

Welfare Regime Types: Do They Really Matter for Welfare Support?

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Introduction

The aim of this paper is to explore whether different welfare regime types yield different welfare attitudes and to assess the relevance of common propositions about this relationship in the literature. Previous research has been inconclusive in this respect, as some (Svallfors 1997; Arts and Gelissen 2001; Andress and Heien 2001; Svallfors 2004; Matthews and Erickson 2008) have found significant links between welfare regime type and welfare attitudes whilst others have failed to find this link (Papadakis and Bean 1993; Bean and Papadakis 1998). This paper presents a comparative analysis of eight western, post-industrial liberal democratic countries belonging to four different welfare regime types: social democratic¹ welfare regimes represented by Sweden and Norway; conservative welfare regimes -Germany and France; liberal welfare regimes -the United States and Canada; and radical welfare regimes – Australia and New Zealand.

Item Response Theory (IRT) models (Mokken Scaling) are used to investigate the latent structure of responses about different welfare policies, and in particular to establish whether there are underlying dimensions that can account for these responses. These analyses are of importance for two reasons. The most important is conceptual: any latent dimensions that are found to signify that responses have to be interpreted at a higher level of abstraction than the specific wording of the question would suggest. Secondly, and as a by-product of the first: to the extent that latent dimensions are found to exist, composite scores can be defined that encapsulate the responses to all items involved and that replace the individual items as ‘dependents’. The reliability of these composite scores is higher than that of the separate items, which increases the statistical power of any subsequent analyses. The next stage of analysis involves linking the dependent variables to relevant independent variables. These variables include background and social-structural characteristics such as gender, age, education, occupation, employment status, income, party preference and union membership. This part of the analysis will be conducted in the form of nested regression models.

Welfare regime types

It is probably not possible to study welfare regimes without referring to Esping-Andersen’s (1990) seminal work on welfare regime classifications.² His 1990 book ‘The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism’ has become a modern classic and a benchmark for welfare state classification. More recent research has recognized that countries can be classified better into four (or even more) welfare regime types.³ Esping-Andersen used de-commodification⁴, social stratification and employment to classify countries into different welfare regime types. *Social democratic* welfare regimes are characterized by high levels of de-commodification, high standards of meeting needs, high levels of re-distribution, and generous benefits that are not means tested and not dependent on individual contribution. *Conservative* welfare regimes have medium levels of de-

¹ The distinguishing attributes of the different welfare regimes will be elaborated below.

² Esping-Andersen based his 1990 research theoretically on Titmuss (1974) who provided a foundation for Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime typology. He drew empirically on comparative research by for example Wilensky (1975), Mommsen (1981) and Flora (1986).

³ This will be discussed in further detail below.

⁴ The degree to which a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market.

commodification and benefits depend on a person's position in the labour market and within the family. Conservative welfare regimes focus on the male breadwinner and most benefits depend on the man's previous financial contributions into the welfare system.⁵ *Liberal* welfare regimes have low levels of de-commodification, benefits are limited and means tested, and there is limited re-distribution of incomes. Therefore, citizens in different regime types have very different experiences, and, conceivably also different expectations regarding the welfare policies the state may provide to its citizens (Arts and Gelissen 2002).

Three worlds?

Esping-Andersen's welfare regime classifications have generally been accepted as useful and the vast majority of research about welfare state regimes has relied on Esping-Andersen's 1990 classifications without questioning their foundation. However, there has been a debate about whether three welfare regime types are enough to classify all welfare regimes (Castles and Mitchell 1993; Ferrera 1996; Hill 1996; Bonoli 1997; Svallfors 1997; Castles 1998; Korpi and Palme 1998; Arts and Gelissen 2001; Arts and Gelissen 2002; Scruggs and Allan 2006; Svallfors 2007). Castles and Mitchell (1993) developed four different welfare regime categories: liberal, conservative, non-right hegemony (similar to Esping-Andersen's social-democratic regime type) and radical.⁶ They used levels of welfare expenditure, average benefit equality, the proportion of GDP raised by income and profit taxes when categorizing countries into different regime types. The category that they add to Esping Andersen's typology is the *radical* welfare regime type that is characterized by more inclusive benefits with thresholds set at higher levels resulting in more people receiving means tested benefits than in liberal welfare regimes (Castles and Mitchell 1993; Castles 1998; Scruggs and Allan 2006).

