BRADLEY’S ACCOUNT OF IDEAL MORALITY: SELF-REALIZATION AND ITS EQUIVOCATIONS

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1. PREAMBLE

Many commentators regard *Ethical Studies* as the most Hegelian of Bradley’s writings.\(^1\) The common perception is that the Fifth essay of that work, which articulates an ethics of “My Station and its Duties”, expresses Bradley’s position on the question of the nature of morality.\(^2\) Nonetheless when the dialectical structure of *Ethical Studies* is taken into account, the common perception is not only questionable, but it also emerges that, in interrogating the nature of morality, Bradley’s concern is beyond matters merely ethical, in so far as, on Bradley’s view, the question of the nature of morality inevitably implicates the larger question as to the relation of morality to religion, and of religion to philosophy.\(^3\)

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Thus in accentuating the claim of ideal morality in the Sixth Essay against the *apotheosis* of social morality, Bradley’s attempt is to offer a larger perspective on the being of morality itself, as it bears on the question of the nature of ultimate reality. Paradoxically, Bradley concludes by way of anti-climax that the highest viewpoint on morality is still inadequate to the matter, given that morality is inherently self-contradictory. Thus Bradley ends up with a dialectics of appearance rather than the sort of speculative dialectic we find in Hegel, on which all oppositions within consciousness is wholly overcome. The net result is that, on Bradley’s view, no relational system is ever complete as there is something of the real that escapes representation, so that morality, religion and philosophy are all appearances of the absolute, and not the Absolute.

Given the often confused environment of much of the contemporary debates on the nature of morality in which communitarianism is dualistically opposed to individualism, and ethical relativism pitched against ethical objectivism, the relevance of Bradley’s accentuation of the ideality of morality is beyond question, as it provides useful resources for thinking together personal and social morality without reducing one to the other.

For sake of convenient exposition we develop our argument in terms of the following procedure. After an account of the dialectical structure of the *Ethical Studies* with specific focus on the ethics of “my Station and Its duties”, we consider the claims of ideal morality, first in relation to the ethics of “my stations and its duties” and then in terms of the opening it provides for understanding the relationship between morality, religion and philosophy. The final step of our reflection considers the question of the contemporary relevance of Bradley’s account of morality as self-realization. Let us then begin immediately by focusing on question of the dialectical structure of Bradley’s *Ethical Studies* and the light it sheds on Bradley’s account of morality as self-realization.

2. THE QUESTION OF THE DIALECTICAL STRUCTURE OF ETHICAL STUDIES

Commentators are in general agreement concerning the dialectical structure of *Ethical Studies*. Prima facie, the series of essays which comprise the work seems disjointed. A close inspection, however, reveals an underlying unity. The essays are held together by the central thesis *Ethical Studies* advances, namely, the view of morality as self-realization.

2.1. THE PROBLEMATIC STATUS OF THE CONCEPT OF SELF-REALIZATION

In offering an account of morality as self-realization, Bradley is cognizant of the fact that the concept of self-realization is equivocal, meaning, in effect, that it is one thing to assert that morality is self-realization and another thing altogether what the assertion might mean. That the notion of self-realization is amenable to diverse interpretations makes it imperative that any account of morality in terms of self-realization must clarify the sense in which the notion is employed. Moreover, it must set itself apart from other prevalent accounts of self-realization, if its contribution to the matter is to have any philosophical merit.

In line with the foregoing proviso it is not surprising that *Ethical Studies* has a polemic and a constructive side to it. In other words, Bradley’s attempt to formulate a satisfactory account of

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4 ES, 312

5 Cf. Damian Ilodigwe, *Bradley and the Problematic Status of Metaphysics*, Chapter 1


7 See ES, 224-231
morality proceeds by criticising some popular interpretations of self-realization. This negative exercise is largely Bradley’s concern in Essays Three to Four, once he has established self-realization as the end of morality in Essay Two (ES, 64-81) Nonetheless, it is more than a negative exercise, for the critique resolves itself ultimately into a positive theory of morality relative to which the central issue concerns the status of the self that is realized in morality.\(^8\)

That the Essays which make up ‘Ethical Studies’, constitute a unity means that one cannot be read in isolation from the rest, if our overall purpose is to grasp the argument they jointly articulate. This should be evident from a brief review of the ethical perspectives Bradley examines in Ethical Studies, namely, “ethics of pleasure for pleasure’s sake”, ethics of “duty for duty’s sake”, and ethics of “My station and its Duties”. What the reader will notice is that there is a sort of dialectical progression from one essay to the other.\(^9\) If the ethical viewpoints they articulate were to be arranged hierarchically, the “ethics of pleasure for pleasure’s sake” will occupy the lowest rung of the hierarchy. Although, “ethics of duty for duty’s sake” will occupy a higher rung than the “ethics of pleasure for pleasure’s sake”, it will nevertheless be ranked lower than the “ethics of my station and its duties”. (ES, 141, 160-163)

The dialectical ordering of the various perspectives on the nature of morality is arguably responsible for the formal structure of Ethical Studies. Perhaps, it also accounts for Bradley’s procedure in developing the central thesis of the work in terms of the affiliation between morality and self-realization. We must bear this point in mind, if we are to understand the continuity that binds the critical and constructive moments of Ethical Studies. For, all the time Bradley’s overall concern is to intimate an adequate notion of the self that is realized in morality.\(^10\)

As will emerge, the upshot is that it is not the atomic self of hedonism, or the formal self of Kantianism. Nor is it merely the social self of “my station and its duties”. Thus, it is clear that an isolated reading of the essays can only lead to selective appreciation. And such is the case with the estimate of Ethical Studies that merely sees it as the locus classicus of modern critique of utilitarianism, or the view that identifies “my station and its duties” as expressive of Bradley’s ultimate position.\(^11\)

\(^8\) Although Richard Wollheim recognises this point, and has persistently drawn attention to it, it strikes one as strange that he nevertheless characterises Bradley as merely negative thinker in his F. H. Bradley (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, Second Edition,, Chapter 1) In my view, there is a fundamental incoherence between this characterisation and his recognition of the status of “My Station and its Duties.”


\(^10\) This dialectical feature of Ethical Studies is arguably replicated in Bradley’s later works such as Principles of Logic, Appearance and Reality and Essays on Truth and Reality, where he is searching for an adequate account of the nature of judgment, reality and truth respectively. See Principles of Logic, Book 2, Appearance and Reality, Chapter 15, Essays on Truth and Reality, 110-130. See also Damian Ilodigwe, “Bradley’s Account of Truth: Between Epistemology and Metaphysics”, Collingwood and British Idealism Studies, 19: 2 (2013), 219-250
Indeed were the dialectical ordering of the essays borne in mind, it should be possible to avoid such selective appreciation. For, it will be immediately clear that the three mainstream accounts of morality that Bradley criticizes only serve to set up the dialectical stage for his own substantive contribution to the matter, as articulated in the Chapter on ideal morality. Obviously, the three are not on a par; hence, the dialectical categorization. Nonetheless, the upshot is that each points to a more inclusive position, one that is more adequate to the matter. In keeping with this dialectical principle, the implication is that the ethics of “pleasure for pleasure’s sake” sets the stage for the discussion of the ethics of “duty for duty’s sake.” In the same vein, the ethics of “duty for duty’s sake” prepares the way for the examination of the claims of the ethics of “my station and its duties”, just as the latter also leads to the consideration of the claims of ideal morality.

Now we may think that the sort of dialectical categorization attributed to the structure of Ethical Studies is merely a formal consideration. However, this is far from the case. For, it is ultimately founded on Bradley’s perception of how well each of the perspectives fares in grappling with the question of the nature of morality. While one perspective is said to be more adequate than its predecessor is, it is certainly not the case that any of the perspectives is fully adequate. Nor are any of them completely bereft of truth. The point is that in its unguarded optimism, one account tends to over blow its claim; and, consequently, degenerates into a questionable one-sidedness.

Yet if the inadequacies of one perspective call for the emergence of another perspective, this is to be seen as an attempt to redeem what is true in the lower perspective, to deliver it from its ruinous one-sidedness. That this is the case reinforces the dialectical continuity between the Essays and the various perspectives they articulate.

