Scotland's community land initiatives: democracy and community in new decision-making spaces

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TO THE READER
The following is a draft paper written to accompany my presentation to the Political Studies Association 2015 conference. I hope it will be of use and interest to conference participants, but it is far from polished and finished! Please contact me before citing or quoting from it in any way.

1. Introduction
Scotland's community land initiatives (CLIs) are distinctive locally-based social enterprises, pursuing a range of local development goals through the ownership of land and physical assets. Emerging in the early 1990s, in some areas of the Highlands and Islands they are now major landowners. As well as vehicles for promoting local economic and social development, they can also be seen as attempts at introducing democratic processes into the economic sphere. They thus offer new possibilities for engaging people in core political questions about the control of resources and development; and for researchers to study the questions around civic pride, democracy, economy and the politics of place that frame this conference.

In these respects, the community land movement shares several features with a host of initiatives aimed at improving people's lives through increasing locally-based decision-making power. Varying widely in origins, goals and structures, included under this category might be neighbourhood regeneration or community development bodies (Shucksmith 2000, Schofield 2002, De Filippis and Saegert 2008, Lawless 2011, Mansuri and Rao 2013, Skerratt and Steiner 2013), local governance organisations (Raco and Flint 2001) or various forms of co-operatives and collective asset ownership bodies (Aiken et al 2008, Short 2008, Woodin et al 2010, Black and Leeman 2012). These initiatives may concern whole localities, or have a slightly different basis, e.g. a workplace; both also cited as bases for the formation of communities (Crow and Allan 1994: 3-4).
These initiatives often involve the creation of new decision-making spaces at local level. The power relations around these are sometimes analysed using democratic theory, as “grassroots democracy” (Kaufmann and Alfonso 1994), “participatory democracy” (Pateman 1970, Mansbridge 1983), or “empowered participatory governance” (Fung and Wright 2003). Others draw more on sociology and geography to analyse initiatives aimed at increasing “participation” in decision-making spaces, focussing on the terms of access to them, forms of power at work within them, and their enmeshment in wider structures of power at different spatial scales, from local to global (Cornwall 2002, 2005; Gaventa 2006a). This latter literature calls for (Cornwall 2002: iii):

a greater understanding of the micro-politics of participation (...) approaches that locate spaces for participation in the places in which they occur, framing their possibilities with reference to actual political, social, cultural and historical particularities.

This paper attempts to develop such an understanding of the “micro-politics of participation” with regard to the Scottish communityland movement, drawing on my doctoral research into two neighbouring CLIs in particular as a case study. It is structured as follows. The next subsections introduce the theoretical approach to power and place, and the empirical field of study – the community land movement – in a little more detail. After that, qualitative data on participation in CLIs is presented and analysed. The conclusion reflects briefly on the issues raised in relation to the nature of democracy at micro-levels.

1a. Participation in new local decision-making spaces: theory – the powercube approach

In the analysis of participation and decision-making – and democracy, politics and the social sciences more generally – power is a fundamental concept (Haugaard and Clegg 2008, Lukes 2005, Gaventa 2003, Scott 2001, Giddens and Pierson 1998, Mann 1986). One common view of power is that it is found in social relationships where two social actors are in conflict, and both attempt to gain power over the other. This is a “zero-sum” conception of power: for one actor to gain power, the other must lose some; power cannot be increased, only its distribution altered.

Alternatively, power is seen as the capacity for action, and found in a much wider range of relationships and situations. An actor's power is simply seen as what they are able to do. This is an “additive” concept of power: one actor's power does not necessarily take away from that of another. It is possible for the total sum of power to be increased. This might be by one actor teaching themselves a new skill. But it might also be by two actors working together to achieve a goal that neither could on their own: “positive sum” or “collective” power (Mann 1986), or “power with”
(Chambers 2006). This working together might be on a strictly equal footing, or it might be
hierarchical to some degree – and indeed, different sorts of power relationship may well be
“intertwined” in “most social relations” (Mann 1986: 6).

From these starting points, more can be said about power and place. Gaventa's 'power cube' model,
offers a way of integrating concerns about different forms (or “faces”) of power, different spaces
where decisions are made, and different geographical levels of action. Aimed initially at helping
citizen groups and NGOs strategise, it provides a useful starting point for an enquiry into how the
community land movement relates to power, place and change.

Figure 1: The powercube

'Visible' power we can see in open action and struggle, formal power 'on paper' and out in the open.
'Hidden' power is behind-the-scenes, whereby regulations and procedures empower some and
disempower others. And thirdly, there is the “invisible” power of ideas, habits and culture –
affecting patterns of thought and behaviour in ways we may often hardly be aware of.

Space refers to social 'spaces for engagement' (Gaventa 2006: 27), any social context or practice
where people come together. Focussing on the role of such spaces in power relations, in particular
in relation to governance and decision-making, the cube uses a threefold categorisation of 'closed',

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'invited' and 'claimed/created' spaces. A space is closed to an actor if they cannot participate directly in it: a space where (Gaventa 2006: 26):

elites (be they bureaucrats, experts or elected representatives) make decisions and provide services to ‘the people’, without the need for broader consultation or involvement.

'Invited' spaces are those in which participation is possible, but on the terms of those who created the space. Many of the initiatives associated with the co-production of public services – service user groups and others – have broadly this character. 'Claimed' or 'created' spaces are those where actors have the power to define the terms of participation – whether by taking over a space previously less open (claimed), or through creating their own space, for example through self-organised social movements. Spaces can be categorised from a range of different actors' perspectives. The parliamentary committee (or even London gentleman's club) that is a closed space to most people, may be seen as claimed or created by the MPs who use it. The key insight is that it matters how and by whom a space was created, and what the 'terms of engagement' in it are (Gaventa 2006a: 26).

