Putting an end to long-lasting conflicts is never easy. A good example of the challenges involved is Colombia, home of the second largest displaced population in the world. Despite four years of intense negotiations, a peace agreement between the government and the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was unexpectedly rejected in a referendum in September, with the no vote winning by a mere 0.6% majority. The surprise rejection shows how peace in a democracy requires more than conflicting sides arriving at a deal.
In a democracy, the perception that both the benefits and costs of peace are fairly distributed among all stakeholders is critical to any potential agreement. This is particularly important in Colombia’s conflict, which started 52 years ago and has caused 250,000 casualties, displaced over 6 million people, and remains one of the largest ongoing armed conflicts in the Western Hemisphere. Ending this war with the proposed Havana peace agreement, however, proved unacceptable to a slim majority of Colombians, in large part for not being tough enough on FARC members for their actions during the conflict. Indeed, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos has been accused of conceding too much to the FARC.
The no vote is seen by many as Colombia’s own “Brexit” moment. The decision of President Santos to ratify the peace agreement through popular vote was shortsighted. He was misled by personal ambitions and overly optimistic polls projecting a yes vote of 66 percent. President Santos mistakenly thought he could silence the opposition’s voice as embodied mainly by former President Álvaro Uribe.
The opposition demanded, among other things, that FARC members be sentenced for their crimes and have their political privileges limited in the potential first post-war elections. The campaign against the peace deal was built upon the idea that President Santos was about to transform FARC into an armed political party. Despite these accusations, it seemed President Santos had everything working in his favor. After all, for the first time since the start of the conflict, the most recent peace negotiations hosted by Cuba appeared to be closing in on a deal.
An overconfident President Santos failed to consider voter turnout, which was only 38% of the electorate. Of the 13 million ballots turned in, 50.2% were marked no and 49.8% were marked yes. The margin of victory was only 53,894 votes. This result has major implications for renewed attempts to revitalize the peace talks.
FARC is emerging stronger in the aftermath of the referendum. Unlike President Santos, FARC leader Rodrigo Logroño, known widely as “Timochenko,” can exercise more autonomy in choosing future strategies. Timochenko’s leadership is not based on democratic rapport with his followers. Most Colombian politicians must try to convince voters to accept the terms of a peace agreement, whereas FARC’s leader autocratically decides on behalf of the group’s 6,500 guerrilla fighters. While FARC was clearly the underdog in peace negotiations in the past due to the effective cohesiveness of the Colombian political elite, the group now enjoys a better position relative to a political establishment that is now more divided than ever.
Although President Santos has new momentum after recently being named the Nobel Peace Laureate for 2016, it remains unclear how he will satisfy the demands of a newly energized political opposition on the one hand with a more autonomous FARC on the other. The reopening of peace negotiations must come soon, in spite of how unlikely unifying the country around a new peace deal may seem.
The complexity of reaching a new deal is daunting. This challenge should not, however, overshadow the overall positive context of this historical moment. Firstly, the Colombian government has already initiated talks with the second-largest guerilla group, the National Liberation Army (ENL), showing its commitment to a more encompassing peace agreement while appealing to FARC to not abandon the negotiating table. Secondly, while eight previous presidents have tried to negotiate a peace accord with both FARC and ENL, none came anywhere near as close to success as the attempts made by President Santos, which can only be interpreted as unprecedented progress. Thirdly, the negotiations to obtain peace have mainly involved countries from within the region—Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, and Venezuela—thereby reducing the risk of possible suspicions about foreign power involvement with any interest other than that of guaranteeing peace.
Today’s Colombia is very different from the Colombia of the past. Nowadays, Colombia displays a more mature democracy that is painfully aware of the staggering losses that continue to accumulate from a longstanding armed conflict. It is clear that Colombia’s long path to peace might be even more tortuous than previously imagined. But while democracy itself seems to have disrupted this path, it has at least assured there is no clear winner or loser, which is the cornerstone of any lasting peace.
Helder Ferreira do Vale is Professor at Hankuk University’s Graduate School of International and Area Studies.
Image: Andres F. Uran
