A paper presented at the Political Science of British Foreign Policy panel
British International Studies Association Annual Conference
University of Southampton 18-20th December, 1995

Abstract
This paper is in three parts: In Section 1 aspects of the nature of political science are discussed.
In Section 2, problems and concepts specific to the study of the EU are examined, and
in Section 3, an outline single government explanation of the problems of UK in the EU is offered.
The working of the institutions of the European Union, the practical impact of the European Union on British institutions, and the Post-Modernist perspective as a possible approach to the study of European Union are not examined in this paper. Equally, legitimacy, democratic deficit and institutional reform will not be addressed, except in passing. These exclusions do not affect the arguments of the paper.

Section 1: Political Science explanation

The position maintained here (....) is that the landmarks of political science have long ceased to be noticed, academic principles ignored and ambiguity allowed to flourish. For the purposes of political practice, it matters very little whether ambiguity flourishes or not. But if the academic intention is to prevail where the academic subject-matter is concerned, certain confusions must be avoided in the future. 1

A

Indeed, since Hix covers so many concepts and approaches one is forced into beginning with his paper. And, on the face of it, because he deals with these issues comprehensively, one is also reduced to commenting on his arguments and criticisms. But, upon reflection, it is evident that Hix leaves the problem of explanation hardly touched, let alone exhausted. For far from offering meta-theoretical, even methodological arguments, Hix begs the question of explanation by conflating arguments about explanans with the explanandum. Thence, attention is rapidly focused on discovering the relative merit of one or another approach. But this does not clarify the character of a meaningful political science explanation: by what mark shall we evaluate the relevance and accuracy, that is to say the adequacy, of any such explanation. Hix does not speak of these issues, which invites the legitimate speculation that he must consider that the existing procedures, concepts and methods of International Relations and Comparative Politics are, as such, exhaustive of political science. Undoubtedly, Hix's paper is useful - qua informative - but it is also altogether unsatisfactory because it fails to address the nature and requirements of explanation in political science: the nature of the explanans is not examined at all.

Now, it may be thought that Hix's paper is not an exercise in explanation, but rather in explication:. but this claim, were it to be made, would fail because no explications, qua distinctly clear statements (for some, and in the language of scientific explanation, definitions 3) which clarify, and, as it were, take meaning further, emerge from his paper. Three specific points may be made.

Firstly, on a point of rather simple logic, the use of such terms as "part formed", "sui generis", "heuristic", an "underdeveloped" or "primitive" theory or one which is "in its infancy", but, above all, and especially "political", raise expectations that there exists a body of 'knowledge' which gives meaning to these terms in the manner and the context in which they are used. Now, the use of such relational terms must be allowed when justified, such as in an article demonstrating how what was "part formed", or "sui generis",4 et cetera, can now be seen in its true light and full glory. Even so, the use of the word "political" - the principle term in the explanandum - is always suspect in any article which purports to examine explanations of the political category. We know that this word is used in many different senses and must wonder why it is that we are expected to extract the sense intended from the context in the face of the fact that often more precise alternatives are available. This leaves a number of instances in which the use of the term simply defies any clear construction (see The Appendix). To the skilled and the experienced going the long way round and calling upon the imagination to help with meaning is only an inconvenience, but we all have experienced the way in which students, even the more advanced, are continuously baffled by this term.

Secondly, the two contending approaches exclude and ignore the fact that their offerings and theories are predicated upon the successful existence of a rather important, indeed, primary approach, namely, that of single government study. To assume that the study of EU must be either in terms of International Relations, which excludes "the politics of", or Comparative Politics which enables us to study the internal politics of a "political system" begs the epistemological (largely meta-analytical) question concerning the nature and the status of concepts and theories which both these approaches must employ. The point is clear: such concepts are primarily the outcome of single government studies, without which no international or comparative perspective is possible. Neither can begin ab-initio; they are both dependent upon the fact and the findings of single government studies which, mistakenly, is not accorded its deserved recognition. And strange though it is, increasingly all governments are examined from the comparative perspective! 5

Thirdly, Hix's paper is elliptical in that the explanandum turns out to be the "politics of" the EU, not the EU. Indeed this distinction is crucial to Hix's concluding preference for the primacy of the Comparative Politics approach, while in the process, almost in passing, he accords International Relations a role confined to the study of "integration".

Clearly, the explanandum for Hix is the "politics of", not the European Union as such. But,… how are we to study of the "politics" of "something" about which we are fundamentally uncertain? The desire to study the politics of EU begs the question of what the EU is, and what kind of concepts are relevant to it. Or must we emulate the Realist who begins with a "blind" acceptance of the fact of sovereign state? This would be less of a problem if sovereignty and, with it, legitimacy were theoretically substantiated and justified. The problematic of the Realist finds a parallel in the claim that there is a problem of democratic deficit in the EU, which can only be asserted when it is also accepted that democracy is a theoretical possibility and, demonstrably, a meaningful reality somewhere. But claims of Representative Democracy have yet to be theoretically justified, which explains why accounts of democratisation are, academically, futile exercises. Without some unproblematical answers to the first, the second cannot even be contemplated, except if we begin with an absence of mind: ignore theory and deal with facts, and pretend that it is a meaningful thing to do. Furthermore, the application of concepts characteristic of the idea of the "State" to a set of institutions which, all agree, is not a "State" raises serious issues, and exposes us to the charge of "doing" what is not "doable".6 Just as the Realist can speak of the world of States only if he/she is also prepared to ignore the fact that the notion of the state is problematical, and a "democratic audit" begs the question of democracy, mutatis mutandis, focusing on the "politics of" the European Union would require that since we are not certain about its nature, we should proceed by ignoring it. 7

In effect Hix suggests that even though the nature of the EU is not clear, we can, nevertheless, successfully describe its decision-making environment through Comparative Politics. This is baffling. Perhaps the un-stated answer is to be found in what Comparative Politics is understood to offer: after all, it is said to be a process whereby an increasingly higher level of generalisation is made possible, leading to the creation of some "empirical generalisation-cum-theory" which can explain the data on which it is based (it will be comical if it did not!), or similar data (equally peculiar if it could not!). But even if one were to grant all this, unfortunately the seeds of discord are already present in it. The comparative method - it is disingenuous to make a distinction between comparative "politics" and "analysis", for they have a common identity in that they share the "comparative method" - is not a means of discovery, but a rather limited method of analysis with two possible uses: it is a means of reporting findings, and it is an important low-level didactic technique. In both cases, the analyst must know both sides of the comparative equation [that upon which the analysis is being based - quasi-explanans - and that which is to be "explained" - quasi-explanandum -] to a (very) considerable degree. But neither side of this equation is accessible through the comparative method. While this paper is not the proper place for a full blown argument of this kind, this much I must say: for the comparatist to be able to analyse the European Union politics, qua its decision-making processes, he/she must know the conditions, which also presumes the nature, of the European Union. But we are still not sure of the "evolving" nature of the EU and, in proceeding on a comparative basis, Hix means to leave this difficulty out of the picture. There is no special kudos to be had from repeating the rather obvious point that absence of clear understanding of the nature of the EU is precisely the biggest problem with any study of the European Union; it has been the biggest quasi-known of the post-1945 period.

The importance of this point is clear. Suppose we should decide to undertake a comparative analysis of aspects of the EU, and for this purpose have all the relevant concepts: we can only begin when we have an account of what we want to examine. But, how do we come by such an account? Certainly not through the comparative method which can only be effective in a very limited sense once we have the facts. But, social reality is not a physical "thing" out there which we can "observe". Social science facts are "descriptions" which require concepts for their identification qua facts, as well as the evaluation of their relative worth and relevance. 8 It is hard to see how one can "do" a "meaningful" comparative analysis of EU politics at all. Please note the "do" and the "meaningful" in this sentence: not that it has not been done, is not being done, or will not be done, but that its "doability" as a political science exercise is in doubt.

The burden of the argument is that Hix's paper, as an example of the type, demonstrates the inadequacy of this kind of approach because it fails to address the question of explanation in political science. But, it may be retorted, Hix is proceeding on the basis of a necessary and necessarily presumed level of apprehension, else nothing of worth can ever be written. This is, of course, always a forceful argument, and must be examined.

Arguments about explanation have a rather peculiar character. We can speak of explanation only when we are in possession of the material to be explained and are familiar with the necessary and relevant procedures. The first, and supremely important, implication of his point is that the discourse of explanation can only have meaning at the epistemological and, for that reason, meta-analytic level. It is talk about talk between conversants; it is more than a mere conversazione, and admits only the cognoscenti as participants. This talk is not part of the initial stages of education in political science. And because a great deal in common must already exist between the participants in this lonely talk, it is not necessary to say everything nor to spell out every detail. To the un-initiated such a talk is necessarily elliptical. But the un-initiated has no business judging it.

Now, it may be objected that the nature of the evident ellipsis in Hix's paper has been misunderstood. But such an objection is easily countered: the necessary ellipsis which characterises arguments in explanation are of a certain identifiable, almost predetermined type. They are concerned with the basics, such that reference to a theory or a particular method is expected to suffice. But, the thrust of an argument in explanation is about the possibility and the meaningfulness of explanation, not the relative merit of one approach as opposed to another. We must examine the explanans in terms of their relevance in rendering a given explanandum less ambiguous and unfamiliar within the discipline and according to what constitutes explanations for and in it. This necessitates that whatever the ellipsis, it should not serve to exclude arguments about the nature of political science. But this is precisely what is conspicuous by its absence in papers/articles of the type, of which Hix's is one example. And, to proceed in the manner he prescribes, we shall have to function in a condition of nescience. The cognoscenti will, naturally and rightly, look upon this with a degree of disdain.

B

On the other hand, one's "thoughts" is not an expression of one's opinion and "reflections" which is of equal worth to that of others, but rather a claim to "knowing" the circumstances, and more. Whereas there is no need to argue the first case, the second requires a good deal of construction. And there are two aspects to it. The first has to do with "knowing", and the second with what is attached to any such claim.

The burden of the point is that it is not the proper function and objective of political science to address and seek to explain "politics" as such, which is, rightly, the ambit of the contemporary historian, 12 such as the very able Peter Hennessy, or well-informed commentators, such as Elinor Goodman and Peter Riddell. And the objection to reducing, and confining political science to an analysis of politics is that it is thus reduced to contemporary history. But, contemporary history is not a self-dependent discipline, and requires the fruits of other disciplines in order to have an account of "what is".

For many, "what is" is only a description of the prevailing "now" conditions, from which to start. But, to know "what is" we need to have some understanding of its becoming. And if the claims of the historian are to be believed, we need to have a historical account in the first instance. On this view, any account of "what is" is a piece of writing in history. And this is so, irrespective of the necessary distinction between contemporary history and history, primarily, in that the former deals with a living period and a recent past for which original and primary documents are not available, and about which "detached" historical judgement is not yet possible.

Now, while it is absolutely essential that any meaningful explanation can only begin with "what is" - else analysis will simply not be meaningful - yet the very determination of "what is" will crucially affect subsequent analysis. The point is this: while an account of "what is" is our starting point, as a matter of fact such an account is far more than that, for it is in itself a determination, and, as such, the culmination of our previous work. Moreover, not only must we know "what is", we must also be able to justify how it is that we know it. To start, we must already have finished. And when we know "what is", we also know what is or is not good about it. Lest this should provoke the rather irrelevant objection that this is not obviously so, one need only say that only when we know "what is" we can begin to articulate its problems and explicate inferences which are, normally, seen as the end product of analysis. Thus the emphasis shifts to how we can create an account of "what is".

Granted that an account of the becoming of something is essential to an account of what it is, one must then ask how is a historical account constructed. And the argument is that history is more than a documented story of a number of occurrences, made into a coherent whole by the story-teller. The historian, inevitably, takes with him/her a world of ideas, and must have access to concepts that may explain the decisions of those whose actions have left residues in a documented, or documentable, form, else they can not be made to bear evidence to anything, without which the gaze of the historian will simply not fall upon them. While broadly uncontroversial, this statement begs the question of where these ideas and concepts come from.

It is a mistake to assume that these concepts present or suggest themselves, jump out of the documents that the historian is examining, or that they are culled from the pages of the history. On the contrary, these concepts must be external to the events, else the historian will not even be able to identify a "period", let alone decide what constitutes evidence and for "what". Put simply, these concepts are theoretical constructs, but not of the historian. Nor are they emanations from the hyper-active mind of a sage philosopher somewhere, for we must give an equally tortuous account of the manner in which the interplay between the theoretical and the empirical is a necessary condition of the "creation" of concepts.

The burden of the point is this: political science is precisely the conjunction of the theoretical and the empirical. It is neither history, nor is it philosophy; it is both and at the same time neither, and its identity is drawn from the fact that both are necessary for it. This is not to play on an ambiguity, but rather to emphasise that political science has an irreducible character all of its own. The study of politics, qua the empirical study of policy, institutions and actors, in a "continuous present" sense, is the domain of contemporary history. If political science is reduced to the study of policy, it is thereby also reduced to contemporary history. The study of institutions of government, understood in broad terms, necessarily evokes an account of their becoming, if for no other reason than the fact that the "continuous present" is only an abstraction. But if political science is reduced to the study of institutions, it is also reduced to history.

And, pari passu, given that the study of ideas is the proper domain of philosophy, when the necessarily theoretical character of political science is mistaken for its supposed philosophical identity, then political science has been reduced to philosophy. But, as the cognoscenti will readily recognise, political science is none of these and yet all of them at the same time.

The distinct character of political science does not drive from the fact that it combines the fruits and methods of many disciplines - more than one academic discipline does that - but that it does so in a rather special way. It is this that gives political science its irreducible character. To go back to the example of democracy, 13 it is possible to conduct an empirical study of the manner and the extent to which one or another country is a democracy; it is equally possible to examine the evolution of democratic institutions in a given country over the years, or, for that matter, to argue whether it is a democracy of one type or another. But the meaningfulness of all this depends on an understanding of what stands for democracy and, therefore, what features we should seek and examine. And such a study becomes an account in political science when larger questions are raised and discussed; these include the way and the extent to which the essential claims of democracy are theoretically delivered and how they link with the idea of "Being" and "being human"; or the manner and the extent to which these theoretical claims are a possible reality, implicitly also raising the all important question of the extent to which the central and important claims of the theory can be delivered in practice. To do so, we must rise above the subject, and examine the broader claims of the concepts and facts involved: this locates political science above the humdrum of politics qua policy, practice and action, and puts it beyond the explanatory claims of history and philosophy, while also adapting the explanatory powers of both to its requirements.

On this view, political science is inevitably conceptual, but above all else, meta-analytic: its concern is with the explanation of concepts that guide human action. It yields thoughts and concepts about the inter-play and interaction within a multitude. It needs to have a view of what it is to be human, and what is necessarily involved in the inter-play and interaction which follows the fact of its multiple numbers. It yields theoretical accounts concerned with possible (clearly contingent) configurations, and cannot avoid being judgemental. It distinguishes between the good, the better and the best. It is only in this sense that we can construct the more profound critiques of existing systems of government, and thereby give meaning to arguments about its possible reform - not validate calls for action. It is, in the ultimate, an account in morality and moral justification of action under given conditions. And it is marked by restlessness for the rather simple, yet profoundly important, reason that its fruit is not a simple and uncontroversial account of "what is", for political science answers always provoke yet another argument. Moreover, the contestable character of its findings acts as a break on what we might say: since there are no ultimate answers, we can only offer arguments, but must desist from acting upon them as though they are the panacea. And although it is obvious, it must yet be said that this is only so within a given range of acceptability: we must all draw upon our moral resources and resist certain types of ideas irrespective of all else. Our claim to knowing does not deny the fact that, along with others, we, too, are thrown into this world and must act in it.

It is, thus, true to say that a political scientist has three "identities": as a practitioner of one of its two constituent academic disciplines (i.e. history and philosophy), which one transcends when one approaches the subject matter from the perspective of meta-analysis, and, finally, almost inevitably, one is a "failed politician and reformer".

Section 2: Problems of Explaining the EU

A

What exactly is one supposed to examine when studying the politics of and/or in European Union? As is clear from a cursory glance at the system, decision-making bodies at the European Union level are not dependent upon an electoral procedure for their existence and powers, nor - were it meaningfully possible - for their legitimation. Moreover, though clear it must still be said that, acceding to and holding important office at the European Union level - that is to say office invested with power to cause a change of direction in policy - is not predicated upon a distinctly European Union electoral or other public procedure. This applies to appointments to the Council of Ministers as well as the Commission. Of course members of the European Parliament are elected: but despite some recent reforms of its powers and functions, and in the face of much wishful thinking and more opaque, almost procrustean, arguments from some academics, it remains, rightly, an irrelevant body within the existing relations of powers at this level. 14

This being the case, it is not at all clear what the politics of/in European Union really means, never mind arguments about the best academic approach to "it". Alas, Hix does not say, nor do the authors he approvingly quotes. One might surmise that, given the foregone, European Union politics might actually mean relations and dealings between member states, or "politicking" and positioning among the members of the commission: its study will, one presumes, emulate the bureaucratic politics of Graham Allison, or the bureau-shaping type arguments of Patrick Dunleavy. 15

European Union is characterised by the sheer absence of what is traditionally understood as "political activity" appropriate to a democratic state characterised by the freedom to organise in order to compete for power in free and open elections, which will determine the shape of the representative assembly which, in turn, will determine which party/parties will have "temporary" access to the constitutional powers of the state. Embedded in this rosy view of representative democracy are, at least, two further features: firstly, that for the duration, the elected are in a position "to hold to account" wielders of the powers of the state, and, secondly, that this supposed process of accountability is repeated on a state-wide basis at the next round of competition for governmental power. It is a matter of historical fact that none of these characteristics are also features of the European Union. Here, politics, even in its widest sense, is conspicuous by it absence, and that is that.

In studying the EU we must start with the necessary recognition that it does not resemble the state in the ordinary sense of that term. But even this negative judgement is made possible because we are applying the template of the state to it, where the "it" is an account of its becoming. The juxtaposition of this account with that of the state entails the negative judgement that the EU is not a state: but this is not a statement of what it is. Some at this stage seem to give up and claim that it is sui generis, or do as Haas did and fudge the issue. 16 Well, not quite.

The difficulty of classifying the European Union arises, in the first instance, from the fact that it is an international system, but one which evidently does not conform to its norms. It is clearly international, but not obviously intergovernmental. On the other hand, it is not one that conforms to the norms of a properly speaking full-fledged supranational system. Yet, in one way or another, these terms are relevant to its description. It is in this sense that we cannot admit the meaningfulness of "sui generis" as a label, even though we are not in a position to give an unproblematical account of its nature. The problem is not one of knowing the intricacies of the European Union as a system, but rather one of having an accurate theoretical account to explain it. Three confusing factors mitigate against an un-problematical account of the European Union.

Intellectual and academic legacy

This may appear unfair, for, on the face of it, American identification of the longer-term objective of European developments coincide with a strand of thought that has had an honourable tradition in Europe, 17 namely the dream of Europe-wide peace, preferably secured by means of some Europe-wide co-operation, if not federation. After all, any history of Europe would have to tell the tale of war and conflict right across the continent for well-nigh ten centuries. Moreover, the inter-war experience of the League of Nations, the analysis of its failure, and the facts of the 1940-45 period focused attention on the unbridled nation-state as the culprit. Somehow bracing the potential of the sovereign nation-state became the immediate objective: and the panacea was soon discovered in the idea of getting rid of unbridled sovereignty through a federation of some kind.

The point is this: in one way or another, both the movement of ideas about the future of Europe, and academic discourse of the subject tended to focus on federalism as the answer. More than that, early influential academic contributions - such as that of Haas and Lindberg - also picked up the idealism and the dream of European unity - such as that of Monnet and Spinelli - and showed how the institutional changes of the 1950s were in fact noble and creative attempts at securing a peaceful future by bringing forth a new political structure, which, to succeed, would have to eventuate into a European federation.

This short statement of a long and complicated process, which certainly invites historical analysis, is intended to make this point: federalism has, in this way, become inevitably and ineluctably associated with the fortunes of European unity. This has turned "federalism" into a touchstone by which to measure the progress of policy for each member state. From the academic perspective this "political" (meaning eristical) use of "federalism" has been an unmitigated disaster. In the process, no attempt worth the name has been made to examine the theoretical meaning of federalism, not even its specific meaning in association with the American federalism and other federated system. 18Yet the American example has been used either as a comparative touchstone, or as a source of lessons - identifying "dos" and "don'ts" - for each member state in the EU. Equally, and for much the same reason, the wider conceptual arguments about the meaning of European unity have remained largely un-theorised. Integration, as understood in terms, or in relations to terms, defined by Haas in 1958, has become the necessary process/condition without which the ultimate goal of a federation would not be possible. There are assumptions built into this kind of thinking which have not been isolated nor examined. But they must be unpacked.

Limitation of terms of discourse, linguistic and conceptual

The word "supranationalism" has tended to be used, in a sense close to its natural meaning, 19 to denote a position above, therefore, higher, than the nation and the national, where the national/state level institutions continue, albeit not as heretofore. This conception identifies the seat/location of the authority to decide certain types of issues. Such a meaning is not, as such, a problem, but when it acts to inhibit and preclude further thought it becomes a, in fact the academic, problem. And it can do this as a result of being associated with the idea that in terms of the international system, we can only move along a spectrum that is defined by sheer intergovernmentalism, as one extreme, and federalism, as its other extreme. On this conception, then, to the extent to which supranationalism has been given more than a merely linguistic meaning, it refers to the federal level. 20 This is an unfortunate confusion, albeit that it has had a significant implication for the debate about, and understanding the nature of, the European Union. More than that, this infamous "f" word, thus misunderstood, has entered the lexicon of British political practice in an altogether bizarre way.

But this silly confusion need not be there. The resources of political science can be mustered to construct a more fecundive theoretical meaning for supranationalism, which will also re-define the range of possible configuration of the international system. This process, briefly indicated below, will also necessitate that we re-define our understanding of Federalism not as a concept 21 - although , that too - but re-define its role as the system contraposed to intergovernmentalism. That is to say, the spectrum of possibilities will range from intergovernmentalism but not to federalism, rather to supranationalism. 22

On this reading, Intergovernmentalism and supranationalism are generic forms encompassing a range of possibilities, from the extreme of a closed world of insular sovereign territorial, even "ethnic", states, to that of a world government - be it a "democratic" world "federation" or an imposed multi-ethnic Empire - a move from the many to the few, ultimately only one, seat of sovereign authority. 23

Now, it may be thought that this theoretical range is, in fact, a mere continuum. And because there are only two extreme and pure cases, this impression apparently stands. But it would also be misleading. The meaning of this continuum must be examined in terms of two distinct, though not entirely separate, analytical dimensions; namely, from the perspective of the nation/state and that of the characteristics of the continuum.

Now, moving along from a strictly intergovernmental type there comes a point where the character of the system is no longer intergovernmental. And such a qualitative point of change-over may occur because some functional organ, cutting across the sovereign authority of the state, has - to coin a phrase - hollowed it out, or, difficult though it is to imagine, "states" may have willingly yielded sufficient ultimate decision-taking powers to another organ, thereby placing the territorial state in a "subordinate" position. 24 Moreover, this range is also relevant to the arguments of functionalist-integration theorists, who emphasise a similar point of change-over, though arrived at differently. 25 Significantly, the change-over range is primarily characterised by what happens to the nation/state. When the powers of the state are modified in a defined and limited way, the outcome is likely to be a federated system. But if such modifications are either extensive, or touch powers and functions considered to be definitive of sovereignty, then, in effect, a proper transfer of sovereignty takes place, creating not a federated system, but a new state. On this view, then, federalism is only a limited case of supranationalism, not to be confused or identified with it: "federalism" ought not to used to mean "supranationalism".

From the perspective of the continuum it is important to notice that the evident conditions of the case of supranationalism are obviously different from those of intergovernmentalism, but the principles which inform and structure such a world of supranational government are only a re-incarnation of the principles of sovereignty26 and ultimate power which also underpin the world of intergovernmentalism. The theory remains intact, the empirical conditions are different. And whether we like it, or like it not, the idea of sovereignty and the necessities of governing, too, in whatever form, remain largely constant. For, whereas intergovernmentalism is characterised by the inclusive self-defining authority of a given (nation-) state in relation to all the others, supranationalism is marked by the degree to which the ability to determine issues in terms of self-inclusive state-based interests is replaced by a necessity to abide by decisions taken elsewhere for the reason that they are the legitimate decisions despite the fact of one's profound disagreement with them. Put differently, what ultimately marks intergovernmentalism and supranationalism is the location of power to self-define, which is the ultimate mark of sovereignty. To emphasise a point previously made, federalism offers a compromise solution in which a circumscribed but continuing authority of its constituent members is reconciled with legitimate authority of the supra-"state", that is to say, federal, level. 27 It is a half-way house. But it is also an unstable touchstone, for its principles are defined differently in the practice of each federation, meanwhile actual federations change their character over time. 28 Federalism is not a proper base for evaluating the nature of the European Union: the parameters of federalism remain indeterminate, but there are many specific federal systems each contingently defined.

The primary difficulty with understanding the EU issues from the fact that it belongs in this change-over range, but this is a judgement, not a self-evident "fact". By definition, the nature of such a system is not clear, nor are its problems, though familiar, "typical". The character of any grey-area system is contingently determined by the relative preponderance of intergovernmental or supranational practices. And whereas each system has a discernible short-term direction, but, ceteris paribus, because there is no imperative as such for a given international regime irresistibly to change in a specific direction, we ought not to speak of it, in a "Whig" sense, as an "evolutionary" system, unless by that we mean no more than to say that it is changing. But, so do all political systems. However, given that human systems are not immutable, they are reasonably stable. But a grey-area system is, ipso facto, not stable. The grey area does not depict a pivotal range of equilibrium, but one of change-over. And a political system within this range is subject to contradictory forces of the two generic forms. 29 Therefore, all that can be said is that it will change. Importantly, this means that participating in a grey-area system does not, in itself, mean commitment to any logic of incremental change to supranationality.

Now, the Treaty of Rome, et cetera, speak of an "ever closer union", thereby indicating the direction, but not the substance of its development. How "close" is a "closer union"? Must "high politics" be added to its functions? What will be left to member states? And the proclaimed desire to be at the heart of Europe begs this question: "what sort of Europe?" Contingent questions of substance are not simply a matter of immediate motives and desires: to explain the resultant sum, we must understand its becoming which, in this case, throws us back on examining the motives, desires and the felt limitations that each member of the Union brings to it. The batttle is not, so to say, only about the shape of Europe, but also about the fate of the European idea of the state.

The paradoxical nature of the European Union: "high politics" means and "low politics" ends

In this sense, we have always been faced with an interesting potential. For "low politics" objectives to work, the system would have gradually to assume increasingly unified procedures and standards, and for reasons the imperatives of which derive directly from the logic of co-operation at the level of "low politics" objective, the emerging entity would almost inevitably take on an increasingly unified and uniform shape and character. If this was not obvious to all and was not printed, banner style, in newspapers at the time when we joined in 1972, it certainly was clear to anyone who bothered to examine the situation. Curiously, the fact that projects of political union had consistently appeared on the agenda, always to run into some sort of difficulty, seemed to re-assure many that it was not a centrally important issue and that as an item on the broader agenda it was manageable. British insistence that no major changes to the system be made before the completion of British membership was, to a large extent, predicated upon the presumed capability of each member state to exercise a kind of ultimate veto on a matter it recognised to be of vital national interest to it. The so-called Luxembourg Compromise hid the fact that the reality of the European Union was not of this kind at all, and that the success of the broader objectives would almost inevitably mean an increasing involvement with other matters. Put differently, to assume that a completely free trade policy could be successfully organised amongst a number of European nations without these nations sharing other views and objectives or, more meaningfully, co-ordinating other policy matters, can only make sense if we assume, firstly, that the actual international system is precisely as that understood by nation-state Realists, and, secondly, that it does not matter if one nation disapproves of important matters of a non-tradable kind, so long as the trading relations are kept out of "politics". Neither of these assumptions has anything to do with the history of European integration and of the European Union in its various guises: indeed, in many ways these assumptions are diametrically opposed to some of the thinking which underpinned the need for, and the earlier "stages" of, European co-operation.

Section 3: explaining the UK (membership) in the EU

A

To the extent that the European Union, in its various guises and forms, has, as an entity, been beyond the constituted state, it belongs squarely in the realm of foreign policy analysis. But, as the arguments of section 2 indicate, the resultant European Union has had a mixed character in that from inception its procedures have been "high politics" means mustered to achieve "low politics" objectives, and has been unstable, in that periods and tendencies of predominantly intergovernmental or supranational style can be identified in its short history. 30 This has also meant that the foreign policy character of the relations between the member states and the European Union has been an odd one. There is no gain-saying that the event and the manner of the numerous points of contact between its members has necessitated a change in the fact and perception of government and its structure at the national level, albeit that the fact of this change has yet to become popular property. Indeed, there has been an odd attempt, on the part of most UK governmental institutions and "political" elements (including government departments, ministers, and parties) to pretend that nothing much has changed, and that the traditionally understood authority and power of Her Majesty's Government remain intact. At the pivot of this looking-glass view is the fiction, in itself a supremely important historical fact, that, properly speaking, the rolling sovereignty of UK Parliament also remains intact, such that, at any rate constitutionally, a simple Act of Parliament can take us out of the European Union - albeit that a great deal more than this is involved in effecting such a policy objective.

In the context of UK membership of the EU it is precisely the UK vision that we must understand. And given the arguments of this paper concerning the meaningfulness of analysis and explanation and the primacy of single government analysis, we need to offer and seek to apply some theoretical statement which has sufficient fecundity to make accessible the present position and attitude of those who are empowered to speak and decide for the UK in respect of the European Union.

Hoffmann, in 1966, argued that the European experiment has served to show the obstinacy of the state, later adding to this by emphasising its continued importance as the organising unit of political life. 31 To be sure, this is the "pessimistic" message in Haas, 32 albeit because, so he argued, the "supranational" elements had not pushed when they should have. However, whereas intergovernmentalism is the natural outcome of the idea and the fact of sovereign (nation-) states, European integration is, in its very essence, opposed to the idea and fact of intergovernmentalism. Ever-since Westphalia, relations had been among states: "high politics" was always a distinct category, divorced from the limited processes of domestic "low politics". But "democratisation", and the fact that millions were killed in the game of relations between states, meant that such a division was increasingly more difficult to maintain. Soon it became important to emphasise the inherently peaceful nature of democracies precisely because their foreign policy was not divorced from their political processes. And it is also true that these conceptions were formalised into theoretical statements only in 1960s, 33 but this has more to do with the history of international relations than anything else.

Intergovernmentalism, at any rate since Westphalia, has been the norm; that is not in doubt. But it is a norm that is being increasingly eroded. The question is how to explain British attitude to the EU: can policy analysis explain it? If not, why not? And what other necessarily domestic politics approach may be required?

B

It has, for sometime, been the vogue to explain British "awkwardness" in terms of policy objectives. Two claims are associated with this approach: that domestic roots "determine" foreign policy, and that policy analysis can explain the British position. Bulmer 36 is closely associated with this development, although he makes the more modest claim that such an approach can only clarify British negotiating position. A number of studies from this perspective, famously that of Stephen George, have effectively established it as the only approach for some. 37

It is plainly mistaken to seek an "objective definition of awkwardness" or to insist that a popular and influential Awkward Partner thesis exists but is difficult to piece together; 38 psychopathologists might have something to say on it, but one must doubt the relevance and applicability of such a conception to the behaviour of the state. Equally, branding Britain as an "Awkward Partner" is misleading, even though it is popular and much beloved of students, and those who prefer simplification to understanding. That it has become invested with meaning which was, evidently, not intended is unfortunate, but while Stephen George did not dispell the myth in the second edition of his book, he has since sought to give it a simpler meaning. 39 However, Hoffmann shows how awkward were the French under de Gaulle, 40 and we must also recall that Bulmer's initial research was on Germany, while Jeffery 41 suggests that they may yet become a new "awkward partner" because of their domestic difficulties. The Italians have always been "awkward" in their absolutely inimitable way.

Not only is the accolade "awkward" not reserved for Britain, George and others have been at pains to point out that we also have a "distinguished" record of being a good partner. This takes the argument back to Bulmer: policy analysis can at best contingently account for one negotiating position at a time. But because the essence of the problem of the UK-EU is not to be found in policy issues, policy analysis cannot offer explanations of the British stance. The contribution that such an approach may make must not be underestimated. But in terms of explaining British stance it offers an awfully short-term view. Its arguments are necessarily contingent, contemporary history type, relying on history for support. But historical explanations are not that of political science. So, if the British have been awkward, the question is: "why?" a history of awkward policies will merely underline this question. 42

In seeking a political science explanation of the UK in EU we must go beyond the mere characterisation of episodes and their contingent reasons, and offer indicative theoretical statements which can render such episodes intelligible. Such indicative statements must be independent of what they explain, and have an ambit greater than the span of the subject they explain, with at least a serious hint of pointed anticipation, but certainly not prediction. Empirical generalisations defined by specific preconditions will not do: we must seek statements which can explain more than some episodes of, say, the UK-EU relationship. In the nature of things, such explanations are theoretical statements about the British constitution. This is not to claim that we must have a general theory of British politics; but that meta-analysis enables us to arrive at theoretical statements at a high level of abstraction with commensurate explanatory powers. 43

An examination of the UK constitutional behaviour concerning the British "union" (resurrecting the fact, but not the rhetoric, of its geopolitics) results in the identification of a number of features which have evidently remained constant. 44 These features focus on the government at the centre; we have here a centre-perspective which is more than merely the sum of the institutions of government. Some may confuse this with the idea of "official mind"45 because they both focus on the centre, rather than on policies and institutions. However, the "official mind" view is only a projection of the centre-perspective and, importantly, requires a broader background if it is to be properly explained.

Moreover, when the overall thrust of policy concerning the UK-union is placed alongside policy concerning UK and the EC/EU, it becomes evident that in certain important respects UK-EU policy is simply the reverse, a mirror image, of the UK-union policy. The fact of the UK "union", as understood in its proper historical context, appears to exert a determining influence on the UK attitude to "union" at the level of Europe, and elsewhere. This line of thinking is predicated upon the identification of a continuing "self-interest" of the centre as an un-stated guiding principle of action over longer periods. In part, Jim Bulpitt's arguments are, even if only indirectly, relevant here, and, mutatis mutandis, so are those of John Banks. 46

A constitutional self-image, reflected in the attitude of the British centre to UK "union" plays an evidently important role in defining British EU attitudes. In this scheme, the explanandum is the British centre, not specific policy issues or episodes. We can thereby explain both episodes of British enthusiasm and reluctance to co-operate with the European Union, and show that in pursuing such policies, the United Kingdom has remained consistent. This also explains the curious fact that since 1945 parties in government have been consistently more anti-integration than parties in opposition! 47 Our reputed awkwardness is no more than a function of the fact that the "closeness" of "an ever closer union" is understood in a manner that is inconsistent with this constitutional self-image: for each member state, "Europe" means a Europe of a certain kind.

It is not that Britain cannot abide supranational systems; our history shows this to be so. The problem of the UK in EU is three-fold.

Firstly, there is a serious contradiction at the very heart of the process in Europe, explained by the theoretical arguments concerning the change-over range in section 2 of this paper.

Secondly, for the European Union to succeed according to the logic of supranationalism, the substance of British self-image, its identity, must be sacrificed. It requires the withering away of the sovereign state; the "abridgement of national sovereignty", 48 "national self- abdication" or "national self-abnegation", in place of "national self-determination". 49 It is revealing that for the British centre the fact of federated structure at the level of the EU is "pragmatically" acceptable provided it is not given a constitutional form.

But, thirdly, the rather unique position of the government at the centre shows the Janus face of its attitude to the UK-union and the European Union. In all cases, a centre-perspective, always predicated upon the continuity of the centre, is the principle of action. This is often presented in terms of sovereignty of Parliament, the "birth-right" of the British, and similar ideas. Yet if the continuity of the centre should demand that the UK-union be re-structured (1920, Ireland; currently, Northern Ireland; tomorrow, Scotland?; and Wales? Curiously the break-up of the UK union is taking place in the reverse order of the sequence of its historical creation!), that too will become British policy. The irreducible element - the very sine qua non of this self-image - is "English" government, albeit that it is never articulated as such. For in the UK, "English" and "British" are intensely "political" terms in that they speak volumes about the nature of the union in question. That this requires a meta-analytical examination of the nature of sovereign power in the UK, meaning the nature of the Monarchic underpinnings of its historically understood (N.B. not historically justified or legitimated) system of government, is clear. This is not to invite another study of the Monarchy and its historical place or social role, but a constitutional theory examination of the nature of sovereign power in the United Kingdom. 50

In the circumstance, and despite much Parliamentary ado and even more inter- and intra- party politicking, British attitude to developments and changes on the continent remains less than clear. A return to a pure, or even largely, intergovernmental system is, on the face of it, out of the question, despite much but irrelevant desire of some. This is in part due to the haemorrhage that has steadily drained much of the force from the idea of a self-defining sovereign entity capable of controlling its people. Such ante-deluvian notions no longer receive "validation" except from spent politicians who doggedly cling to dreams of yesteryear, or those who wish to invoke the force of ethnic nationalism and resurrect the dangerous dream of national self-determination. For the UK as an entity this means that withdrawal from the European Union is hard to contemplate. But even more improbable is the possibility that any British government, constituted under the present arrangements, would actually support the supranationalist potential implicit in the European dream with its promise of destroying national sovereign governments. It may not be too far fetched to say that British membership in the European Union is probably the best spur to constitutional change this country has ever had in its long and, in many ways, distinguished and honourable history. And the first important step may yet be the Scottish settlement, not the largely foregone conclusion of the settlement in Northern Ireland. And a Scottish settlement will also reveal the extent to which self-determination in the contemporary world, and specially for members of the EU, could mean anything more than local/regional government within the broader framework of both European Union and "global" forces.

Notes