WHAT LIES BEHIND THE GLITZ AND GLAMOUR OF PRESIDENT XI JIPING'S STATE VISIT?

President Xi Jinping’s October state visit to the UK was full of symbolism, and the red carpet and pomp and ceremony certainly struck a chord with the Chinese media and populace. But was it about anything more?  Behind all the glitz and glamour lay two related messages from London.

The first was about the bilateral relationship. Coming after a number of high-level visits – including Prince William’s to China in March – the welcome accorded to Xi Jinping demonstrated the British government’s desire for a positive and substantially improved relationship, which would allow the UK to benefit from the opportunities accorded by China's development.

The second – following the UK’s announcement of its intention to apply to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in March this year – was a message about China’s global standing, a signal that London recognizes the relative shift in influence in global economic governance towards China, and by implication away from the West. The announcement during the visit of a ‘global comprehensive strategic partnership’ between the UK and China does something to reflect this global dynamic.

But all the pomp and ceremony of a state visit can actually get in the way of understanding the underlying dynamics in any bilateral relationship. And the bilateral framework of such events makes it difficult to bring the complex networks of ties that those two countries have with their other partners or competitors to bear on the analysis.

With this in mind, is the so-called ‘golden era’ in UK-China relations, posited by some officials and commentators before the visit, coming to fruition? It is worth noting that Xi and Cameron did not give a clear imprimatur to this concept in their joint press conference, and Cameron noted that ‘some’ had referred to a ‘golden era’, placing a bit of distance between himself and the concept.

Indeed, for all the enthusiasm shown towards China’s visiting president, UK policy towards China has probably not yet found a mature, stable and sustainable narrative. As some of the domestic debate in the UK demonstrated, political pressures around human rights or perceived economic risks from China’s rise (the surprise issue of the week was alleged steel dumping) will continue to weigh on the British government.

A number of serious commentators have suggested that the UK has gone too far to try and erase memories of the high-level 18-month ‘freeze’ in relations from May 2012 after the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister met the Dalai Lama in London. Pendulum swing theories may be worth dusting off.

Neither does London quite appear to have worked out how to balance a push towards improved relations with China with its long-standing alliance with the United States or its rather dysfunctional relationships with the rest of the European Union. These ties may be weakening for other reasons, but that will give London fewer diplomatic options and therefore constrain the UK’s flexibility in its approach to China.

The challenges of balancing these networks of relationships as the UK navigates a changing world should be at the heart of British foreign policy over the coming years. For the moment, though, what does the state visit tell us about wider questions of international relations?

First, the UK’s approach is further evidence – if such were needed – of the impact of the rise of China. The unipolar moment is long over, and a world featuring a larger number of significant powers is more clearly with us. In going against US preferences by signing up to the AIIB in March, London also sent a message about the declining hegemonic capacity of the US, as Washington was unable to achieve its policy goals even in respect of one of its strongest traditional allies.

Secondly, and following on from this, the AIIB and state visit sequence of events this year highlighted more than was the case before the differences in approach and in interests between the US and (at least some) Europeans when it comes to China. These are not new – the UK’s approach to Chinese-based global telecoms company Huawei, for example, has demonstrated this for several years now. But these developments require us to look afresh at the prospects for the trans-atlantic relationship.

Thirdly, when it comes to China, the apparent desire on the part of Beijing to embrace a closer relationship with London suggests a willingness to continue to engage with the existing international system and acknowledge the legacies of its historic distribution of power, at the same time that the Chinese government talks about reforms to global governance. The old status quo-revisionist dichotomy is looking increasingly unable to cope with the complexities of contemporary international relations.

In sum, Xi Jinping's state visit to the UK symbolised the shifts in the global distribution of power, and the openness of the current UK to government to negotiate its way through a world order which is different from that which some had hoped might have been entrenched by the end of the Cold War and the apparently unparalleled dominance of the United States. However the challenge in doing so that lies ahead of London should not be underestimated.

Tim Summers is an Adjunct Assistant Professor at the Centre for China Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong and a Senior Consulting Fellow at Chatham House. This post represents his personal views.

Image: No 10 CC BY-NC-ND