Abstract: This paper seeks to revitalize critical approaches to global politics and to resolve the ongoing ‘global governmentality debate’ taking place within IR’s global governance literature. It does so by introducing Heideggerian notions of the technological enframing of being and subjectivity as a new and effective medium through which to theorise IR and global politics through everyday practices. Whilst scholars such as Neumann, Joseph, Walters, Rosenow, and Vrasti, claim that governmentality analytics offers a critical account of the global spread of (neo)liberal power, norms, and rationality, this paper argues that these scholars employ a narrow reading of governmentality that fails to effectively theorise how global politics is ‘governmentalised’ through practices falling outside of IR’s liberal canon. Thus, much ‘critical’ work in governance studies serves to enforce and to reify what it aims to transcend. Instead, this paper offers IR an account of global governmentality that operates prior to, and thus undergirds, liberal practices: the demarcation of subjectivity, power, and the self, through the technological enframing of being as theorised by Heidegger. By combining the thought of Heidegger and Foucault, IR can gain a new analyses and understanding of the interrelationship of subjectivity and global politics that is sui generis, instead of positing liberal rationalities as a priori foundations for global thought. As such, this theoretical paper aims to have critical purchase for IR and governance studies by putting forth a new way to conceive of the spread and entrenchment of global norms, rationalities, and practices.

Keywords: Global governmentality, Foucault, Heidegger, neoliberalism, metaphysics
‘All of these reflections on governmentality, . . . should not be taken as gospel truth. This is not finished work, it is not even work that’s been done; it is work in progress, with all that this involves in the way of inaccuracies and hypotheses—in short, it amounts to possible tracks for you, if you wish, and maybe for myself, to follow.’ (Michel Foucault)\(^1\)

‘. . . for how shall the consequence ever attack the ground on which it stands?’ (Martin Heidegger)\(^2\)

It is no secret to scholars of International Relations (IR) that the thought of French historian and philosopher Michel Foucault has become commonplace throughout its literature.\(^3\) Whilst Foucauldian notions of discipline, genealogy, power, and knowledge were frequently invoked by critical IR scholars throughout the 1980s and 1990s,\(^4\) only recently, however, has IR adopted Foucault’s concept of ‘governmentality’ as an analytical lens through which to diagnose relations of power operating at international and global levels.\(^5\) Generally understood as a diagnostic device used to uncover the rationalities, technologies, and practices that ‘conduct the conduct’ of actors ‘from a distance’,\(^6\) governmentality studies thereby offers IR new analytical insights by exposing the ‘productive and micropolitical dimensions of power over [IR’s] traditional concerns


\(^5\) Walters, 82-83.

\(^6\) Miller and Rose, ‘Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of Government’ Governing the Present
with instrumental control or structural domination; discursive and practical dimensions of politics over concerns with political agents and structures; and epistemic and technical dimensions of governance concerns with authority and institutions. In short, this burgeoning new ‘global governmentality’ literature allows IR to conceive of global governance in a new way: as a constellation of liberal govern-mentalities now ‘becoming detectable at the global level . . . reconfigur[ing] the relations between states and other actors.’

However, although the notion of global governmentality is now widely acknowledged in IR, awareness of this new concept has not lead to its acceptance. Instead, a contentious ‘global governmentality debate’ concerning the feasibility of ‘scaling up’ governmentality analytics from the domestic and state levels to the international and the global realms, has developed. On the one hand, opponents of global governmentality typically argue that (1) There exist essential and unbridgeable methodological, ontological, and epistemological differences between domestic and inter-state governance

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and a truly global (neo)liberal rationality of governance.\textsuperscript{12} (2) Global governmentality ignores the uneven distribution of neoliberalism across states,\textsuperscript{13} sublimating the importance of local political conflicts by tacitly presupposing the ontological existence of a ‘global’ realm of politics as an apologia for IR’s analysis.\textsuperscript{14} (3) Global governmentality ignores Foucault’s own assertions that governmentality, as an analytic, be confined solely to problematics of the state and of liberal government.\textsuperscript{15}

On the other hand, advocates of global governmentality analytics respond that (1) The historically unique and unprecedented emergence of globalized state relations can indeed buttress and describe newly-emerging global governmentalities, operating as ‘universal, but not truly global.’\textsuperscript{16} (2) That governmentality is not manifested solely by or within preordained discursive spatial demarcations, such as states, but through multifarious types of practices occurring anywhere between various types of agents at levels of self, family, group, institution, state, economy, etc. Where there is conduct, in other words, there is a form of government conducting it.\textsuperscript{17} (3) That neoliberal rationalities are not limited to the state, as evinced by their promotion amongst international and non-governmental organizations that generate and evince new problematics of liberal governance across the globe, thickening the international with economically and politically liberal norms and rationalities.\textsuperscript{18} (4) Finally, proponents of global governmentality argue that power, existing only as a relation conducting the knowledge

\textsuperscript{13} Joseph, ‘Limits of governmentality’.
\textsuperscript{14} Chandler, ‘Globalising Foucault’.
\textsuperscript{15} Selby, ‘Engaging Foucault’; Joseph, \textit{The Social in the Global}.
\textsuperscript{16} Vrasti, ‘Universal but not truly global’.
\textsuperscript{17} Kiersey, Weidner, & Rosenow, ‘Response to Chandler’.
\textsuperscript{18} Neumann & Sending, ‘International as Governmentality’.
and thought between free and competing actors, is not limited to the successful operationalization of state-led initiatives but can be equally as effective in failed attempts at liberal governance. If power alters and steers the subjective knowledge, and hence the active conduct, of actors engaged in governmental practices, then governmentality must certainly be in operation at a level of subjective conduct, rather than objective actions.¹⁹

In light of this ongoing debate, we must ask: does a liberal global governmentality actually exist? This paper argues that that both sides of IR’s global governmentality debate fail to answer this question because each mistakenly and implicitly treats the concepts of ‘liberalism’ and its correlative of ‘society’ as bounded, essential, and a priori components of governmentality. By ignoring Foucault’s oft-repeated warnings that his scholarship ‘is like the crawfish and advance[s] sideways’,²⁰ Foucauldian IR scholars reify liberalism by needlessly foreordaining it as a precursor and foundation for any attempted discussion and analysis of political and governmental rationalities that might or might not exist on a global scale. In other words, IR scholars conflate what governmentality as an analytic might do for the globe, with what Foucault as a scholar once did within the liberal state during one of his brief ‘advances sideways.’ Thus, this erroneous conjoining of (neo)liberalism with governmentality skews the arguments of both sides of the global governmentality debate, by situating liberalism as an inevitable or a priori background condition of international relations prior to actually engaging and diagnosing any empirical practices and histories. Such potent presuppositions, therefore,

reduce what should be an ad-hoc analysis discerning our ‘history of the present’ by investigating and interpreting a wide-range of practices, into a foreordaining of liberalism’s inevitable universalizing tendency and its and governmental efficacy.

Instead of beginning with Foucault’s interpretation of the state and its (neo)liberal practices and power relations, this paper argues that the philosophical basis of contemporary governmentality analytics ultimately rests upon an alternative conception of the relation between subjectivity and objectivity, and between nature, science, and truth, than that put forth by liberalism. This conception of governmentality is grounded upon the metaphysics of Martin Heidegger, and what he identifies as the essence of modern science and technology: ‘enframing’. Understood as the metaphysical configuration or composition of subjectivity and thought in a manner amenable and akin to planned projection, calculation, ordering, and regulation, enframing operates as the subcutaneous power that opens the subjective space in which governmentality can emerge into being.  