2. 2. THE DIALECTIC OF HEDONISM AND KANTIANISM: THE QUESTION OF MATTER AND FORM OF MORALITY

We can develop the foregoing point by focusing more closely on the relationship between the Essays that comprise ‘Ethical Studies’. Consider the transition from Essay 3 to Essay 4. In making pleasure the sole good, it is not the case that Hedonism is without point at all. That


12 Bradley’s strategy here is analogous to what he does in respect of the problem of truth, especially his account of the three classical theories of truth, correspondence, coherence and pragmatism. He is often taken to have espoused a coherence theory of truth. Nonetheless Bradley, in fact, expressed reservation about the ideal of coherence, if taken as a substantive submission in respect of the nature of truth. He maintained instead that the essence of truth is better understood in terms of the notion of system even if in the end this it-self is insufficient. For, there is divergence between truth and reality despite the fact that truth wants to be wholly one with reality. For further discussion of the matter, see Damain Ilodigwe, “Bradley’s Account of Truth: Between Epistemology and Metaphysics”, Collingwood and British Idealism Studies, 19: 2 (2013), 219-250
pleasure is a good is beyond question. Nevertheless, the fallacy in the Hedonist viewpoint is the
equation of pleasure with the good.\textsuperscript{13} While pleasure must have a voice in the good, pleasure in
itself and by itself is certainly not the good (ES, 126, 143). By viewing pleasure as the sole good,
Hedonism inflates the claims of the content of morality in a way that explicitly undermines the
formal element in morality.\textsuperscript{14} The ethics of “duty for duty’s sake” comes unto the scene to correct
this truth turned into error by insisting that the formal element in morality, namely, the goodwill,
cannot be explicated merely in terms of the moral content, but is always a fundamental
presupposition of the moral content.\textsuperscript{15} As Bradley points out in remarking the advance of
Kantianism over hedonism:

We have learnt that the self to be realized is not the self as this or that feeling, or as any
series of particular feelings of our own or others’ streams or trains of consciousness. It is,
in short, not the self to be pleased. The greatest sum of units of pleasure we found to be the
idea of mere collection, whereas, if we wanted morality, it was something like a universal
that we wanted (ES, 160)

That the ethics of “duty for duty’s sake” comes unto the scene to correct the Hedonist fallacy
about the place of the universal in moral experience is no mean feat. This is why it deserves to be
placed on a higher rung of the dialectical ordering. Yet the well-meant contribution of “duty for
duty’s sake” does not make it impeccable. For, while it surely corrects hedonism, it too
seemingly falters in its articulation of how the moral form relates to the moral content, so far as
the universal is represented as a pure will without sympathy for heteronomy (ES, 143).

This divorce of duty from moral inclination is problematic, as it naturally leads us to ask how
the goodwill is related to and is realized in the will of this particular man. Yes, the goodwill must
be above his particular will if there is to be morality. Yet the overall question is how it is
affiliated to the will of this or that man? Without prejudice to the strong point of ‘ethics of duty
for duty’s sake”, Bradley condemns its empty formalism at the start of the fifth essay thus:

And, passing then to the opposite pole, to the universal as the negative of the particulars, to
the supposed pure will or duty for duty’s sake, we found that too was an unreal conception.
It was a mere form which to be will, must give itself a content, and which could give a
content only at a cost of a self contradiction: we saw further that any such content was in
addition arbitrarily postulated, and that, even then, the form was either never realized,
because real in no particular content, or always and everywhere realized, because equally
reconcilable with any content. And so, as before, with happiness we perceive that morality
could here have no existence, if it meant anything more than the continual asseveration of
an empty formula (ES, 161).

\textsuperscript{13} AR, 357-8

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{15} See Walsh, Hegelian Ethics, Chapter 2
Bradley throws further light on his meaning by adding that:

To complete the account of our negations, we saw further with respect to duty for duty’s sake, that, even were, it is possible (as it is not) to create a content from the formula, and to elaborate in this manner a system of duties, yet even then, the practice required by the theory would be impossible, and so too morality, since in practice particular duties must collide, and the collision of duties, if we hold to duty for duty’s sake, is the destruction of all duty, save the unrealized form of duty in general (ES, 161).

The above passages allow us to see Bradley’s point against the ethics of “duty for duty’s sake”. Notice, however, that because of the way it conceives the good will, Bradley rates the ethics of “duty for duty’s sake” as the opposite pole of “pleasure for pleasure’s sake” (ES, 161). We may understand this as suggesting that if we have to choose between the two as the ultimate account of morality, we are to settle for neither of them. In other words, we must press on for a fuller position, since we can neither acquiesce with the hedonist apotheosis of the moral content, nor “duty for duty’s sake’s” apotheosis of the moral form.

This is precisely what Bradley does, meaning that, although the ethics of “pleasure for pleasure’s sake” set up a dialectical stage for the articulation of the ethics of “duty for duty’s sake”, we nonetheless still do not have a dialectical resting place. Since we cannot take either of the opposing polarities as ultimate, given their respective flaws, we must see that they both now set up another dialectical stage for the possible emergence of a fuller perspective. Indeed, this is how to perceive the relation between “pleasure for pleasure’s sake”, “duty for duty’s sake” and “my stations and its duties”. However, the search for an adequate perspective has not been stagnant after the investigations of Essays 3 and 4. Some progress has been made, except that there is still a need for further progress. As for the progress already made, which in effect is a summation of the gains contributed by essays 3 and 4, Bradley writes:

What we have left then (to resume it) is this. The end is the realization of the goodwill, which is superior to ourselves and again the end is self-realization. Bringing these together, we see the end is self-realization of ourselves as the will, which is above ourselves. And this will (if morality exists) we saw must be “objective”, because, not dependent on “subjective” liking, and ‘universal’ because not identifiable with any particular, but standing above all actual and possible particulars. Further, though the universal is not abstract, since it belongs to the essence that it should be realized, and it has no real

16 Readers of Hegel’s *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences*, especially that part of it in which Hegel discusses what he calls three attitudes to objectivity, will recognise a parallel between Hegel and Bradley here, as far as the general structure of their argument is concerned. Just as Hegel regards empiricism and the critical philosophy as varied instantiations of abstract metaphysics, Bradley too in the context of the moral question treats hedonism and Kantianism as respectively one-sided. And perhaps in this larger sense, Bradley could be said to be a student of Hegel.
existence except in and through its particulars. The good will (for morality) is meaningless if whatever else it be, it be not the will of living finite beings (ES, 162).

2. 3. HEDONISM, KANTIANISM AND THE TRANSITION TO HEGELIANISM: ANTINOMY OF DUTY AND INCLINATION AND THE QUESTION OF RECONCILIATION

As we have seen, the fundamental issue arising from the discussion of “pleasure for pleasure’s sake” and “duty for duty’s sake” is the question of how we are to conceive of the relation between the good will and the will of this or that man. In both of these paradigms, what we have are dualistic options, as far as one apparently highlights what the other denies, with the result that the substantive issue remains to be resolved. It is precisely because the substantive issue remains within the oppositional frame that it is forbidden to rest in either of the poles. The above passage, however, makes evident how this issue is to be resolved without taking refuge in either of the disjunctions. This, Bradley says, requires that the universal is not an abstract universal but a concrete universal. In Ethical Studies, Bradley gives an indication of what he means by concrete universal, and why the universal ought to be concrete rather than abstract:

It is a concrete universal because it is not only above, but is within and throughout its details and is so far only as they are. It is the life, which can live only in and by them, as they are dead unless within it, it is the whole soul, which lives so far as this body is as unreal an abstraction as the body without it. It is an organism and a moral organism, and it is a conscious self-realization, because only by the will of its self-conscious members can the moral organism give itself reality. It is the self-realization of the whole body, because it is one and the same will which lives and acts in the life and action of each. It is the self-realization of each member because each member cannot find the function which makes him himself, apart from the whole to which he belongs; to be himself he must go beyond himself, to live his life he must live a life which is not merely his own but, which nonetheless, but on the contrary all the more is intensely and emphatically his own individually (ES, 162).

Bradley’s views the proposal that the concrete universal is a moral organism—which concretizes itself in the will of the particular individual and as such ensures the possibility of self-realization—as the panacea to the antinomy of Hedonism and Kantianism; or, again, the antinomy of content and form. Bradley himself is emphatic about this virtue of the ethics of “my station and its duties”, as he tells us:

Here and here first are the contradictions which have beset us, solved. Here is a universal which can confront our wandering desires with a fixed and stern imperative, but which yet is no unreal form of the mind, but a living soul that penetrates and stands fast in the detail of actual existence. It is real and real for me. It is in its affirmation that I affirm myself, for I am but a heart beat in its system. And I am real in it, for when I give myself to it, it gives
me the fruition of my own personal activity, the accomplished ideal of my life, which is happiness. In the realized idea which is superior to me, and yet here and now in and by me affirms itself in a continuous process, we have found the end, we have found our self realization, duty and happiness in one — yes, we have found ourselves when we have found our station and its duties, our function as an organ in the social organism (ES, 163).

