THE STATE IS A MULTI-SYSTEM
- Understanding the Oneness and Diversity of Government

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Abstract: The contemporary state has been the focus of considerable controversy – about whether it exists and has ontological status (or not); about how it may be delineated; and about the sense in which it operates as a unity or some form of integrated agency in relation to civil society, and viz a viz other states. I argue that the modern state in liberal democratic societies can be understood as a multi-system - the complex amalgam of ten different forms of state, which are held together or integrated by six main attractive and inter-connecting factors. States additionally cohere because of their endogenous dependence on a particular economic system, interactions with national culture, and the generic impact of state efficacy.

If we are to make progress in analysing states, both political science and the social sciences more generally need to move on from previously over-simplistic concepts of what the unity of the state entails. On the one hand, to deny the existence of the state because of institutional multiplicity, or a diversity of organizational forms, is crude and ungrounded. On the other hand, traditional statism cannot be rescued by emphasizing just one form of the state, or over-weighting a particular integrative force. Instead we need to recognize the simultaneous systemic oneness and empirical diversity of the state as a multi-system.

Paper to the 2014 UK Political Studies Association Conference, Manchester, 15 April 2014.

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‘Sometimes it is hard to know where politics ends and metaphysics begins: when, that is, the stakes of a political dispute concern not simply a clash of competing ideas and values but a clash about what is real and what is not, what can be said to exist on its own and what owes its existence to an other’.

*J. M. Bernstein*

The state has always been a fiercely disputed or suspect concept, especially in Anglo-American societies with a scientific culture stressing ruthless empiricism, a philosophical approach sceptical of monolithic systems, and a strong political commitment to pluralism. For many years these influences conjoined to create an intellectual climate in Britain and the United States where ‘the state’ was seen as something foreign, to be disliked and distrusted, a purely ‘continental’ construct (Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009, pp. 6-7; Wilson, 1887; nettle, 1986). Political philosophers in these countries overwhelmingly concluded that the state was a reified abstraction. Once admitted into political science vocabulary, it would inevitably only be anthropomorphized and begin to stride the landscape of thought, legitimating violations of rights and oppressive acts (for ‘reasons of state’), and inspiring unhealthy and unreasoning forms of patriotism and loyalty. For instance, writing in 1915 Dewey argued:

‘[I]n German literature… the State, if not avowedly something mystic and transcendental, is at least a moral entity, the creation of self-conscious reason operating in behalf of the spiritual and ideal interests of its members. Its function is cultural, educative. Even when it intervenes in material interests, as it does in regulating lawsuits, poor laws, protective tariffs, etc., etc., its action has ultimately an ethical significance: its purpose is the furthering of an ideal community. The same thing is to be said of wars when they are really national wars, and not merely dynastic or accidental’ (Dewey, 1979, p. 170).

For pluralist thinkers, the state could only be legitimately admitted into discussion when handling the classics of political thought, dealing with safely by-gone eras and political forms (the Greek city states, the renaissance state of Machiavelli). Elsewhere the appearance of this concept must always be queried and decried as a form of mystification, distorting or detracting from the reality of specific institutions and actors behaving in empirically observable ways. Many writers (for instance, Mitchell, 1991, p.77; Hay, 1999, p. 320) have re-quoted an abbreviated aphorism by Phillippe Schmitter that: ‘[T]he modern state is … an amorphous complex of agencies with ill-defined boundaries performing a variety of not very distinctive functions’ (Schmitter, 1985, p. 33). But they do not notice that even Schmitter immediately went on to acknowledge that ‘as a symbolic and systemic
totality’ the state continues to dispose both of extensive coercive powers and legitimate authority within its territory. In the early twentieth century, mainstream Anglo-American economics succumbed to the prevailing anti-statism of the period by substituting an unanalysed and neutralized ‘Government’ for the state of earlier texts. Government was left unanalysed because it was now explicitly classed as lying outside economics’ disciplinary scope. (Even in public finance textbooks) ‘government’ was principally handled in the discipline by assuming that it could undertake perfect market corrections whenever needed – the leitmotif of the first edition of Samuelson’s textbook.

Nor is this calculated over-emphasis on the diversity of the state nowadays confined to liberal pluralists. Channelling Aristotle against ‘the state considered as a sort of political universal’, Michel Foucault famously observed:

[T]he state does not have an essence. The state is not a universal nor in itself an autonomous source of power. The state is nothing else but the effect, the profile, the mobile shape of a perpetual statification (étatisation) [process of state formation] or statifications, in the sense of incessant transactions which modify, or move, or drastically change, or insidiously shift sources of finance, modes of investment, decision-making centers, forms and types of control, relationships between local powers, the central authority, and so on. In short, the state… has no heart in the sense that it has no interior. The state is nothing else but the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities’ (Foucault, 2008, p. 77).

In a recent review, Jessop (2008, p. 125) also finds ‘declining interest in the more esoteric and abstract modes of state theorizing’ in the Marxist and post-Marxist literatures, detecting a consensus in which: ‘[T]he state is seen as an emergent, partial and unstable system that is interdependent with other systems in a complex social order’ (p.128). Yet he also notes that ‘The state is the site of a paradox. On the one hand it is just one institutional ensemble amongst others within a social formation; on the other hand it is peculiarly charged with maintaining the cohesion of the social formation of which it is a part’ (Jessop, 2008, p.129).

In this paper I want to first quickly sketch three reasons why these various attempts to minimize, sideline or even discard the concept of the state now make little or no sense. Second I briefly review the main forms of state and discuss how they interconnect. Third, I consider the principal integrative forces within and between the main forms of state. I conclude by setting out a particular claim about the oneness and diversity of the state, namely that it is a multi-system in which all forms need to work jointly if the whole is to survive or flourish. This multi-system is recognizably the same across different states.
The continuing centrality of the state

‘All government is an ugly necessity’.

G.K. Chesterton

All the variants of conceptual anti-statism sketched above appear to be driven either by a ruthless empiricism that rejects any internal unity to government, or by a kind of intellectuals’ tidiness urge or an aesthetic repugnance at having to cope with complex phenomena. Such stances have been undermined and beleaguered by three key contemporary developments underscoring the centrality and indispensability of the state - the linkaging of the great financial crisis of 2008-12 to the fiscal crises of many states; the enduring salience of the state/non-state (or public/private) concepts in economics; and the continued polarization of political debates and ideological conflicts within liberal democracies around state versus private sector conflicts.

By 2008 the onset of the financial crisis highlighted in an acute fashion the inescapable role of state policies in underpinning the banking and financial systems of national economies. Successive legal and other changes made in modern times created an opportunity for banks to expand their lending, effectively underpinned by governments and taxpayers in the role of lender of last resort, a process that a senior Bank of England policy maker, Andrew Haldane (2011, p. 3) aptly termed ‘financial deepening’:

For the better part of a century, between 1870 and 1970, financial deepening in these countries followed a modestly upward trend. Over this period, the average bank assets-to-GDP ratio rose from 16% to over 70%, or less than 6 percentage points per decade.

Since 1970, this trend has changed trajectory. The ratio of bank assets-to-GDP has more than doubled over the past 40 years, rising from around 70% to over 200%, or over 30 percentage points per decade. In other words, since 1970 financial deepening has occurred five times faster than in the preceding century. For some individual countries, the rise has been more dramatic still - in the UK, the ratio has risen five-fold.

Figure 1 shows the chart that accompanied Haldane’s analysis, illustrating the sharp rise in the average advanced industrial country ratio of bank assets from around 50% of GDP in 1950, to an average of 200% by 2000. This growth continued through to 2007, and in the great financial crisis of 2008 exposed the huge vulnerability of countries like Iceland, Ireland and the UK where bank assets were much higher multiples of GDP.
The crisis demonstrated in stark terms how far bank and financial firms’ operations depended upon the security provided by national governments guaranteeing private sector debts. After the US decision to let Lehman Brothers go into liquidation a wave of financial panic swept through the most exposed economies in Europe and the USA, which was only halted by governments intervening in a wide variety of ways to nationalize or otherwise secure bad debts from cascading through the financial system. Yet what began as private sector crises of bad lending and rash financial behaviours, very quickly ended up as crises of state financial credibility in the worst affected countries. The International Monetary Fund and the European Union institutions, especially the European Central Bank for the Eurozone countries, played a modest role in then stabilizing the situation. But their role was modest indeed when set against the adjustments in fiscal positions and state budgets that fell upon the most deeply affected countries – each of which largely had to manage through the crisis on the basis of its own resources.

The centrality of state policies in the crisis (including the key role of more effective and precautionary economic and financial regulation in averting crises in some countries
like Australia, Canada and Germany) meshes well with second key factor that has kept the concept of the state alive in liberal thought – its centrality in economics. In practical terms the 2008 crisis demonstrated the indispensable role of states in underpinning all markets. In mainstream economics this role was progressively backgrounded, with a theorized ‘perfect’ government signalling the end of economics’ reach from the 1930s through to Samuelson’s introduction of welfare economics in the mid 1950s. Later developments from the 1970s pushed back the frontiers of political economics, and sought a more active and realistic model of government within the discipline’s focus of concerns, looking to endogenously model aggregate government responses instead of assuming them. Yet even as late as the Drazen’s (2002) macro-political economy textbook mainstream economics still handled an integrated ‘government’ role and issues of institutional design only with standard economic concepts and tools, while excluding any mention of the state concept. It also managed to say not one word about the issues touched on by Haldane above. A huge amount of institutionally specific analysis was summarized by Drazen on issues such as the economic salience of creating an independent central bank. But about the state’s role in underpinning financial markets, bank lending and economic security there was no mention, even in the sub-field for which it was most relevant.

However, the importance of the state concept within economics was kept alive and assigned significance in several other ways. A kind of economics fetishism focused obsessively on issues around public-collective goods versus private-individual goods. In Austrian School and Hayekian thought the state appears as a kind of market-nemesis, no sooner tolerated in one sphere than it will be launching modern societies on the slide into authoritarian administration (perhaps even a totalitarian society) (Hayek, 1944). Partly drawing on this ideological tradition, and partly not, the later successful public choice theory critique of the liberal economics’ ‘government as impartial market arbiter’ position progressively re-endogenized ‘government’ as a coherent and joined-up actor in economic thinking. So the scepticism of pluralist political science about the state sits very uneasily with the continued salience within its dominant disciplinary neighbour economics continues about public/private polarities.

The third and strongest influence preventing any marginalization of that state has come from practical political debates, especially the development and morphing of neoliberalism in the USA since the 1970s. It has brought a visceral dislike of ‘the state’ back from the margins of political discourse and into the mainstream of American debates.
Foucault decried ‘state phobia’ amongst Marxists and on the political right as illusory, but the latter variant especially has remained a vital element of modern politics. Libertarian thinkers like Murray Rothbard (1977) have an intellectual view that makes Hayekian anti-statism seem a pallid resentment by comparison:

There runs through… most of … my work… a deep and pervasive hatred of the State and all of its works, based on the conviction that the State is the enemy of mankind. In contrast, it is evident that David [Friedman, author of the merely privatizing text *Machinery of Freedom*] does not hate the State at all; that he has merely arrived at the conviction that anarchism and competing private police forces are a better social and economic system than any other alternative. [T]here is no sign that David Friedman in any sense hates the existing American State or the State per se, hates it deep in his belly as a predatory gang of robbers, enslavers, and murderers. No, there is simply the cool conviction that anarchism would be the best of all possible worlds, but that our current set-up is pretty far up with it in desirability.

At the time he wrote this passage, this kind of rhetoric still put Rothbard (just) beyond the neo-liberal pale. But not any more. In particular, the neo-liberalism of the Regan era was marked by the establishment of a rigid anti-statism in Republican party attitudes that systematically sought to restrict the scope of state-public activity, paralleling Thatcherite ideas in the UK. During Jeb Bush’s first (successful) campaign to become Florida’s governor, he proclaimed: ‘Government is not good. This campaign is about clubbing the government into submission’ (my italics).

The neo-conservative period under George W. Bush marked a partial resiling of anti-statism, with the integrated projection of American power overseas instead seen as the priority. For neo-con intellectuals and practitioners fetishizing government’s size and boundaries was a secondary issue – big government was chiefly problematic when fiscal pressures from other policy sectors impeded the need for emphatic (expensive) foreign and defence policies. But the practical politics of Washington and beltway still saw the Reaganite agenda being implemented via ceaseless corporate pressure and political finance linkages, with strong effects:

‘For three decades now a consistent majority of Americans has agreed with the following statements when asked: “When something is run by the government, it is usually inefficient and wasteful,” “The federal government controls too much of our daily lives,” “Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good,” and “Poor people have become too dependent on government assistance programs”’ (Lilla, 2010).
Since the financial crash of 2008-9 and the subsequent recession the emergence of the populist Tea Party once again strengthened a fierce anti-statism, now linked to an embittered nostalgia for a distant pre-modern time when individuals could be self-reliant and government could be minute:

‘The seething anger that seems to be an indigenous aspect of the Tea Party movement arises, I think, at the very place where politics and metaphysics meet, where metaphysical sentiment becomes political belief… The implicit bargain that many Americans struck with the state institutions supporting modern life is that they would be politically acceptable only to the degree to which they remained invisible, and that for all intents and purposes each citizen could continue to believe that she was sovereign over her life; she would, of course, pay taxes, use the roads and schools, receive Medicare and Social Security, but only so long as these could be perceived not as radical dependencies, but simply as the conditions for leading an autonomous and self-sufficient life. Recent events [the financial crash of 2008 and depression lasting to 2011] have left that bargain in tatters’ (Bernstein, 2010).

Again with massive corporate backing, Tea Party activism swept through the Republican party (Courser, 2010), leading to a reviling of the ‘weakness of will’ about the big state shown in the Bush era, a stance later characterized by Karl Rove as ‘childish’ (Gerson, 2010; and see Gerson and Wehner, 2014). Yet similar ideas now recur routinely and pervasively in the discourse of American business, Republican politicians and right-wing intellectuals and commentators, producing a level of violence in political rhetoric that has few European counterparts. I have argued elsewhere that:

‘We might draw at least some parallels between the recurring anti-state backlashes [in the USA] and Roger Griffin’s 1991 definition of fascism as “palingenetic ultra-nationalism”, intoxicated with the idea of national rebirth. In the same way we might speak of the American far right as embracing “palingenetic anti-statism”, where the body politic seems repeatedly to resurrect elements from its embryonic development, even though their potential environmental relevance has long since lapsed’ (Dunleavy, 2011, p. 4).

The European equivalent of this right-wing harking back to simpler times is in the main more straightforwardly nationalist, ultra-nationalist or quasi-fascist, evidenced by the growth of anti-foreigner, anti-immigration and anti-EU parties across all European countries. Yet some of these parties also have strong anti-state strands in their ideologies. For instance, during the 2010 UK general election the right wing populist party UKIP advocated rolling back public spending to 1997 levels, reversing around £200 billion of increased spending, half of it on the NHS. In wider political debates in Europe too, business intellectuals and commentators on the right routinely denigrate government in strong terms.
To give just one example, the intellectual and businessman Matt Ridley (1996) proclaimed that the state is ‘a self-seeking flea on the backs of the more productive people of this world … Governments do not run countries, they parasitise them’. (He subsequently went on to spectacularly crash the former building society turned bank Northern Rock into bankruptcy in 2008, ironically belying the headline of the *Daily Telegraph* article publicizing his view: ‘Power to the people: we can’t do any worse than government’. Even this disastrous fiasco could not prevent Ridley rising back to prominence again as an influential right wing commentator for *The Times* (Monbiot, 2010)).

The erstwhile liberal-conservative-pluralist effort to deny the usefulness of the state as an organizing concept in political science has been decisively marginalized by the scale of the nation state’s key role in the profound crisis of 2008-12, the continued intellectual centrality of state-non-state concepts in economics, and the apparently irrepressible salience of anti-state politics in the USA and other countries. If practical politics, intellectual development in economics, and critical areas of policy-making are all now structured so much in pro- and anti-state terms, then the original pluralist denial of any validity to ‘the state’ seems fruitless and not worth perpetuating. Yet abandoning a last-ditch denial is only a first-stage step to achieving greater understanding. The problems of defining an effective, positive analysis of the state (one that is empirically plausible) remain substantial.

**The main forms of state**

To understand ‘the state’ better, we must generate an inclusive listing of the ways in which it is present in the world, a listing that does not omit salient features of the concept-in-use. Figure 1 above meets this need. It provides a basic map-and-typology of the modern forms of state, and shows in a preliminary way how they are inter-related. Figure 1 forms the (complex) structure of which most of the remaining linear text exposition is an (inadequate and limited) re-expression.

Second, I seek to show how these different forms of state are connected to each other by real, objective causal links and flows – the focus of section 3 below. The patterns involved here are intricate and cannot be captured verbally alone. Figure 1 arranges the main forms of the state in two-dimensional space, allowing some relationships to be physically expressed. For instance, it shows which forms of state are closest to which other
forms. In addition, the state is unified in an interestingly complex way – by *multiple integrative forces*, each of which is partial in its coverage. But taken together these linkages create a binding net of causal influences, such that developments in one form of state always have significant implications for changes in other forms. I begin by examining the nine main forms of state (plus three sub-sets of the first and most crucial form) shown in Figure 1.

My discussion seeks to answer the question: How can we distinguish a *fundamental* form of the state, a key system composing the multi-system, from the purely contingent institutional arrangements that may apply across different countries and societies? A voluminous literature already covers some of the different forms in Figure 1, for example, discussing the ‘welfare state’ or the ‘regulatory state’. But these accounts almost all follow the ‘primitive’ strategy of claiming primacy for one or another state function and mode of integration over all others – a position that I strongly resist here. Some other boxes in Figure 1 are innovative and are rarely covered in the existing state literature. So how can each of these particular characterizations be justified?
[The long version of this paper on Research Gate here includes a detailed discussion of each of the component forms of state in Figure 1, but is sadly too long for a conference paper format. The longer, complete version of the paper can be downloaded from: ].

Summing up the ten forms of state

Figure 2 below provides a summary overview of how each form of state can be linked to
- a distinctive story of origins (which provides a narrative justification of its importance or primacy);
- to a founding dichotomy (in Luhmanian terms), from which chain orderings can be derived;
- to a core logic of operations; and
- to core institutions and organizations.

Most of the classifications in Figure 2 should be immediately clear I hope, and all are justified further in the long version of this paper referenced above.

One strategy that I have followed is to seek to identify foundational dichotomies for each form of state. The idea here derives from Niklas Luhman, one of the leading post-war German social theorists of modernization. In this account specific systems develop in society through the elaboration of dichotomies that simultaneously define ‘inside’ concerns separated from and responding to an ‘external’ environment. The essential driving force here is the internal differentiation of the system so as to be able to handle complex external phenomena. For instance, Luhman (1979) sees the state (and other institutions) as defined partly in a system of power - here the powerful/powerless dichotomy is developed as a radically effective medium for social communication. ‘Chains of power’ provide frames that locate all institutions and individuals in a comprehensive hierarchy, and once institutionalized operate in catalytic fashion to accomplish collective social purposes (Luhman, 1979). There are many such systems (or sub-systems) in this approach, and they operate in an increasingly ‘autopoietic’ (i.e. self-sufficient and relatively independent) fashion (Luhman, 1990). Over and above the power/state-lead other examples of sub-systems might include trust as a social medium, or law and the legal system. Some of these elements (like trust systems) may not fit neatly against the typology of state forms set out here. But the following discussion seeks to show that many forms of state do embody a relevant Luhmanian dichotomy.
**Figure 2: Some key underpinnings of the main forms of state**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of state</th>
<th>Story of origins</th>
<th>Organizing dichotomy (Luhmann)</th>
<th>Core logic</th>
<th>Core institutions</th>
<th>Main Mintzberg organization type</th>
<th>Organizational culture</th>
<th>Agency type</th>
<th>Tool mix</th>
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<tr>
<td>A. State as a stream of tax revenues</td>
<td>State as a stationary bandit (Olson) or revenue maximizer (Levi)</td>
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<td>Fiscal development – expansion of the tax base; ensuring tax discipline</td>
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<td>Strongly hierarchist</td>
<td>Taxing</td>
<td>Authority, Organization</td>
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<td>A1 Budgetary state</td>
<td>Common pool resource problem</td>
<td>Funded vs not funded</td>
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<td>Professional bureaucracy</td>
<td>Hierarchist, sometimes strongly so</td>
<td>Control</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Central bank Bond market Treasury</td>
<td>Professional bureaucracy</td>
<td>Mix of hierarchist and individualist</td>
<td>Regulator y</td>
<td>Authority, Expertise</td>
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<tr>
<td>A3 Planning/ developmental/ infrastructure state</td>
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<td>Treasury, business ministry, development agencies</td>
<td>Professional bureaucracy</td>
<td>Individualist</td>
<td>Transfer agency (business-facing)</td>
<td>Treasure Expertise</td>
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**Figure 2 continued:**

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<tr>
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<td>Hierarchist</td>
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<td><strong>D. The information (database) state</strong></td>
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<td>E. Regulatory state</td>
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<td>Within safe/ sustainable limits vs outside such limits</td>
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<td>Authority Old: Organization New: Expertise</td>
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<td>Old style: Machine bureaucracy</td>
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<td>F. Welfare state</td>
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<td>Treasure Organization Expertise</td>
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<td>Expertise, Treasure, Organization</td>
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<td>H. Defence state</td>
<td>Jeopardy or self-sufficiency in an anarchic international order</td>
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<td>Defence Department, Armed forces</td>
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<td>Hierarchist</td>
<td>Capital intensive delivery agencies or Contract</td>
<td>Treasure, Expertise, Organization.</td>
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<td>I. State as a focus of national identity</td>
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<td>J. Coalitional (bloc or alliance) state</td>
<td>Jeopardy or self-sufficiency in an anarchic international order</td>
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<td>Cosmopolitan hierarchist</td>
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A second question useful for distinguishing fundamental forms of state from less salient institutional variations asks if that form has a distinctive ‘story of origins’, a highly simplified justifying narrative of why this form of intervention and state development came into being and has been sustained over time. Where the same credible story of origins is told across countries and institutional settings, and is also sustained over long periods of time, then the cultural and anthropological supports of that form of state intervention are generally stronger and deeper rooted. Two further criteria are also covered in the short accounts below. The third asks if a given form of state can be seen as responding to a distinctive core logic of operations, a set of structural influences that must systematically pattern its responses in a way that if not ineluctable is none the less hard to escape or change. The fourth main criterion seeks to link each form of state to core institutions and organizations that are recognizably beneath the surface fuzz of variations across countries in the detailed workings of state interventions.

In addition the four right hand columns in Figure 2 show additional codings for each main form of state in terms of:

- The main organizational/morphological types identified in Mintzberg’s valuable typology. The key configurations here are:
  - machine bureaucracies (associated with strong Weberian civil service systems and old-style regulation);
  - professional bureaucracies (associated with grass roots public service delivery and new-style regulation); and
  - divisionalized bureaucracies (characteristic of the defence sector and armed forces).
  - Two other Mintzberg forms play more marginal roles in modern states - adhocracies in the staffs surrounding presidents and premiers, and a few dedicated innovation/modernization agencies; and
  - simple bureaucracies in quasi-market delivery systems and the delivery of services in the peripheries.

- The organizational culture prevalent in each state form distinguished by Hood (1998) Most important here is:
  - ‘hierachism’, a combination of high ‘grid’ (many formal rules) and high ‘group’ (strong mutual surveillance and conformism amongst staff members), characteristic of machine bureaucracies. However, there are
also versions of hierachism that lean towards ‘individualism’, a low grid/low group focus on market-lead changes and risk-taking, found in some business-facing agencies;

- ‘egalitarianism’, a low grid/high group form prevalent in strong professional bureaucracies, like those doing decentralized public service delivery in health care, education, social work etc; and

- ‘fatalism’, a kind of bureaucratic coping culture with high grid/low group, characteristic of failing or stagnant machine bureaucracies, like prison systems or immigration agencies, often because of ‘chronic capacity stress’ (Bastow, 2013).

- the predominant agency type identified by Dunleavy (1991); and

- the main mix in that state form of the ‘tools of government’ identified by Hood and Margetts (2007), summed up in the slightly amended mnemonic NATOE, covering nodality (N, the state’s central positioning in societal information systems), authority (law and regulation, the ‘A’), treasure (the ‘T’, essentially finance, property and requisitioned resources), basic bureaucratic organization (the ‘O’), and organized, esoteric expertise (the ‘E’ added as a separate element by Dunleavy and Carrera, 2013, p. 79).

**The integrative forces of the state**

So far my attention has focused chiefly on what differentiates state forms one from another, on the diversity of the state. Turning now to the ‘oneness’ of the state, I consider next what factors make the state as a whole a genuine multi-system – and not just a random bundle of loosely associated institutions. The first aspect of a proof here is simply that the ten forms of state (and three sub-forms) distinguished above are present in all modern states, especially those in advanced industrial societies and in liberal democratic polities. No modern state can do without any of the ten main forms, or the three sub-forms (A1 to A3). If the states were no more than loose assortments of institutions, could this degree of macro-institutional isomorphism be explained?

Second, Figure 3 sets out a basic matrix mapping of the closely linked elements amongst the different state forms and shows the following main linking factors:

(i) *Tax flow dependency* units the key economic forms of state numbered A to A3 – without a secure, consistent and buoyant flow of tax revenues no state can
successfully budget, defend its currency and raise debt effectively, or afford to undertaken developmental interventions.

(ii) *Budgetary dependency* spreads widely from the institutions of the budgetary state to all the main spending sectors, especially the welfare state, developmental state, information state, security state, defence state and to a lesser degree the regulatory state. Each of these sectors is involved in regular, annual ecological competition with each of the others for (relatively) fixed funding resources. The 2008 financial crisis also demonstrated that although the central bank role does not normally involve heavy budgetary expenditure, interventions to prevent banking system meltdown can have long run expenditure consequences, as liabilities are actualized, the state absorbs bad assets or ‘too big to fail’ banks, and an additional squeeze is put on all other sectors.

(iii) Constitutional and legal inter-connections are equally as general as the state as a stream of tax revenues. They fundamentally condition the operations of the largely ‘immortal’ bureaucratic/organizational state (especially the slow-moving organizational cultures of public agencies), and the operations of the information and regulatory states. Legal rights and provisions additionally strongly condition the character and efficacy of the tax state, as well as shaping the derived operations of budgetary systems, and the central bank/Treasury roles in bond markets and debt management. Influences on the planning/infrastructure state are less strong, chiefly operating via contracting rules.

(iv) Common bureaucratic and organizational factors within state agencies strongly condition how the welfare, regulatory, security and defence states all operate, creating strong organizational culture continuities, common processes, personnel inter-connections, and public expectations about rights and treatment.

(v) The development of information systems is increasingly key for how the welfare, security and defence states operate. If the information state is weak or plagued by contracting problems then none of the major service sectors can meet business-comparable or internationally competitive standards. At its most fundamental, the state’s tax capacity now depends strongly on databases development and matching corporate and personal sector ICT and legal capabilities.
Figure 3: The major dependency and inter-dependency cluster factors that integrate the state as a multi-system

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Key: The main clusters are:

- **Tax flow dependency**
- **Legal interdependency**
- **ICT competencies**
- **Budgetary dependency, and ecological competition**
- **Organizational form and culture continuities**
- **Security/defence inter-dependencies**
- **Keynesian linkages**
- **Weak linkages**
(vi) The security, defence, national identity and bloc/coalition states are closely bound together by intelligence (including information state), homeland security, force projection and alliance-sustaining capabilities. With relatively fixed national boundaries, the salience of security-intelligence-ICT factors over force projection capabilities has grown.

There are, finally, some weaker linkages. The willingness of the central bank/Treasury state to undertake counter-cyclical borrowing conditions the scale of the development state, which in turn impacts on the welfare burden. There are factors of national identity involved in central bank and Treasury decision-making on currency management (for instance, conditioning Thatcher’s and later UK Euro-sceptic opposition to European monetary convergences in the ERM and Euro) – although they do not affect countries equally.

In Figure 3 there are 81 possible two-way inter-connections between the 13 main forms of state, and only 31 of these are shown coloured in as significantly inter-related, and five weak links. Thus plenty of white spaces remain (covering more than half the total). The overall structure of the state thus has relatively restricted inter-connections and many gaps and distant, mediated connections. It is not a blanket wall of similar inter-dependencies.

Conclusions

The state is a multi-system. Like many innovations, the proposition may seem obvious once explicitly set out. Yet we know from other branches of knowledge how resistant human knowledge development can be about recognizing multi-systems. For several thousand years generations of highly skilled and intelligent people knew the location of all the obvious organs within the human body. But for almost all that time the interpretations of what each organ was for, how it operated, and how each organ linked to others were overly simplified. Bodily systems were typically characterized in ways that now seem to us to be naïve, almost childish - in terms of their radical incommensurability with the phenomena to be explained, and the obvious gaps in knowledge or prediction that they left unexplained. It is only in the last century that we have come to what might be called a ‘grown up’ understanding of the human body as composed of lots of different cells; where cells of the same kind form a tissue; multiple tissues together make an organ; a group of organs makes a complete system; and the collection together of a number of systems and their interactions with each other produces an organism as multi-system, the human body. How many
systems we delineate in the body is of course partly constructed, depending on what level of detail we focus on (how far we go into sub-systems). But a roughly adequate characterization would say that the human body has seven essential systems – the conscious brain, the unconscious brain (the brain stem), the endocrine system, the cardio-respiratory system, the gastro-intestinal system, the genito-urinary system, and the muscular-skeletal system.

Seen in this perspective it is hard not to look at the highly simplified discussions of the state in contemporary practical political discussions and to feel that a far wider group of viewpoints than the Tea Party remain stuck in relatively childish modes of thought. Academic discussions are more sophisticated in their form of expression, and more articulated in their conceptions of the state (Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009). But from that book, or any other review of contemporary theories of the state, it would be hard to argue that the progress made has been cumulative; that current scholarly debates and controversies have become less polarized over time; or that any viewpoint has yet embodied sufficient internal development to embrace the range of empirical phenomena needing explanation.

The current paper seeks to encourage a more integrative and articulated concept of the state as the complex product of a number of different systems (and sub-systems). I have distinguished ten basic forms of the state (plus three derived sub-systems) – as

- a stream of tax revenues, implying
  - an integrated budgetary apparatus
  - a lender of last resort to the national banking sector, and issuer of government debt
  - an economic developmental/infra-structure capability
- a common constitutional and legal order
- a common template of bureaucratic organization and socialization
- a connected set of information systems
- a connected regulatory apparatus
- an overall system for welfare risk pooling and meeting anthropological needs
- a homeland security apparatus
- a defence/armed force-projection capability
- an institutional apparatus supporting a national identity; and
- a node of co-operation in wider coalitions or blocs of states.
Six principal connective forces operate

- the dependency of almost all state functions on tax-raising;
- more specific budgetary competitions and allocations;
- constitutional and legal inter-dependencies and their extension via regulatory instruments; organizational and bureaucratic commonalities;
- information state commonalities and linkages; and
- a nexus of national identity, security, defence and coalitional factors.

All of these forms of the state and integrative forces are essential to the whole. They must interact effectively together within narrow limits and tolerances if the state as a whole to operate successfully.

Many aspects of this substantive way of framing things are eminently disputable. Different authors and schools of thought will certainly want to contest the number of systems included, or to attempt to re-define their characters. Hopefully, however, it will still be feasible to reach some scholarly agreement that the state (like the human body) is composed of multiple systems, each of which contributes outputs of existential significance for the whole. Multiple linking factors integrate some parts of the operations of the state, but none of these alone integrates the whole, nor does every part connect to every other. Instead connectivity is relatively loose, but none the less vital. Perhaps we may in time agree on a ‘modernized Leviathan’ image of a multi-system, complexly integrated state (analogous to the human body as we now know it to be). If so, we should also advance our understandings of how political practitioners at many levels handle the diversified forms of the state in connected ways, and their interactions.
Endnotes

2. 2. Chesterton (1915).

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