As will be examined below, both Foucault and Heidegger identified and privileged the same historical moment of this transformation of human thought in(to) subjectivity and enframing, declared ‘the Cartesian Moment’ by Foucault. It was only after this moment, and after a new space of enframed subjectivity was manifested, that the discovery of society, liberalism, and other technologies of governmentality, were necessitated. It is technological and metaphysical enframing, therefore, that governs governmentality, by opening into human thought a self-certain sub-jectivity through

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22 Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1981-1982 (New York: Picador, 2005); p. 27.
which objective representations such as liberalism, and society, can emerge. When seen in this light, a domestic or global governmentality does not need to crystallize from any specifically liberal rationality or society. Instead, its existence depends upon the diffusion of the technological metaphysics that constitutes subjectivity as able to enframe, or represent, objective reality in the form of calculation, regulation, and control: an enframing best demonstrated and evinced through the global spread of Western science and technology across planet Earth.

This paper will now proceed as follows: It will begin by providing a brief overview of Foucauldian IR’s conceptual dependence on (neo)liberalism as the medium through which governmentality must be spread across the globe. It then highlights how Foucault’s own rendering of governmentality was designed to ‘advance sideways’, transitioning from practices as varied as the formation of the nation-state, to classical, ordo-, and neo-liberalisms, and just prior to his death, ancient Greek practices constituting the self and truth. This highlights (1) how Foucault came to utilize governmentality as a tool extrinsic to, and thus not dependent upon, statist or liberal rationalities of government, and (2) a constant thread running subtly through each of Foucault’s seemingly disparate invocations of governmentality: the momentous transformation in Western subjectivity and practice that occurred during the Cartesian Moment, and from which, altered conceptions of the self and subjectivity necessitated both raison d’etat and liberal governmentalities.
After illustrating how Foucauldian IR’s eschewal of the Cartesian Moment reifies liberalism, it then moves on to examine how a defining characteristic of modern international relations, global governance, and even of life in our modern age itself, emerged from this overlooked moment: the metaphysical and technological enframing of being and subjectivity, as elaborated by Heidegger. Here it will be demonstrated how Foucauldian IR’s reification of liberalism arises from, and is simultaneously coextensive with and constituted by, this underlying enframing of thought. Therefore, when viewed as emanating from within our contemporary horizon of subjectivist and technological metaphysics, IR’s liberal rationalities of global governance will not be falsified, but buttressed, supported, and enhanced by a deeper and more fundamental historical and metaphysical explication for their being and existence: the planetary spread of Western science and technology. After reviewing literature in Foucauldian IR that has attempted to incorporate the global spread of Western science and technology, this paper will conclude by explicating how the noble intentions of these IR scholars proceed in the right direction, do not go far enough. ‘Metaphysics grounds an age’ not merely by describing its surface practices, but by determining what in being can be disclosed or revealed in human consciousness as cognizable existents and referents comprising the self and world.  

Hence, for IR to ignore the historical constitution, creation, and emergence of Western subjectivity during the Cartesian Moment, is to ignore the underlying metaphysical orientation, and hence the global possibilities, of governmentality itself. It is in analyzing and explicating how subjectivity must first be enframed, and then globalized, in order for any liberal governmentality to congeal, that this paper hopes to contribute to resolving IR’s the global governmentality debate.

Conflating Global Governmentality, Liberalism, and Society

Drawing from literature in Foucauldian IR, it becomes difficult to determine the conceptual boundaries separating (neo)liberalism, society, and governmentality, when applied to the global realm. Indeed, these concepts have become so entwined that it is even difficult at times to tell them apart. For example, critics such as Selby slam the notion of global governmentality because ‘[Foucault] was above all an interrogator of modern liberal capitalist societies’, and hence ‘scaling-up’ and ‘internationalising’ governmentality becomes ‘less an interrogation of liberalism than a prop to reworked liberal accounts of the international arena’. The problem for Selby, therefore, is that ‘Foucault ends up being used less to interrogate liberalism, than to support what are in essence reworked and reworded liberal accounts of global politics.’ The spatial configuration and ontological composition of liberalism is misused by IR scholars, therefore, but, liberalism remains the locus of IR’s governmentality analytics. Similarly, for Joseph, ‘If neoliberal governmentality is something that emerges in the advanced liberal societies, and the Anglo-Saxon ones in particular, then attempts to apply governmentality to all parts of the globe must be treated with some skepticism.’ In other words, governmentality must be used only to analyse state-led processes of the neoliberal accumulation and distribution of capital, and moving governmentality outside of the practices of the advanced-liberal state makes it ‘so general as to render it virtually

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26 Joseph, Social in the Global, p. 69.
meaningless.\textsuperscript{27} So, although an ‘international governmentality’ is indeed possible if it is disciplined and normalized into state behavior through cogs of global governance such as international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), a ‘global’ governmentality is impossible because of the uneven nature of international socio-economic systems.\textsuperscript{28} A non-liberal global governmentality is impossible, in this case.

Although proponents of global governmentality take the opposite stance and assert its existence on a global scale, they do so \textit{despite} sharing the exact same rootedness on liberalism and its governmental rationalities as do their critics: According to Vrasti, these critics ‘fail to take full stock of Foucault’s contribution to the study of global liberalism, which owes more to [theories of] economic liberalism’, and hence, shows the promise of global governmentality ‘to reveal the material, cultural, and cognitive elements that allow liberalism to operate as ‘principally a civilizational project’ with universal, albeit not yet global, reach.’\textsuperscript{29} Hence, IR’s task is ‘not to draw a map of all the places where liberalism works and where it does not, as Joseph’s statist ontology demands’.\textsuperscript{30} Neither is it to analyse, or to promote and constellate, only statist politics, contestations, or attributes of political liberalism and its sites of participation, contestation, and conflict, as claimed by Joseph and Chandler. Instead, ‘Global governmentality manifests its force not by the actual number of people or states it controls, but by acting as a standard of reference against which all forms of life . . . can be assessed according to modern [neoliberal]
conceptions of civilisation and order.” What matters for IR is not a spatial distribution detailing where or how neoliberalism governs and disciplines bodies, but instead, a global logic or rationality evinced through local relations of power that conducts action in accordance with liberal precepts. Kiersey agrees, suggesting ‘that neoliberal economic governmentality labours vigourously on the production of subjects of economic responsibility’, and hence it is not the state, but neoliberal power relations siphoned and used by the state, that manifest a global conduct of conduct. Governmentality’s ‘neoliberal . . . globalising impulse’ is not limited to Western material infrastructure(s) or capital, therefore, but operates by constituting subjects with an emerging form of liberal economic rationality. Neumann and Sending agree, and claim that a global thickening of liberal norms constitutive of contemporary global governance mirrors the rise of governmentality once described by Foucault as governmentalizing the state. Hence, it does not reduce nor dissolve the power or sovereignty of the modern state, but instead, reconstitutes it in accordance with underlying liberal governmental rationalities integrating the international realm into a more global polity. Global governmentality, they write, operates when ‘the meaning and role of sovereignty are largely defined by governmental rationalities that now increasingly operate on the global level. The liberal rationality of government exerts structural pressure on states to open more and more interfaces with other agents, preferably on a global scale.’ Despite the increasing need to police and discipline recalcitrant actors, it ‘is due to the ever-increasing structural pressure exerted by liberalism . . . understood as a selector of why certain practices

31 Vrasti, ‘Universal but not truly global’, p. 16.
34 See Neumann & Sending, Governing the Global Polity.
35 Neumann & Sending, Governing the Global Polity, 6.
become constitutive of sovereignty . . . [that] the global polity of the liberal story’ is emerging.  

Indeed, an expanding literature detailing the various practices and technologies through which IR scholars identify and catalogue the rationalities (styles of thought) and technologies (the application of rationality to a practice) of a global governmentality is too voluminous to list here. Instead, what must be highlighted for the purposes of this paper is that Foucauldian IR generally deposits liberalism as an endemic and a priori component of any properly ‘global’ governmentality, and then proceeds from this liberal foundation with its analysis of the global. Why? Does governmentality in IR have to be liberal in form? Can there be a non-liberal foundation for a global governmentality?

In order to answer this question, we must first explore why IR considers liberalism as intrinsic to, rather than just coincident with, governmentality. As Neumann and Sending note, Foucault’s genealogy of state power first introduced governmentality as a ‘new rationality of political rule—in essence a new realm of politics—predicated upon how “society” emerge[d] in the late eighteenth century as an entity external to and qualitatively different from the territory and inventory of the state.’ Hence, liberal governmentality was necessitated when ‘society’ as a realm of being problematized how to foster and shape ‘autonomous individuals [to] become the parameter for effective

36 Neumann & Sending, Governing the Global Polity, 158.
governing. For Gordon, ‘The existence of society is an inherently historic process, in which society is continually tearing itself apart and thereby at the same time endlessly remaking its own fabric.’ Governmentality, therefore, becomes an ‘organic component’ of this continuous remaking of liberal society, both ‘individualizing and totalizing: that is, about finding answers to the question of what it is for an individual, and for a society or population of individuals, to be governed or governable.’ Thus, Foucauldian IR treats the concept of modern society as an object appearing in its own reality, where its quasi-natural processes stem from the action of free and rational individual subjects. These subjects must, therefore, be defined, ordered, thought about, calculated, and acted upon, by liberal government, so as to conduct their conduct without direct or forceful intervention.

Foucauldian scholars in IR are quick to note that the sixteenth and seventeenth-century emergence of (classical) liberalism, society, and governmentality, became ‘turned inside out’ by more recent forms of ordo, neo-, and ‘advanced liberalism(s)’ that utilize notions of biopolitics, risk, enterprise, etc. The attributes of these liberalisms are adopted as templates through which rationalities and mechanisms of global governance can be filtered. However, the originary concepts of liberalism and society as first formulated by Foucault in his Collège de France lectures are left relatively unexamined, especially

40 Gordon, ‘Governmental Rationality’, p. 36.
concerning their historical accuracy and composition. Indeed, IR seems to have taken Foucault at his word that society engendered liberalism, and moved on; extrapolating contemporary governmentality analytics from his initial prognostications, the global must inexorably be liberal, because we see liberal norms everywhere. ‘In this sense, states care about following norms associated with liberalism because being “liberal states” is part of their identity in the sense of something they take pride in or from which they gain self-esteem.’\textsuperscript{43} As such, this paper will now examine in greater depth the original composition of liberalism and society that was so crucial for Foucault’s past, and our present, understanding of governmentality and the global. Utilizing and engaging with what Foucault omitted or overlooked concerning the nature and form of these concepts, therefore, raises the potential for IR scholars to expand their conceptual oeuvre concerning the global, rather than limiting it to Foucault’s past prognostications.

\textbf{The Cartesian Moment: Establishing the Grounds for Liberalism, Society, Self}

Foucauldian IR scholars are correct when they identify ‘society’ as emerging when an all-encompassing police governmentality, one that embraced juridical law, dissolved into a new problematic of governing free and economic citizens within the sovereign space of the state.\textsuperscript{44} Foucault identified this ‘new ensemble’ of society as a ‘governmental


\textsuperscript{44} Foucault, \textit{Birth of Biopolitics}, p. 295; Vrasti, ‘Universal but not truly global’.
technology’ or ‘new reality on which [governmentality] will be exercised’. However, according to Foucault, society was ‘not an historical-natural given . . . not a primary and immediate reality . . . [not] simply [the] product [of a governmental technology]’, but was ‘an element of transactional reality . . . which seems to me to be absolutely correlative to the form of governmental technology we call liberalism’. Therefore, although there is a relation, indeed a strong correlation, society and liberalism are not framed as being co-constitutive or inseparable. Liberalism, likewise, is defined by Foucault as ‘a technology of government whose objective is its own self-limitation insofar as it is pegged to the specificity of economic processes’. Hence, if a technology of government is understood as a ‘mechanism for rendering reality amenable to certain kinds of action’, or for the ‘spaces and devices’ used to translate and manifest underlying political rationalities into the domain of reality or being, then what was the underlying ‘schemata for representing reality’ that demanded and disclosed both liberalism and society as two correlative, yet separate, governmental technologies?

The problem of ‘government’ broke out suddenly in the ‘sixteenth century with respect to many different problems at the same time and in completely different aspects’. Why? It was at this moment that the West’s understanding of the relationship between mankind, science, and physical nature, became problematized like at no other time in human

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history.\textsuperscript{51} Prior to the sixteenth century, it was commonplace knowledge that everything in nature testified to God’s dominion over and through the ‘entire fabric of the world, natural or human, and [it was] apparent on every level of existence.’ Indeed, at this time it was simply \textit{known} that ‘What God is to nature, the King is to the State.’\textsuperscript{52} Order, hierarchy, and nature, operated according to their hierarchical place and rank in a great chain of Being. Likewise, what God was to Nature, and the King was to the State, the Husband was to the Wife and to the family in the realm of \textit{economia}: the household.\textsuperscript{53} This underlying yet overarching ‘political rationality’ and understanding of nature of being thereby determined how thought, practice, and referential existents and experiences were rendered as real to the human observer: what Dreyfus identifies as a ‘cultural paradigm’. A cultural paradigm shapes and determines the ‘understanding of what it is to be’ in a particular culture at a specific time, because it ‘collects the scattered practices of a group, unifies them into coherent possibilities for action, and holds them up to the people who can then act and relate to each other in terms of [shared exemplars].’\textsuperscript{54}

In our case, the moment which Foucault correctly identifies as the emergence of the technologies of society and liberalism stems from the West’s transition in cultural paradigms. As we will see below, this was the cultural paradigm shift from the Aristotelian and medieval-scholastic understanding of nature, politics, and the world, to the modern cultural paradigm articulated most clearly in the philosophy (and, as we

\textsuperscript{53} Toulmin, \textit{Cosmopolis}, p. 127.
would now call it, ‘science’) of scholars such as Newton and Descartes. As Foucault later called it, this shift was a ‘Cartesian moment’, a truly formative, crucial, and decisive moment in the history of Western thought and the constitution of modern subjectivity. In short, it reshaped, delimited, and reconstituted how the self, or now the ‘I’, as a subjectivity, related to truth as a form of knowledge representing an accurate picture of the external object-ive nature of the world. ‘The Cartesian approach’, writes Foucault, ‘refers to knowledge of the self, as a form of consciousness’. He continues, noting that ‘the modern age of the history of truth begins when knowledge itself and knowledge alone gives access to truth’; truth as a self-certain knowledge that the cogito of the subject possesses about external objects. He adds that

What’s more, by putting the self-evidence of the subject’s own existence at the very source of access to being, this knowledge of oneself (. . . in the form of the impossibility of doubting my existence as subject) made the “know yourself” into a fundamental means of access to truth.

If we are inquiring into Foucauldian IR’s reification of liberalism in literature on global governmentality, then why have we now strayed so far as to be discussing how the Western cultural paradigm, based on subjectivity and the ‘I’ as our self-certainty as held out against the representable and knowledge truth of objectivity, emerged in the sixteenth century? In short, in the Cartesian Moment our modern relation to self, nature, and the world, was determined. As Foucault admitted at the outset of The Birth of Biopolitics,

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55 Dreyfus, ‘Nihilism, art, technology, and politics’, p. 354.
56 See Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject.
57 Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, p. 14
58 Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, p. 17.
59 Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, p. 14.
‘Nature is something that runs under, through, and in the exercise of governmentality. It is, if you like, its indispensible hypodermis.’\(^{60}\) It was the identification of *natural processes* within the ‘new reality’ of society, and thence of the market, that opened up the possibility for government by shaping action and conducting conduct in manners construed to be in accordance with this new notion of ‘process.’ Prior to the Cartesian Moment, however, the notion of ‘process’ was ascribed and relegated solely to the realm of nature, cycling between birth and death, growth and decay; it was unknown in the human world, until the modern science founded at the Cartesian Moment ‘[began] testing natural processes under prescribed conditions, and with the observer, who in watching the experiment becomes one of its conditions, [introduces] a “subjective” factor . . . into the “objective” processes of nature.’\(^{61}\) Our understanding of nature as objective and knowable, in other words, determined the background, or the framing, in which any governmental technology or rationality could emerge in order to govern the new reality of the ‘process’.

As this paper will now argue, just as the concepts of subjectivity and ‘process’ facilitated the ‘new reality’ of liberalism and society from out of the Cartesian Moment’s new understanding of objective scientific knowledge, so the intimate and implicit link between the West’s understanding of science and nature *continue* to determine contemporary notions of neoliberalism, society, and global governmentality, today. Again, liberalism and society *stem* from, but are not constitutive of, the new form of thought that emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. To begin analysing what

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\(^{60}\) Foucault, *Birth of Biopolitics*, p. 16.

this historical moment can tell us about modern global governmentality, this paper will now invoke the philosophy of a scholar that specialized in how the metaphysical constitution and operation of modern subjectivity and science congealed at exactly this Cartesian Moment: Martin Heidegger.

Although the integration of the thought of Foucault and Heidegger has been undertaken by scholars such as Dreyfus and Elden to great success in the disciplines of philosophy and geography, it has largely been absent from IR.\(^{62}\) Hence, this paper now aims to bridge this gap, explicating how Heidegger’s description of our modern technological and subjectivist metaphysics undergirds the notions of society, liberalism, technology, and subjectivity, framing governmentality analytics in contemporary IR. To provide an overview of Foucault and Heidegger’s entire oeuvre, as well as every single point of conceptual overlap, is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say, that Foucault’s work itself was grounded upon the thought of Heidegger,\(^{63}\) with Foucault himself admitting in a revelatory interview just prior to his death in 1984: ‘For me Heidegger has always been the essential philosopher. . . . My entire philosophical development was determined by my reading of Heidegger.’\(^{64}\) Elden even goes as far as to declare that ‘Nietzsche’s influence on Foucault is indeed immense, but it is continually mediated by Heidegger, and Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche.’\(^{65}\) How so? In general, both scholars


\(^{63}\) See work by Dreyfus and Elden, especially.

\(^{64}\) Michel Foucault, as quoted in Dreyfus, “‘Being and Power’ Revisited’, p. 31.

attempt to explain how any referent or object cognized by a human subject emerges within, and through, historically specific practices that predetermine the relationship between the subject, objects, and the truths and knowledge(s) enveloping each.

Heidegger’s understanding of Being as ‘that on the basis of which beings are already understood’, and Foucault’s understanding of power as a relation, the exercise of which structures how subjects act upon one another to shape how truth and action conducts conduct, are indeedcomplementary. As Dreyfus adds, if we look to the later work of Foucault, ‘we will find Foucault’s view [on power and being] approaching Heidegger’s, as the two thinkers focus their analysis on the understanding of being characteristic of modernity.’ Thus, having looked at global governmentality’s notion of modernity as inexorably neoliberal in rationality and practice, it is to Heidegger’s metaphysical description of modernity to which we now turn.

As we have noted, IR tends to take Foucault’s notions of liberalism and society for granted, eschewing an analysis of their underlying historical conditions and formations in favour of adopting Foucault’s pre-packaged concepts. Heidegger’s philosophy allows IR to buttress, and correct potential shortcomings hindering these Foucauldian concepts, by providing a more thorough philosophical elaboration and conception history regarding their emergence into being at the Cartesian Moment. If it can be demonstrated that Heidegger offers a window into the implicit background conditions undergirding both nature and governmentality, it then becomes advantageous for Foucauldian IR to

66 Martin Heidegger, as quoted in Dreyfus, ““Being and Power” Revisited”, p. 31.
68 Dreyfus, “‘Being and Power’ Revisited”, p. 38.
understand how his metaphysical understanding of subjectivity, science, and technology, can be internationalised and globalised.

Like Foucault, Heidegger argues that ‘Modern thought does not appear all at once . . . but it is only during the seventeenth century that [its] decisive clarifications and foundations are accomplished.’⁶⁹ These clarifications and foundations of thought crystallized in the science of Newton and the philosophy of Descartes. Prior to Newton, ‘the idea of the universe (world) which reigned in the West up to the seventeenth century was determined by Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy,’ which understood beings in nature as phainomenon, or as ‘what shows itself in that which occurs out of itself.’⁷⁰ In other words, there was no such thing as a subject-ivity re-presenting what is presented to it in external object-ivity, but beings were apprehended by humans as ‘presencing’ or emerging in time, ‘unconcealed’ into the world of human awareness with self-contained properties and attributes. ‘How a body moved depended upon its nature, or the place to which it simply belonged in nature. The where determines the how of its Being, for Being means presence.’⁷¹

For example, under this cultural paradigm, humans conceived of the body of fire as moving upwards, and the body of soil or earth as moving downwards, because the motion of each body’s place was determined from within itself, striving to return to the place that accorded with its nature. ‘How a body moves depends on its species and the place to

which it belongs.'\textsuperscript{72} Newton’s doctrine of motion constituted a revolution in human thought, in that it displaced the Aristotelian conception of nature, motion, and bodies, practiced for centuries throughout Greek, Roman, and medieval thought. ‘Therefore,’ Heidegger notes, ‘the concept of nature changes. Nature is no longer the \textit{inner} principle out of which the motion of the body follows; rather, nature is the mode of the variety of the changing relative positions of bodies, the manner in which they are present in space and time, which themselves are domains of possible positional orders and determinations of order’.\textsuperscript{73} Following upon the new science’s intrinsic demands to become the ‘standard of \textit{all} thought’ by entrenching its new conceptions of the uniform universality of nature, Descartes likewise ‘grasped the idea of a \textit{scientia universalis}, to which everything must be directed and ordered as the one authoritative science.’\textsuperscript{74} What, however, could be grasped as universal, uniform, axiomatic, ‘absolutely first, intuitively evident in and of [itself] . . . concerning the whole of beings, what is in being and what \textit{Being} means,’ and as the self-foundational principle of all human positioning?\textsuperscript{75} The answer, for Descartes, is the self, the \textit{cogito}, the ‘I think’; not because he was a skeptic, Heidegger notes, but because Descartes needed a mathematical or self-disclosing foundation upon which, in accordance with this new understanding of nature, all thought could be grounded as certain.

Now, what does this changing conception of ‘the natural process [as] nothing but the space-time determination of the motion of points of mass’, and Descartes’ establishment

\textsuperscript{72} Heidegger, ‘Modern Science’, p. 285.
\textsuperscript{73} Heidegger, ‘Modern Science’, p. 288.
\textsuperscript{74} Heidegger, ‘Modern Science’, p. 299.
\textsuperscript{75} Heidegger, ‘Modern Science’, p. 301.
of the *cogito ergo* as the foundation for knowledge, have to do with the Cartesian Moment and global governmentality? In short, what resulted from the combination of Newtonian science and Cartesian philosophy in this moment was the formation of modern Western metaphysics: the very same metaphysics that now undergirds and constitutes the subjectivities, sciences, rationalities, technologies, and nature and truth, as practiced and actuated by Western consciousness and diagnosed by governmentality scholars today. ‘Metaphysics’, although typically a confused or contested term,\(^7^6\) must be understood not as a specific doctrine or discipline of philosophy, but as a ‘[thinking] rather on the fundamental structuring of that which is, as a whole, insofar as that whole is differentiated into a sensory and a suprasensory world and the former is supported and determined by the latter.’\(^7^7\) Thus, metaphysics refers to the mode of subjective perception initiated at the Cartesian Moment, in which man becomes a reflexive subject, or ‘that being upon which all that is, is grounded as regards the manner of its Being and its truth’ as against the subject as an external object.\(^7^8\)

The Cartesian Moment turned things, placed in-themselves, into objects knowable through scientific representations by a subject. No longer simply ‘presencing’, objects needed to be re-presented by subjectivity back to itself, as re-cognized objects. ‘The fact that whatever is comes into being in and through representedness transforms the age in which this occurs into a new age in contrast with the preceding one.’\(^7^9\) How? The ‘objectness of representing, and truth [as the self-certainty of external knowledge]

\(^7^8\) Heidegger, ‘Age of the World Picture’, p. 127.
\(^7^9\) Heidegger, ‘Age of the World Picture’, p. 130.
defined as the certainty of representing,’ forces both the self and nature into a
metaphysics that must perceive and experience reality only by ordering, regulating,
calculating, and manipulating referents in nature, as objects. The world suddenly
becomes akin to an external and objective ‘picture’, or ‘world view’, emanating from the
way that subjectivity must represent its objective reality as orderable, calculable, and
being external, manipulable.

This paper argues that from this new Western subjectivist metaphysics, the essence of
governmentality analytics, or the implicit framework of thought that is coextensive,
complementarity, and constitutive of Foucauldian IR’s understanding of global
governance, emerged: the technological ‘enframing’ (Ge-Stell) of Being. According to
Heidegger, enframing denotes ‘Modern science’s way of representing [that] pursues and
entraps nature as a calculable coherence of forces’. Put another way, enframing is ‘the
gathering together of that setting-upon which sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth to
reveal the real in the mode of ordering’, regulating, securing, and calculating, or what
Heidegger calls ‘standing reserve’ (Bestand). According to Heidegger, it was the in the
Cartesian Moment that enframing, as a mode of being, comes to metaphysical fruition by
constituting Western subjectivity: it manifests itself by delimiting, structuring, and
orienting the manner in which humans can reveal, disclose, and understand truth, nature,
and themselves, as existing in the world. As will now be demonstrated, it is this
underlying metaphysics of technological enframing that governs, and has always
governed, governmentality analytics, by ‘start[ing] man upon the way of that revealing

80 Heidegger, ‘Question Concerning Technology’.
through which the real everywhere, more or less distinctly, becomes standing-reserve.\textsuperscript{82}

When the world has become a represented, objective picture, and the self has become a self-certain subjectivity, only \textit{then} ‘will the community as the sphere of those goals that govern all achievement and usefulness have any meaning.’\textsuperscript{83} When the self has been enframed under a Western metaphysics positing subjectivity and objectivity as truth and knowledge, then conducting the conduct of others through order, regulation, and calculation, not only becomes possible for the first time in human existence, but it even becomes \textit{necessary} in order to ‘be’ in the Western world.

**The Enframing of Power: Nature, Liberalism, Society, Subject**

There is a staunch similarity between Foucault’s concept of power and Heidegger’s concept of Being. Each exists as a relation between self and other that is determined by shared social practices, which provide ‘a background understanding of what matters and what it makes sense to do, on the basis of which we can direct our actions’, and upon which we can understand ‘what it is for anything to \textit{be} at all.’\textsuperscript{84} Power and Being each describe the formation or demarcation of a horizon, or ‘clearing’ of subjective awareness and representation, in which the ‘regimes of truth’ unique to each disparate ‘cultural paradigm’ must inevitably crystallize to form social practices and relations.

Taking these similarities into account, what this paper argues is that Heidegger’s description of the metaphysics of modern technology as enframing can function as a

\textsuperscript{82} Heidegger, ‘Question Concerning Technology’, p. 24.
\textsuperscript{83} Heidegger, ‘Age of the World Picture’, p. 133.
\textsuperscript{84} Dreyfus, ‘Nihilism, Art, Technology, and Politics’, 351.
blueprint for how governmentality can operate at a local or global level: in other words, *enframing governs governmentality*. ‘Circumscribing [enframing] gives bounds to the thing. With the bounds the thing does not stop; rather from out of them it begins to be what, after production, it will be.’85 This raises the question of how, after thought was bounded and circumscribed as ‘subjectivity’ in the Cartesian Moment, governmentality could eventually become ‘what, after production, [it is today]’ in IR: an inexorably neoliberal understanding of the power relations of global governance. As will now be demonstrated, Foucauldian IR’s understanding of governmentality remains wedded to (neo)liberalism not because liberalism is integral to governmentality itself, but because it continues to be, albeit implicitly, tied to how modern science and technology represents nature.

At the very outset of the *Security, Territory, Population* lectures in 1977-78, Foucault labels the ‘mileau’ as a precursor to what he would later articulate as the medium or clearing for governmentality’s operation. The mileau, ‘what is needed to account for action at a distance of one body on another’ was in actuality ‘a notion that already existed in physics and was employed by Newton and the Newtonians.’86 Foucault describes in these lectures how ‘nature itself has constituted for man . . . another mileau’ because within it ‘the sudden emergence of the naturalness of the [human] species within the political artifice of a power relation [becomes] something fundamental,’ and the mileau becomes both the determining factor of nature, and the medium through which

government must occur.\textsuperscript{87} After the Cartesian Moment, ‘We enter a politics’ in the seventeenth century, ‘whose principle object will be the employment and calculation of forces. Politics, political science, encounters the problem of dynamics.’ Crucially for the argument set forth in this paper, Foucault adds that ‘at the same time, and by completely different processes, the sciences of nature, and physics in particular, will also encounter this notion of force. \textit{So the dynamics of politics and the dynamics of physics are more or less contemporaneous.}\textsuperscript{88}’ Indeed, to be able to conceive of, and to postulate and circumscribe, any ‘action at a distance’, depended not upon politics, but upon shifts in Western understandings of science and metaphysics engendered by Newtonian science and Cartesian philosophy. Foucault adds that the work of Leibniz after this moment ‘is proof that the homogeneity of the two processes [politics and science] was not entirely foreign to the thought of the time.’\textsuperscript{89} Hence, ‘The real problem of this new governmental rationality is . . . a political reason that is now essentially defined in terms of the dynamic of [natural] forces’.\textsuperscript{90} The motor of governmentality, its expansionary catalyst after the Cartesian Moment, is not liberalism, nor society, but the manner in which science circumscribes and enframes these concepts into operable, calculable, and manipulable, being.

Prior to examining how classical liberalism emerged from this scientific understanding of nature, we must first examine the other ‘reality’ that Foucauldian IR claims is integral to global governmentality: society. As argued above, ‘society’ emerged into reality only

\textsuperscript{87} Foucault, \textit{Security, Territory, Population}, p. 22, 23.  
\textsuperscript{89} Foucault, \textit{Security, Territory, Population}, p. 296.  
\textsuperscript{90} Foucault, \textit{Security, Territory, Population}, p. 296.
after the Cartesian Moment enframed subjectivity in a manner that granted natural ‘processes’ that were once confined to nature, to be translated over to the world of human relations. In other words, Western ‘society’, as a bounded polity with its own self-regulating and natural mechanisms of operation thereby appeared as a new reality only after a subjectivist metaphysical foundation opened it to scientific analysis. The polity, conceived as objective picture by a subject, suddenly became an object amenable to and thinkable through, regulation, ordering, and calculation. Society, therefore, despite constituting the ‘emergence of this absolutely new thing, the population, with the mass of juridical, political, and technical problems it gave rise to’, was not an essential precursor to the power relations comprising governmentality. Instead, it was an effect of an underlying subjectivist metaphysics that now viewed the ‘world picture’ through the lens of processes of modern science.

In fact, the subdivision of the ‘human species’ and ‘the public’ described by Foucault as catalysing the emergence of society\(^{91}\) was also extensively documented by Heidegger and Arendt, and their contrasting accounts are certainly worthy of brief comparison here.\(^{92}\) Writing prior to Foucault, Arendt concurs that ‘the social’ or society ‘is a relatively new phenomenon whose origin coincided with the emergence of the modern age and which found its political form in the nation-state.’\(^{93}\) The ‘emergence of society’ and ‘the rise of the social’ transformed what was once private matters of the household, the *economia*, into matters of public concern for all: ‘the bodies of peoples and political communities

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\(^{93}\) Arendt, *Human Condition*, p. 28.
[became translated] into the image of a family whose everyday affairs have to be taken care of by a giant, nation-wide administration of housekeeping."⁹⁴ Unlike monarchy or sovereignty, society operates according to ‘a kind of no-man rule’ which ‘expects from each of its members a certain kind of behavior, imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to “normalize” its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement.’⁹⁵ Now, ‘through society it is the life process itself which . . . has been channeled into the public realm’,⁹⁶ sublimating unpredictable political action once characteristic of man, for the stable and mechanistic processes best captured by ‘statistics, that is, the mathematical treatment of reality, [which] was unknown prior to the modern age’.⁹⁷ Society became a reality not because of the failure of a police rationality to govern, but because the Cartesian Moment instigated a new form of Western thought; a subjectivity designed to circumscribe, bound, and order its objective world in accordance with modern science, and its transmutation of the ‘process’ from nature to the human world.

We must now turn to Foucault’s description of the emergence of liberalism itself. In doing so, we will find that, like the concept of ‘society’, the materialization of liberalism is coextensive with modern science and metaphysics, as emanations from the Cartesian Moment. Thus, liberalism will be demonstrated to be a correlative effect of, rather than an essential component of, the operation of governmentality.

⁹⁴ Arendt, Human Condition, p. 28.
⁹⁵ Arendt, Human Condition, p. 40.
⁹⁶ Arendt, Human Condition, p. 45.
⁹⁷ Arendt, Human Condition, p. 43. Also see Chapter VI, ‘The Vita Activa and the Modern Age’, for a more thorough explication of how science and Descartes grounded our modern age in the subjectivist and technological metaphysics described by Heidegger.
Foucault wrote in the *Birth of Biopolitics* that ‘the art of government must . . . [take] as its objective the bringing into being of what the state should be’.\(^9\) As outlined above, this objective was possible only by treating nature as a calculable coherence of force relations, after a shift in cultural paradigms moved the *economia* from the private realm of life within the household to become the public, political, ‘economy’ of society and state.\(^9\) What contemporary global governmentality scholars omit when referencing this emergence of society and liberalism, therefore, is its initial and rather explicit dependence upon *nature*, as framed by the scientific and technological thinking of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As Foucault stressed, ‘Nature is something that runs under, through, and in the exercise of governmentality. It is, if you like, its indispensable hypodermis. . . . a permanent correlative.’\(^1\) The liberal market, at its outset, comes to disclose truth about a ‘new reality’ of population and economy only because it is situated upon a new understanding of nature. As outlined above using Heidegger’s philosophy, this understanding of nature was elicited from a new metaphysical subjectivism in human thought. If enframing, as the metaphysics of our modern age, circumscribes and bounds what is brought into the clearing of both power and Being, it should come as no shock that the ordering, regulating, and calculating of government, originally derived from the scientific enframing of the processes of nature rather than from liberalism or society. Indeed, as Foucault states: ‘If we take things a bit further back, if we take them up at their origin, you can see that what characterizes this new art of government I have spoken about would be much more a naturalism than liberalism, inasmuch as the freedom that

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\(^9\) Foucault, *Birth of Biopolitics*, pg. 4.
\(^1\) Foucault, *Birth of Biopolitics*, pg. 16.
the physiocrats and Adam Smith talk about is much more the spontaneity, the internal and intrinsic mechanics of economic processes than a juridical freedom of the individual recognized as such.\footnote{Foucault, \textit{Birth of Biopolitics}, pg. 61.} Indeed, the emergence of government as a rationality depended not on society or liberalism, but ‘what we see appearing in the middle of the eighteenth century really is a naturalism more than a liberalism.’\footnote{Foucault, \textit{Birth of Biopolitics}, pg. 62.} Essential to governmentality, therefore, was a new relationship to nature that was catalysed by the subjectivist metaphysics and Newtonian science of the Cartesian Moment. ‘They [liberalism, economy, and society] are things that do not exist and yet which are inscribed in reality and fall under a regime of truth dividing the true and false.’\footnote{Foucault, \textit{Birth of Biopolitics}, pg. 20.} What matters is truth (metaphysics), before the objects inscribed into reality from that truth.

However, IR scholars are quick to note a crucial transformation from classical liberalism’s adherence to naturalistic processes of the market, to the artificially-induced neoliberalism set-forth by the German ordoliberals in the twentieth century.\footnote{Foucault, \textit{Birth of Biopolitics}, pg. 120.} Does the identification of governmentality with science’s understanding of nature not become irrelevant, therefore, under this modern and artificial construction of neoliberal rationalities of government? Hasn’t our scientific understanding of nature become irrelevant for a contemporary global governmentality? As this paper will now outline, the transition from the naturalistic processes of classical liberalism to the artificial and ideal construction of modern neoliberalism, \textit{exemplifies} and reinforces the co-constitution of
modern (global) governmentality and our modern age’s technological understanding of science, nature, and world.

**Technological Metaphysics as Grounds for Global Governmentality**

Foucault highlighted that the West’s conception of nature determined its understanding of being, stressing that everything from Kant’s perpetual peace to the liberalism of the physiocrats, was grounded upon it: nature prescribes economic, moral, and juridical ‘obligations for man, but which nature has in a way dictated to him secretly, which she has, as it were, marked out in the very arrangement of things, of geography, the climate, and so on.’ 105 With the emergence of the ordoliberal (and contemporary neoliberal) conception of the market, this ‘naïve naturalism’ of classical liberalism was replaced by an understanding of markets as artificial mechanisms to be constructed by the state; circumscribing an ‘artificial game of competitive freedom’ in which government must ‘contrive the [institutional, cultural, social, and economic] conditions under which competitive conduct can be allowed to come into play’. 106 Nature, and discoveries of modern science undergirding its expression, was understood by Foucault as being excised from governmental rationalities of state, market, and economy. Thus, it is understandable why today’s Foucauldian IR scholars conceive of global governmentality only as conjoined to liberalism: neoliberalism was claimed by Foucault as ‘a new form of global rationality, of a new calculation on the scale of the world’, 107 and any ‘global’

105 Foucault, *Birth of Biopolitics*, pg. 57.
107 Foucault, *Birth of Biopolitics*, pg. 56. Although Foucault was here referring to classical liberalism, there is no conflict in this select case, of extending it to his later discussion of neoliberalism.
governmentality must supposedly be identified, therefore, with it. As Rosenow notes, “‘Government’ and ‘liberalism’ have to be regarded as existing in an inseparable relationship’, as neoliberal regulations ‘elucidates one the central features of governmentality.’\(^{108}\) The ‘global governmentality debate’, therefore, becomes, a debate over where, how, and to what extent, neoliberal practices and rationalities can ascribed and analysed across international and global spaces.

What Foucauldian IR’s concept of global (neoliberal) governmentality ignores can now generally be outlined in three ways: (1) Although Foucault initially developed governmentality in the College de France lectures of 1977-78 by analysing the constitution of the state, and later of liberalism, his thoughts on it were constantly changing and evolving.\(^{109}\) By 1984, Foucault was using the ‘conduct of conduct’ to analyse power relations existing between selves, or ‘actions upon actions’, to diagnose how the interplay of historically specific knowledge(s) emerged as tacit truths through the interplay of truth and falsity.\(^{110}\) The self, Foucault concluded, was the ultimate hinge upon which governmentality turned: ‘[I]f we take the question of power, of political power’, wrote Foucault, ‘situating it in the more general question of governmentality understood as a strategic field of power relations . . . [it cannot] avoid passing through, theoretically and practically, the relationship of self to self.’\(^{111}\) Therefore, Kiersey, Vrasti, and Rosenow are correct in noting that governmentality analytics in IR are in no way


\(^{109}\) Walters, Governmentality, p. 11.

\(^{110}\) Foucault, ‘Subject and Power’.

\(^{111}\) Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, p. 252.
limited or conjoined solely to the concepts or practices of the state, or of society.\textsuperscript{112}

However, where participants on both sides of the global governmentality debate stumble, is when they reify liberalism by insisting that governmentality must somehow always operate through liberal rationalities, whether they exist as ‘a multiplicity of different neoliberal practices at different institutional sites’\textsuperscript{113} as a ‘global liberalism that is not a global reality . . . but a quite selective or stratified field of possibilities’,\textsuperscript{114} or as the production of neoliberal ‘subjects of economic responsibility’.\textsuperscript{115} Likewise, even critics such as Selby, Chandler, and Joseph, limit their conception of global governmentality to the notion of society, states, or neoliberal flows of capital. In a rather ironic fashion, the critics of global governmentality, in attempting to negate the flawed ontology of a neoliberal global apologia or of neoliberal flows of capital, wind up reifying and ossifying the same liberal concepts that they attempt to denigrate. Foreordaining liberalism as a rationality of government, therefore, becomes mere calculative projection and description; or, an implicit reification. As outlined above, if a subjectivist metaphysics constituted by technological enframing is indeed the underlying foundation for modern thought and government, the positing of neoliberalism as a grounds for governmentality as an \textit{a priori} supposition for the global is entirely consistent with subjectivity’s need to enframe, order, and calculate, reality. The global reach of technological metaphysics will be described below.

\textsuperscript{112} See Kiersey, Rosenow, Vrasti.
\textsuperscript{113} Rosenow, ‘Decentering Global Power’, p. 508.
\textsuperscript{114} Vrasti, ‘Universal but not truly global’, p. 16.
\textsuperscript{115} Kiersey, ‘Neoliberal political economy’, p. 377.
(2) Despite Foucault’s oft-repeated claims that it was the ‘Cartesian Moment’ in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in which the social, political, and economic constitution of our contemporary thought and subjectivity emerged, IR has done little historical investigation concerning: (A) The underlying mechanisms explicating how and why this moment affected the state, the economy, society, and the self, in the manner Foucault claims, and (B) If the concepts Foucault derives from these analyses are indeed correct, are missing any key correlative elements, or if they can be explained by other histories, rationalities, or technologies of power. As highlighted in this paper, it is likely that Foucault borrowed much from the philosophies of Arendt and Heidegger. A comparison of these thinkers and their accounts of the origin of our modern society and liberalism revealed a divergent explication of the transitions described by Foucault; an explication that demonstrates not the essentiality of liberalism to government, but its *correlation* as a technology constituted by technological and metaphysical subjectivism. Indeed, Foucauldian IR ignores that the concepts Foucault frames as *sui generis* manifestations resulting from the failure of past police rationalities of governance, are consistent with broader epochal transitions in ‘cultural paradigms’. As will now be discussed below, it is clear that our modern and scientific conception of ‘nature’ that framed the outward manifestations of government in classical liberalism, was not in fact displaced by the ordoliberal economic ideals of an artificial market. Instead, modern science and the metaphysical and technological enframing undergirding its practices was simply incorporated and *assimilated into* government to such an all-encompassing degree, that we now take the technologization and rationalization of subjectivity, nature, and Being, that occurred at this moment, for granted.
(3) In mistakenly assuming (neo)liberalism is (a) an *a priori* requirement for
governmentality, and (b) the sole or primary global medium through which government
can occur, Foucauldian IR thereby reifies liberalism. However, if we accept that
governmentality is capable of analyzing power relations constituting the state, the
economy, or *any* relation of power in which practices delimit, frame, and conduct the
conduct of the self and others,\(^\text{116}\) then the potential for a global and *non-liberal*
governmentality becomes possible. This possibility hinges upon a viable (global) practice
or milieu being identified, through which relations between self and others can occur, or
through which subjectivity can be framed and acted upon by shared social practices.\(^\text{117}\)
This paper will now provide a brief overview of this non-liberal global governmentality,
by discussing how modern Western science and technology can offer a contrasting
account of global governmentality: one entirely consistent with, and predicated upon, the
subjectivist and technological metaphysics articulated at the Cartesian Moment.

As noted earlier, Foucault’s scholarship shared with both Heidegger and Arendt a central
premise: that from the Cartesian Moment emerged our contemporary and modern form of
consciousness, as the self-certainty of subjectivity, contrasted against an objective and
external world. Hence, rather than misconstruing the ordoliberal eschewal of ‘ naïve
naturalism’ as bifurcating nature and liberal governmentality, therefore, we may now
understand this moment as evidence of the technological enframing Heidegger postulated
as gripping our modern age. Thus, the ordo- and neoliberal adoption of purely ideal and

\(^\text{116}\) Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject*, p. 252.
\(^\text{117}\) However, for one attempt at a non-liberal global governmentality, see Olaf Corry, *Constructing a
technical rationalities for the economy, is not, as Foucault claims, as eschewal of nature; it is in perfect accordance with the intensifying technological enframing of Being as described by Heidegger, which aspires to the artificial ‘projection . . . of a fixed ground plan’ so that ‘procedure makes secure for itself its sphere of objects within the realm of Being.’¹¹⁸ An artificial idealization of a perfect market structure is, therefore, the epitome of technological enframing. Understood in the light of metaphysics, therefore, Foucauldian IR’s conception of neoliberal rationality represents not an eschewal of modern science or nature, but instead, its implementation.¹¹⁹

Indeed, if governmentality itself is acknowledged to be governed by the enframing of technological metaphysics, then we may now extend this foundational technological rationality to the globe in new ways. How? Heidegger’s portent of globalization states: ‘In the planetary imperialism of technologically organized man, the subjectivism of man attains its acme, from which point it will descend to the level of organized uniformity and there firmly establish itself.’¹²⁰ Despite its high-flung rhetoric, Heidegger’s claim is actually similar to IR scholars that claim ‘global governmentality studies need to explore strategies and technologies used to reaffirm the liberal project as a universal, albeit spatially varied and contested, standard of reference.’¹²¹ The crucial difference between Heidegger and Foucauldian IR, therefore, is that for Heidegger the ‘universal’ is not liberalism, but its underlying foundation of technological metaphysics, or the enframing

¹¹⁹ Jorenen, ‘New Modes of State Governmentality’.
of subjectivity and being. A sign of this global or universal event, according to Heidegger,

‘is that everywhere and in the most varied forms and disguises the gigantic [i.e. the globalisation of technological and subjectivist metaphysics, or enframing] is making its appearance. In so doing, it evidences itself simultaneously in the tendency towards the increasingly small. We have only to think of numbers in atomic physics. The gigantic presses forward in a form that actually makes it seem to disappear—in the annihilation of great distances by the airplane, in the setting before us of foreign and remote worlds in their everydayness, which is produced at random through radio by a flick of the hand. Yet we think too superficially if we suppose that the gigantic is only the endlessly extended emptiness of the purely quantitative. . . . We do not think at all if we believe we have explained this phenomenon of the gigantic with the catchword “Americanism” [globalization].

Ironically, this portent of neoliberal globalization hints at how global governmentality’s reification of (neo)liberalism is self-perpetuating: although IR scholars expertly pinpoint the rationalities and technologies of modern liberal governance, the very act of this framing, positing, and the bringing of these governmentalities into being through scholarship, serves more as a description of explicit regimes of power, than an investigation into their actual historical root as implicit manifestations of subjectivist and technological engframing. When viewed in the light of subjectivist metaphysics, liberalism ‘rests on a naïve conception of the individual “I.” . . . distinguished only by its [subjectivity’s] ability to represent other beings and use them (i.e. make beings present in whatever way it wills)’. A description of liberalism, without thinking of it through its

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implicit metaphysical constitution, becomes a reification.\textsuperscript{124} In other words, although Foucauldian IR correctly and nobly identifies rationalities of increasingly global forms of liberal power, by treating liberalism as the foundational condition for these forms of power it attributes to it a false primacy; it reifies liberalism, rather than thinking through it.

As both Foucault and Heidegger noted, we cannot escape from the social practices constituting our own historical subjectivity. There is no Archimedean point from which to stand back and surveil power, or Being. However, we may still engage in styles of \textit{thinking} that problematize and destabilize our own subjective clearing: historical ontology, or genealogy.\textsuperscript{125} Considered historically, therefore, a non-liberal global governmentality \textit{might} be identified if we can diagnose governmental practices, rationalities, and technologies, emanating in clear accordance or conjunction with this gigantic ‘planetary imperialism of technologically organised man’. Since enframing is both local (embodied in the practices examined by governmentality analytics), and global (expanding in its reach through material technologies \textit{and} the representational and subjectivist metaphysics from which technology is disclosed), conceiving of governmentality as emanating from technological enframing thereby allows IR to disclose a truly global governmentality. As stressed by Heidegger, although subjectivist metaphysics permeates all aspects of modern thought, it is most easily revealed in its essence (enframing) when examining modern science and technology. ‘Scientific


\textsuperscript{125} Stuart Elden, ‘Reading Genealogy as Historical Ontology’, in Alan Milchman & Alan Rosenberg (eds.), \textit{Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters} (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), pp. 187-205.
knowledge is the basis for progress in the modern era’, whilst ‘Technology is the expression of such knowledge and provides the means for organizing economic activity and addressing social needs, such as providing food, housing, clothing, medicine, transport, education, commerce, manufacture, and so on.’\textsuperscript{126} In short, modern science and technology is diffused into every aspect of modern life: ‘no aspect is free, or could be free, from its involvement or influence.’\textsuperscript{127} Although IR scholars have acknowledged that ‘Technology shapes international politics in profound ways’ and that it is ‘implicated in every significant shift in the character of international affairs in the modern era,’\textsuperscript{128} it is largely treated as exogenous to political relations.

This paper argues, therefore, that a non-liberal yet global governmentality can be situated upon both the material and metaphysical diffusion and constitution of modern Western science and technology, as it sweeps the globe. Notably, Foucauldian IR scholars such Methmann have recently attempted to analyse the former (material technologies), and their constitution of governmental rationalities. Methmann provides an interesting account of how a global governmentality, ‘affecting the individual ‘conduct of conduct’ from the global level’, is manifested through the enforcement of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) established at the Kyoto Protocol to help safeguard ‘a planetary problem space’ concerned with climate change.\textsuperscript{129} Although highlighting the importance of technology and ‘technological zones’ in which calculatory regimes bring new objects

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{126} Leigh Glover, \textit{Postmodern Climate Change} (New York: Routledge, 2006); p. 67.
  \item \textsuperscript{127} Glover, ‘\textit{Climate Change}’, p. 67.
  \item \textsuperscript{129} Methmann, ‘Sky is the Limit’, p. 2-3.
\end{itemize}
into being, and focusing on climate change ‘visualized as a global problem’,\textsuperscript{130} Methmann’s alternative take on global governmentality ultimately falters: by embracing CDMs as ‘a market-based approach’ to climate change, his analysis is hinged upon ‘a global carbon governmentality . . . [that] establishes liberal norms at the international level and governs through them “at a distance”.’\textsuperscript{131} As we have noted earlier, although Foucauldian IR scholars may produce erudite and informative analyses of global liberal rationalities of governance, to assert liberalism as the milieu for ‘action at a distance’ is to mistake the message, for the medium. Methmann’s analysis, representative of Foucauldian IR in general, reifies liberalism by construing it as the sole medium or rationality for a possible global governmentality.

\textbf{Conclusion:}

This paper has argued that Foucauldian IR reifies liberalism by misconstruing it as the \textit{a priori} foundation, and the sole medium of operation, for a truly global governmentality. In order to detect the existence of a non-liberal global governmentality, it investigated the emergence of society and liberalism as ‘new realities’ or as governmental technologies, as described by Foucault. This yielded a surprising insight: that the emergence and operation of government was determined not by the existence of liberalism, nor of society, but instead by the scientific reconceptualization of nature, and natural processes, as engendered by the Cartesian Moment. Hence, buttressed by the philosophy of Heidegger, this paper demonstrated that within the Cartesian Moment an epochal shift in

\textsuperscript{130} Methmann, ‘Sky is the Limit’, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{131} Methmann, ‘Sky is the Limit’, p. 10.
Western thought emerged; one in which science, philosophy, nature, and government, were all subsumed under a metaphysical and technological ‘enframing’ of Being. The paper then demonstrated how this metaphysical and technological enframing, understood as the securing, ordering, calculating, and regulating, of Being by a self-certain subjectivity, could facilitate a governmentality analytic in which liberalism and society were non-essential. Foucauldian IR, therefore, reifies liberalism by mistaking it as an integral and essential foundation for global relations of power. As such, this paper then concluded with a brief overview of how Heidegger’s portent of globalization, or of the ‘gigantic’, ‘planetary imperialism of technologically organized man’, could allow for a non-liberal global governmentality to be developed: one based upon the spread of science and technology as indicative of the metaphysical enframing buttressing governmentality, rather than that of liberalism. Hence, contemporary IR stands to benefit from the inclusion of metaphysics and enframing in their analyses of the global.

As Heidegger once wrote, ‘If we succeed in reaching the metaphysical ground that provides the foundation for science as a modern phenomenon, then the entire essence of the modern age will have to let itself be apprehended from out of that ground.’ This essence, as an enframing of being that delimits the boundaries of subjectivity at its roots, thereby answers the original call of Foucault’s governmentality analytics: to explain the mystery of action operating at a distance. It behooves IR, therefore, not to ignore technological metaphysics and its influential spread across the globe in the manifestations

133 Rose and Miller, ‘Power Beyond the State’, p. 60.
of science, technology, and subjectivity, but to expand its outlook to include a global governmentality predicated or founded upon this metaphysical ground.