In recent weeks, Andy Burnham has given clearer signals about his government’s approach towards Europe. On 23 August, he told European Council President António Costa that Britain had to be ‘bolder’ in getting closer to the EU. In his first Commons speech as prime minister, he said that Brexit aggravated Britain’s economic problems, ushering in low growth and stalled regeneration. In their meeting at Downing Street two days later, Burnham and Emmanuel Macron discussed the UK’s ‘drive to get closer to Europe’.

These interventions, coming ahead of the next UK–EU summit later this year, suggest that Burnham intends to move beyond the overly cautious Starmer years. In a political climate where the direction of Burnham’s European strategy is still unclear, three pressures are likely to shape it: an increasingly pro-European turn in public opinion, the legacy of Starmer’s EU reset, and Europe’s continuing role as a fault line within Labour.

Public opinion has moved—but Labour still needs to keep Leave voters

The Leave vote in 2016 did not end debate over Europe. YouGov’s polling in June 2026 shows a marked shift: the proportion of Britons thinking Britain had been wrong to vote Leave rose from 42 per cent in August 2016 to 57 per cent in June 2026. The June 2026 survey also found that 55 per cent supported rejoining the EU in principle. This reflects the observable shift in public opinion from narrow acceptance of Brexit towards a pro-European majority over the past decade. Avoiding the European question may therefore become politically costly for Burnham’s Labour in the not-too-distant future.

However, this is not an unconditional mandate to rejoin; the same survey found that 59 per cent supported a closer relationship without rejoining the EU, the single market or the customs union – including 54 per cent of Leave voters. This may explain why Burnham’s Europe minister Hamish Falconer promised a ‘deeper’ and ‘more ambitious’ relationship with the EU whilst simultaneously expressing the government’s commitment to Labour’s 2024 red lines. Many Labour MPs, including Burnham and Falconer, represent Leave-voting constituencies, and Labour must still compete with Reform UK for them. This points to a certain path for Burnham’s emerging European strategy: seeking deeper sectoral cooperation without an immediate reversal of Brexit.

Starmer’s reset is both a platform and a constraint

After the 2024 general election, Starmer’s government embarked on a ‘reset’ of post-Brexit relations. The 2025 UK–EU summit produced a security and defence partnership and commitments to deepen cooperation on food trade, energy, carbon markets, Erasmus+ and a youth experience scheme. Yet Labour’s red lines limited progress, which ultimately frustrated EU officials.

Starmer chose the reset as a politically safer option than maintaining a more distant post-Brexit relationship, which would alienate Remain voters, or seeking to rejoin the EU, which would anger Leave voters. The reset delivered practical gains, but Starmer failed to clearly explain its final destination or how it fitted into Labour’s broader governing project.

Burnham inherits both the benefits and limitations of this approach. Falconer said that future agreements with the EU must pass Burnham’s ‘Makerfield test’ by producing tangible benefits for ordinary people, including those in Leave communities. This signals that Burnham will largely stick to Starmer’s middle course but will attempt to sell closer EU ties through concrete economic benefits such as lower costs, better jobs and wider economic opportunities.

Burnham’s tendency to separate Europe from his domestic agenda or treat it as a later priority, however, risks undermining his own strategy. Nor can he indefinitely avoid addressing what this incremental approach will mean for Britain’s long-term place in Europe – a question his predecessor left unanswered.

Europe remains a fault line within Labour

Partly because the 1975 and 2016 referendums were fought between pro- and anti-European blocs that cut across party lines, Europe remains divisive within Labour, as it does within other British parties.

This became clear during the crisis that ended Starmer’s premiership. Wes Streeting called for a renewed ‘special relationship’ with the EU and Britain’s eventual return to the bloc. Lisa Nandy criticised the ‘sudden focus on Europe’. Burnham acknowledged a possible long-term case for rejoining but opposed rerunning the Brexit debate, while Tony Blair and David Blunkett warned against making rejoining an immediate political strategy.

These positions, ranging from caution through support for closer cooperation to explicit support for rejoining, showed that Europe is still a controversial topic inside Labour because of its ties with the party’s political standing, ideological direction and prospects in government. When moving closer to the EU, Burnham must therefore take necessary measures to prevent Europe becoming a source of party infighting.

Burnham’s government is still in the process of crafting its EU agenda. Growing – but conditional – pro-European sentiment amongst the public, Starmer’s reset legacy and Europe’s continuing capacity to divide Labour set the clearest parameters of Burnham’s approach to Europe. Ultimately, though, this strategy’s success will depend on recognising a fact that repeatedly unsettled British prime ministers during the UK’s 47 years of membership: Europe is not simply a foreign policy question; it is part and parcel of Britain’s politics.