Do different welfare regime types cause different welfare attitudes?

Welfare institutions are rules and procedures that are embodied in e.g. social insurance systems that regulate entitlements in situations of inability to earn an income (unemployment, illness and disabilities, old age, etc.), while other institutions are defined by e.g. electoral systems. Institutions create what is the norm in a particular welfare regime type (March and Olsen 1989; Rothstein 1998; Myles and Quadagno 2002; Swank 2002; Iversen 2005; Iversen and Soskice 2006; Myles 2006; Blekesaune 2007; Edlund 2007; Iversen and Stephens 2008). Therefore, it is expected that people in different welfare regime types will have different opinions about welfare policies.

Citizens of social-democratic and conservative welfare regimes are expected to express strong support for welfare state intervention. Citizens of liberal and radical welfare regimes are expected to show little support for welfare state intervention (Svallfors 1997; Korpi and Palme 1998; Kim 2004; Svallfors 2004; Svallfors 2007).

Existing empirical research has followed two general strategies when analyzing to what extent the expected relationships between welfare regimes and support for welfare policies do indeed manifest themselves (Jaeger 2006). The first approach follows Esping-Andersen's (1990) path and analyzes how the effect of social cleavages on attitudes

⁵ For a comparative study on the breadwinner model see e.g. Lewis (2001).

⁶ Also referred to as Antipodean welfare regimes in literature.

towards welfare policy may vary between welfare regimes (e.g. Papadakis and Bean 1993; Svallfors 1997; Bean and Papadakis 1998; Andress and Heien 2001; Svallfors 2004).

The second approach builds on the assertion that countries empirically cluster into regime types. The second approach does not distinguish individual countries but pools them into clusters which are then compared (Arts and Gelissen 2001). Both types of research have established a link between welfare regime type and different levels of welfare policy support. The first type of research tends to find differences in support at the macro level but limited differences at the micro level (Jaeger 2006). This paper uses the first approach to be able to differentiate between country and regime effects.

The main individual-level characteristics used in the literature to explain attitudinal differences are self-interest, different socialization patterns resulting in specific values and norms - particularly justice beliefs - and class. Situational factors such as unemployment, cultural integration based on welfare regime type, and political preferences are used to explain why people have different attitudes towards welfare state policy. Self-interest and justice beliefs are most frequently used to explain different attitudes to welfare policy at the individual level (Papadakis and Bean 1993; Bean and Papadakis 1998; Andress and Heien 2001; Arts and Gelissen 2001; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003).

Self-interest is related to rational choice theory where people seek to maximize their utility. In the current context it leads to the expectation that people will not approve of welfare policy that they are unlikely to reap the benefits of themselves (Matthews and Erickson 2008). This leads to the expectation/hypothesis that most people in Social-democratic welfare regimes will be more positive towards welfare policies (as they benefit from them) and that most people in liberal welfare regimes will not support such policies (as they are unlikely to benefit from them).

Data

The data used is the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2006 Role of Government IV module.⁷ The ISSP is designed to be carried out in a cross-national context. The questionnaires in all countries are translations from an English master questionnaire. The 2006 Role of Government module contains a spectrum of questions relating to welfare attitudes as well as social background questions. All eight countries included in this study have satisfactorily large sample sizes, ranging from 933 to 2,781.⁸ The questions that relate to welfare opinions are:

On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to:

V25. provide a job for everyone who wants one?

V27. provide health care for the sick?

V28. provide a decent standard of living for the old?

V30. provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed?

⁷ The data is available to download at <http://www.issp.org>.

⁸ See Appendix 1 for a complete details of sample sizes and gross sample sizes.

- V31. reduce income differences between the rich and the poor?
 V33. provide decent housing for those who can't afford it?

The response options for these items are: definitely should be; probably should be; probably should not be; definitely should not be; and can't choose.

Methods

The first method of analysis is IRT models in the form of Mokken Scaling with the MSP5 software (Mokken, 1971; Molenaar and Sijtsma 2000). Mokken Scaling is appropriate to establish whether the six ISSP variables above have an underlying latent dimension concerning welfare attitudes. Respondents attitudes towards welfare issues are used to create a latent dependent variable 'welfare' based on the six questions above. Another benefit of Mokken Scaling is that it provides us with item means for each variable making attitude comparison between countries easy to interpret. Secondly, nested regression models are used for each country to establish whether causes of welfare attitudes differ between countries and/or welfare regime types. Nested regression models allow us to introduce a block of independent variables at a time to our regression model and compare the difference in R^2 between the different blocks. Gender, age, education, occupation, employment status, income, party preference and union membership are used as independent variables. All variables, except age, are coded into dummies.⁹

Results Mokken scaling

Mokken scaling was used to establish whether there is one (or more) latent dimension(s) concerning welfare attitudes that are expressed in the responses to the six variables described above. Mokken scaling is an ordinal monotone IRT model (see Mokken 1971; Mokken 1997; Sijtsma and Molenaar 2002; van Schuur 2003). When using categorical data it avoids the problem of over-dimensionalising that commonly plagues confirmatory factor analysis (e.g. van Schuur 2003), while requiring fewer assumptions than the Rasch model. Mokken scaling can be used to analyse ordered polytomous items and yields estimates of scalability for a set of items (the H coefficient) or for separate items in relation to the set of items in which they are included (item coefficients, or H_i).¹⁰ In addition, the model yields estimates of reliability (Rho) for a scale.¹¹

The variables used were recoded from 1 = agreeing least with welfare provisions to 5 = most in favour of welfare provisions. Respondents who stated that they 'can't choose' were coded as 3 (i.e., in between disagree and agree).¹²

⁹ See Appendix 2.

¹⁰ In the context of mass-survey data, the following rules are generally applied to assess scalability: no scale, or non-scalable item (H or $H_i < 0.30$); weak scale or weak item ($0.30 \leq H$ or $H_i < 0.40$); moderate scale or moderate item ($0.40 \leq H$ or $H_i < 0.50$); strong scale or strong item ($0.50 \leq H$ or H_i).

¹¹ Rho should be >0.70 . See Mokken (1971); Niemöller and van Schuur (1983).

¹² The Mokken scaling was also carried out with missing values and 'can't choose' deleted from the analysis, which yielded similar results. The re-coded version used here resulted in slightly lower H values for the scale (0.01-0.07 lower). The comparison of scalability for these two different codings of the same variables demonstrates that the interpretation of the 'can't choose' response as located in between agree and disagree is largely correct (otherwise scalability would have plummeted to low values), but also that it introduces a little more noise in the data (hence the small drop in H coefficients).

Table 1. Mokken scaling, scale results

Item	SWE	NOR	GER	FRA	USA	CAN	AUS	NZL	All
	Item	Item	Item	Item	Item	Item	Item	Item	Item
	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
Government responsibility:									
jobs for everyone	0.44	0.32	0.32	0.34	0.47	0.32	0.34	0.34	0.39
health care for the sick	0.33	0.28	0.33	0.31	0.51	0.26	0.30	0.30	0.35
living standard for the old	0.41	0.31	0.36	0.36	0.51	0.34	0.36	0.35	0.40
living standard for the unemployed	0.44	0.37	0.35	0.40	0.48	0.38	0.39	0.37	0.43
reduce income differences	0.47	0.33	0.35	0.36	0.41	0.37	0.36	0.37	0.40
provide decent housing	0.45	0.33	0.37	0.42	0.49	0.41	0.43	0.45	0.43
Scale H =	0.43	0.33	0.34	0.36	0.47	0.35	0.37	0.37	0.40
Rho =	0.80	0.73	0.75	0.74	0.80	0.72	0.73	0.74	0.76
n=	1,194	1,330	1,643	1,824	1,518	933	2,781	1,263	12,486

Table 2. Mokken scaling, item means per country

Item	SWE	NOR	GER	FRA	USA	CAN	AUS	NZL	All	Range
	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	
Government responsibility:										
jobs for everyone	3.32	3.91	3.62	3.36	2.69	2.55	2.81	2.61	3.11	1.36
health care for the sick	4.55	4.87	4.43	4.36	4.32	4.55	4.62	4.58	4.52	0.55
living standard for the old	4.43	4.80	4.31	4.34	4.35	4.44	4.39	4.41	4.43	0.49
living standard for the unemployed	3.86	4.08	3.50	3.47	3.06	3.32	3.13	2.90	3.38	1.18
reduce income differences	3.59	3.83	3.62	3.93	3.12	3.55	3.36	3.02	3.51	0.91
decent housing	3.76	3.85	3.70	4.00	3.80	3.90	3.73	3.51	3.78	0.49
n=	1,194	1,330	1,643	1,824	1,518	933	2,781	1,263	12,486	12,486

The scale runs from 1-5 with 5 completely agreeing with the statement.

Table 1¹³ provides an overview of the scalability of the items, as expressed in the scale H coefficient and the item coefficients H_i , both for the individual countries and for the pooled data. The analysis for the pooled data ($n=12,486$) yields a scale H coefficient of $H=0.40$ while $Rho=0.76$, which indicates a moderately strong scale for the items. We can therefore conclude that a single latent welfare attitude dimension underlies the responses to the separate items for the pooled data. The pooled results also hold for the separate countries, although there are some variations. Individual country analysis indicates that the homogeneity (i.e., uni-dimensionality) of the items is strongest in Sweden and the USA; $H=0.43$ for Sweden and $H=0.47$ for the USA; $Rho=0.80$ for both countries. This is interesting as the welfare provisions in Sweden and the USA are on opposite ends of the welfare spectrum with universal welfare provisions in Sweden and means tested welfare provisions in the USA. Opinions about welfare are more strongly integrated amongst Swedes and Americans than amongst citizens of other countries (and other welfare regime types). Yet, in the other countries too, a single dimension underlies the responses to the individual items. The scale analysis have found evidence of structural

¹³ Items are arranged in ISSP questionnaire order.

equivalence¹⁴ and this allows us to construct a new dependent variable ‘welfare’ as we measure the same underlying dimension in all variables.

Table 2 provides the means of individual scores for each of the items of the Mokken scale. The highest possible score is 5.00 and the lowest is 1.00. The items are in ISSP questionnaire order rather than in the ‘least’ to ‘most’ popular item order within each country. “Provide health care for the sick” is the most popular item in all countries but Sweden and the USA where “provide a decent standard of living for the old” is the most popular item. “Provide jobs for everyone” is the least popular item in all countries except Norway, where “reduce income differences between rich/poor” is least popular and Germany, where “provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed” is least popular. It was expected that ‘major’ welfare provisions like providing for the old (pensions), unemployment and healthcare would be popular in all countries and welfare regime types. Pensions and healthcare are indeed popular in all countries with item means over 4.31 with the USA having the lowest item mean for healthcare. It is not surprising that the USA has the lowest mean for healthcare, as it is the only country in the study without universal healthcare provisions. Support for the unemployed has means above 3.47 in Sweden, Norway, Germany and France, but much lower means in the USA, Australia and New Zealand. However, Canada has a mean closer to the conservative welfare regime countries, which may be due to Canada’s somewhat more generous unemployment benefits. However, welfare regime types do not affect attitudes towards the other ‘major’ welfare provisions.

Results nested regression models

We would like to determine what factors correlate with, or potentially ‘cause’, support for welfare policies. One could try to do that by regressing the responses of each of the items in turn on a series of independent variables. Nevertheless, the findings of the scale analysis tell us that the responses to all items derive from a single latent variable. As a consequence, one would get approximately the same results from all those separate regressions. Hence, it is better to use the composite scale scores as dependent variable; moreover, that score also is more reliable as it contains less random variation than the separate items, so that any relationships will be shown more robustly.

Nested regression models are used as we do not want to enter all independent variables into the regression equation at the same time; entering all independent variables at the same time may result in multicollinearity and this can generate interpretation problems.¹⁵ Therefore, nested regression models are suitable as they allow us to use theoretical considerations of the different models and it allows us to better diagnose the nature of any multicollinearity problems.¹⁶

¹⁴ See e.g. Scheuer, A. & Schmitt, H. (2009); Davidov et.al. (2008).

¹⁵ We do not use stepwise procedures as they are a-theoretical and likely to yield results for the different countries that are difficult or even impossible to compare.

¹⁶ There were multicollinearity problems for certain independent variables (e.g. disabled; far right; far left; unemployed) but time limitations restricted us from diagnosing the nature of the multicollinearity problems. This will be addressed in future research.

Table 3. Changes in adjusted R² in 4 nested regression models

Country	Model 1 adj. R ²	Model 2 adj. R ²	Model 3 adj. R ²	Model 4 adj. R ²
SWE	0.03	0.12	0.14	0.24
NOR	0.04	0.10	0.11	0.15
GER	0.01	0.06	0.09	0.14
FRA	0.03	0.08	0.08	0.28
USA	0.03	0.13	0.15	0.23
CAN	0.01	0.07	0.10	0.14
AUS	0.01	0.04	0.06	0.16
NZL	0.01	0.06	0.09	0.18
Pooled data	0.01	0.07	0.09	0.18

Model 1: female + age

Model 2: model 1 + education dummies + occupation dummies

Model 3: model 2 + employment status dummies + income dummies

Model 4: model 3 + party left-right dummies + union dummies

Nested regression models are based on the analyst's distinction between blocks of variables that differ in terms of their location in a hypothesised causal structure. They allow us to assess the change in R² (i.e., the autonomous explanatory power) for each block of independent variables.¹⁷ All independent variables, except age, were coded into dummies as they are ordinal level variables. Moreover, comparison of the evolution of regression coefficients as additional blocks of variables are entered in the regression equation allows us to establish the extent to which the effect of 'earlier' variables is mediated by 'later' ones. The blocks of independent variables were entered in order of theorized influence on the dependent variable. Earlier blocks were expected to have a smaller explanatory factor on the dependent variable whereas the last block was expected to have the largest explanatory factor on the dependent variable.

Table 3 provides us with an overview of the R²s for our different models. Model 1 (female + age) has a low R² in all countries, ranging from .01 to .04. This is expected as all countries included in the study are modern western countries where the role of women is not contested and age discrimination is not of a particular concern. Model 2 (model 1 + education dummies + occupation dummies) provides us with some additional explanatory power and the R²s have increased by almost ten percentage points in Sweden and the USA. This indicates that education and occupation play an important role in explaining welfare attitudes in Sweden and the USA, but much less so in the other countries.¹⁸ Model 3 (model 2 + employment status dummies + income dummies) provides little additional explanatory power for 'welfare' in all countries except Germany and New Zealand. This is somewhat surprising, as one would expect that income would play a role in affecting welfare attitudes. However, this matches the findings of Bean and Papadakis (1998). This will be discussed below in the context of Figure 1. Model 4 (model 3 + party left-right dummies + union dummies) does provide reasonable explanatory power for welfare attitudes in Sweden, France and the USA as well as for the pooled data. The increase in R² is around 10 percentage points in most countries except France where it is

¹⁷ Conventional OLS regression models will tell us the effect of all independent variables on the dependent variables.

¹⁸ Future research will introduce education and occupation in separate models to determine which has the largest effect on the R².

close to 20 percentage points. Party preference and union membership are thus very strong indicators for explaining welfare attitudes in all countries regardless of welfare regime type.

Many researchers state that support for welfare policies is dependent on being a potential beneficiary (Papadakis and Bean 1993; Bean and Papadakis 1998; Andress and Heien 2001; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003). Rational self interest would lead the ‘needy’, or those likely to be needy, to be more supportive of welfare policies. In order to assess the relevance of this notion, the next section of the paper will look in detail at some of these groups and their support for the composite ‘welfare’ dependent variable. First, we will look at the effect of income on welfare support and then the effect of party preference on welfare support.

Figure 1 shows the unstandardized regression coefficients ‘b’ of each of a series of income dummies for the eight countries included in the study. Income quintiles are used as they provide an appropriate comparison of relative income between countries; they allow comparisons between the lowest income groups in each country, then next to lowest income group etc. The highest income group being the reference category (the value of the regression coefficient for this base category is thus 0 in all countries).

Income does not have a strong impact on welfare attitudes (as was already noted in the findings in Model 3 discussed above); this finding is in line with results by Papadakis and Bean (1993) and Bean and Papadakis (1998). In four countries –Sweden, New Zealand, Australia and Canada– income differences are weakly but monotonely related to support for welfare. This is the pattern that one might expect from theorising in the literature. In Germany and Norway, however, and possibly in the US, a nonlinear relation between income and support for welfare is found, with middle income groups displaying higher levels of support than either very low or very high incomes. The result is surprising as Andress and Heien (2001) report a strong positive effect of income on welfare attitudes in the USA, and as most of literature theorises a monotone relationship. Finally, the pattern is different yet in France, where different income groups do not differ at all in terms of support for welfare, except for the highest income quintile, which is less supportive.

At this stage, it is impossible to state what causes these differences in the way in which income is related to welfare attitudes; whether this is caused by different patterns of entitlements for different income groups, or by different ways in which income, welfare and (left-right) ideology are interconnected.

Figure 2 shows the impact of party preference on welfare attitudes. Left party preference has a strong positive impact on welfare attitudes in all countries, except Norway and Germany. Conservatives were used as the reference category for party preference on welfare attitudes. Party preference also has the predicted effect on welfare attitudes left party preference has a much higher impact on welfare attitudes than preference for centre liberal and conservative parties. Left party preference is the strongest predictor for welfare attitudes for all independent variables included in the nested regression models (Papadakis and Bean 1993; Bean and Papadakis 1998).

However, the nested regression models do not allow us to distinguish causes of welfare attitudes in the different welfare regime types.

Figure 1. Income unstandardized regression 'b' coefficients for welfare support





Figure 2. Party preference unstandardized regression 'b' coefficients for welfare support¹⁹



¹⁹ The legends for Figure 2 are (from left to right in the panels): far left, centre left, centre liberal, conservative and far right.

Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to explore and assess the common propositions regarding welfare regime type and welfare attitudes set out in literature. The Mokken scale analysis indicated that there are differences between welfare regime types and welfare attitudes. Respondents in social democratic and conservative welfare regimes are more likely to have positive attitudes toward welfare policies that are not considered ‘major’ welfare provisions (pensions, healthcare and unemployment). The theoretical reasons for this is fertile ground for further research as explanations such as self-interest, justice beliefs, class, party preferences, socialisation patterns and regime dependent cultural integration need to be considered after using multi-level modelling. Multi-level modelling is also needed to establish whether effects are individual level or at the aggregate level and additional latent dimensions need to be considered.

The nested regression models indicated that left party supporters has more pro-welfare attitudes in all countries regardless of welfare regime type. The results indicate that different welfare regime types foster different welfare attitudes in the Mokken scaling but it was not possible to differentiate between welfare attitudes and welfare regime types in the nested regression models.

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Appendix 1. Sample information ISSP 2006.

Country	Sample Size	Gross sample size	Start/end date	Sampling type	Fieldwork method
Australia	2,781	6,666	11/07-16/10/2007	Random from electoral roll	Mail
Canada	933	3,500	03/03-31/10/2006	Two stage random, white pages	Mail
France	1,824	9,771	01/09-31/12/2006	Random equal probability	Mail
Germany	1,643	4,652	18/03-21/08/2006	Two stage random, municipalities	Face-to-face/ self completion
New Zealand	1,263	2,250	10/08-10/10/2006	Stratified random sample, el. roll	Mail
Norway	1,330	2,700	20/09-17/11/2006	Systematic random sample	Mail
Sweden	1,194	2,000	07/02-28/04/2006	A representative sample of the Swedish population 17-79 yrs.	Mail
United States	1,518	2,491	07/03-07/08/2006	Multi-stage area probability sample	Face-to-face

Appendix 2. Re-coding of variables.

The 'welfare' dependent variable was created from V25, V27, V28, V30, V31, V33 from ISSP 2006. The variables were originally coded from 1= 'definitely should be' to 4= 'definitely should not be' with 'can't choose' coded as missing, but were recoded to the more intuitive 1= 'definitely should not be' to 4= 'definitely should be' with 'can't choose' still coded as missing. The 'can't choose' (coded as missing) were recoded to 3 for the Mokken Scaling.

The independent variables: gender, age, education, occupation, party preference, union membership, employment status and income were coded into dummies. E.g. gender: female=1, male=0.

Reference categories in the nested regression models: female, university education, ISCO_01 (occupation), conservative, not union member, full-time employment, and the highest income quintile.