One of the stranger dimensions of the parliamentary debate over extending British airstrikes against ISIL into Syria has been the fact it did not represent public opinion. The public supported bombing in Syria way back in September 2014, when MPs agreed to restrict action to Iraq alone. As I wrote at the time, parliament’s decision on that occasion said more about party politics than it did about democracy. Until recently the public’s support for fighting ISIL in Syria was holding steady at a little under 60%. When members of the shadow cabinet claimed the public was “deeply sceptical” about military action, they were demonstrably wrong.

The picture has grown more complicated in the last few days, however. There has been a small but significant drop in public support, by some accounts taking it below 50% for the first time since the summer of 2014. From a political perspective, the cause is clear. Jeremy Corbyn has “turned” public opinion against the use of force. From an academic perspective, as ever, things look more complicated.

For one thing, though public support for bombing has fallen, it has not disappeared. The most recent polls show just under 50% support compared to just over 30% opposition. That is a long way from a consensus against the use of force. Secondly, public attitudes have clearly not shifted decisively in line with Corbyn’s arguments. The proportion of poll respondents who approve of parliament’s decision to veto military action against the Assad regime in August 2013 has fallen from 74% to 42%.

Instead two elements appear to be at work. Both appear prominently in the literature on how public attitudes affect democratic foreign policy.
First, the public has learned more over time about the situation in Syria. It has learned that failing to address Assad regime atrocities was not enough to ‘stop the war’. It has also learned the difficulties of achieving much through air power alone, and it takes the point that it will be difficult to defeat ISIL without allied troops fighting on the ground. To some extent the decline in public support for bombing likely reflects the “elasticity of reality” effect. Over time, the public is exposed to a wider range of more nuanced commentary on a situation, and gains new information about it. That causes some members of the public to reconsider their views.

Second, the Parliamentary Labour Party has publicly revealed its divisions over the use of force in Syria. This has had an effect on Labour voters, who have “rallied round the [red] flag”, supporting their leader in combat against his (political) enemies. Until recent debates, most Labour members opposed the use of force, in line with the position taken by Jeremy Corbyn. But most Labour voters supported it. This is significant. Ordinary voters use a range of heuristics to decide their views on foreign policy matters. One of those is party identification. In recent days it is possible that a number of Labour voters have realised for the first time that the Labour Party leader opposes the use of force in Syria. That has caused them to reconsider their own views.

So the public has become more knowledgeable about Syria, and Labour voters more aware of divisions in their party. Both elements have damaged support for bombing ISIL, sustained until now primarily by concerns about ISIL atrocities in the region and attacks on Western civilians. It is too late for this shift to alter the parliamentary vote. MPs in any event usually do not vote in line with the public’s views. But it may prove significant if the Syrian situation is not resolved in the longer term.

James Strong is Fellow in Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations at the LSE. He tweets @dr_james_strong.

Image: Chris Beckett CC BY-NC-ND