Place is used to indicate different geographical scales of activity. The suggested basic categorisation is again threefold: local, national, global. Gaventa suggests that power is found at many different levels of place, and emphasises the importance of connections between levels - 'vertical links' - in social change.

My doctoral research used this framework as a basis for examining power relations in and around the new decision-making spaces created by the formation of CLIs. The paper now introduces the community land movement, and the particular CLIs I studied, before going on to the presentation of data and analysis.

1b. Scotland's community land initiatives

The first of the contemporary Scottish CLIs was the Assynt Crofters Trust in the North West Highlands. In 1992 the landowner of much of Assynt was declared bankrupt and the area put up for sale for the second time in three years. Local crofters\(^1\) formed a company to buy the land they lived and worked on; land which had been in the hands of absentee private landowners for generations (MacPhail 2002, MacAskill 1999). Other local groups followed, especially in the Western Isles, where today the majority of the land is in community ownership, and the majority of the population

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1 Crofters are tenants of crofts; a type of agricultural smallholding with complex legal protections that are unique to the Highlands and Islands of Scotland.
live on community-owned land (MacKenzie 2012). The growth of this movement was assisted by
dedicated support from the Highlands and Islands Enterprise Community Land Unit (established
1997), Lottery money in the shape of the Scottish Land Fund (first awards made in 2001), and the

In 2010, the umbrella body Community Land Scotland (CLS) was formed, which today has 54
members (CLS website 2015) – groups who either own land, or plan to do so. But there are many
more – the Scottish Community Woodlands Association, for example, has around 200 member
organisations across Scotland (CWA website 2015; including some overlap with CLS). A recent
survey by the Development Trust Association Scotland found 17 very large-scale community land
owners, but a further 287 that owned substantial physical assets, that is to say, more than just the
local community centre (Black and Leeman 2012). And while the large-scale initiatives are
concentrated in the West Highlands and Islands, the wider community assets groups can be found
across Scotland.

The CLIs, that this article focusses on, are almost all legally structured as companies limited by
guarantee. While on the surface these companies are conventional enough, being controlled by
shareholders (“members of the company”) that elect the Board of Directors, in practice they are
structured so as to act as local democratic organisations. Shares are limited to one per member, are
non-tradeable and bring no financial return: they are effectively simply a right to vote on the affairs
of the company. Further, membership of the company is generally restricted to residents of the local
area, and typically the majority of the Board of Directors must also be local residents. Membership
is not automatic: residents do have to make the decision to join the company. However this
generally costs £1 or is free.

In terms of the framework introduced above, formal, “visible” decision-making power is therefore
restricted to members. There are two main sorts of decision-making space: members' meetings, and
Board of Directors meetings. The former are generally only held annually, and, among other things,
elect Directors. The latter are often held monthly and are responsible for more day-to-day
policymaking.

Their activities are generally very wide-ranging. Like Community Land Trusts elsewhere in the UK,
many CLIs do get involved in housing - although generally in partnership with a local housing
association. But they are much more than housing providers: they are active in the areas of
economic development, social service provision and environmental work also. As one activist put it, they are effectively “very local development agencies”. The biggest CLI, Storas Uibhist, owns 90,000 acres, has a 7MW wind farm and is managing a £10m redevelopment of a harbour – as well as several tourism businesses, almost a thousand crofting tenancies, constructing storm defences along 20 miles of coastline, and so on (Community Land Scotland 2014). Many CLIs could display a similar breadth of activities, if not all on the same scale.

1c. The main case study area: Sleat and it's community land initiatives

Sleat, or Sleite in Gaelic, is the southernmost peninsula of the Isle of Skye. It has a population of around 900 people, dispersed fairly evenly around the area in 11 or so townships. The population has almost doubled in the last 40 years; one major factor in this has been the development of the national Gaelic college, Sabhal Mòr Ostaig, on the peninsula. This has brought jobs, enabling people to stay, and attracting new residents. This has been coupled with more general in-migration to the Highlands and Islands from the rest of Britain in recent decades, facilitated by changing patterns of housing and wealth, employment and communications, and cultural shifts in perceptions of urban and rural living. Far from the stereotypical remote rural backwater, Sleat is, like many places, somewhere where the demography – and the community – is in flux.

The CLIs in Sleat are the Sleat Community Trust (SCT), and the Camuscross and Duisdale Initiative (CDI). The former was formed in 2003, and its area of interest covers the entire peninsula. It currently owns a site near the ferry terminal where it's office is based, and where it operates a shop/PO, petrol station and leases a garage; and a substantial forest, with plans underway to buy more forestry. It currently employs four paid staff, as well as a number of local contractors for specific pieces of work. It generates income chiefly from timber sales and from grant and loan funding. SCT activists – by “activist” I will mean anyone, staff or volunteer, regularly involved in the work of the organisation – have recently become directors of both Community Land Scotland and the Community Woodlands Association, two membership organisations which represent many community land initiatives.

The Camuscross and Duisdale Initiative began almost as a breakaway from SCT, as the Camuscross Community Initiative, focussing on what its activists felt was a relatively neglected part of the peninsula around the township of Camuscross. The neighbouring township of Duisdale was incorporated during the process of the group purchasing a local reservoir, for use as a source of hydro-electric power, through the Land Reform Act. CDI owns the reservoir and is still working on
the hydro scheme, but its main concern now is the development of a “Sustainable Community Hub”: a shop/café/venue building in its locality. Other activities include a “Grow to Eat” campaign promoting allotment gardening and home-made food processing, the holding of social events such as dances and a highland games style “Crofter's Olympics”, and exploration of local heritage projects. It employs no paid staff and owns no premises; it is entirely volunteer-run and committee meetings are held in members' houses.

It is obvious even from this brief account that neither of the Sleat CLIs is a large-scale landowner. Most of the peninsula is in the hands of two private estates. The CLIs own small- to medium-size areas of land and fixed tangible assets. In this respect they are not typical of the 17 big “community buyouts” discussed above, with which the community land movement is often associated. However, the Sleat CLIs are more typical of community land ownership in general than the stereotype suggests – even in the Highlands and Islands. They are also, like Sleat itself, dynamic and changing.

2. Power, community and participation: data and analysis

The preceding section has introduced two community land initiatives on the Isle of Skye, showed how they are part of a wider movement in Scotland, and suggested that their impact on local power relations and the “micro-politics of participation” can be understood by analysing how different forms of power affect participation in their various institutions and activities, and especially their decision-making spaces. This section now attempts that analysis.

2a. Visible power – membership, participation and contestation

Here I shall consider three sorts of ‘visible’ participation: as a ordinary member; as an 'active' member, e.g. a member who has contributed to organising an event or sat on a working group; and as a Director of the company.

Sleat Community Trust currently has “over 500 individual or group members” (SCT website 2014), which is around two-thirds of the adult population of the peninsula. The Trust website states that membership is “open and free”, although members must submit an application form for the approval of the directors. (Typically two or three new members are approved each month at directors' meetings.) The Articles of Association specify further that members must be over 18, ordinarily resident “in the community” as specified by postcodes, and eligible to vote in local government elections “in a polling district that includes the Community or part of it”, and “support
the Objects” of the company (Sleat Community Trust undated). Members receive the newsletter, and are eligible to vote for directors of the Trust, and on other issues internal to the Trust as and when they are put to a vote.

CDI had 95 members in 2010, which they say represents 65% of the adult population of the area (Donald Rankin Associates undated). Membership is again free and open to anyone over 18 “who is normally resident” in the postcode areas covering the two settlements. Membership confers democratic rights within the organisation, to nominate or stand as a director and vote, as well as to “have your say on company policy and direction”.

Reasons for joining CLIs varied. Many people joined for the straightforward reason of wanting to support the organisation. One couple who had moved in to the area revealed that they had joined SCT before even arriving in Sleat. There are other reasons for joining. One person who was strongly sceptical of much community land activity was nevertheless a member of SCT, in order to receive the newsletter and “find out what they're up to”! However, in general sceptics were less likely to be members, as one might expect.

Active involvement in the CLIs could be as directors, or, in the case of SCT, as participants in some of the subsidiary companies and working groups. A structure involving sub-groups and subsidiary companies is used by many CLIs, not just to limit financial liabilities of the central organisation, but also to facilitate the engagement of more local residents. Sub-groups provide a less committing way to participate in the organisation than becoming a director, allow the CLI to draw on specific skills and expertise, and also provide something of a training ground for future directors of the whole organisation.

Not all members were actively involved in CLIs, of course. However, a sizeable proportion were: 85 SCT members had been involved as participants in working groups or directors of the Trust or a subsidiary (Bryan and Scott 2012: 14).

A little insight into the social structure of participation in CLIs is given in Table 1. A word of caution about the data: these figures certainly do not include everyone who has participated in CLI activity in Sleat; nor are they drawn from a representative cross-section of the local population. They are simply calculated from what data I obtained during field research. They therefore cannot be used to conduct meaningfully precise statistical tests on whether participation in CLIs is
representative of the population in general. Yet, while the “sample” used for this analysis is nonrandom - undoubtedly skewed towards participants in CLIs, and possibly in other ways too - it nevertheless represents a substantial proportion of Sleat: around 110 people out of a total adult population of 770 (2011 census).

Above caveats very firmly in mind, it does appear CLI participation tended to be by middle-aged to older men who moved to the area as working-age adults, without prior local family connections. However, it is also clear that such a portrait of a “typical” CLI activist masks considerable diversity in practice. There are women; there are people with various sorts of local roots; there are registered crofters. It does seem as if crofters and locally-rooted people make up a higher proportion of CDI activists, as compared with SCT, although both are found in both organisations. And, although again most of the age bands are based on the author's estimate, which is of course a significant weakness of the data, it is at least clear that there are relatively few young people involved. The view that CLIs in general – or SCT in particular – are dominated by “incomers” is perhaps more based on perceptions of who the main personalities are who are associated with them, rather than analysis of everyone who has been involved in a committee or working group at some point. Looking at the directors of SCT alone, the picture is more definitely mostly one of middle-aged male in-migrants – but again not entirely.

2b. Hidden power: elections, invitations and motivations

What are the processes that produce this pattern of participation? This section considers how and why people choose to participate actively in the work of CLIs in Sleat – particularly as Directors; and why they do not.

Generally, CLIs have a fixed number of directors, with fixed terms and requirements that directors and office-holders rotate every few years. This is the case in Sleat also. Yet despite this very visible community power over the appointment of directors, in practice there are almost never competitive elections. In Sleat, SCT seems to have had contestation for director posts in the first few years, but not recently. CDI directors could be elected, but in practice this doesn't happen.
Table 1 analysis of available data on participation in Sleat CLIs

Notes:
1. Participation is defined as formal membership of any committee or sub-group of the organisation
2. Ages are estimated.
3. This is NOT a comprehensive record of everyone who has participated in a Sleat CLI – see fuller explanation in the text above.

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<tr>
<td>No registered crofter in household</td>
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Sources: fieldwork data and interviews; Sleat Community Trust (2011) “What have we done” p4: “Who has done it all?” list; SCT and CDI websites and newsletters.
It seems that this is not because it just so happens that the number of people who stand for election matches the posts available. Instead it appears that directors stand for election because existing directors have suggested to them that they do so. Rarely does anyone stand for election as a director without the blessing of at least some of the incumbents. And while one might imagine that there could be different groups of CLI directors each encouraging their preferred candidates to join them, it seems that sufficient consensus and coordination has prevailed among CLI directors in Sleat that it has never happened that more people are persuaded to put themselves forward than places that are available. Indeed, people rarely talk about “standing for election” as a Director; they tend to talk about simply “going on the Board”. In short, the process is more one of co-option confirmed by a subsequent show of assent at an AGM, rather than contested election.

This situation suggests several questions about power. How does this practice fit into local power relations? Who is empowered and who disempowered? How is it seen locally – by activists involved, and by others? What do we know about why people do or do not stand as directors, and what does it tell us? And how are these relationships in local spaces connected with wider patterns of power: as Mosse writes, do they “overcome rather than reproduce wider unequal power relations” (Mosse 2007: 32), or the reverse?

Firstly, Trust activists were quite open about approaching people to become directors. Indeed, some saw it as good practice – ensuring that the Trust benefits from having the best people running it:

In fact, I used to, influence that a fair bit, because if I knew we were looking for three directors, I'd go out and, headhunt people. And I'd make sure that they filled in a nomination form (...) So there you go I just (laughs) I picked my own directors! But it was good! I mean I don't mind admitting it, I did influence who the directors would be in the initial stages, and er, it was good because we had good strong people with (...) good range of knowledge and experience ('James', SCT activist)

This can easily be seen as existing activists exercising power over who participates in the organisation's decision-making spaces. Indeed, it is that, and the speaker acknowledges the ambiguity of this in the context of a democratic structure: “I don't mind admitting it”. Yet, as he goes on to say, it is understandable for the short-term interests of the organisation, and it is in this context that the practice is justified.

It is clear from the range of people that do participate that this practice does not completely close
off CLI spaces to any one section of the community. SCT's network of working groups and subsidiary companies provides a framework for people to engage in the organisation without becoming a fully-fledged director – allowing for confidence-building and experimentation on all sides. And the encouragement of people to stand as Directors, while carrying an obvious risk of creating a Directorial clique, has crossed various local divides. Sometimes this may be because the particular skills someone can bring to the organisation are appreciated, regardless of disagreements on other issues (e.g. Gaelic promotion). In other cases, it may be because existing Directors are responding to concerns that a local constituency feels disconnected from the CLI. Thus Sleat Community Trust responded to an independent review which highlighted the lack of crofting engagement with the Trust by inviting the Sleat General Grazings Committee to nominate a representative to the Board. Some directors may even feel that an element of adversarial debate is healthy for the organisation, although others may be more uncomfortable with this.

Another quotation offers a slightly different perspective, that this exercise of power is benign for the director: it builds their self-belief. This argument goes that being a Community Land Initiative director is demanding, unrewarding and intimidating. There is no monetary reward; little kudos in the community; and for some people, the idea of having responsibility for a company, dealing with public officials, funding and so on is very intimidating (i.e. a lack of “power within” in relation to public, visible power). Therefore it is necessary to go out and recruit and encourage suitable people. Such activities are creating a culture of inclusion, breaking down “invisible” barriers which perhaps need active intervention from the more powerful to be broken. From this perspective, what is to be explained is not why so few people have been directors, but why so many have done this. Here is an extended extract from an interview with an SCT activist expressing this kind of perspective on participation and becoming a director:

They've probably been through now all the most likely suspects in the community (...) All the sort of people who, everyone would recognise as being of some, not standing in the community but, you know, who've had something to do in the community (...) I mean I probably wouldn't have done it if I hadn't been asked to (...) I wouldn't have thought of it, I don't think. 'cos I always think, there's always someone more able to do it than I am! (laughs) (...) And I think a lot of people feel that. And sometimes you know, people need bringing out of themselves a bit, you know, to, just to have a go at something. (...) So I think it's, um, I think it's true there's been a lot of big personalities, involved (...) I mean especially when you get people like [name] on who's, very well known, very well respected, you know, not hugely egotistical man by any means, but still, very able and very, competent, and I think people would feel, oh goodness [name] knows so many people, and I think that's when I felt at such a huge disadvantage when they're talking about councillors and things like that, I was like, haven't got a clue who you're talking about.
There are several points in this extract relevant to the analysis. Firstly, she refers to the benign, empowering aspect of being approached to get involved with the SCT - “I probably wouldn't have done it if I hadn't been asked to”. So here, the “encouragement” of directors contributes towards the inclusion and empowerment of people who are perhaps lacking in “power within” in this field.

However, this need for people to be empowered by existing activists, or “bringing out of themselves to have a go at something”, arises because of the perception that the existing activists are “very able” and “know so many people” - the people who have “had something to do in the community”. In other words, they are people with visible power in the sense of work positions or formal qualifications, who operate beyond the boundaries of the community, as well as having touched many lives within the community. As well as an element of rational comparison of life and work experience, skills and knowledge, there is surely an element of the “invisible”, third face of power in this feeling of powerlessness relative to the “big personalities” who get involved in community politics. She believes that “a lot of people feel” that “there's always someone more able to do it than I am” and so don't even think of getting involved. Another person interviewed, who was also involved with SCT, commented that many people wouldn't feel they had the skills to get involved, “although I would say that anyone can contribute”.

Perceptions of personal capacity might be based, not so much on lack of power within, as on a feeling that one's powers are already fully engaged elsewhere. This perhaps helps explain the relative lack of people of working age or with young families involved in community politics, despite their strong attachments to the place through work, social ties and bringing up children there. A few such people were active in both CLIs and other community groups, e.g. the Ardvasar Village Hall committee, but they stood out from a wider group of volunteers who were largely retired or at least whose children had left home. The demands of economic and domestic activity simply leave these people with little time and energy to devote to community politics. In this vein, one working mother expressed frustration at rumours that a certain prominent in-migrant who had retired to Sleat was interested in becoming involved in SCT:

What kind of understanding does he have of your average person in Sleat? He doesn't have a clue, not a clue! (...) But he can afford a house site, he can afford a big fancy house, and he's got all the time in the world to get involved in Sleat Community Trust. Your sort of average person, that's from Sleat, that's working 40 hours a week or more, what time do they have to give to a community trust, or to steer a community trust? They're at the whim of rich people who have the disposable time, really.
These, whether lack of confidence or time, are surely among the “wider unequal power relations” which Mosse writes of (2007: 32). Of course, neither the demands of work and family life, nor the “invisible” power enjoyed by people with formal qualifications, or powerful positions at work, are directly the creation of CLIs. Their existence, shape and development are part of much wider social structures and processes. But encouraging “good strong people” with “good range of knowledge and experience” must surely have contributed to the perception that running SCT is for the “big personalities” who “know so many people”; to reproducing existing patterns of power, at intra-community level.

To what extent can a small community-level organisation do other than this? It is evident that activists feel a responsibility to the organisation (and those acting as company directors are legally obliged to). They may see the purpose of the organisation as to empower the community through its projects, rather than through its internal democratic structures. And, to include people in its management, as well as to deliver projects, one first has to ensure that the organisation survives. CLIs are not part of the formal political system, their existence guaranteed in statute. They are companies, responsible for their own survival: although none has as yet, in principle they can go bust. They are dependent for this survival on relationships with a wide range of actors controlling different resources: most notably funding, but also advice and technical expertise. The active recruitment of people with time to give, and professional skills, and connections to powerful actors and key spaces outwith the community, is not surprising in this context. It is not likely that there is any conscious strategy aiming at making the Trust's decision-making fora “invited” rather than “open” spaces: rather a focus on including those judged most useful to the organisation as a social enterprise, which may have this unintended consequence.

There may be many other reasons for non-participation, of course. People give varied reasons for their decision to “go on the Board” - or not. Sometimes these preferences certainly had the appearance of empowered choices; sometimes, deeper cultural or political factors may also be discernible. Attitudes towards the organisation in general, or specific projects, are sometimes part of the answer:

“Do you feel you have a say in how it's [Tormore Forest] run now?” I ask. “I don't put myself forward for that. Because I don't believe in it, that's why.”
(extract from fieldwork notes, conversation with 'Dougal', Sleat resident)
Comments from others suggested that participation more broadly was likely to be restricted to those in favour of the current direction of any organisation:

...if I've not got anything constructive to say, I don't say anything – I don't tell them (…) they have lots of meetings but I'm not going to go if all I want to do is say no.
('Edward', Sleat resident)

Some people linked participation in community organisations with “incomers”. Here is one self-described “white settler” in conversation at the fringes of a CLI organised meeting:

You get the white settler, them and us, mentality, and I think that's sad. Look here today, there's only about two crofters here, the rest are all white settlers like me – that's sad (…) look at Tormore (…) that's good – but again, it's all white settlers.
(extract from fieldnotes, conversation with 'Alex', Sleat resident)

It is notable that the meeting at which this conversation took place was in fact attended by many people who could trace generations of their family in Sleat, and certainly more than “about two”. Nevertheless, several people suggested that non-participation in community organisation was a feature of Highland culture. Here is one resident talking about whether there is a pattern in who gets involved with Sleat Community Trust, in response to my question:

'Ruaridh': Seems to be the same people that are kind of involved in it all the time. But then again, a lot of people that make the noise after these things are voted never put themselves up for it in the first place (...) You tend to find that probably locals don't, go for that so much, when maybe they start complaining about incomers [...] yeah there probably is a pattern but, you know, if people want to break the pattern, then go for it.

Interviewer: They should go for it – why do you think they don't?

'Ruaridh': I think it's a very Highland kind of thing isn't it, plenty talking about it but, em, don't actually want to put their heads above the parapet maybe (...) been the same for years, people, having a..., moan about somebody that's in charge or something,'he's on every committee under the sun' - oh right ok, well you go in for it - 'ah no no no I'm not do that!' (laughs) that'll shut [them] up! So that's my kind of opinion on it! (laughs)
('Ruaridh', Sleat resident)

The speaker implies that, while there does seem to be a preponderance of “incomers” rather than “locals” in SCT, and that this does elicit expressions of grievance, these expressions are perhaps less heartfelt than they first appear. They are perhaps more about using prominent local people as scapegoats and targets for offloading discontent, than about genuine grievances; “pub talk” in common parlance. This may be so. But on the other hand, various forms of power inequality may lead to even genuine grievances being aired in “backstage” spaces when people are reluctant to confront power holders in public. Taken together, the last few quotations illustrate a theme of
reluctance to *publicly* oppose CLI activities that is quite strong in the data.

Others take a slightly different approach to this issue. The speaker in the next extract talks about non-participation and links it to different skills and life experiences between “locals” and those who have “moved in”. However, she presents non-participation more as a positive choice, to not get pressed into organising; and extends it towards a quiet life in the community more generally.

Some people say “there's not many locals on these committees”, but it's our own fault – because we don't want to do it! I hold my hand up – I don't want to do it. And if people have moved in and have done this sort of thing elsewhere, then let them do it (…) we support things, events if they're on – but organising, no, someone else can do it! (…) we don't [even] go visiting the neighbours in the evening! (...) we're quite happy...

('Betty', Sleat resident)

Note that 'Betty' identifies with “locals” in contrast to incomers. In fact she moved to the area as an adult herself. However, she has been resident for many years and married a locally-born man. Further, her husband is a retired professional: the type of person who is often found on community organisation boards and might be thought to have the skills and confidence to do so in Sleat, if interested. Again, the initial quotation expressing unwillingness to go to a meeting and be critical, is from an in-migrant to Sleat from outwith the Highlands. These quotations also illustrate the difficulty in attempting any kind of simple read-off of attitudes and practices from personal background and identity categories.

2c. Hidden power: community social structures

Power is said to be accompanied by responsibility (Lukes 2005: 57-8, 66-67). While the philosophical basis of the link between power and responsibility is clear, how is responsibility to be understood sociologically? One possible interpretation is that responsibility refers to the powers that others can exercise over you by virtue of a position of power that you occupy.

This therefore requires some mechanism by which others can exercise that power. There are the formal mechanisms of local accountability discussed under “visible power” above. Then, some people are wary of the financial and legal responsibilities associated with land ownership: they see ownership as leaving them open to the exercise of power by others (financial institutions, contractors and creditors, neighbours and potential plaintiffs).

Some are also cautious about assuming the local *social* responsibility that might go with participating in a local decision-making space, such as those created by CLIs. If it is accepted that
the interests of the individual members of any community of place will sometimes differ, then it can be seen that there is the potential for local decision-making processes to throw up decisions that will inevitably disadvantage somebody in the community, to some extent. And, in any community characterised by multiplex relationships (where people have multiple connections between them – see Cohen 1985: 22), as well as formal mechanisms of accountability discussed above, those disadvantaged may be able to operationalise the concept of responsibility in other ways. At its simplest, this can involve ostracising those to be held responsible. Others (Parman 2005, Crow and Allan 1994: 10-11, Shucksmith et al 1996: 230) have suggested that, in the context of community social structures, gossip functions as a form of social control, and may affect individuals' willingness to engage with controversial issues. To the extent that someone is integrated into local socialising networks, and depends on others within them for their social relationships, they are subject to their power.

To become a CLI director is to expose oneself to this – even to aspersions about one's possible financial or egotistical motivations for engaging in the ostensibly altruistic field of community activism, and and to scapegoating talk. Such pressures are alluded to in another recent study of CLIs (McMorran et al 2013: 24). Some felt that such calculations of tradeoffs between the benefits of greater power versus the risks of taking responsibility played a major part in forestalling greater interest in collective land ownership from crofters in Sleat:

> crofters are, just a little bit reticent to, to get together [to organise a community land buyout], because, because ultimately they may fall out with their neighbours, and it's far better to just rub along with your neighbours, and hate the landlord, than it is to get rid of the landlord and hate your nextdoor neighbour.

('Joe', Sleat crofter)

In a classic community study, Frankenberg suggests that such social risks are highest for people most dependent on local social networks. Most likely, these are those people with family history in the area, who have lived there most of their lives; his helps explain the preponderance of “incomers” in positions of local responsibility (Frankenberg 1957). However, data on the social mix of CLI participants in Sleat suggests that this does not mean that “locals” will avoid any involvement in community organisations. How is this local/incomer distinction nuanced in practice?

Firstly, at this micro level, variation in personalities and interpersonal social relations will matter.
Some “local” people may be more willing to live with criticism than others; they may be more or less dependent for their self-esteem on socialising and the goodwill of others. And again, some activists developed practices for coping with this kind of criticism. When I asked one whether involvement in community organisations required a “thick skin”, he said:

No, you've just not got to let it get personal [and] to let things fly over you (…) it's fun and games, I love it!
('James', SCT activist)

Also, the degree of potential controversy varies from issue to issue: people may be involved with an organisation, but take care to stay out of those areas of its work that might bring them into conflict with their neighbours or relatives.

Others may have found community politics more difficult. Several people who had been Community Councillors during an acrimonious debate over the use of Gaelic language in the primary school recalled how “unpleasant” their involvement had made their everyday social relations, regardless of their position on the school issue. It seemed to have put some of them off such public involvement.

Secondly, some “incomers” may still want to have a locally-based social life, and find involvement in community projects can constrain as well as facilitate this:

I'm sure they talk about it [CLI politics] (...) but they wouldn't talk to me about it in the shop. I mean I've never been in the shop or anywhere, petrol station or anything, and had anybody from what I regard as sort of local community come and mention to me what's happening, or “I've heard such and such”, so I think that there's a sense in which you just get left out of the loop really.
('Nicole', SCT activist and in-migrant)

Again, socialising, and flows of information – or “gossip” - are not restricted to local family networks, but may include neighbours and in-migrants. Here Woods' typology (Woods 2010) is helpful in going beyond the simplistic “incomer”/”local” dichotomy. It may be not only “natives” who risk important social relationships with involvement in potentially controversial initiatives, but some “investors” too.

Thirdly, it is worth noting that there may be more at stake than social relations in themselves. Those who wish to redress disadvantage they have suffered may have control over other resources – they
may be members of a grazings committee, for example - and be in a position to alter their decision-making accordingly. The anticipation of such 'tit-for-tat' reactions is seen, for example, in this quotation from a community activist (not in Sleat – from Macleod et al 2010: 86) about the risks of using the Land Reform Act against a local landowner:

if a landowner near the community is unfriendly and uncooperative, using the Act against them can lead to a lifetime of obstruction and pettiness which is unproductive.

This speaker uses terms very similar to Cohen (1985: 28-9), who suggests that interpersonal conflict within a locality can lead to considerable difficulties and complications in the conduct of everyday life.

These factors increase the attractiveness of having ultimate decision-making power vested in a non-local body. Some suggested that the preservation of local social relations was helped by having external agencies – such as the local authority or Crofting Commission – assume responsibility for decision-making over contentious issues. And some staff of such bodies may be well aware of these local dynamics: for example, one Crofting Commission member suggested that where conflict had emerged, CLIs might sometimes need the Commission to step in as “the bad guy” (in conversations at 2012 CLS conference).

However, there were those for whom becoming active with the Trust brought benefits also, with one commenting that, having always been known as someone else's partner or parent, it was “quite interesting” to start being known for yourself. The same person spoke of their satisfaction of being involved in positive change, specifically relating to disbursing income from Tormore forest:

with the, the new fund, you know, 'cos you can actually help quite a few, local organisations, relatively easily, with not huge amounts of money but enough to show something really positive for. Like new play equipment and things like that, you know. Which would take a lot of coffee mornings and things to raise the money for!
('Alison', SCT activist)

The preceding paragraphs discuss the hidden face of power and community land initiatives in terms of incentives for participation associated with local social relations. While some attach value to taking responsibility at local level, they may also acknowledge that avoiding it can be “convenient”. It seems likely that the difficulties in local social relations created by taking such responsibility are
what they had in mind. However, the analysis of “hidden” power relations in terms of social structures and incentives stops short of considering the cultural contexts in which preferences are formed. The next section therefore explores culture and the third face of power in relation to ideals of community.

2d. Invisible power and the meanings of 'community': solidarity, localism, consensus and fear of politics

Community may influence participation, not just as a form of social structure, but also as a cultural symbol or ideal. It was suggested earlier that community is used to express ideas about how local social life should be; and prominent among these were ideals of neighbourly solidarity and co-operation, and friendly social relationships.

These ideals may encourage and strengthen participation. Several people thus referred to serving on community bodies as “doing your bit” for the community. Some in Sleat even see community action – explicitly including land initiatives – as a contemporary successor to past forms of collaborative power that arose in response to the “economic interdependence” (DeRienzo 2008) of previous generations.

Community, then, may be a goal of community land initiatives. The emphasis of many CLIs on population growth and the retention of young people and families in their localities suggests a social structural understanding of community. The power to initiate economic development, or provide social service infrastructure, such as housing, can be seen as the power to make strategic life choices for the community as a collective entity. Without economic and social services, population declines and the community's very survival is imperilled – whether the result is total depopulation or, more likely in the short term, a shift towards a locality as a place for wealthier people to retire to, rather than a demographically mixed population.

Community is also understood in terms of social practice, as solidarity and conviviality. These goals may also be served through CLI activity, perhaps as much through the method of organising and generating power as through the projects being undertaken. Collective practices and interaction stimulate ideas and “imaginings” of community and belonging: the social bases for cultural interpretations (Neal and Walters 2008: 282-3, 293).
This interpretation of CLI activity – as helping provide “the glue” that binds communities through shared work – is to some extent anticipated in Jedrej and Nuttall’s work. They comment that local economic and resource control issues are more promising focii around which to build local collective power in rural Scotland than cultural issues, which they associate with “divisiveness” and a heightened “anxiety felt towards incomers” (Jedrej and Nuttall 1998: 179-180). And this sense of repurposing of older forms of collective action may not be unique to Scotland. In his comparative study of agriculture in Skye and western Norway, Sabhal Mòr Ostaig lecturer and Camuscross crofter Gavin Parsons (Parsons 2011: 166) notes the Norwegian “dugnad” system of collective work:

There is a useful word in Norwegian which means a co-operation with neighbours - **dugnad** – when somebody puts word around that they need help. This **dugnad** used to be commonly employed for farm work when the majority of it was done by hand, but now it is mostly used for community projects (in urban as well as rural situations).

He goes on to quote a Norwegian interviewee saying that they have used this system to build a village hall and sporting facilities.

However, ideals of community may pose difficulties for participation also. Ideas about respect for your neighbours that encourage mutual aid, may also discourage “interference” in each others' business. Further, seeing “community” as a quality of social relations akin to friendship, emphasising goodwill and commonality, may cause difficulties when differences of opinion or interests arise. It was notable that in Sleat, in contrast to the positive associations of “community” for most people, “politics” was used almost as its antithesis, to refer to conflict and rancour. In the groups and localities studied, conflict was not always avoided, but there seems to be a widespread feeling that it should be avoided, and that episodes of conflict, or adversarial promotion of one particular viewpoint, were lapses from the ideal – were “not community”.

In this light, elections can perhaps be seen as institutionalised conflict: contestation between individuals is built into the design. The extent to which, in contrast, many CLI Directorship elections are effectively processes of co-option of candidates, rather than contests, was discussed in Chapter Six. In her study of New England town meetings, Mansbridge suggests that friendship provides the model of social relations that culturally underpins many “face-to-face participatory democracies”. She documents a number of instances where electoral processes were managed in
order to avoid open contestation between individuals, and suggests (Mansbridge 1983: 9) that:

friends make their decisions by consensus (…) voting symbolises (…) division.

She counterposes “unitary” democracy to the “adversarial” form associated with contest and conflict. This latter is perhaps the “politics” that Sleiteachs oppose to “community”.

Such a conception of community is rather communitarian. The ideal of community that underlies it may be not so much one of collective struggle against injustice, but of common identity (Delanty 2003: 3). In the case of CLIs, this is likely to be an identity constructed around place. Thus many people emphasised not so much the democratic structures of CLIs as the element of local control – that local people run it. They are relatively happy to “implicitly delegate” the actual running of the organisation to whoever is prepared to do it, provided they are seen as members of the community. In this view, landowners can be seen as members of the community, rather than something apart – as partners rather than antagonists. Such a view may be espoused, even by those who appear somewhat embarrassed about some of its communitarian associations:

it's about, I think, the entire community, the big community, working together. That sounds very David Cameron! Wash out my mouth! (…) But because the Clan Donald is a trust, and the trust is made up greatly of local people as well, and the Sleat Community Trust is made up entirely of local people, and the, CDI is made up entirely of local people. And because the people who work for Fearann Eilean Iarmain are now local people. And, and [landowner] is a local (…) You've just got to try and find the best way of working together. ('Lorna', CDI activist)

Again, this suggests the impact that local residence, investment and participation in local social life makes to attitudes towards landowners. It does not entirely eliminate desire for change or for community ownership, but it certainly seems to limit the popularity of such a strategy. Equally, local control, or the perception of it, may generate support for CLIs, as in the case of this person who had earlier raised a number of objections to the way that CDI had gone about some of their projects:

But, what's happening here is it's the locals who are driving the change. Which is what you would want.
In sum, there are cultural pressures towards consensus in CLI decision-making, and against the participation of those who feel opposed to CLI projects, in addition to the social pressures outlined above. These include a desire for convivial social relations (Neal and Walters 2008) that conflict potentially threatens; and a feeling that a “community” mode of action is opposed to “politics”. While these are not of CLIs’ making, they often appear to aspire to them: thus CDI's slogan is “all pulling together”. However, their logo illustrates this with a sketch of a tug-of-war team: a reference to the Crofting Olympics, but perhaps also to an understanding of community that incorporates ideas about “collective struggle” (Delanty 2003: 3) in some contexts, as well as the avoidance of conflict in others.

As this latter example suggests, such pressures towards consensus are not all-encompassing. The practice of community meetings seemed to allow for questioning and expressions of dissent. Where these occurred, they were not dismissed as inappropriate, either in public or, as far as the data can show, in private conversation afterwards. However, it was notable that a few occasions of open conflict at meetings prior to the start of fieldwork were reported as being quite emotional – a phenomenon Mansbridge also discusses (1983: 62-5). Nor is this communitarian consensus universal. Some people are certainly aware of conflicting interests. And some are sceptical of the association between community and consensus, or can recount tales of “hidden” conflict in local decision-making spaces (e.g. crofting and grazings committees). But in general, and for various reasons, the desire to avoid open conflict is quite widespread.

What are the power implications of this? Mansbridge suggests that unitary democracies do not promote equal power among their members, but that this does not necessarily produce injustice. Where members of a polity share a common interest, such “unitary” or consensual and deliberative forms of decision-making may be advantageous to all – effectively by encouraging the best exercise of all the powers present within the community (Mansbridge 1983: ix-x, 23-35). In contrast, where interests conflict, insisting on couching debate in terms of the “common good” can obscure the issues at stake, delegitimise the expression of self-interest, and allow the more powerful to protect their ideas or interests at the expense of others (Mansbridge 2003: 180-183).

To conclude this section: in terms of community land ownership, to the extent that ideals of “community” help CLIs harness the energies and resources of more powerful local actors, including
landowners, they can contribute to local empowerment more widely. But to the extent that ideals of “community” empower those more powerful in decision-making already – by virtue of privileged access to resources, or cultural standing, they limit the impact of CLIs on the redistribution of power at local level.

### 2e The three faces of power: participation in relation to land and development

As well as the structures and meanings of community, residents' position in relation to land is a factor affecting their participation in CLI activities. What is at stake may be different for different people, of course: control over the use of land may impinge on their “strategic life issues” (Kabeer 1999) to very different extents. This section considers this in relation to debates over the powers that land ownership gives, and the types of resource that land represents to different residents of Sleat.

Firstly, there is the rational calculation of whether land is felt to be an important enough resource for economic or social development to warrant spending one's free time on an organisation interested in it. Some people hold the view that local control of the land in which the community is situated is essential for getting the best outcomes from development for local people. Land is seen not only as an agricultural resource, but simply as physical space, with a myriad of potential uses. Others may take a more pragmatic view, that some landed assets might be of value to the owner, but some are not, and takes a case-by-case approach to whether community ownership is appropriate. Finally, there is the view that sees land as placing heavy demands on the time, knowledge and finances of its owners, and sees community ownership as undesirable for this reason.

Others still see land as not particularly relevant; control of it not a significant life issue. