).

Political Islam and its party representation across time have been under the total control of the military and the Constitutional Court of Turkey (T.C. Anayasa Mahkemesi). With the solutions of coup d'état by military forces operation in accordance with the Kemalist principles a number of parties that represented political Islam closed. The Constitutional Court of the country also prohibited the function of the Islamic parties with the accusation that they were opposed to the country's Kemalist principles (Narli, 1999; Sakalioğlu, 1996; Akgun, 2002; Taniyici, 2003).

The 2002 elections were a turning point for the Turkish political system. It was the first time after the establishment of the Republic that a single pro-Islamic party gained enough seats to form a government (Başlevent et al, 2004). The party leadership came from the reformist wing of the Islamist traditional background of the FP (Fazilet Partisi - Virtue Party), and AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - Justice and Development Party) gained a strong majority in the November 2002 elections (Bozarslan, 2004).

The stable political dominance of political Islam with AKP as its powerful advocator, posed a challenge to the Kemalist nationalism (Gülalp, 2002). Under the shade of Kemalism, the new advocator of political Islam adapted its political agenda to appear in line with the country's modern goals and the citizens' will for democratic and stable political life along with the preservation of an authentic identity and the Republic's power. These aims of AKP are to lead the country towards the EU accession with a movement of "Muslim democrats" in which Islam is a cultural background and not an element that influences its political agenda (Lesser, 2004). The religious agenda of AKP signifies the re-emergence of political Islam in Turkey's political life that exists in parallel with the Kemalist secularization tradition.

Others argue that Islam as a force with clear political determinants never left the country. It remained hidden and strong at the southwest and Anatolia regions where it was accepted. Islam was a powerful and strong element of the Turkish national identity for the public and the Islamic elites (Fuller, 2004). What has changed however is its expression of the Islamic movement and ideology, which adapted to the circumstances that put Turkey in the middle of the West and the East, and promoted the preservation of an authentic identity and the State's power. Thus the view that AKP has a well-hidden Islamic agenda, as a party that has been shaped from the wings of the Islamist FP (Fazilet Partisi, Virtue Party) still holds strong.

Ideological tensions between Kemalism, Nationalism and Islamism

Recently Turkish politics are marked strongly with adversative influences of authenticity and secularization: on one hand, the headscarves are more evident than before and new mosques are constructed; on the other nationalistic preferences of a strong state are prevalent; and at last, central in the political agenda are the efforts to modernize life according to Western patterns. This raises questions about how the combination of traditional values, the Islamic tradition, Kemalism and nationalistic views, and EU accession are expressed in citizens' political preferences. The nature of the ideological space between Kemalism and Islamism has changed since political Islam (with AKP as its advocator) added the EU accession goal to its political agenda.

Kemalist nationalism, as expressed by the CHP, comes in direct tensions with Islamism on (a) the role of religion, (b) the secularist orientation of the society based in the western model, and (c) the features that compose Turkish nation, and (d) Turkey's foreign policy goals. The CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Republican People's Party), is the Kemalist party that supports democracy, modernization and laicism for the state and society. In the lines of the Kemalist dogma, CHP as its child promotes democratic values and the equality of all the Turkish citizens towards the path of modernization. Religion has to remain a personal issue and has to be freed by politicization. The party appears as an advocator of Social Democracy which supports pluralism and participation in the society. Also, supports individual freedoms and minority rights. Additionally highlights the priority of the labor rights within the society against the liberal capitalism reforms (The programme of the CH Party, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Programı, 2008). Moreover CHP supports Turkey's EU accession and in general Turkey's relations with the West.

The AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) established a new political understanding in the Turkish political system. They are presenting the party's agenda as based on conservative democracy laying in the centre-right of the political spectrum. The main party's aim is a way of modernity that goes in hand with traditions, a kind of universalism combined with the local; a rationalism that does not ignore the religious understanding of life. As Erdoğan stated, AKP supports a system that incorporates local and traditional values and principles and the universal trends of conservatism (Erdoğan, 2004). AKP's agenda combined religion with the secular values of Turkey. Namely, it supports secularism in line with the democratic values and freedom rights, while religion works as a social value with no involvement in the political life of Turkey. According to the AKP agenda, in result of those aims comes the community's cooperation towards peace, stability and Turkey's wealth.

On the right of AKP, ultra- nationalism is represented by MHP. The first extreme right party was established when the multi-party period started in the Republic. The CKMP (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi - Republican Peasants' Nation Party) founded in 1948 and renamed in 1969 to MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi - 'Nationalist Action Party) when adopted an ultra-nationalist agenda based on communitarian nationalism (Akgun, 2002). MHP is the third and last party (along with AKP and CHP) that is being represented in the Turkey's Grand National Assembly today.

The ultra- nationalist party (MHP) holds political orientations that include both religious beliefs as well as Kemalist goals. They are loyal to the traditional values and principles of Islam since Islam composes one of the main features of the Turkish nation (Dursun, 2006). Democratic values and secularism are also supported by MHP in combination with the importance of the Turkish state as the only power

that has to be powerful and unify all the Turks together.(The program of MH Party, 2009- MHP programmı, 2009). For MHP, the most important issue is the Turkish national identity, and all the members of the society are servants of the Turkish state (Akgun, 2002). The party's main aim is the transformation of Turkey into a leader country and the unification of the Turks under the state along with the preservation of the cultural inheritance of the Republic is another significant goal for MHP (The program of MH Party, 2009- MHP programmı, 2009). They are also against minority rights and they do not accept any compromise on that issue. Regarding their view towards the EU they are sceptical towards the country's membership. Along the same lines they are against the domination of any foreign power in Turkey (Akgun, 2002).