To understand Bradley’s celebration of “my station and its duties” in the above passage, we should make explicit a point that has been implicit in our discussion so far. As noted at the outset, the notion of self-realization is inherently equivocal. It is important to see that according to Bradley at the heart of this equivocity is the issue of the status of the self to be realized. And by implication, we must judge the adequacy of any account of morality in terms of this consideration. This is a fundamental presupposition that governs his appraisal of the three main ethical positions we have been examining.

Indeed, if viewed from the standpoint of “my station and its duties”, it becomes clear that Bradley locates the battleground between the contending perspectives on this topos. No attentive reader of Ethical Studies can be in any doubt about this point if the overall drift of “my stations and duties” is grasped. For, once Bradley has advanced the ethics of “my station and its duties” as the reference point for mediating the antinomy of Hedonism and Kantianism, duty and inclination, his next move then is to justify the dialectical superiority of “my station and its duties”.

As far as I can see, Bradley does this by suggesting that the account of the self, which the ethics of “my station and its duties” offers us, is an advance over that which we find in Hedonism and Kantianism. Bradley makes this point in terms of the importance of social relation for a correct understanding of the nature of moral experience. The point must be viewed as an extension of his assault on the above ethical theories, especially the individualism implicit in Hedonism. Put briefly, Bradley’s contention amounts to the claim that extrapolated out of the social milieu, the individual is highly impoverished, since social relation enters his very essence. As Bradley puts it very well:

If we suppose the world of relations; in which he was born and bred never to have been then we suppose the very essence of him not to be. If we take that away, we have taken him away, and hence he now is not an individual in the sense of owing nothing to the sphere of relations in which he finds himself but does not contain those relations within himself as belonging to his very being, he is what he is, in brief so far as he is what others also are (ES, 166-167).17

17 Bradley makes the point at issue here even more succinctly: “the individual man, the man into whose essence his community with others does not enter, who does not include relation with others in his very being, is we say, a fiction” (ES, 168).
HEGELIANISM AND THE QUESTION OF THE STATUS OF SOCIAL RELATION IN MORAL EXPERIENCE

Our account so far should allow us to make sense of the suggestion that Hedonism and Kantianism jointly set up a dialectical stage for the coming to the fore of the ethics of “my station and its duties”. In this regard then, Hedonism and Kantianism look forward to the ethics of “my stations and its duties” for the resolution of the antinomy between duty and inclination. If Hegelianism overcomes this antinomy by invoking social relations as corrective to the atomism of Hedonism and the formalism of Kantianism, the question remains whether we have indeed eventually found a final resting place; so far as concerns the search for a full perspective on the nature of morality.

The virtues of “my station and its duties” vis-à-vis the other contending perspectives is not in doubt. What is at issue is whether this it-self is adequate for our purpose. No doubt, Bradley seems to give the impression that it is. Hence, he might have encouraged the usual attribution of this ethics as his ultimate position. For consider, for instance, what he says in the following passage:

The belief in this real moral organism is the one solution of ethical problems. It breaks the antithesis of despotism and individualism. It denies them while it preserves the truth of both. The truth of individualism is saved because, unless we have intense life and self-consciousness in the members of the state, the whole state is ossified. The truth of despotism is saved because unless the members realise the whole by and in him-self, he fails to reach his own individuality. Considered in the main, the best communities are those who have the best men, and the best men are the members of the best communities (ES, 187).

Consider also the following passage:

There is nothing better than my station and its duties nor anything higher or more truly beautiful. It holds and will hold against the worship of the individual whatever form that may take. It is strong against frantic theories and vehement passions and in the end it triumphs over the fact, and can smile at the literature, even of sentimentalism, however fulsome in its impulsive setting out, or sour in its disappointed end (ES, 201).

The language of the above passage and several others is explosive and certainly misleading. Solely based on these passages, it is possible to accuse Bradley of over-celebration of the virtues of “my station and its duties” to the point of misleading his readers into thinking that it is without blemish. And possibly, this passage is what has prevented some commentators from appreciating that Bradley’s position is not fully expressed by “my station and its duties.”

Instructively we also see an explicit reservation about the potentials of this ethics in the said essay in which the misleading language occurs. This equivocation is especially evident in the final pages of “my station and its duties”. What forces Bradley to end the essay by underlining his ambivalence to the ethics is the realisation that, as important as social relation is to morality,


19 The overall drift of Marina Paola Bachetti’s account of My Stations and its Duties gives the impression that this point is not taken into account. See her “My Station and Its Duties” in Idealistic Studies 22, 1992: 11-24. See also Burton F. Porter, Reasons for Living: A Basic Ethics (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988), 199-203.
it cannot itself be absolutized. For there is a certain sense of singularity (individuality) which is also indispensable; and, as such, is no less constitutive of the essence of the individual as much as his social relations.  

Indirectly, elsewhere Bradley says emphatically to the effect that “man is not man at all unless social, but man is not much above the beasts unless more than social” (ES, 223).

On Bradley’s view,

Personal morality and political and social institutions cannot exist apart and (in general) the better the one, the better the other. The community is moral, because it realises personal morality; personal morality is moral, because in so far as it realises the moral whole (ES, 188)

These passages are not afterthoughts except one has concluded ab initio—of course misled by Bradley’s own explosive language—that the ethics of “my station and its duties” is expressive of Bradley’s ultimate position. Indeed, they are not afterthoughts because they emerge again explicitly and consistently in the remaining part of that work (Ethical Studies). That they are not afterthoughts suggest Bradley’s reservations about the “ethics of my station and its duties”. In breaking down the antinomy between duty and inclination, it represents an advance over Hedonism and Kantianism, so far as it provides us with a solution to a fundamental problem at the heart of moral philosophy, namely, the question of the relation between particular and universal. 

The positive contribution of “my station and its duties” in this regard is the insistence that the particular and universal are not exclusive opposites. The revocation of the dualism sets in a new perspective our conception of the relation between the moral “is” and moral “ought”. As it were, it allows us to see that the issue is not whether they are at all related, but rather the more subtle question of their inter-play in moral experience: the modus of their relation.

Yet while “my station and its duties” marks a milestone in the search for an adequate conspectus on the nature of morality, it itself remains unsatisfactory; so far as we can hardly deal with the question of the relationship between personal morality and social morality solely and

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20 Essentially this point expresses part of the existentialist critique of Hegelian dialectics as formulated by Kierkegaard and it has been appropriated in several ways by existentialist thinkers such as Heidegger and Sartre.

21 Copleston notes the apparent inconsistency between this thesis and Bradley’s seeming, exaltation of my stations and its duties. According to him, the former commitment should have led Bradley to revise such statements, as “there is nothing better than my stations and its duties, nor anything higher and truly beautiful”. But, as I have suggested, when the overall drift of Ethical Studies is taking into consideration, especially its ultimate focus which is made clear by the essays that succeed my station and its duties, it becomes clear that this is just one of the instances where Bradley’s explosive language gets him into trouble. For Copleston’s viewpoint, see his A History of Philosophy Vol. VII1 Bentham to Russell (New York: Image books Doubleday, 1985), 190-195.

22 Cf. Peter Nicholson, The Political Philosophy of British Idealists, 3

23 Cf. ES, 163

merely in the terms of the provisions of ethics of “my stations and its duties.” Thus just as hedonism and “duty for duty’s sake” jointly set the stage for the emergence of “my stations and its duties”, “my station and its duties”, together with Hedonism and Kantianism resets the stage for a consideration of an even more adequate perspective on the nature of morality, namely, ideal morality, as Bradley calls it.

3. BRADLEY’S ACCOUNT OF IDEAL MORALITY

In turning our attention to Bradley’s account of ideal morality in what follows we must keep in mind that Bradley’s account is driven by the same question of the nature of self that is realized in morality – a matter which preoccupied him until now in the previous essays. With the breakdown of the ethics of “my station and its duties” at the end of the fifth essay, Bradley takes up afresh the task of addressing the question of the nature of morality in the sixth essay by proposing a theory of ideal morality.

3.1. THE QUESTION OF THE NATURE OF SELF REALIZED IN MORALITY

Essentially Bradley’s contention is that the self realized in morality is not the atomistic self of hedonism, or the abstract self of Kantianism, or the mere social self of “my stations and its duties”. The self realized in morality, on the contrary, is the ideal self. The ideal self is the self that is one with its highest good, and, as such, is not merely defined in terms of the fanciful wishes of the particular self or in terms of the legitimate demands of social morality.

