

No place like home? Britishness, multiculturalism and the politics of utopia

Dr Rhys Andrews
Dr Michael Marinetto
Cardiff University

Paper for presentation the Political Studies Association Conference, Edinburgh 29 March – 1 April 2010.

By focusing on the ‘imagined communities’ that underpin the ‘true’ civic or ethnic bases of nation-states, national identities reflect fantasies about the kind of society in which citizens ‘ought’ to live. Recent debates about what it means to be British furnish a vivid illustration of this phenomenon, with protagonists largely subscribing to two alternative visions of Britain. The first of these imaginaries embraces an optimistic, Whiggish account of paradise found: an historic democracy, reinvigorated by its dynamic, creative metropolitan centres; the second, a darkly melancholic tale of paradise lost: a former superpower, subsumed by supranational forces and losing touch with its rural English soul. At the heart of both imaginaries are contrasting views about the place of multiculturalism within the construction of British national identity. We argue that these competing visions of a multicultural Britishness reflect a demise in genuinely utopian reflection on the state of humanity in the wake of globalisation.

Introduction

Recent debates about Britishness have drawn on political imaginaries that seek to re-vision or revive notions of the British 'nation' as an 'imagined community', which is constituted by the beliefs of those people living within its geographical boundaries (Anderson, 1983). This discourse has reflected growing interrogation of the meaning of national identity in the UK and its continued relevance in an increasingly diverse multicultural (and multinational) society (e.g. Bradbury, 2006; Uberoi and Modood, 2010; Parekh, 2000; Robbins, 1998). It has also been shaped by a series of policy initiatives that seek to address a multitude of different social problems, including citizenship education in schools (DfES, 2007), citizenship tests for immigrants (Home Office, 2004) and proposals for a series of 'banal' awareness-raising initiatives, such as a national "British Day".

Inevitably, since national identities are in a constant state of flux, attempts to define or fix them require the mobilization of substantial ideological resources (Hall, 1991). The alternative visions of Britain which have emerged in the Britishness debate serve as a compelling illustration of this phenomenon in action. By seeking to articulate distinctive imagined communities that underpins the 'true' civic (or ethnic) bases of the UK, multicultural and traditional narratives of Britishness reflect fantasies about the kind of society in which UK citizens 'ought' to live. On the one hand, attempts to delineate a so-called 'golden thread' of British values that are compatible with multiculturalism draw on the idea of Britain as a tolerant liberal society, which is able to accommodate and even celebrate growing ethnic and cultural diversity. On the other hand, those seeking to re-establish the credentials of a primordial Britishness, rely on images of nostalgia for empire, continued greatness in the world and the rural idyll of the English countryside. In this paper, we draw on theories of utopian thinking to explore how each of these responses to multiculturalism represents a failure of the political imagination.

There is little doubt that the Britishness debate has serious implications for those living in twenty-first century Britain. However, several questions about its provenance remain unanswered. What conceptual resources are available for re-imagining Britishness? How might national identity in the UK be reformulated in response to multiculturalism? Despite the existence of a small yet growing literature examining specific elements of the current Britishness debate (e.g. Andrews and Mycock, 2008; Karvounis, Manzo and Gray, 2003; White, 2008; Wolton, 2006), to date little attention has been paid to its implications for the theorisation of alternative social scenarios. This paper seeks to address this gap in the literature by drawing on theories of utopian politics to explore the relationship between the Britishness debate and contemporary multiculturalism. The emergence of alternative visions of British national identity during the past decade is first considered, before notions of utopian politics and their connection with multiculturalism are examined. The paper concludes by advancing some provocative suggestions about the likely fate of Britishness and multiculturalism in the coming years.

Imagining Britain in the 21st century

Calhoun (1991) describes imagined communities as ‘large collectivities (whose members are) linked primarily by common identities but minimally by networks of directly interpersonal relationship’ (95-6). Although a multiplicity of such communities may serve as sources of self-identification, (Hall 1992; Sen 2006), territoriality and ethnicity are conventionally regarded as perhaps the most salient (Phillips 2002; Smith 1991). The distinctive narratives, myths and stories, which are embodied within geographical and ethnic constructions of community constitute especially powerful ‘cultural artefacts’ with ‘profound emotional legitimacy’ for individuals, strong enough to make them ‘ready to die’ in certain circumstances (Anderson 1983: 13-14, 129). Thus, the social construction of national identity

has particularly important implications for those individuals residing with the boundaries of nation-states, especially as it is invariably carried out via ‘the marking of difference and exclusion’ (Hall, 1996: 4). Indeed, national identity may be regarded as ‘a project, the success of which depends on being seen as an essence’ (Reicher and Hopkins, 2000).

Debates about the essence of contemporary Britishness have been strongly shaped by recent demographic changes within the UK. In particular, as British society has become more ethnically diverse, so social constructions of civic and national identity have increasingly sought to capture the ‘true’ essence of Britain. In seeking to define Britishness, such constructions have inevitably utilised those ideological resources that are closest to hand. Liberal interpretations of Britishness have woven together ‘Whiggish’ history with the theory and practice of multiculturalism, while conservative interpretations draw on long-held views about the global pre-eminence of the Anglo-British state and the English way of life. Since these two interpretations represent the most prominent recent attempts to confront the enduring ‘fuzziness’ around notions of ‘Britain’ (Cohen, 1994), they are now explored in more detail.

Multicultural Britain

In common with other developed nation-states, civic and national identity in the UK has undergone continual negotiation and renegotiation (Lawson 2005). While there have been periods when the expression of a common British sentiment was widespread, especially in the aftermath of the Second World War (Weight, 2002), conceptions of Britishness have largely been utilised as platforms for political mobilisation by elites seeking to promote sectional interests or respond to social problems. The revival of the Britishness debate in recent times is no exception to this phenomenon. Gordon Brown – the ‘Bard of New Britishness’ (Nairn, 2006) – for example, has argued that the ‘rediscovery’ of ‘long-standing

British values', such as tolerance, decency and fair-play, is necessary to prevent the 'Balkanisation of Britain' threatened by growing ethnic diversity, increased immigration and nationalist separatism (Brown, 2004). What is perhaps unique about the latest Britishness debate is the effort that has been made to bring together multiculturalism and notions of a common shared national heritage.

Tony Blair (2003) described Britain as 'one nation, one community' built on shared British values, such as democracy, tolerance and internationalism. Although such claims about the virtues of the British way are extremely contestable (particularly given the historical legacy of the British Empire (Gilroy, 2004)), establishing a link between Britishness and democratic values has facilitated the articulation of a liberal multicultural vision of contemporary Britain. Moreover, it is a vision with at least some empirical validity. Survey and case study evidence suggests that many minority ethnic and immigrant groups associate themselves closely with broad notions of British identity (Jacobson, 1997; Stone and Muir, 2007). The links between multiculturalism and liberal notions of Britishness may not always be evident in government policy and practice (Wolton, 2006), but there is no doubting that there are strong theoretical as well as empirical grounds for expecting such connections to be present.

Several sociologists suggest that the demographic changes wrought in the past decade or so have spurred the rise of 'global cosmopolitanism', especially within the large cities of developed nation-states (Appadurai, 1996; Giddens, 1998). The rise of hybrid heterogeneous metropolitan identities has meant that the social construction of Britishness increasingly draws on disparate sources of self-identification, ranging from multi-ethnic food to global popular culture (Westwood, 2000). The liberal mobilisation of multicultural notions of Britishness has thus sought to marry the celebration of British institutions with the decentring of whiteness that has occurred in the post-colonial era. While this process may not have

eradicated racism (Rothon and Heath, 2003), racialisation (Uberoi and Modood, 2010) or the conflation of English and British national identity (Lee, 2006), it has nonetheless become the default public position on Britishness of the political elite (Andrews and Mycock, 2008). Nevertheless, alternative visions of Britishness continue to retain a powerful hold over certain sections of the media and the political right. In particular, the national imaginary that draws on notions of Britain's international standing and the rural idyll of the English countryside remains deeply influential (Wallwork and Dixon, 2004).

'Great' Britain

Traditionally, British national identity was intrinsically linked with the supposed superiority of Britain's political institutions and the spread of the British Empire (Colley, 1992). By forging the British nation in opposition to others and otherness, it was possible to unite the disparate classes and nations of Britain around the cultural of its dominant nation, England (Robbins, 1998). Although in the post-imperial era it is no longer possible to draw upon global pre-eminence as a source of identification for British citizens, it is nonetheless still the case that nostalgia for past greatness is a powerful force driving attempts to remake Britishness (and Englishness) (Karvounis, Manzo and Gray, 2003). Indeed, the imperial nationalist narrative which connects Britain's identity with the United States and its former colonies remains a potent political rallying point for politicians (especially Conservatives – Hague, 2010).

In addition to clinging to the illusion of greatness, adherents to the political imaginary of 'Great' Britain invariably exhibit nostalgia for other things past or passing. In recent times, this attitude was most memorably encapsulated in John Major's misquoting of Orwell's reflections on Englishness. Central to the misty-eyed evocations of best bitter, the sound of leather on willow and 'invincible' village greens, is the notion that the English countryside is

the repository of Britain's 'quintessential national virtues' (Lowenthal, 1991: 213). The purported organic harmony between people and place embodied in the rural history of England served as a potent emblem of the cohesiveness of British society (Rose, 1995). Moreover, England's rural idyll furnished the strong contrast with the other that underpinned imperial ambitions (Agyeman and Spooner, 1997). For example, posters produced during the Second World War exhorted people to ever greater sacrifice in order that English country life be preserved (Aslet, 1997).

Although the social construction of the English rural idyll is no more fixed than the political imaginary of Britain (see Halfacree, 1997), it nonetheless tends to privilege certain sorts of hierarchical social relations (Little and Austin, 1995). To the extent that multiculturalism is acknowledged within this imaginary, it is seen as a threat to the existing social order rather than as offering potential for its extension or revitalisation (Knowles, 2008). Given that the heart of the English rural idyll is often located with those few Home counties surrounding London (Morgan, 2002), it is perhaps not surprising that cultural and ethnic heterogeneity have been almost anathema to this vision of Britishness in the past. Ray Davies' laments for the old traditions along with the new aside, it seems likely that for the time being the overwhelming whiteness of rural landscapes (Chakraborti and Garland, 2004) will impede recognition of Britain's 'greatness in retreat' (Nairn, 1988).

Multiculturalism and Utopia

Both the imperial nationalist and multicultural narratives of Britishness are obsessed with difference. The former is petrified by the seeming encroachment of different ethnic cultures. The strategy is to curtail ethnic differentiation in a bid to maintain national homogeneity or a distinct national identity that is all-British. The former, on the other hand, celebrates difference and seeks to embrace greater recognition and openness to ethnic differentiation.

Here, there is no limit or strict quotas to the ethnic melting pot. The more cultures, the better. Both perspectives are so preciously wedded to their own predilections of what it means to be British that they suffer from terminal myopia. It may be possible that Britain is far from experiencing a boom in cultural diversification. Yet, the exact opposite may be true. Britain may be undergoing the cultural equivalent of Taylorism: in the face of globalisation, standardisation and uniformity abound.

The historian Russell Jacoby writes about the cultural flattening of American society, which has also inflicted the British Isles: 'No group is able, and few are willing, to stand up to the potent homogenizing forces of advanced industrial society...All differences between groups have not disappeared; this is obvious. Yet they may progressively decline' (1999: 48). All Britons whether they hail from East London or East Asia 'buy the same goods, look at the same movies and television, pursue the same activities and have – more or less – the same desired for success' (ibid). Take language as an indication of this homogenisation. English has become the lingua franca of Europe, if not the world. Britain itself is well on the way to becoming a monolingual country. According to 2009 Eurostat figures, 51 percent of British school children learn no foreign languages whatsoever (The Economist. 2009).

The key levelling force of course is capitalism. In the real world, capitalism is likely to be with us in the short, medium and long-term – or any other temporal category you could care to mention. To use the neo-Marxist terminology of Antonio Gramsci, managerial capitalism can be described as a hegemonic system, meaning it is all conquering and dominant. Some thinkers, such as Francis Fukuyama in his bestselling book from 1992, *The End of History*, are resigned to the ultimate dominance of Western liberal capitalism. For Fukuyama, there may be shifts and changes in this dominant economic system but capitalism remains the summit, it is the absolute horizon beyond which there are no other views. Even Slavoj Žižek, the radical Slovenian intellectual, is resigned to the fact that *capitalism is*

indestructible: ‘...Mao’s attempt, in the Cultural Revolution, to wipe out the traces of capitalism, ended up in its triumphant return’ (2007: 7). With some degree of irony Žižek notes that we should possibly wait for some form of divine intervention – a radical revolutionary spin on Heidegger’s assertion: *Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten*, which is translated as ‘only a God can save us’.

The growing dominance of capitalism has undoubtedly driven out absolute poverty from the West and now in East Asia. It has brought a certain amount of prosperity for certain areas of the world. The campaigning economist Jeffrey Sachs and the journalist Thomas Friedman would have us believe in the great developmental strides of global capitalism. East Asia is the shining exemplar of their well-meaning but essentially utilitarian position. But with material prosperity has come the grinding poverty of philosophy – the waning of philosophical and ideological alternatives to capitalism. For a growing number of commentators since the 1960s the success of capitalism is synonymous with the decline of utopian thinking. To paraphrase W. B. Yeats poem *The Second Coming* which used Eschatological biblical imagery to reflect on the aftermath of the First World War: ‘The utopians lack all conviction, while the cynics are full of passionate intensity’.

Yeats’s pessimism is certainly shared by contemporary commentators. Francis Fukuyama, though generally ridiculed as right-wing ideologue by the left, has something worthwhile to say about the ‘existential’ consequences of capitalism’s dominance. He notes in an early pamphlet for the RAND Corporation: ‘the triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of visible systematic alternatives to Western liberalism’ (1989: 2). He may have overstated the case slightly as alternatives do exist: Despotic, military dictatorships seem quite popular alternatives to democratic capitalism in parts of Africa, the Middle East, Asia and territories of the former Soviet Union. In addition, Fukuyama’s arguments may sound familiar. We have certainly heard them before. Indeed,

The End of History may be regarded as a rehash of Daniel Bell's the 'end of ideology thesis' from 1960 but with added philosophical depth and touches. However, the critics were too quick to dismiss Fukuyama; for he does not offer crass triumphalism, a celebration of the moral ascendancy of capitalism. Using Hegel and Alexandre Kojève, Fukuyama mourned the existence of any philosophical, ideological or political, alternatives to Western capitalism.

The end of history will be a very sad event. The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one's life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands. (Fukuyama, 1989: 22-3)

Does this signify the end of utopian ideals and convictions that tomorrow can be radically better than today? It could be argued that in fact free market capitalism is in itself a utopian idea but one which has closed-off all opposing alternatives. This is the point made by the business management theorist Martin Parker: 'So a pro-market managerialism which is utopian in form gets naturalized and justified at the same time that discussions of other ways of thinking about organizing are closeted as curios' (2002: 3). Indeed, this is a classic example of how ideology works in the modern age. Radical alternatives to capitalism do not have to be violently suppressed; they just have to be labelled as unrealistic, the products of crazed ideologues, or simply dangerous. In contemporary society, we are told that the capitalist economy is how the world is and it is how the world will continue to run.

This is not the whole story. Intellectuals and activists do entertain alternative social scenarios. But it is not so much utopian thinking as pragmatism, modesty, realism, technocracy or the occasional reactionary flights of fancy that dominate. For the popular imagination, what is on offer is not so much Emerald City or Shangri-La but Milton Keynes. And this is where ideas about Britishness and ethnic diversity come into the equation. Kenan Malik makes a telling observation:

As the meaning of politics has narrowed, so people have begun to view themselves

and their social affiliations in a different way. Social solidarity has become increasingly defined not in political terms - as collective action in pursuit of certain political ideals but in terms of ethnicity or culture. The question people ask themselves are not so much 'What kind of society do I want to live in?' as 'Who are we?'. (Malik, 2005: 376)

Or in the context of this paper the question is this: Who are we as Britons? For those on the nationalist right, the answer exists in the past, to a time when Britannia ruled the waves and colonised vast territories of the new world. This particular ethno-political narrative attempts to recreate an ethnically pure version of Britishness, which is a figment of the imagination of neo-nationalist ideologues. In fact, in *Picture Imperfect*, a study of utopian thinking for the modern age, Jacoby argues how we have more to fear from nationalists than utopian idealists.

The centre-left response to the question of 'who are we?', as shown above, is a multicultural version of Britishness. In certain respects, the multicultural vision of Britain is, despite the liberal posturing, still pernicious. According to Jacoby, multiculturalism is a sign that political thinking has reached an impasse, a position of deep ennui: 'The rise of multiculturalism correlates with the decline of utopia, an index of the exhaustion of political thinking' (1999: 33). The British intellectual critic Kenan Malik applied the same criticism to Britain. He observes how multicultural ideas and discourses of Britishness are counterproductive: they undermine what is ultimately of value about cultural diversity. The importance of diversity is that it expands what is possible, comparing different lifestyles and belief systems and judging them in appropriate ways. According to Malik, the multicultural project values diversity as an end in itself, which is problematic: 'the pursuit of multicultural policies has led us to imagine that we are far more diverse than we are' (2005: 376). As such, multiculturalism confines humanity to various political ghettos, undermining the possibility of creating universal values and beliefs, or ideas about a truly 'collective language of citizenship'.

The problem is that in the world inhabited by the left-liberal intelligentsia,

commitment to progressive ideas is measured in terms of enthusiasm for multiculturalism. In effect, the more you support multiculturalism, the more virtuous you are (Jacoby, 1999: 31). Multiculturalism becomes the methamphetamine of a beleaguered and tired intelligentsia, a vital fillip for the intellectually disillusioned. It is an 'ideology for an era without ideology' (Jacoby, 1999: 33). One of its key proponents in British intellectual circles, Tariq Modood, argues that the ideology is worth defending against the naysayers, and there are a few. For this academic expert, we need more not less multiculturalism. Why? Does it offer a radical alternative for humanity, where tomorrow will be radically different from today? Hardly. Modood's enthusiasm is behind a fairly moderate political project: 'contrary to the claims of its critics...the key trends and developments are broadly consistent with moderate pragmatism yet, inevitably, uneven multiculturalism' (2007: 14). Modood goes on to elaborate what this political project involves: 'For multiculturalism is a form of integration. It is a form of integration that best meets the normative implications of equal citizenship' (ibid). Jacoby, though, lacerates the conservative political ambitions and horizons of multiculturalism. Effectively the multicultural project becomes defined by appointments and jobs, being part of an organisation whether a university or corporation: 'multiculturalists want more of their own people in the organization. This is fully understandable, but it is not radical, and it is barely political' (Jacoby, 1999: 63). The same can be said about the demand for gender equality. What is demanded from multiculturalists is a type of ideologically driven patronage, a bigger slice of the cake for certain underrepresented people. This is hardly revolutionary stuff. There is no desire to transform the cake, or rather the system. The system remains intact but with greater diversity.

There are also good professional reasons why members of the intelligentsia, especially university academics, are so keen to defend multiculturalism. A number of senior academics have built their academic reputations and professional empires on the basis of

being the leading 'named' experts in multiculturalism. According to Ricci, in scholarly communities 'one tends to develop research projects which break ground that others have not tilled before, to stake out small areas of inquiry that other scholars have not yet...conquered for their own. There is, therefore, a propensity constantly to refashion the scope of political science into smaller and smaller realms of expertise' (1984: 222). Multiculturalism is one such social science specialism that has now splintered into various sub-fields, which look at, inter alia: mobility, migration, religion, identities, political participation. And of course there are various experts connected to different ethnic groups. Multicultural studies, once on the periphery of academe, is now a mainstream academic enterprise. Multiculturalism has become, in intellectual terms at least, the gift that keeps on giving for those that manage to corner this particular section of the market. University department's and appointments committees endow prestigious chairs in multiculturalism. The paymasters at research funding bodies in the UK have supported issues related to multiculturalism.

It should therefore come as no surprise that some of the most ardent critics of multiculturalism have come from outside of the academy. The journalist Yasmin Alibhai-Brown (2000) and the independent intellectual Kenan Malik (2009) have been leading critics. In academia, multiculturalism is the dominant paradigm and, for perfectly understandable career reasons, have not gone against the grain. Where else should we go to find more radical, even utopian thinking about ethnicity and humanity? The German Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch offers us one possibility. His 1964 book *The Spirit of Utopia* makes a case for the idea that what inspires disruptions of the future is art, literature, poetry, music. The medium of fiction can be a vehicle for exploring radical and unrealistic visions of the future. Recent films such as *Crash*, *American History X* and *This Is England* offer thought-provoking views on multiculturalism. But possibly the one fictional drama that considers both multiculturalism and utopia is the HBO series *Oz*, screened between 1997 and 2003. *Oz*

is the moniker given to Oswald State Correctional Facility – a high security prison in some unknown location in the States. Most of the narrative arcs throughout the six seasons of this drama take place in cell block 5 (aka Emerald City or ‘Em City’) which is an experimental unit set up by the idealistic, and university-educated, correctional officer, Tim McManus. The unit is a controlled environment in which there is equal representation of the main ethnic and social groups within the general prison population (Gen Pop) – the Sicilians, the Irish, the Muslims, the Aryan Brotherhood, the gays and so on. The emphasis in ‘Em City’ is rehabilitation and education, as the unit manager has idealised notions that hardened and violent criminals can become responsible citizens. However, ‘Em City’ is no utopian, multiracial paradise. Inmates in ‘Em City’ are regularly stabbed (‘shanked’), strangled, assaulted and sodomised, and drug abuse and trafficking is also rife. When ethnic or social integration takes place, it is often for the express purpose of organising violent and deadly retributions against other inmates - members of a rival faction within Emerald City. The sub-text from the Oz series is clear: the prison system, even when attempts are made to reform it and make it more progressive, ultimately brutalises inmates. There is no prospect of utopia, no place to truly call home, whilst the system remains.

Conclusion

This paper presentation has examined the idea of Britishness. Or more specifically, it has considered imagined versions of Britishness, which have distinct fantasies about how citizens should comport themselves. Two alternative versions of imagined Britishness were initially explored in the paper. The first version offered an optimistic portrayal of Britishness as something which is progressive and inclusive, open to different ethnic cultures. A more pessimistic version is the imperial nationalist version of Britishness which draws upon the faded grandeur of a once superpower status. Central to both these perspectives, as shown in

the paper, are quite different views about the contribution of multiculturalism to British life and national identity. Each in its own way is preoccupied with ethnic difference – one is keen to promote cultural differentiation, the other want to place limits on its seeming encroachment. The assumptions underlying both versions of Britishness can be subject to the usual social science critiques. For example, the nationalist mindset is obviously reactionary and has something of a racist agenda. Multiculturalism has also been scrutinised by social and political scientists. There are commentators for whom today's multiculturalism is based less on ethnic lines than on patterns of consumption. However, this paper has located the problems surrounding imagined conceptions of Britishness within a debate not usually associated with national identity and Britishness. We have located these conceptions of Britishness within the context of discussions about utopia, or more specifically as national ideologies for an age without ideological alternatives. These diverse conceptions of Britishness are a symptom of an age where utopian thinking seems to have been exhausted. Indeed, these idealised versions of Britishness can be seen as weak substitutes for radical utopian thought, of the non-blueprint variety that seek to better the lot of humanity as a whole. In fact, both versions of Britishness seem to exist to serve the interests of sectional interests. The nationalist view serves reactionary elements from the Daily Telegraph to the BNP. The multicultural image of Britishness seems to serve, more than anything else, the interests of the liberal elite, and has furnished a comfortable niche for professional intellectuals and academics. Ultimately, though, both conceptions offer little in the way of hope in a future which is radically different from today. The words of Ernst Bloch are relevant and, possibly prescient, on future ideas about Britishness: 'And yet what is left for us here, we who suffer and are dark, is to hope far ahead. If it remains strong enough, becomes pure, possesses itself undivertedly enough, it will not go to ruin – hope will not let us go to ruin' (1964, p. 276).

References

- Alibhai-Brown, Y. (2000), *After Multiculturalism*, London: Foreign Policy Centre.
- Anderson, B. 1983. *Imagined communities*. London: Verso.
- Andrews, R. and A. Mycock. 2008. Dilemmas of devolution: the 'politics of Britishness' and citizenship education. *British Politics* 3: 139-55.
- Appadurai, A. (1996) *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Aslet, C. (1997) *Anyone for England? A Search for British Identity*. London: Little, Brown and Company.
- Blair, A. (2003) Speech to Foreign Office conference: 'Britain in the World', London, 7th January 2003.
- Bloch, E (1964), *The Spirit of Utopia*, reprinted 2000, Stanford, Calif.,: Stanford University Press.
- Bradbury, J. (2006) *Union and Devolution: Territorial Politics in the United Kingdom from Thatcher to Blair*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Brown, G. (2004) The Golden Thread that runs through our history. *The Guardian*, 8th July 2004.
- Calhoun, C. 1991. Indirect relationships and imagined communities. In *Social theory for a changing society*, ed. P. Bourdieu, and J.S. Coleman, 95-121. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Chakrabortu, N. and Garland, J. (eds) (2004) *Rural Racism*. Cullompton: Willan Publishing.
- Cohen, R. (1994) *Frontiers of Identity: The British and Others*, London: Longman.
- Colley, L. (1992) Britishness and Otherness: An Argument. *Journal of British Studies* 31(3): 309-329.
- DfES (2007) *Curriculum Review: Diversity and Citizenship*. London: Stationery Office.

- The Economist (2009), 'The disaster of monolingual Britain', *Charlemagne's Notebook - The Economist* Sept 25th (www.economist.com/blogs/Charlemagne/2009).
- Fukuyama, F. (1989), *Have We Reached the End of History?* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation).
- Fukuyama, F. (1992), *The End of History and the Last Man*, London: Hamish Hamilton.
- Giddens, A. (1998) *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Gilroy, P. (2004) *After Empire: Multiculture or Melancholia*, London: Routledge.
- Hague, W. (2010) 'The foreign policy framework of a new Conservative government', Speech to the Royal United Services Institute, 10th March.
- Halfacree, K.H. (1995) Talking about rurality: Social presentations of the rural as expressed by six English parishes. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 11(1): 1-20.
- Hall, S. 1992. 'The local and the global: Globalization and Ethnicity'. In A. King (ed.), *Globalization and the World System*. London: Macmillan.
- Hall, S. 1996. Introduction: who needs 'identity'? In *Questions of Cultural Identity*, eds. S. Hall, and P. du Gay, 4-10. London: Sage.
- Harvie, C. (2006) 'Bad history', *Political Quarterly* 77(4): 439-477.
- Heath, A., Martin, J. and Elgenius, G. (2007) 'Who do we think we are? The decline of traditional identities', in A. Park, J. Curtice, K. Thompson, M. Phillips and M. Johnson (eds.) *British Social Attitudes: the 23rd Report – Perspectives on a Changing Society*, London: Sage
- Home Office. (2004) *Life in the United Kingdom: A Journey to Citizenship*. Home Office: Stationery Office.
- Jacobson, J. (1997) Perceptions of Britishness. *Nations and Nationalism*, 3(2): 181-199.
- Jacoby, R. (1999), *The End of Utopia: Politics and Culture in Age of Apathy*, New York: Basic Books.

- Jacoby, R. (2005), *Picture Imperfect: Utopian Thought for an Anti-Utopian Age*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Karvounis, A., Manzo, K. and Gray, T. (2003) Playing mother: Narratives of Britishness in New Labour attitudes toward Europe. *Journal of Political Ideologies* 8(3): 311-325.
- Knowles, C. (2008) The landscape of post-imperial whiteness in rural Britain. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 31(1): 167-184.
- Lawson, N. (2005) *Dare More Democracy*, London: Compass.
- Lee, S. (2006) 'Gordon Brown and the British way' *Political Quarterly* 77(3): 369-378.
- Little, J. and Austin, P. (1996) Women and the rural idyll. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 12(1): 101-111.
- Lowenthal, D. (1991) British national identity and the English landscape. *Rural History*, 2(2): 205-230.
- Malik, K. (2005), 'Making a difference: culture, race and social policy', *Patterns of Prejudice*, 39 (4): 361-78.
- Malik, K. (2009), *Strange Fruit: Why Both Sides are Wrong in the Race Debate*, Oxford: One World.
- Modood, T. (2007), *Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Morgan, K. (2002) The English question: Regional perspectives on a fractured nation. *Regional Studies*, 36(7): 797-810.
- Nairn, T. (1988) *The Enchanted Glass; Britain and its Monarchy*. London: Pan Books.
- Nairn, T. (2006) 'Gordon Brown: Bard of Britishness', in Nairn, T. et al *Gordon Brown: 'Bard of Britishness'*, Cardiff: Institute of Welsh Affairs.
- Parekh, P. (2000) *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Parker, M. (2002), 'Utopia and the organizational imagination: outopia', in Marin Parker (ed.), *Utopia and Organization*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Phillips, T. 2002. Imagined communities and self-identity: an exploratory quantitative analysis. *Sociology* 36: 597-617.
- QCA (2007) *The National Curriculum 2007*. London: QCA.
- Reicher, S. and Hopkins, N. (2000) *Self and Nation*. London: Sage.
- Ricci, D. M. (1984), *The Tragedy of Political Science: Politics, Scholarship and Democracy*, New Haven, Conn.,: Yale University Press.
- Robbins, K. (1998) *Great Britain: Identities, Institutions and the Idea of Britishness*, Harlow: Longman.
- Rose, G. (1995) Place and identity: A sense of place. In D.Massey and P.Jess (eds) *A Place in the World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 94-118.
- Rothon, C. and Heath, A. (2003) 'Trends in racial prejudice', in A. Park et al. (eds.) *British Social Attitudes: The 20th Report - Continuity and Change Over Two Decades*, London: Sage.
- Stone, L. and Muir, R. (2007) *Who Are We? Identities in Britain, 2007*. London: IPPR.
- Uberoi, V. and Modood, T. (2010) Who doesn't feel British? Division over Muslims. *Parliamentary Affairs*.
- Wallwork, J. and Dixon, J.A. (2004) Foxes, green fields and Britishness: One the rhetorical construction of place and national identity. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 43(1): 21-39.
- Weight, R. (2002) *Patriots: National Identity in Britain 1940-2000*, London: MacMillan.
- Westwood, S. (2000) Re-branding Britain: Sociology, Futures and Futurology. *Sociology*, 34(1): 185-202.
- White, P. (2008) 'Immigrants into Citizens', *Political Quarterly*, 79(2): 221-31.

Wolton, S. (2006) Immigration policy and the 'crisis of British values'. *Citizenship Studies* 10(4): 453-67.

Žižek, S. (2007), 'Resistance is Surrender', *London Review of Books*, 29 (22): 7.