To sum up political Islam and ultra-nationalism are two significant political forces, which despite their disagreements on modernization, minority rights and the role of the state come together on the preservation of a Turkish state with an Islamic and cultural identity, in other words the aim of the preservation of the Turkish state's Islamic authenticity (Robins, 1991; Sakallioğlu, 1996; Yavuz, 2000). *Kemalist nationalism* and its secular principles that continue the modernisation path of the country pose the most important challenge against the domination of religion within society's structure (Gülalp, 2002). This marginalisation of religion into the private sphere placed religion at the base of efforts against the project of modernisation (Sakallioğlu, 1995). Thus, the political landscape of Turkey is shaped by the co-existence of these contradictory powers with opposing goals and aims.

The struggle for the preservation of the Islamic principles and values takes place and coexists with the need for modernization according to the Western patterns and the EU rules. The issue of Turkey's accession in the EU lies on the differences between the fundamental principles of the Community and the Islamic percepts of the Republic (Gallala, 2006). This aspect gains special significance today when the relations between Turkey and the EU entered a new period on October 4, 2005 with the negotiations for Turkey's EU accession in Luxemburg. Now Turkey is officially a defined candidate country

Despite their differences, the two ideological spaces (political Islamism and Kemalist Nationalism) converge on the EU issue. With the liberalisation of political Islam, the attitude towards the EU changed with the "Muslim democrats" trying to gain the country's accession. The CHP is traditionally supporting Turkey's EU relations and the modernisation pattern of the West. In reference to the EU issue we see that the Islamic roots of AKP and CHP's secular-based agenda co-exist in Turkey's political life. On the other end, ultra-nationalists (MHP) do not support the country's EU membership opposing the domination of a foreign power or institution to the Turkish nation.

To the outside observer, it often seems that today's Turkey has two faces: a conservative religious face overseeing domestic issues and a modernized face gazing at EU membership. Nevertheless, we saw that these faces are sometimes similar, and sometimes different. How do citizens negotiate the similarities and differences between Islamists and Kemalist nationalists in the path towards modernization and the preservation of the Turkey's authenticity set out by the AKP "Muslim democrats"? The answer might lie in the way elements of Kemalist nationalism and political Islam are internalized by Turkish citizens in the current political climate.

Public opinion and political behaviour studies on Turkey

The study of the Turkish political and social environment has not yet expanded to the study of decision- making processes and the multiple determinants of political attitudes and behaviours. A few important studies construct explanatory models of voting behaviour, and show that the Turkish party system and the electoral body of the voters are characterized by great volatility and fragmentation (Çarkoğlu, 2002; Çağaptay, 2002; Başlevent et al., 2004; Cornell, 1999).

Volatility and fragmentation in Turkey are often explained on the basis of social and political cleavages. The centre-periphery cleavage, the left- right dichotomy, Islamism against Kemalist secularism and Turkish nationalism against the Kurdish nationalism , are the most prominent dichotomies that dominate the Turkish political system after the last coup d'état in 1980 (Başlevent et al., 2004). These dichotomies are explained below.

Despite the 10 percent nationwide threshold which makes the electoral system less liberal, the levels of the electorate fragmentation in Turkey still remain high (Başlevent et al, 2004). As Taagepera (1999) notes, less liberal electoral systems do not allow the shape of small parties to obstruct the fragmentation of the electorate. Nonetheless Taagepera supports that as social and political cleavages grow the levels of fragmentation in the electorate body become larger. According to Başlevent et al. (2004) that view applies to the experience of Turkey. In the last two decades there have been new dichotomies that dominate the political system of Turkey. Adding to the traditional centre-periphery cleavage and the left- right approach, we have also seen secularism versus Islamic revival, and Turkish versus Kurdish nationalism.

The difference between the centre and periphery in Turkey started in the years of the Ottoman Empire and has been transferred to the Republic (Mardin, 1973, Tachau, 1984) and it refers to specific social, economical and cultural characteristics. The centre of Turkey represents the urban, secular, nationalist and more Westernized part of the country occupied by military and bureaucratic officials. The periphery is religiously oriented, agricultural, traditional and away from the modern Western principles being parted with ethnic, religious and regional- based groups of people. This cleavage is often seen as the main explanatory factor of political preferences. The centre votes traditionally for liberal parties while periphery votes for conservative ones (Sayari, 1978; Özbüdün and Tachau, 1975; Kalaycioğlu, 1994; Secor, 2001; Ergüder, 1980; Heper, 1998).

Kalaycioğlu used survey data in 1994 to analyze the correlations between voting preference and the place of residence (urban or rural). He concluded that the main division in the Turkish political stage remained the centre- periphery differentiation since it was based on levels of religiosity (Kalaycioğlu, 1994). Narli and Dirlik(1996) also find a tendency of radical political choices of the electorate resting on this centre-periphery cleavage. Çarkoğlu in 1998 with his analysis of the results of the general election in 1991, 1995 and the local elections in 1994 finds that there is a different level of electoral instability between different regions. He also supports that the high levels of dispersion within the party system and the military interventions led to an increase of party-clustering and a decrease in the role of the centre-periphery Fractionalisation became more homogenous in Turkey and regional differences lost their importance. Özcan (2000) criticized the centre-periphery cleavage explanation. He noted that the changes that happened in Turkey after 1950 modified qualitatively the context of the centre and periphery.

The left- right cleavage (Heper and Evin, 1988, Toprak, 1981; Çarkoğlu, 1998) approach gained support with the establishment of party coalitions in the 1980s.

That was explained as Turkey's political transition into a modern democratic state with economic, political and social changes (Heper and Evin, 1988). In 1998 Çarkoğlu, analyzed the party manifestos in Turkey from 1950 to 1995 and found a fundamental change: Turkish political parties from 1950-1995 changed their political agenda and representation of their strategic goals in order to gain mass support and this resulted in electoral shifts. The social and economic transformations lead to a more complex political system and in extent to new party strategies and tactics. Çarkoğlu with his analysis of three surveys conducted in 1977, 1990 and 1995, concluded that there was a fundamental change that took place in Turkey, with the transition from the centre- periphery cleavage to a more stable right- left dimension of differentiation between the parties. Toprak (1995) also finds the centre- periphery cleavage is out of date. The typical village people who did not have any communication with the modernized centre do not exist. The fast mobilisation connected these people with the centre because they had relatives or friends that moved to the high populated cities. Çarkoğlu also states that the hostility within the centre-right and centre-left parties is artificial since they ideologically match. Esmer (1995) used three surveys conducted from 1990 until 1994 and found that in terms of the voters' perceptions the ideological differences between the left-right parties are significantly important, while the differences between the centre-right and centre- left are not. Not all agree however. Başlevent et al. (2004) emphasize that there is an important difference between the centre-right and centre-left parties, from the perspective of their voters.

Turning to religion, several studies identify it as an important factor of voting preference (Ergünder, 1980-1; Ayata, 1993; Heper and Evin, 1998; Kalaycioğlu, 1994, 1997, 1999; Esmer, 1995; Toprak, 2000, Başlevent et al., 2004). Ergünder (1980-81) showed that voters who have strong religious affiliations supported the Justice Party (A.P) while those with weak affiliations voted for the Republican Peoples' Party (CHP). Kalaycioğlu used survey data in 1994 to analyze the correlations between voting preference and the place of residence (urban or rural), educational level, gender, socioeconomic status and centre- periphery. He found that religiosity was the main determinant of voting preferences and that the main division was the centre- periphery differentiation since it was based on levels of religiosity (Kalaycioğlu, 1994 and 1997). Başlevent et al. (2004) used 2002 survey data to show that citizens' affiliation with Islam was important.

Another dichotomy is secularization. The antagonism for domination between secular and Islamic advocates appears in the very early stages of the Turkish Republic. Based on that ideology -based preference, the history of Turkey's political system is being recycled throughout the years. Islamism advocates challenge the established secular- Kemalist tradition of the Republic and generated polarisation (Çarkoğlu, 1998). Taniyci (2003) identifies secularism as the determinate factor upon which the centre- periphery framework is based.

Özcan (2000) shows that early formation of political inclinations plays a significant role in voting behaviour. Using data from the 1987 and 1991 general elections and 1989 local elections in Istanbul, he finds that the primary political preferences determined by political socialisation have a stable explanatory power in citizens' political behaviour. Early voting preferences and religion affected the party preferences of the electorate in 1987 and 1989. Data for the 1991 election in Istanbul show that place of birth, age, occupation, political attitudes as well as years of residence in Istanbul, father's educational status, socio-economic class, the process of

migration to Istanbul and the number of members of the family that have income were predictors of voting behaviour.

Özbudun and Tachau (1975) point to class as to explain voting preferences. The path towards modernisation generates conflict between different socio-economic classes. This class- based conflict influences the electorate’s political behaviour (Heper and Evin, 1998; Ayata, 1993). On the other hand, some studies find the decline of class- based voting behaviour. Namely Kalaycioğlu (1994) and Narli and Dirlik (1996) find that class is not an important factor of political behaviour. Similarly Özcan (2000) condemns the applicability of the class based voting noting that aggregate data from the electoral results in Turkey cannot be explained by the voters’ class.

Additional factors include ethnicity, education, and economic status. Ethnicity is identified by Kalaycioğlu (1997) as a significant factor that affects electoral behavior leading to high levels of fragmentation in Turkey in the post-1980 era. Başlevent et al. (2004) points to issues related to ethnic identity to understand voting preferences. Education is also seen as an important determinant of voting preferences in Turkey (Kalaycioğlu 1994; Başlevent et al. 2009). Başlevent et al. (2004, 2009) use survey data from 2002 and 2003 and find that economic factors determine voting.

As Başlevent et al. (2009) notes universalism is another significant division which affects voting behaviour in the Turkish political system. According to this division some citizens are in favour of the country’s EU accession, some are against it, and some are conditionally in favour. The issue of accession in the EU raises questions about the compatibility of the fundamental principles of EU, the Muslim law, and Islamic principles inherited from the Ottoman years (Yavuz, 2000; Gallala, 2006). The Islamists and Islamic nationalists take issue with the Western interpretations of democracy, development and values (Turam, 2004). In Turkey, the resurgence of Islam is founded on the rejection of the modernisation system represented by the Western states and the European Union. Authenticity is then seen as the avoidance of the adoption of the principles of the West and it is reflected in the efforts of the Turkish policy-makers negotiating the terms of access in the EU (Robins, 1991; Ayubi, 1980).

HYPOTHESES

With the above in mind, in this paper, we examine the controversy between the Islamic authenticity and secularization in citizens’ political views and choices. The focus is on public attitudes in Turkey towards a number of specific issues such as minority rights, ethnic diversity, citizenship, faith and religiosity, state and foreign policy as well as the trust and confidence to intra-state and international organizations.

Reflecting the re-emergence of political Islam in Turkey’s political life, we expect Islamic attachments to exist in parallel with Kemalist nationalism and shape the way citizens make political choices. Our aim is to identify the borders of Kemalist Nationalism and Islamism as expressed in public opinion.

Below are our expectations:

	Nationalism	Islamism
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Religiosity	Religion is a private matter, which lies away from the political spectrum	High importance of religion. Religion has social value that cannot be overwhelmed by modernisation processes
Modernisation	Total agreement in line with the Kemalist inheritance. Ultra nationalists support secular basis of the Republic with the view that modernisation has to empower the Turkish nation and state.	Conservative modernisation in line with the Turkish values and traditions
Ethnic diversity and minority rights	Promotes equality, participation and freedom rights for all citizens. Ultra- nationalist against any minority assertions	Sensitive issues: Kurds and Armenians. Respect towards minority rights. Defend Turkish national unity.
Citizenship and National identity	Emphasis on the secular state. Ultra- nationalists show great importance in the national identity and Turkish citizenship.	Emphasis on traditional values and principles
Attitudes towards the state	Respect towards the secular basis of state. Ultra- nationalists show unconditional obedience to the state.	Respect towards the state.
Internationalisation and EU membership	Agreement with EU membership and cooperation with Western powers. Ultra-nationalists against the EU membership	Agreement with the EU membership. Support connections with the Islamic countries as well as with the West
Trust to institutions	Trust the military	Trust the government and the police

Let's review the expectations of the above table. Looking at religious orientations, we expect a negative relationship between Kemalism and the endorsement of the influence of religion in public life. This should be in line with the agenda of Kemalist Nationalism that promoted the marginalization of religion into the

private sphere. We expect to find that secular principles are associated with high Kemalism which oppose the domination of religion, and stronger Islamic principles associated with support for political Islam in line with the AKP's view towards the role of religion as a great social value.

In terms of internationalization and modernization, we expect political Islam to influence the political agenda more than Kemalist nationalism due to the rising power of AKP. The traditional Islamic values and principles are threatened by modernization, but the new form of AKP Islamism promotes internationalization and the Europeanization of the country along with the preservation of the Islamic tradition. We expect support for political Islam to explain favourable views for the country's relations with the Islamic countries. On the other hand, support for Kemalism will be associated with favourable views of the country's relations with the Western powers.

In terms of ethnic diversity, minority rights and tolerance, we expect to find Kemalism associated with equality and freedom rights as the base of democratic values. Islamism is expected to promote conservative orientations about minority rights and support state control over minorities that could pose threat to the traditions of the society.

We expect Kemalist nationalism and political Islam to determine different considerations on issues involving the criteria that shape Turkish citizenship and the Islamic identity. For political Islam, we expect national identity to be structured around the idea of Islamic authenticity. On the other hand, we expect that Kemalist nationalism will be associated with views of national identity as the preservation of Turkish authenticity.

Towards attitudes to the state we expect Islamism orientations to be associated with strong connection and obedience to the state. Kemalism orientations on the other hand will reflect obedience with the critique towards the state.

We will also look at political issues like EU accession, foreign policy, economic performance maintaining order, and values. Based on our theoretical review, Islamism will explain support towards the country's EU membership as well as the country's relations with the Islamic world in lines of the liberal economy. Kemalist nationalism attitudes will explain support of the country's EU membership and opposition to the liberalisation of the economy towards more socio-democratic policies.

In terms of the trust towards the country's institutions and political structures, Islamism will be associated with high trust in religious leaders, the courts, and the EU while Kemalism will highlight trust to the military as the protector of the Kemalist inheritance.

RESEARCH METHOD AND DATA COLLECTION

Existing public opinion surveys do not contain many variables that are relevant to our hypotheses, and very often data is not available for analysis at the individual level. For example the World Values Survey asks questions about politics and society in a general way, without a clear focus on Turkish society². To test our hypotheses, we collected survey data in Ankara in August 2009 using self-administered questionnaires. The survey records the opinions of 107 Turkish citizens.

² <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>

We used a snowball sample (Bryman, A., 2008; Salganik and Heckathorn, 2004) starting with 10 initial contacts who put us in contact with other people from their environment³. We used a large number of initial contacts and tried to ensure that carefully the participants came from different socio-political backgrounds. We focus here on the urban only populations and therefore we did not sample citizens from the rural environment of Turkey. The data collection was conducted in the capital of Turkey, in Ankara.

Some of the questions we asked participants were sensitive, and a snowball sample relying on personal references would build trust. With this in mind, we asked our initial contacts to act as references for the participants that followed. In addition, Turkey's population is very heterogeneous in terms of the determinants of political ideological orientations such as ideological levels, religiosity strength and traditionalism⁴.

Before continuing, it is important to note the particularities of our sample. Although we tried to avoid limiting our sample to a particular demographic, and we interviewed participants from all walks of life and with diverse backgrounds, we can not argue that we have a sample that is representative of national trends. For example, the majority of participants are voters of CHP (73.1%) and a small number of participants are voters of AKP (8.6 %). According to the national statistics from the last election (March 2009) AKP received 38.8% of the voters, CHP the 23.1%, MHP the 16.1%, DTP 5.6%, SP the %.2%, DSP the 2.8%, BBP the 2.2% and Independents the 0.4%. The sample is equally split by gender, but it contains a large percentage of highly educated and younger citizens.

These sample particularities do not allow us to put forth meaningful arguments about the average political orientations of the Turkish population. This shortcoming however is not problematic for the purposes of our study. We are mainly interested in understanding the process through which citizens reach their judgments and point to the main elements of their evaluations, instead of making claims regarding the state of weak or strong ideological orientations in the whole of Turkey.

The survey contains measures of support for Islamism and Kemalist nationalism and political attitudes such as tolerance, respect for minorities, ethnic diversity, citizenship, faith and religiosity, EU integration, and evaluations of the state and foreign policy.

- We measure Islamism by the extent to which participants felt part of the Islamic world. Similarly, we measure Nationalism by the extent to which they felt part of the Turkish nation state.

³ Snowball sampling is a special non-probability method which relies on referrals from initial subjects to generate additional subjects. Most commonly it is being used in studies which aim to produce specific measures to be tested in larger samples. Although estimates have to be done cautiously, snowball and respondent-driven samples can provide asymptotically unbiased estimates (Salganik and Heckathorn 2004; Snijders 1992).

⁴ Residents of urban centers on the coast are distinct from the population living in the eastern parts of the country. A representative cross-sectional survey would be costly and very time consuming and could not be implemented without substantial funding. Given the poor response rate figures of representative public opinion surveys at about 25-35%, it is questionable whether a truly "national" sample would be acquired with random sampling.

- To measure religiosity we asked participants whether they were religious, how important Allah was in their lives, and how important religion was for the country.
- Ideological predispositions were measured on a seven point left-right scale.
- Respondents were asked about the salience of the following political issues: making sure the country has strong defence forces, membership in the EU, giving people more to say in important government decisions, maintaining a stable economy.
- To measure orientations towards ethnic diversity, we asked our participants whether ethnic diversity erodes the country's unity, and whether it enriches life.
- To measure attitudes towards the rights of minorities we asked participants to indicate how important they found the issue of integration of ethnic minorities in their country, and also whether they would support granting cultural rights to minority populations.
- We also examined tolerance towards different groups in society. Participants were asked whether people should be tolerant of those who choose to live according to their own moral standards even if they are different from their own. They were also asked to identify which societal group they would not like to have as neighbours, which group should not be allowed to teach in schools, and which group they disliked the most.
- We also measured opinions towards the perceptions of citizenship by asking participants whether certain characteristics should be a requirement for the attainment of Turkish citizenship: having ancestors from Turkey, being born in Turkey, adoption of Turkey's customs, and being a law-abiding citizen towards the Turkish state.
- To measure attitudes towards Turkey's EU accession, we asked how important was Turkey's integration in the EU and whether it would have an impact on community life. Respondents also rated advantages and disadvantages of Turkey's joining the EU, namely the weakening of religious values, the weakening of national identity, the decline of the agricultural sector, of the Turkish firms, the restriction of independence for Turkey, the rise of separatist movements and the rise of religious fundamentalism. On the positive side, respondents rated the strengthening of Turkey's position in the international stage, the advantages for Turkey's economy, the access to free EU travelling (without visa needed) and the country's democratization according to the EU pattern. In addition, participants were asked to indicate their level of trust and confidence in the EU.
- Attitudes towards modernization were measured by two questions: whether tradition and modern values should coexist, and whether modern values should be emphasized more than tradition.
- To measure attitudes towards democratization we asked participants how important it was for them to live in a country that is governed democratically.
- Internationalization was measured by asking participants whether they were against or in favour of the principles and values of the EU and authenticity was measured by assessing whether they were against or in favour of the principles and values of Turkey.

- Turning to values, participants were asked whether they should adjust their moral behaviour to the changes of the world.
- Participants' attitudes towards the state were measured by asking whether the state was sacred.
- We also measured trust towards religious leaders, the courts, the parliament, the EU and the UN.

FINDINGS

Our first set of results involves the role of religion in citizens' lives. As we see in Table 1, Islamism is significantly associated with religious beliefs whereas nationalism is not. A unit increase in Islamism increases perceptions of the importance of Allah in citizens' lives by about .34 points. This effect is the same among CHP voters, indicating that the importance of Allah has no party boundaries. The importance of religion in Turkey is also enhanced by Islamism. For a unit change in Islamism, the importance of religion as an issue in modern Turkey increases by .68 points.

*** Please insert Table 1 here ***

The level of religiosity of the participants is closely related with opinions about modernization reported in Table 2. Here we see that opinions on the role of traditional values in modern life are influenced by political Islam and Kemalist nationalism in conflicting ways. The version of modernization supported by political Islam is one that emphasizes tradition more than modern values. The influence of Islamism here is significant for the sample overall (.13 points) and also among the voters of CHP. On the other hand, Nationalism has a negative influence. As nationalism increases, participants become more inclined to disagree with the statement that modern values should be emphasized more than tradition. Modernization, when inspired by Nationalism promotes the co-existence of tradition with moral values (.23 points).

Nationalism appears also to be less approving of change. It agrees with the statement that newer lifestyles contribute to the breakdown of society. The effects are even more pronounced among CHP voters who express lower approval of newer lifestyles (.45 points) and seem to be more comfortable in a mix of tradition and modern times. Islamism, on the other hand, promotes modernization over tradition and does it in a more rigid way. Adjusting behavior to adapt to the changing world is viewed more negatively as Islamism increases (.17 points).

Please insert Table 2 here

This rigidity of Islamism is also evident in opinions regarding ethnic diversity, minorities, and tolerance. Islamism has a positive effect on the opinion that ethnic diversity erodes unity (.15 points), and a negative effect on the opinion that ethnic diversity enriches life (.10 points). On the other hand, Nationalism does not see ethnic diversity as a problem to unity (.30 points) and instead supports cultural rights to minorities (.19 points), an effect which is doubled among CHP supporters (.40 points). Tolerance for different moral standards is also promoted by nationalistic orientations. This is in line with secularist and Kemalist opinions about the coexistence of minority populations within the Turkish society. These views differ significantly from those of the Islamic parties of AKP and MHP.

Please insert Table 3 here

Turning to perceptions of Turkish national identity, we note more differences between Islamism and Nationalism. Islamist considerations view having Turkish ancestors and being born in Turkey as being important components of Turkish citizenship. On the other hand, the adoption of customs and the following of the law is what make a good Turkish citizen in the eyes of nationalists, and particularly CHP voters.

Please insert Table 4 here

Despite their differences, Nationalists and Islamists agree on the importance of the obedience to the state. Both have a positive influence, with the effect of Nationalism being almost double (.38 points) that Islamism (.18 points) and increasing even more for CHP voters (.61 points). On the other hand, giving people more say in governmental decision, and protecting freedom of speech decline in importance as Islamism increases, and the effects are consistent even among CHP voters. As we see in Table 5, Nationalism is associated with increased self-perceptions of being a world citizen (.41 points).

Please insert Table 5 here

Do the internationalization orientations promoted by nationalism also carry over in the issue of European integration? In line with our hypotheses, Nationalism has a negative influence on assessments of the importance of EU membership (.34 points). Islamism is the main driving force behind the evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of EU accession. For example, as Islamism increases, perceptions of the strengthening of Turkey's international position increases (.17 points), and so does the expectation of the democratization of the state (.19 points), and the expectation of economic advantages (.14 points). Islamists also see the danger of the rise of religious fundamentalism to decrease by joining the EU (20 points) but are afraid of the weakening of religious values (.20 points).

Please insert Table 6 here

Turning to national politics, we see that what matters is different for Islamism and Nationalism. As Table 7 indicates, the two camps do not see eye to eye when it comes to national defense. With Islamist considerations, strong defense forces have increased importance (.14) while maintaining a stable economy declines in importance (.11 points). With Nationalist considerations on the other hand, the importance of strong defense forces declines (.34 points), and the decline doubles in size for CHP supporters (.59 points). On the other hand, maintaining order in the Nation is a priority promoted by nationalistic considerations (.12 points).

Principles and values are also points of division. While nationalism promotes principles and values of Turkey (.29 points), an appreciation that is increased among CHP voters (.45 points), Islamism favors principles and values of the EU (.32 points), an effect that is persistent even among CHP voters.

Please insert Table 7 here

Last topic of our examination is political trust. In Table 8 we notice the differential impact of Islamism and Nationalism on political trust. Where Islamism promotes political trust to religious leaders (.17 points), and trust in the parliament

(.20 points), Nationalism promotes trust in courts (.25 points) and reduces trust in international bodies such as the EU (.20 points) and UN (.37 points).

Please insert Table 8 here

CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we examined the impact of Islamism and Nationalism on political attitudes and the process of modernization in Turkey. The understanding of the impact of these two influences is particularly interesting now when AKP, the party of moderate Islam, governs the country. We found evidence of nationalism, in line with the long tradition of Kemalist nationalistic considerations determining Turkish politics. We also found evidence of rising Islamism, even among voters of the CHP party. These two forces in certain instances collaborate while in others create tensions.

The re-enforcement of Islam is significant in the case of Turkey because it takes place in a secular state where features of the tradition of Kemalist nationalism lie within all the aspects of life since the very early establishment of the Republic. The secular nationalism with its view of development for Turkey goes along with the Islamic values and principles that count over of 1400 years of history (Salt, 1995). In the case of Turkey, the so-called resurgence of religion is a public- lead re-introduction of religion into the modernized society as a factor that has been well-hidden and limited in the private sphere but still has the power to shape beliefs, inspire safety and establish the power of its believers..

As Başlevent et al. (2009) argue, the supporters of AKP and political Islam have been under change in line with the party's liberal transformation towards a conservative democratic party. Our findings show that this change affected the supporters of the CHP as well. Leaving aside the difference between the conservative democracy of AKP and the social democracy of CHP, the past conflicts between political Islam and Kemalist nationalism still play an important role in Turkey.

This is a preliminary take in understanding these complex dynamics of influence, but it opens further avenues of research to investigate Turkish public opinion. One direction is to examine the elements that influence citizens' party preferences and voting behavior. As the governing party of AKP expresses the strong Islamic views and at the same time is trying to establish Turkey's EU accession, it is interesting to study more extensively the expectations and determinants of the opinions of its voters. Our aim is to collect more data, increase the size and the representativeness of the sample, to be able to test more complex relationships.

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Appendix : Tables

Table 1: Attitudes towards Religion

		Sample Overall	CHP Supporters
Allah important in life	Constant	5.72 *** (1.21)	5.04 * (1.89)
	Islamism	.34 *** (.07)	.35 *** (.09)
	Nationalism	-.04 (.14)	-.02 (.21)
	Adj R ²	.19	.18
	N	105	67
Importance of religion in Turkey	Constant	-3.82 (5.94)	2.41 *** (.53)
	Islamism	.68 * (.34)	.03 (.02)
	Nationalism	.64 (.66)	.06 (.06)
	Adj R ²	.031	.019
	N	105	67

Notes: ⁺ p<.01, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis.

Table 2: Attitudes towards Modernization

		Sample Overall	CHP Supporters
Emphasize modern values more than tradition	Constant	8.46 *** (1.18)	7.66 *** (1.71)
	Islamism	.13 ⁺ (.07)	.27** (.08)
	Nationalism	-.38 ** (.13)	-.35 ⁺ (.19)
	Adj R ²	.08	.19
	N	104	67
Modern values coexist with tradition	Constant	6.07 *** (.87)	7.74 *** (1.34)
	Islamism	.06 (.05)	.15 * (.06)
	Nationalism	.23 * (.10)	.03 (.15)
	Adj R ²	.06	.06
	N	105	67
Adjust behavior to changing world	Constant	7.24 *** (1.25)	6.70 *** (2.01)
	Islamism	-.17 ** (.07)	-.03 (.09)
	Nationalism	-.03 (.14)	-.03 (.22)
	Adj R ²	.05	.03
	N	104	67
Newer lifestyles contributing to breakdown of society	Constant	6.16 *** (.83)	4.75 *** (1.04)
	Islamism	-.001 (.05)	.04 (.05)
	Nationalism	.29 ** (.09)	.45 *** (.11)
	Adj R ²	.07	.20
	N	105	67

Notes: ⁺ p<.01, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis.

Table 3: Attitudes towards Ethnic Diversity, Integration and Tolerance				
		Sample Overall		CHP Supporters
Ethnic diversity erodes unity	Constant	4.88 ***	(1.38)	3.58 (1.98)
	Islamism	.15 *	(.08)	.01 (.09)
	Nationalism	-.30 *	(.15)	-.15 (.22)
	Adj R2	.047		.023
	N	104		67
Ethnic diversity enriches life	Constant	7.26 ***	(.84)	5.78 *** (1.19)
	Islamism	-.10 *	(.05)	.01 (.05)
	Nationalism	.17	(.09)	.31 * (.13)
	Adj R2	.047		
	N	104		
Cultural rights to minorities	Constant	7.02 ***	(.71)	5.30 *** (1.00)
	Islamism	-.06	(.04)	-.07 (.05)
	Nationalism	.19 *	(.08)	.40 * (.11)
	Adj R2	.048		.16
	N	104		67
Tolerance dif. moral standards	Constant	6.68 ***	(.72)	6.94 *** (.97)
	Islamism	-.03	(.04)	-.00 (.04)
	Nationalism	.27 *	(.08)	.24 * (.11)
	Adj R2	.08		.05
	N	104		67

Notes: + p<.01, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis.

Table 4: National Identity elements

		Sample Overall	CHP Supporters
Citizenship: having ancestors	Constant	3.75 * (1.51)	2.62 (2.36)
	Islamism	.21 * (.09)	.23 * (.11)
	Nationalism	-.04 (.17)	.08 (.26)
	Adj R2	.04	.04
	N	104	67
Citizenship: born in soil	Constant	5.25 *** (.144)	5.47 * (2.25)
	Islamism	.21 * (.08)	.20 * (.10)
	Nationalism	-.18 (.16)	-.23 (.25)
	Adj R2	.048	.038
	N	104	67
Citizenship: adopt customs	Constant	4.61 *** (1.25)	3.95 * (1.87)
	Islamism	.10 (.07)	.18 * (.09)
	Nationalism	.16 (.14)	.18 (.20)
	Adj R2	.036	.049
	N	104	67
Citizenship: abide laws	Constant	6.26 *** (1.02)	2.32 (1.62)
	Islamism	.08 (.06)	.10 (.07)
	Nationalism	.14 (.11)	.55 ** (.18)
	Adj R2	.04	.16
	N	105	67

Notes: + p<.01, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis.