In other words, the ideal self is not necessarily opposed to the particular self or the social self. Nonetheless, as the infinite whole realized in morality, the ideal self is a universal will which transcends the particular self and the social self and yet is immanent in them, so that the ideal self cannot be reduced to the particular self or the social self without misunderstanding the nature of morality.

In presenting the ideal self as the object of moral action, Bradley’s overall concern is to moderate the claim of ethics of “my station and its duties” with respect to the importance it attaches to social relations as the measure of morality. While social relation is undeniably a constitutive element of morality, morality nonetheless cannot be reduced to a matter of mere social relations; for there is a personal dimension to morality and it is no less constitutive of morality.

Invariably, it means the sphere of morality embodies both the ideal of social and non-social perfection. That is why Bradley maintains that the content of the ideal self, as the object of moral action, is furnished not just by the objective world of my stations and duties, but also by the

25 “If we accept, (as I think we must) the fact that the essence of a man involves identity with others, the question what the final reality of that identity is, is still left unanswered. We should still have to ask what is the higher whole in which the individual is a function and in which the relative wholes subsists and to inquire whether that community is, or can be a visible community” (ES, 204).

26 ES, 220-231

27 ES, 216-217

28 ES, 222-3

29 ES, 218-9
ideals of social and non-social perfection. Thus in denying that there is a region of human life that has not been moralized, Bradley tells us that,

Whatever has been brought under the control of the will, it is not too much to say has been brought into the sphere of morality; in our eating, sleeping, we from childhood have not been left to ourselves and the habits formed in us, now hold of the moral will which in a manner has been their issue. And so in our lightest moments the element of control and regulation is not wanting; it is part of the business of education to see that it is there; and its absence, wherever it is seen to be absent, pains us. The character shows itself in every detail of life; we cannot go in to amuse ourselves while we leave it outside the door with our dog; it is ourself; and our moral self, being not mere temper or inborn disposition, but the outcome of a series of acts of the will. Natural is indeed well to be, but that is because by this time morality should be our nature, and good behaviour its unreflecting issue. (ES, 217-8)

In resuming the point in respect of the unrestricted scope the domain of morality, Bradley continues:

Wherever there is anything to be done in play but in earnest, there the moral consciousness tells us that it is right to do our best, and if this is so, there can be no question but that here is a field of morality. It is a moral duty to realize everywhere the best self which for us in this sphere is an ideal self; asking what morality is, we so far must answer, it is co-extensive with self-realization in the sense of the realization of the ideal self in and by us. (ES, 218-9)

In drawing attention to the non-social dimension of morality, Bradley’s intent is not to make light of the relative truth of the ethics of my station and its duties but to suggest that its viewpoint on the nature of morality is inadequate, so far as it does not take into account the demands of personal morality. To this extent, the ethics of my station and its duties is one-sided and thus requires supplementation. In this context ideal morality renders the service of counter-balancing the excesses occasioned by the apoteosis of social morality by broadening the concept of the moral self, such that while the moral self does not exclude the social self, it is nonetheless irreducible to the social self.

Whereas the Achilles heel of the ethics of “my station and its duties” consists in taking the moral self as co-extensive with the social self, ideal morality strategically extends the world of morality by including within it domains that lie beyond the region of the social self; indeed the entire gamut of existence so far as they are brought under the jurisdiction of the will. So what ideal morality does in attempt to shore up the concept of morality is to include what ethics of my stations and its duties excluded while preserving the legitimate emphasis on the importance of social relation as a sine qua non for morality. The result is that the social self emerges as continuous with the non-social self, given that both are various regions of the ideal self.

Indeed in discussing the relationship between the ethics of “my station and its duties” and ideal morality in the Ethical Studies, Bradley takes care to underline the continuity between both regions of the moral self by insisting that while the self which is true to my stations and its duties

30 ES, 219
31 Cf. AR, 380-6
32 ES, 220-225
is “the basis and foundation of the ideal self, social morality does not exhaust the whole of morality”, so that the foundation legitimately provided by social morality always requires to be transcended, if we are to secure an adequate concept of morality.  

3. 2. IDEAL SELF AND THE QUESTION OF INTEGRATION OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL MORALITY

Unsurprisingly, the concept of self that emerges from the correction of the ethics of “my station and its duties” in terms of the claim of ideal morality, is one that is highly ramified, encompassing, as it were, the various regions within the domain of the real. Thus given the all-inclusive nature of self that propels it ideal morality is resourceful in effectively holding together the demands of personal and social morality.

Bradley takes its resourcefulness in this respect as evidence of its dialectical superiority over the ethics of my stations and its duties. He illustrates this point in the Ethical Studies by considering the issue of collision of duties. Given that the moral self is highly ramified as the theory of ideal morality upholds, the moral agent could be confronted with myriads of moral commitments which could sometimes conflict, thus leading to collision of duties.

Collision of duties could occur within the domain of social relations, as when one is caught up in a conflict between whether to attend to one’s health or attend a conference where one has been scheduled to present a paper. Collision of duties could also occur in the domain of self-relation, as when a student is caught up in a conflict as to whether to go to bed by 11pm as required by the rules and regulations of the institution or to extend his study period by a few hours in order to complete an assignment due to be submitted the following morning.

Both sets of example confront us with situations where duties collide. If one has accepted to present a paper at a conference he is duty bound to honour the commitment. Yet he must be alive in order to perform that responsibility, so that he is equally duty bound to take care of his health. Thus in the event of conflict between both duties, the reasonable thing to do is to opt for the higher duty even if it means neglecting the other, without in anyway undermining the legitimate claim of the suspended duty. The same will be true of the case of the student who has to

33 ES, 220-230

34 Again Bradley’s point here is similar to his solution to the problem of floating ideas in the Principles of Logic, for on, his view, no ideas floats ultimately given that it has ultimate reality as the soil upon which it is anchored. It may be considered to float in respect of a specific world, but in the final analysis all the plurality of worlds have their locus in reality so even if it floats in respect of one region, it cannot be said to float in the end. See Essays on Truth and Reality, 29. See also Philip Ferreira, Bradley and the Structure of Knowledge, chapters 1-3. See also Damian Ilodigwe, Bradley and the Problematic Status of Metaphysics, 219-226

35 ES 226-228

36 ES, 227: “Our result then is that ideal morality stands on the basis of social, that its relation thereto is the same relation that subsists within the social sphere, and that everywhere, since duty has to give way to duty, neglect and breaches of ordinary in the name of higher morality are justifiable in the abstract (and that is all we are concerned with); but if the claim be set up n account of devotion to the ideal, for liberty to act thus not in the name of necessity, or to forget that what we breakthrough or disregard is in itself to be respected, such a claim is without the smallest moral justification.” Bradley more or else suggests here there could be exceptions to a law. Nonetheless exceptions are not the rule but are licences granted within
complete his assignment in order to meet the deadline the following day. If his concern is to pass his exams without prejudice to the fact that he may have mismanaged his time, it makes a lot of sense to suspend the rule regarding lights out and secure the higher commitment. As Bradley says explicitly in *Ethical Studies*,

> ...as in no one action can all duties be fulfilled in every action some duties must be neglected. The question is what duties are to be done and be left undone here, and so in the world of my station the neglect of duties is allowed... to neglect duty because of duty means we recognize two duties, one higher than the other. And first it implies we are acting not to please ourselves, but because we are bound to by what we consider a moral duty. It implies again that we consider what we breakthrough or pass by, not as a trifle, but a serious moral claim, which we disregard solely because, if we do not do so, it prevents us from performing our superior service. (ES, 226-7)

The point in all this is that because of its dynamic conception of the moral self, without opposing social perfection to non-social perfection; or, again, without rigidly opposing duty to duty within the ambit of social relations, ideal morality is able to handle these complex situations of moral conflict much better than when the assumption is that the moral self is co-extensive with the social self as the ethics of “my stations and its duties” purport.

As we have seen the major gain secured for our understanding of the nature of moral consciousness by the ethics of “duty for duty’s sake” is the reconciliation of duty and inclination. That gain understandably warranted the transition from ethics of “duty for duty’s sake” to the ethics of my stations and its duties, as the latter offers a more adequate viewpoint than its predecessor. Similarly we must see now that in the renewed context of the resurgence of the question of the nature of the self realized in morality, following the breakdown of the ethics of “my stations and its duties”, the reconciliation of the antimony of personal and social morality by ideal morality, seals the transition from ethics of the “my stations and its duties” to ideal morality, pointing to the latter as the dialectical completion of the former relative to the moral question.37

Yet once ideal morality overcomes the antinomy of personal and social morality by making the non-social self and the social self different but related regions of the ideal self, the moral question restates itself afresh in terms of the issue of how the ideal self relates to the good. The question of the nature of the correlation that subsists between the ideal self and the good is no less important than the question of how the content of the ideal self is to be determined.38 The former consideration, if explored, yields further insight into the claim of ideal morality and so complements the insight provided by the latter.

### 3.3. THE QUESTION OF THE CORRELATION OF THE IDEAL SELF AND THE GOOD

Bradley is aware that the former consideration offers a fuller determination of the claim of ideal morality hence he devotes considerable attention to it in the *Ethical Studies*. Once Bradley has secured the ideal self as the object of moral action, he introduces the topic of the nature of the correlation between the ideal self and the good by asking the question whether morality is co-

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37 Cf. ES, 214

38 ES, 231-235
extensive with self realization.\textsuperscript{39} Ordinarily one should not expect him to return to this question. Yet the suggestion is that even beyond the integration of personal morality and social morality, the moral question remains highly equivocal so far as it is not clear the sense in which the ideal self relates with the good, so that this still leaves the notion of self-realization inherently equivocal when applied to the situation of morality.

Bradley acknowledges the equivocality of the situation in Ethical Studies when he says,

To return to our main discussion – the field of morality we find is the whole field of life; its claim is as wide as self-realization, and the question raised before (p. 64) now presents itself, Are morality and self-realization the same and not different? This appears at first sight to be the case. The moral end is to realize the self, and all forms of realising of the self are seen to fall within the sphere of morality; and so it seems natural to say that morality is the process of self-realization, and the moral man is the man who most fully and energetically realizes human nature. (ES, 228)

Interestingly in raising the question whether morality and self-realization is the same and not different Bradley himself offers an answer as he writes:

Morality then will be the realization of the self as the goodwill. It is not self-realization from all points of view, though all self-realization can be looked at from this point of view; for all it involves will, and so far as the will is good, so far the realization moral. Strictly speaking and in the proper sense, morality is self-realization within the sphere of personal will. We see this plainly in art, science, for there we have moral excellence, and excellence does not lie in mere skill or mere success, but in single-mindedness and devotion to what seems best as against what we merely happen to like... From the highest point of view you judge a man moral not so far as he has succeeded outwardly but so far as he has identified his will with the universal, whether that will has properly externalized itself or not. Morality has not to do with immediately with the outer results of the will; the results it looks at are the habits and general temper produced by acts, and strictly speaking, it does not fall beyond the subjective side, the personal will and the heart. Clearly a will which does not utter is not will, but you cannot measure a will morally by external results; they are an index, but an index must be used with caution. (ES, 228-229)

The above passage contains so much that is of relevance for our purpose. However we should begin immediately by focusing attention on the correlation established between morality and the good, for it helps to clarify the true nature of the moral end. Essentially the point is that morality is about making actual the ideal self in our personal milieu by identifying with the good.\textsuperscript{40} As the embodiment of perfection, the ideal self is the measure of what we are called to be.\textsuperscript{41} In other words it is the measure of our true self as opposed to the false self which is contrary to what we are called to be. To the extent that we make actual the ideal self by uniting our will with the good we ought to affirm, we realise the good self, since the ideal self is an expression of the good.\textsuperscript{42} As

\textsuperscript{39} ES, 228-235

\textsuperscript{40} ES, 230-232

\textsuperscript{41} Cf. AR, 380-388

\textsuperscript{42} See AR, 380-388
Bradley makes clear in respect of the need to subject our personal will to the universal will as a condition for making actual the ideal self,

The end of morals is not the mere existence of any sort of ideal indifferently; but it is the realization of an ideal will in my will. The end is the ideal willed by me, the willing of the ideal in and by my will, and hence an ideal will. And my will as realizing the ideal is the goodwill. A will which obeys no law is not moral; a law which is not willed is nothing for morality. Acts so far as they spring from the good will are good, and a temper and habits and character are good so far as they are a present good will, result from it and embody it; and what issues from a good character must also be likewise good (ES, 230)

From the above clarification of the end of morality as making actual the ideal self in us by uniting our personal will with the universal will, it is evident that the ideal self is not necessarily opposed to the real self. The ideal self, as it were, is the truth of the real self in the sense that it specifies what the real self must fulfil in order to truly become itself. In other words the ideal self more or less challenges the real self to become its full self.

Nonetheless Bradley is aware that despite the ontological communion that subsists between the real and the ideal self, between the “moral is” and the “moral ought” the truth is that there is disparity between the real self and the ideal self in concrete existential ethical situations where the moral agent is faced with the burden of choice. For, we do not always, in fact, unite our personal will with the universal will in affirming the good. On contrary we sometimes find ourselves identifying with the evil we ought to avoid and failing to do the good we ought to do. The result then is that there subsists in the real self (the moral agent) both a good self and a bad self, the good self being the part of us that identifies with the good and the bad self the part of us that is at odds with our highest good.

Bradley sums up the implication of the presence of the bad self within the moral self thus:

For morality the good is still only realized in part and there is something against which it still remains a mere idea. The ideal self then for moral is not visibly universal not fully factual. It is not visibly and in the world seen to be an harmonious system, but in the world and in us realizes, it would seem, itself against itself. And in us it is not a system; our self is not a harmony, our desires are not fully identified with the ideal, and the ideal does not always bring peace in its train. In our heart it clashes with itself, and desires we cannot exterminate clash with our goodwill, and however, much we improve (if we do improve) we never are perfect, we never are a harmony, a system, as our true idea is, and as it calls upon us to be (ES, 232)

3. 4. THE MORAL SELF AND THE DIALECTIC OF GOOD AND BAD


44 ES, 234-235

45 ES, 234
We can deduce from what Bradley says here that the moral self is not at home with the tension between the “is” and “ought” which infects its being, so that in the end, morality is not just a process of actualizing the ideal self in us, but it is also a process of overcoming the bad self in us.\(^{46}\) In other words morality is both a positive and a negative exercise aimed at securing the integrity of the moral self by ensuring that the ideal self is made fully actual without any residue of the bad self remaining in us.\(^{47}\) The negative moment in morality is as important as the positive moment, given that the progressive suppression of the bad self is invariably a boost for the affirmation of the good self, and this can only mean that the ideal self is more and more concretely realized in our personal milieu.\(^{48}\)

The dialectic of the bad and good self means that morality is essentially a struggle, so that the effort we put into ensuring that the bad self is extinguished is no less of moral significance than the result of the process.\(^{49}\) Indeed so long as there is a residue of the bad self in us, we must continue to struggle to overcome it. That is part and parcel of the imperative of morality and there can hardly be progress in the quest to realize the ideal self unless we persevere in the struggle to exterminate all in us that is not in consonance with the good self.

But the crucial question here is: do we ever fully overcome the bad self in us? In other words is the ideal self ever made fully actual in our will, so that the dialectic of the good and bad self ceases and the disparity between the moral “is” and “ought” healed. Or is it the case that the residue of the bad self always persists in some form no matter how much we try to overcome it?

On Bradley’s view, no matter the effort we put into overcoming the bad self, the bad self can never be completely extinguished. In other words, it means the good self can never be fully actualized within our personal milieu as there is always a residue of the bad self. The result is that morality becomes an endless process as the moral self is perpetually engaged in a struggle to exterminate the residue of the bad self.\(^{50}\)

That morality becomes an endless process in which we never succeed in resolving the dialectic of the good and bad self is not good news for theory of ideal morality so far as its claim to offer an adequate account of morality is concerned. The point is ideal morality may succeed in mediating the antinomy between personal and social morality, following the breakdown of the ethics of my stations and its duties, but we cannot say it is an adequate theory of morality, so

\(^{46}\) ES, 232


\(^{48}\) ES, 233

\(^{49}\) As Bradley says in ES, 234, “No one ever was or could be perfectly moral; and if he were, he would be moral no longer. Where there is no imperfection, there is no ought, where there is no ought there is no morality.” Perhaps we can think of the conventional wisdom here that the just man falls seven times a day and rises up as he falls. This reminds us that saints are not flawless people but people who despite recognition of their failings nonetheless struggle in and out of season to better themselves and realize their best possible self.”

\(^{50}\) ES, 234-6
long as the issue of the reconciliation of the “moral ought” and “is” persists in the wake of its attempt to account for how the moral self relates with the good.

The persistence of the dialectic of “is-ought” under the guise of the moral struggle to overcome the residue of the bad self and fully actualize the ideal self indicates that the theory of ideal morality is no less one-sided even if it is dialectically superior to its predecessor theories such as the ethics of pleasure for pleasure’s sake, the ethics of duty for duty’s sake and the ethics of my stations and its duties.

Of course Bradley is quick to admit that ideal morality is not an adequate theory of morality. But he also points out that its inadequacy tells us more about morality itself as a whole than it says about the theory. For, the failure of ideal morality to resolve the “is-ought” issue is not merely an internal failure; its failure in this respect stems from a fundamental dilemma at the heart of the moral consciousness itself. On the one hand the situation of the moral consciousness (as far as inner architectonic is concerned) is such that the persistence of the dilemma is a sine qua non for the possibility and sustenance of morality. On the other hand the resolution of the dilemma is also a condition for the realization of the end of morality.

3.5. MORALITY AS SELF-CONTRACTION

We can easily deduce from this scenario that morality is at odds with itself. No matter how the dilemma is viewed morality is in trouble. Morality will cease to be if the end of morality were to be realized, since the dilemma apparently fuels the being of morality. Yet if morality must be, morality must live with the dilemma, and accept that its resolution is beyond its resources, even as morality strives to realize its end.

All this means therefore that in exercising its being morality literally courts frustration, for despite the fact that it’s inner architectonic legislates that morality desires the good and seek to realise the ideal self as an infinite whole, the dilemma at the heart of the moral consciousness militates against the realisation of the end of morality.

Bradley takes the predicament of the moral consciousness vis-a-vis the question of the resolution of the dilemma of the moral “is” and “ought” as an indication that morality is internally unstable. As he says in respect of the inherently self-contradictory nature of morality, Morality is an endless process and therefore a self-contradiction; and being such it does not remain standing by itself, but feels the impulse to transcend its existing reality. It is a self-contradiction in this way: it demands for what cannot be. Not only is nothing good but the goodwill, but also nothing is to be real but the good (so far as willed); and yet the reality is not wholly good; neither in me nor in the world is what ought to be what it is and what is what ought to be and the claim remains in the end a mere claim (ES, 312)

From Bradley’s standpoint there are at least three points we can draw from the self-contradictory nature of morality. The first point is that the theory of ideal morality, as we have seen, is not wholly to be blamed for its failure to resolve the “is-ought” dilemma, for in trying to do so, it takes on a task that is well beyond the resources of ethical theorization, meaning

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52 ES, 234

53 ES, 236-8
effectively, that, no matter how sophisticated the theorization may be, it cannot settle the moral question so long as the theorization is within the purview of the moral standpoint.

Consequently, even if successor theories emerge which claim to address the same dilemma they cannot succeed in conclusively resolving it. Perhaps this is why despite its failure to resolve the matter Bradley still finds ideal morality dialectically superior to the previous accounts of morality he considered in the preceding essays of Ethical Studies. Perhaps this is also why he considers the theory of ideal morality the most adequate account of morality as self realization we can afford from the moral standpoint.

This brings us to the second point we can deduce from the self-contradictory nature of morality. That no ethical theory can solve the matter of the dilemma of “is-ought” points to the more fundamental point that the matter is beyond the province of ethics as a whole. If, the universal remains but partially realised within the sphere of morality”, as Bradley says; indeed if “the universal is something that forever wants to be, yet it is not”, we can suspect that morality as a whole is helpless in respect of finding a solution to the matter. Thus it is pointless remaining stuck in the realm of morality if our concern is to sort out the matter.

Third point: invariably Bradley takes the internal instability of morality as evidence of its incompleteness, meaning that it cannot ground itself but must be grounded by another. This is why Bradley says that morality is appearance. The hallmark of every appearance is that its internal instability forces it to look beyond itself in search of another in terms of which its incompleteness is completed.

The moral question as to the nature of the self to be realized in morality may have started as a problem within the province of morality, but the breakdown of ideal morality now suggests we must look beyond the province of ethics in order to find a lasting solution to the problem. This is what the internal instability of morality and the fact of its appearance-status suggest. But arguably the same dialectic of appearance that undergirded Bradley’s examination of the various ethical standpoints in Ethical Studies remains at work even now as ethics points beyond itself.

54 ES, 231

55 For a discussion of Bradley’s doctrine of appearance, see Damian Ilodigwe, Bradley and the Problematic Status of Metaphysics, Chapter 1

56 It is largely on this score that David Campbell has claimed that Bradley’s inquiry in Ethical Studies is a transcendental inquiry. Within certain limits, Campbell is right if his claim is understood in terms of the search for the condition of the possibility of moral experience. Indeed this is the sense in which he uses the term, for as he insists, “Bradley is not searching for an absolute yardstick by which we might judge individual human actions. Rather he believes he has found a metaphysical-psychological yardstick by which we might judge the presuppositions about human action which are implicit in various moral theories such as Kantianism and utilitarianism, and in that way a yardstick which might pass judgement, under one aspect at any rate, on various moral theories.” It is precisely in this sense of “transcendental argumentation for what morality or any morality must presuppose” that Campbell locates the kind of moral philosopher Bradley is, as contradistinguished from Kant and Mill. Yet in view of the fact that the notion of transcendental inquiry is equivocal, it is important to insist that Bradley’s inquiry is not merely meta-ethical in Campbell’s sense, and this arguably would be the overall point in affiliating Bradley’s ethics with his metaphysics of the Absolute. For Campbell’s viewpoint, see his “Bradley as Metaethicist,” Idealistic Studies 1977: 253-261.
4. THE INCOMPLETENESS OF MORALITY AND TRANSITION FROM MORALITY TO RELIGION

The incompleteness of ethics of “pleasure for pleasure’s sake” warranted the transition to the ethics of “duty for duty’s sake” and upon the dialectical sublation of ethics of “pleasure for pleasure’s sake”, the incompleteness of the ethics of duty for duty’s sake warranted the transition to ethics of “my stations and its duties” with a guarantee of a fuller standpoint on the nature of morality. In the same vein the incompleteness of the ethics of “my stations and its duties” warranted the transition to ideal morality in search of an adequate solution.

But instructively with the vulnerability of ideal morality laid bare by the issue of the dilemma of “is”-“ought” relation the dialectic of appearance at work in Ethical Studies undergoes some fundamental transformation, as it becomes clear that the standpoint of morality as a whole is insufficient and needs to be transcended. As in previous cases, the dialectic of appearance in Ethical Studies warrants a dialectical transition from ideal morality to a more adequate standpoint. Nonetheless given the appearance status of appearance it is superfluous to continue to search for a solution within the moral sphere. On the contrary the higher standpoint in terms of which the incompleteness of morality is mediated must be sought in a domain beyond province of morality.

On Bradley’s view the higher standpoint that mediates the incompleteness of morality is religion. Little wonder Bradley devotes a considerable attention to the topic of religion and the question of its relationship with morality in the Ethical Studies even though Ethical Studies is primarily a book on ethics. Indeed, Bradley returns to the topic of religion in his magnum opus, Appearance and Reality in different contexts, first in the context of the discourse on the nature of goodness and later in the context of the topic of the relationship between the Absolute and its appearances.

The attention that the topic of religion receives in both of these works is borne out of the fact that, on Bradley’s view, religion is understood as the dialectical brother of morality. This dialectical relationship between morality and religion is illustrated by the fact that religion helps to sort out a fundamental problem that bedevils the moral consciousness. As we have seen what seals the appearance-status of morality, or, rather, its inherently self-contradictory nature is the helplessness of morality in the face of the dilemma that inflicts it, that is, the dilemma of the moral “is” and “ought”. The end of morality is to fully realise the ideal self. But paradoxically the inner workings of morality make this end unattainable. The end cannot be attained without the “death of morality”, so that in choosing to live rather than die, the resolution of the dilemma

57 See Appearance and Reality, especially the chapters on Goodness and Degrees in Truth and Reality.

58 Commentators have consistently pointed out Bradley’s influence on Oakeshott. One area of Oakeshott’s debt to Bradley concerns Oakeshott’s account of the relationship between morality and religion. As Elizabeth Campbell Corey notes, “Oakeshott’s thesis that religion is a completion of morality is a restatement of Bradley’s argument that religion is the concrete whole in which morality is only a part. Indeed, like Bradley, while Oakeshott recognizes the continuity between morality and religion, he is also concerned to stress the difference between the two phenomena. See Cory’s Oakeshott on Religion, Aesthetics and Politics, 74ff. See also Stuart Isaac, The Politics and Philosophy of Michael Oakeshott, p.33-39

59 Cf. ES, 231-4
is beyond the moral consciousness, with the result that the good is never fully realized in morality.\textsuperscript{60}

The dialectical contribution of religion consists in coming on board to sort out this problem that afflicts the kingdom of morality, so that in doing so, religion emerges as the dialectical saviour of morality. In Bradley’s words, “what morality cannot give us, religion gives us.” Of course, what Bradley means here is that with the ascendancy of the religious consciousness there is a guarantee that the ideal self can be fully realized. Bradley makes this point explicit when, in resuming the result of his discussion of the relationship between morality and religion, he tells us that:

Religion we have seen must have an object and that object is neither an abstract idea in the head nor one particular thing or quality, nor any collection of such things or qualities nor any phrase which stands for one of them or a collection of them. In short it is nothing finite. It cannot be a thing or person in the world, as part of it or as this or that course of events in time; it cannot be “All”, the sum of things or persons since, if one is not divine, no putting ones together will beget divinity. All this, it is not. Its positive character is that it is real and further, on examining what we find in the religious consciousness, we discover that the ideal self, considered as realized and real. The ideal self which in morality is to be, is here the real ideal which truly is. For morals, the ideal self was an “ought” an, is to be that is not, the object of religion is that same ideal self, but here it is no longer only ought to be but also is. This is the nature of the religious object, though the manner of apprehending it may differ widely maybe anything from vaguest instinct to the most thoughtful consideration (ES 319-320)

The resolution of the dilemma that inflicts the kingdom of morality by religion may warrant the transition from morality to religion, thus signalling the dialectical superiority of religion over morality. Nonetheless this does not mean that the religious consciousness is absolute.\textsuperscript{61} Indeed in examining the relationship between morality and religion in \textit{Appearance and Reality}, Bradley gives an indication of the metaphysics that underpins the dialectic of appearance at work in his account of the relationship between morality and religion. While Bradley does not jettison the thesis that religion completes morality, Bradley takes care to underline that religion itself is an appearance.\textsuperscript{62} The implication is that religion is incomplete, so that while it completes morality, religion itself is in need of completion.

\section*{4. 1. RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY AND THE ABSOLUTE: DIALECTIC OF APPEARANCE}

But can we understand the incompleteness of religion without an excursion into the theory of the absolute, since the dialectic of appearance that is unleashed by the issue of the incompleteness of morality and religion knows virtually no end, as we are confronted with a scenario in which one appearance completes another appearance, with itself then needing to be completed by another appearance and then the dialectic goes on \textit{ad infinitum}.

\textsuperscript{60} Cf. David Boucher, \textit{Social and Political Philosophy of British Idealists}, Chapter 2

\textsuperscript{61} AR, 401

\textsuperscript{62} AR, 401-405
So far as each appearance is an immanent realization of the absolute the dialectic does not continue endlessly, as it begins with the absolute as its origin and ends with the absolute as its destiny, with the result that no appearance gives us an absolute standpoint, given that each appearance is an appearance of the absolute. What it means, then, is that the dialectic of appearance at work in *Ethical Studies* in respect of the various ethical standpoints Bradley examines as well as his account of the relationship between morality and religion, cannot be fully understood without reference to the metaphysics of the absolute that undergirds it.63

This fundamental presupposition needs to be born in mind to understand the transition from one appearance to another as far as the logic of incompletion and completion at work in the dialectic of appearance is concerned. This is true of the transition from morality to religion. But it is not less true of the transition from religion to philosophy. As if to indicate the tension between religion and philosophy as far as the philosophy of the Absolute is concerned, Bradley emphatically denies that philosophy is ultimate. In other words, this dialectic does not consummate in philosophical consciousness.

Although a significant affinity exists between religion and philosophy, it is wrong, on Bradley’s view, to assume that philosophy is the highest consciousness. Bradley denies that this is the case just as he refuses to grant that status to religion. Yet Bradley recognizes that the transition from morality through religion to philosophy represents a progressive ascent towards the absolute. So, it is as if every appearance in pointing beyond itself not only points to its other but ultimately points to the absolute. This is true of each appearance as well as the entire gamut of the appearance. The point is especially evident in Bradley’s brief discussion of the relation between religion and philosophy in the concluding section of *Appearance and Reality*, where he warns against what he calls a dangerous mistake:

> We have seen that religion is but appearance and that it cannot be ultimate. And from this it may be concluded perhaps that the completion of religion is philosophy and that in metaphysics we reach the goal in which it finds its consummation. Now if religion essentially were knowledge, this conclusion would hold. And so far as religion involves knowledge we are again bound to accept it. Obviously the business of metaphysics is to deal with ultimate truth, and in this respect obviously it must be allowed to stand higher than religion. But on the other side, we have found that the essence of religion is not knowledge. And this certainly does not mean that its essence consists in barely in feeling. Religion is rather the attempt to express the complete reality of goodness through every aspect of our being. And so far as this goes it is at once something more and therefore something higher than philosophy. (AR, 401-2)

**4. 2. ETHICAL STUDIES AND HEGEL’S PHENOMENOLOGY**

Bradley’s *Ethical Studies* has often been compared to Hegel’s *Phenomenology*. Indeed, on account of the similarity between both works, some commentators argue that *Ethical Studies* is

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the most Hegelian of Bradley’s writings. There are grounds for this thesis especially if we consider that the dialectical method of exposition that informs Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* is clearly replicated in *Ethical Studies* as one perspective supersedes another perspective within the overall dialectical train in search of an adequate account of the nature of morality.\(^64\)

Yet when we go beyond this and consider the content of Bradley’s ethics, the divergence between their commitments is, of course, evident without prejudice to the convergence, as Bradley does not espouse the sort of speculative dialectics that has come to be associated with Hegel relative to which all oppositions within consciousness is wholly overcome.\(^65\) Bradley’s dialectics is more appropriately characterised as a dialectics of appearance, so far as Bradley maintains that no appearance could serve to ground itself but must find its satisfaction (its ultimate ground) in the absolute which supra-relational.\(^66\)

As we have seen, this is the logic behind Bradley’s submission that each of the ethical perspectives examined in *Ethical Studies* is inadequate. The same logic drives the transition from ideal morality, to religion and from religion to philosophy, so that in the end, Bradley is led to conclude that no relational system is ever complete, as there is something of the real that always escapes full representation. Thus, morality, religion and philosophy are appearances of the absolute and not the absolute.\(^67\)

5. THE QUESTION OF THE CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF BRADLEY’S ACCOUNT OF MORALITY AS SELF-REALIZATION

At this juncture it is pertinent to raise the question as to the contemporary relevance of Bradley’s account of morality as self-realization. From our exposition it is evident that there are many ramifications to Bradley’s thesis concerning the nature of morality. Consequently, to make an adequate assessment of the relevance of his contributions will require that we take into account the several aspects of the matter.

If considered from the limited standpoint of his criticism of hedonism in the Third Essay, as is often done, the whole of *Ethical Studies* emerges as the *locus classicus* of arguments against utilitarianism, with the ethics of “my stations and its duties”, as articulated in the Fifth Essay, becoming Bradley’s substantive position on the nature of morality. On this reading, the substance of Bradley’s thesis consists in certain appeal to the metaphor of society as a moral organism in overcoming the atomistic individualism of hedonism and the empty formalism of Kantianism.

5.1. IDEAL MORALITY AND NON-REDUCTIONIST ACCOUNT OF SELF

But, as we have seen, if the dialectical structure of the whole of *Ethical Studies* is taken into account, the ethics of “my stations and its duties” cannot be seen as constitutive of Bradley’s

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66 Ibid.

67 Ibid
The theory of ideal morality espoused in the Sixth Essay is more expressive of Bradley’s ultimate position, meaning that, without prejudice to the merits of the ethical holism of the Fifth Essay, Bradley’s overall interest does not simply lie in pitching ethical holism against individualism, understanding, as it were, that such appeal does not settle the ethical question but raises fresh difficulties in respect of the relationship between the individual and the ethical whole.69

Indeed Bradley’s reservation about holism is consistent with his effort to integrate personal and social morality within the framework of theory of ideal morality, as a counter-point to the apotheosis of social morality by the ethics of “my stations and its duties”. Similarly, the understanding that the moral self is not co-extensive with the social-self informs the move to ground the moral self in a notion of the good that is irreducible to neither social good nor personal good, so that albeit, morality is self-realization, self-realization is not co-extensive with either socialization or unbridled self-expression.70

Indeed, the intent to develop a non-reductive account of morality as self realization is behind the opening up of the world of morality to the world of religion and, indeed, the opening up of the world of morality to ultimate reality as a whole in the end. Properly understood, the idea that the ideal self that morality craves to realize can be perfectly realized only in the world of religion and beyond expresses Bradley’s reservation about ethical holism and the need to develop ontology of the moral self that is as adequate as possible.

In his later works, especially Appearance and Reality, Bradley’s protest against holism continues as he warns against what he calls cheap monism.71 Transposed into the context of his social and political philosophy, this warning translates into an imperative to avoid a situation whereby the individual is stifled by the society, or, again, a situation whereby social morality swallows up personal morality and does not promote the pursuit of non-social perfection but undermines it in the name of the whole.72 Of course, the sort of balance that is envisaged here can obtain only in a situation where there is recognition that even if the social organism is a whole in which the individual finds its fulfilment, the social organism is nonetheless not the ultimate whole.73

5.2. BEYOND ETHICAL HOLISM AND INDIVIDUALISM

The point, then, is that, if the theory of ideal morality is recognized as expressing Bradley’s ultimate position on the issue of the nature of morality, it emerges that Bradley’s concern is to negotiate a position that transcends the opposition between ethical holism and individualism, without prejudice, of course, to the benefits that ethical holism secures for our understanding of the nature of morality in relation to the hedonism and Kantianism.


69 Ibid.

70 AR, 488

71 Ibid.


73 AR, 488
Reading the overall argument of Ethical Studies in this fashion could aid a better appreciation of the contemporary relevance of Bradley’s account of morality as self-realization; for it is no secret that the often confused environment of much of the contemporary debates on the nature of morality and politics is bedevilled with all kinds of dualism such as the dualism between ethical objectivism and ethical subjectivism, ethical particularism and ethical universalism, or, again, the dualism between ethical objectivism and pragmatic secular humanism.\(^{74}\)

Of course at the heart of the debates which generate these dualistic positions is the problem of how to understand the nature of truth, goodness and value.\(^{75}\) Given that the positions canvassed often assume an understanding of value that is inhospitable to intrinsic values, the notion of truth and goodness are treated as purely subjective phenomenon with no objective dimension. Yet this subjectivization of the notion of truth and goodness is made possible by the false opposition between object and subject such that the notion of truth and objectivity becomes wholly dependent on subjectivity.\(^{76}\) The attempt to escape from the cul-de-sac of the subjectivism associated with the dualism of object and subject by accentuating the claim of inter-subjectivity as the ground of the subject-object relation does not help matters at all, as it deepens the crisis of the loss of objectivity, with truth, goodness and value emerging as purely human creation.\(^{77}\)

When the epistemic and metaphysical transformation of the notion of truth, goodness and value at the basis of contemporary philosophy is taken into account, we begin to understand why the discourse on the nature of morality and politics is beset with myriads of confusion. For, once the development is transposed from the plane of epistemology and metaphysics unto the plane of ethics, the inexorable result is that ethical values, like their counterparts in other domains of existence, are purely subjective and no more than human creation. Such ethical theories within the space of contemporary philosophy that undermine the objectivity of moral values include utilitarianism, emotivism, naturalism and pragmatism.\(^{78}\) The inhospitality of contemporary philosophy towards inherent values is carried on in the realm of politics by political thinkers who develop accounts of the public space that dispenses with the notion of objective truth. We can think here of Rorty, Rawls, Nozick and Dworkin in respect of the debate between individualism and communitarianism.\(^{79}\)

74 See Dean Geuras, Richard Rorty and the Postmodern Rejection of Absolute Truth, pp. 1-11

75 See AR, especially the Chapter on Goodness. See also Damian Ilodigwe, Bradley and the Problematic Status of Metaphysics, Chapter 10


77 Ibid.


5. 3. MORALITY, POLITICS AND QUESTION OF OBJECTIVITY: TRUTH, GOODNESS AND VALUE

True, Bradley did not write anything on political philosophy. Yet his moral philosophy arguably possesses the resources to engage constructively with these contemporary challenges regarding the nature of morality and politics.\\(^80\) We have noted already, as many commentators recognize, that his critique of hedonism in the *Ethical Studies* constitute is a classical argument against utilitarianism.\\(^81\) But, as we have also maintained, if we allow that his substantive position is expressed by the theory of ideal morality rather than “My stations and its duties”, we begin to appreciate how his contributions can still be a formidable voice in these contemporary conversations. Given that he has often been understood as blindly espousing the ideal of ethical holism under the influence of Hegel, he is seen as part of the problem rather than part of the solution.\\(^82\)

Nonetheless, the moment we shift our focus to the theory of ideal morality and its claim the range of relevance of Bradley’s ethical theorization expands. Of course Bradley’s critique of hedonism is a criticism of subjectivism, so far as the argument is that the notion of good cannot be reduced to pleasure. But consider that his account of ideal morality extends this argument to all forms of subjectivism, so far as in the end, Bradley objects to any reductionist account of the notion of goodness, so that it is inappropriate to reduce goodness to social good just as it is inappropriate to reduce goodness to moral goodness, since goodness is a broader concept than moral goodness and social goodness.\\(^83\) Indeed, as Bradley maintains in his other writings, truth and goodness cannot be divorced from reality.\\(^84\)

The Achilles heel of modern philosophy is the divorce of truth and knowledge from reality and the divorce of goodness from reality.\\(^85\) From this divorce stems several of the ills that plague contemporary philosophy. Bradley recognizes this point but, unlike many contemporary philosophers, he will not address the problem by reducing objectivity to subjectivity, or reduce the object-subject relation to inter-subjectivity. Instead he will address the problem by anchoring objectivity and subjectivity in ultimate reality.\\(^86\)

This is why Bradley maintains that, as the object of moral action, the ideal self is an embodiment of social and non-social perfection. While the ideal self includes the social self, it is

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83 AR, 355-380

84 ETR, 310, 352,

85 ETR, 114-117

86 AR, 480-493
nonetheless irreducible to the social self. In the same vein, despite the fact that the end of morality is to make actual the ideal self, morality never succeeds in doing so because the notion of good at issue in the ideal self is in excess of the ideal of moral perfection.

It is clear, therefore, that for the same reason Bradley would object to ethical holism – if it is not rooted on a more fundamental concept of good and objectivity – Bradley will also object to Rorty’s reduction of objectivity to solidarity, or again, Rawls’ attempt to develop an account of public reason relative to which the concept justice is dissociated from the concept of objective truth. Overall the point is there is no necessary opposition between objectivity and solidarity, so that the ideal of human truth and non human truth can co-exist without one necessarily usurping the claim of the other except either falsely proclaims itself as absolute.

6. CONCLUSION

The perennial appeal of Bradley’s account of morality as self-realization lies in its non-reductive account of the moral self, the fact that it is resourceful in thinking together personal and social morality. Yet more importantly it is instructive that Bradley is the first to admit that his theory of ideal morality is ultimately inadequate, even though it is dialectically superior to its predecessors. Apparently the same confidence and caution he exhibits here in respect of the possibilities and limitations of the theory of ideal morality re-emerges in respect of his estimation of the possibilities and limitations of his metaphysics of the absolute at the end of Appearance and Reality. Yet while his ethics and metaphysics may issue in failure, it is certainly not the sort of deconstructive scepticism that is stock in trade of contemporary philosophy, as the failure of Bradley’s ethics and metaphysics opens up morality and philosophy to ultimate reality.

87 ES, 219-226

88 ES, 231-236

89See AR, 488, ETR, 470. See also McDowell’s “Rehabilitation of Objectivity” in Rorty and his Critics, edited by Richard Brandon, Chapter 6; See also Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), chapters 4-6

90 ETR, 470 See Damian Ilodigwe, “James, Appraisal of Bradley” in Collingwood and British Idealism Studies, Volume 12, No 2, 2006: 37-73; See also his “James and Bradley’s Absolutism” in Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume XL111, No 4, 2005: 603-619

91 Ibid.

92 See the final Chapter of Appearance and Reality which carries the title “Ultimate Doubt” Cf. Damian Ilodigwe, Bradley and the Problematic Status of Metaphysics, Chapter 6. Instructively the sceptical tone of Bradley’s final conclusion in respect of the status of ethics and metaphysics has been appropriated by Oakeshott. With Oakeshott, however, we begin to witness a gradual disengagement from the essentialism that undergirds Bradley’s ethics and metaphysics as the Absolute is reconceptualised in terms of experience and Bradley’s appearances emerges as modes of experience. This transformation of Bradley’s scepticism is especially evident in Oakeshott’s social-political philosophy as articulated in On Human Conduct and Rationalism in Politics. See Elizabeth Campbell Cory, Oakeshott on Religion, Aesthetics and Politics, p. 74ff. See also Stuart Isaac, The Politics and Philosophy of Michael Oakeshott, Chapter 2 and Efraim Podoksik, “The Idealism of Young Oakeshott” in Anglo-American Idealism: Thinkers and Ideas edited by James Connelly and Stamatoula Panagakou (Bern: Peter Lang, 2010), pp. 85-106