IT’S THE DIPLOMACY, STUPID. THE AMBITION OF HUMILITY AND PRAGMATISM

Rarely since the end of the Cold War has an international agreement prompted so much hyperbole as the as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This dry title is more commonly known as the “Iran Deal”, and it is that popular name that contains a hint as to why it is so controversial. For many of its backers, it is a brilliant transaction, both efficient and effective in containing the development of an Iranian nuclear weapons programme; it is also a stepping stone towards peace in the Middle East and perhaps even towards a world without nuclear weapons.

For its opponents, by contrast, it is a dodgy backroom deal that avoids the tough questions and muddles through where clarity would have been required. In their opinion, it officially condones the Iranian nuclear programme, significantly weakens Israel’s relative position, and ensures, rather than prevents, that Iran will soon be able to have nuclear weapons.

Both these extreme positions ignore that the agreement is a result of a multitude of actors and forces. And that its contents are highly technical. The text and its annexes, weighing in at 159 pages, contain details that can fit into all kinds of interpretation.

Fundamentally, the debate about JCPOA is about trust in international relations. At the core of this issue of trust is a key feature of nuclear technology: there is no clear scientific boundary between “peaceful” and “military” uses of nuclear energy: nuclear technology is always dual use. How to use nuclear energy is ultimately a political decision. The Non-Proliferation Treaty explicitly allows the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. JCPOA significantly tightens the definition of what this means for Iran.

JCPOA makes arrangements for three key areas of Iran’s nuclear facilities: manufacture of weapons-grade material (plutonium), enrichment of uranium, and the monitoring arrangements.

1. The agreement sharply limits and circumscribes Iran’s ability to manufacture plutonium and highly-enriched uranium, materials commonly used for weapons production. It asks Iran to convert its Arak site to a lower power research reactor and also put measures in place that prevent the creation of weapons-grade plutonium at that reactor. It also makes Iran export all spent fuel from that reactor.
2. The agreement places significant limits on the number of centrifuges and related research and development that Iran will be able to undertake in future. It is very specific about the number and type of machines that Iran is allowed to use, and it also limits the total stockpile. While this does not take Iran’s ability to manufacture nuclear weapons away, it puts this ability under tight supervision and regulation. While it is estimated that it takes Iran two to three months to achieve weapons-grade development, the stipulation in this area
3. The fundamental disagreements between supporters and opponents of the deal are about the tightness of the monitoring regime – the third key aspect of the agreement. Aspects of the agreements are only valid for a certain amount of time (typically between 10 and 15 years), and therefore involve a certain level of trust in the arrangements. Opponents claim that Iran essentially gets the opportunity to cheat at every turn, and that controls are not tight enough, especially because Iran retains the right to veto members of inspection teams.

It is true: None of these stipulations will prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons with absolute certainty. But the purpose of the deal for the P5+1 countries was precisely to manage a situation where Iran already had that capability in principle – the conflict around Iran’s nuclear programme has been going on for at least thirteen years.

However, short of denying Iran its national sovereignty (and Iranian critics of the deal are already reported as claiming that this has happened within the existing framework), it is difficult to see how a tighter regime could have been devised: inspection takes time and is highly complex, and the P5+1 can overrule Iran in the dispute resolution process about the inspection of sites.

The International Atomic Energy Agency is given significant access that allow its team to monitor certain locations continuously and on a daily basis. Not least, the lifting of sanctions is by no means automatic. Rather, it will be the result of a complex process of inspection and negotiation and only occur after the verification is concluded.

In addition to JCPOA, Iran and P5+1 signed a “Roadmap agreement” on 14 July 2015. This agreement sets a timetable for resolving any remaining disputes about Iran’s military nuclear capabilities in the light of previous IAEA inspections. The “snap-back” mechanism for sanctions in the agreement is unprecedented in its severity and is likely to be a significant disincentive for Iran to push the boundaries: it is automatic as soon as significant breaches of the performance occur. A Procurement Working Group will monitor and approve sales of dual-use goods to Iran.

It is odd that the opponents of the deal assume that power politics will suddenly come to an end once JCPOA is being implemented: intelligence gathering and other forms of power projection will, no doubt, continue and ensure that the agreement is tightly monitored.

JCPOA thus ties its signatories together in a highly complex set of regulations, including mechanism for the resolution of conflicts. It provides for a Joint Commission which will meet regularly and is composed of representatives from the US, the UK, France, Russia, China, and Germany as well as Iran and the European Union.

The agreement itself is far more humble than its most ardent supporters and its opponents assume. And that humility is its ambition. The important thing about this agreement is that it codifies a certain moment of opportunity that forms the basis for future negotiations.

Yes, there are risks. There is no absolute security about what will or what will not happen in the future. But short of regime change in Iran or any form of military action against Iran (both of which would come with very significant risks), it is difficult to see an agreement that does not contain any loopholes. I can see no other option than war against Iran to achieve that absolute security – but that is also an illusion: recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan and, more recently, Libya highlight the problems with forced regime change all too well.

Fundamentally, JCPOA is a significant achievement in two respects. For one, it highlights the importance of trust in international relations, in underpinning the legitimacy of diplomacy. For historically informed research is required to see how that trust emerges, how it breaks down, and how it can be maintained.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, it brings out clearly the ambiguities of creating peace in international relations: it is not merely stability, but is based on a complex process of constant negotiation. It is not a utopia, but engages creatively with the status quo. Populist and straightforward solutions have the advantage of clarity. But they have the disadvantage of bearing little or no relationship to the real world.

In short, this agreement highlights the transformative power of diplomacy in framing change in international relations. It is the result of painstaking work by diplomats and technicians – as well as intelligence officials. If there is a case to be made for the importance of having skilled diplomats, this is probably it.

Whether the gamble – and this is, like all diplomacy, a gamble – works will depend on continuing on the road set by the agreement. Stability in international affairs is a process, rather than a state of affairs, maintained by constant negotiation and re-negotiation. It’s the diplomacy, stupid.

Holger Nehring is Professor of Contemporary European History at the University of Stirling. He tweets @Holger_Nehring.

Image: Mark Chadwick CC BY-NC-ND