Table 5: Attitudes towards government and Political participation

		Sample Overall	CHP Supporters
Obey the state	Constant	.07 (1.53)	-1.79 (2.23)
	Islamism	.18 * (.09)	-.02 (.10)
	Nationalism	.38 * (.17)	.61 * (.24)
	Adj R2	.09	.09
	N	105	67
Giving people more say in gov. decisions	Constant	10.31 *** (.63)	9.95 *** (.95)
	Islamism	-.16 *** (.04)	-.12 ** (.04)
	Nationalism	-.10 (.07)	-.06 (.10)
	Adj R2	.172	.092
	N	105	67
Protect freedom of speech	Constant	10.35 *** (.64)	10.02 *** (.87)
	Islamism	-.12** (.04)	-.09 * (.04)
	Nationalism	-.08 (.07)	-.04 (.09)
	Adj R2	.086	.051
	N	105	67
See myself as World Citizen	Constant	3.67 ** (1.26)	3.80 * (1.79)
	Islamism	-.00 (.07)	.15 + (.08)
	Nationalism	.41 ** (.14)	.32 + (.20)
	Adj R2	.058	.063
	N	105	67

Notes: + p<.01, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis.

Table 6: EU membership considerations

		Sample Overall	CHP Supporters
Importance of EU membership	Constant	7.34 *** (1.41)	5.29 * (2.23)
	Islamism	.08 (.08)	.06 (.10)
	Nationalism	-.34 * (.16)	-.18 (.24)
	Adj R2	.05	.02
	N	104	67
Strengthen international position	Constant	6.20 *** (1.30)	4.86 * (2.30)
	Islamism	.17 * (.07)	.21 * (.10)
	Nationalism	-.05 (.14)	.03 (.25)
	Adj R2	.03	.032
	N	104	67
Democratization of Turkey according to EU pattern	Constant	6.40 *** (1.14)	6.02 * (1.86)
	Islamism	.19 ** (.07)	.20 * (.08)
	Nationalism	-.11 (.13)	-.11 (.20)
	Adj R2	.061	.05
	N	103	67
Economic advantages for Turkey	Constant	5.85 *** (1.22)	2.85 (2.15)
	Islamism	.14 * (.07)	.18 + (.10)
	Nationalism	.01 (.14)	.27 (.23)
	Adj R2	.04	.07
	N	105	67
Restrictions of independence	Constant	6.5 *** (1.28)	7.60 *** (2.40)
	Islamism	-.14 + (.08)	-.21 * (.11)
	Nationalism	-.03 (.17)	-.09 (.26)
	Adj R2	.008	.03
	N	103	67
Rise of religious fundamentalism	Constant	5.82 *** (1.26)	4.78 * (1.93)
	Islamism	-.20 ** (.07)	-.21 * (.09)
	Nationalism	.04 (.14)	.19 (.21)
	Adj R2	.068	.061
	N	103	67
Weakening of religious values	Constant	5.05 *** (1.49)	1.89 (2.36)

Islamism	.20 *	(.09)	.17	(.11)
Nationalism	-.24	(.17)	.08	(.26)
Adj R2	.045		.011	
N	103		67	

Notes: + p<.01, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis.

Table 7: Important political issues and values

		Sample Overall	CHP Supporters
Importance of strong defense forces	Constant	9.78 *** (1.41)	11.89 *** (1.57)
	Islamism	.14 * (.06)	.13 + (.07)
	Nationalism	-.34 ** (.11)	-.59 *** (.17)
	Adj R2	.105	.158
	N	105	67
Maintaining a stable economy	Constant	9.63 *** (.56)	8.89 *** (.67)
	Islamism	-.11 ** (.03)	-.07 ** (.03)
	Nationalism	.02 (.06)	.09 (.07)
	Adj R2	.081	.071
	N	105	67
Maintaining order in the Nation	Constant	8.30 *** (.63)	8.52 (.81)
	Islamism	-.03 (.04)	-.01 (.04)
	Nationalism	.12 + (.07)	.10 (.09)
	Adj R2	.014	.011
	N	105	67
Favor principles and values of Turkey	Constant	6.16 *** (.83)	4.75 *** (1.04)
	Islamism	-.001 (.05)	.04 (.05)
	Nationalism	.29 ** (.09)	.45 *** (.11)
	Adj R2	.068	.179
	N	105	67

Favor principles and values of EU	Constant	4.62 *** (1.40)	4.15 + (2.34)
	Islamism	.32 *** (.08)	.28 * (.11)
	Nationalism	-.24 (.16)	-.18 (.26)
	Adj R2	.129	.072
	N	104	67

Notes: + p<.01, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis.

Table 8: Political trust

		Sample Overall	
Trust religious leaders	Constant	.72	(.99)
	Islamism	.17 **	(.06)
	Nationalism	.06	(.11)
	Adj R2	.071	
	N	104	
Trust the courts	Constant	3.88 **	(1.16)
	Islamism	-.07	(.07)
	Nationalism	.25 *	(.13)
	Adj R2	.025	
	N	104	
Trust the Parliament	Constant	2.39 *	(1.20)
	Islamism	.20 **	(.07)
	Nationalism	-.01	(.13)
	Adj R2	.058	
	N	105	
Trust the EU	Constant	4.62 ***	(1.04)
	Islamism	-.03	(.06)
	Nationalism	-.20 +	(.12)
	Adj R2	.013	
	N	105	
Trust the UN	Constant	6.03 ***	(1.06)
	Islamism	.01	(.06)
	Nationalism	-.37 **	(.12)
	Adj R2	.067	
	N	105	

Notes: + p<.01, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis.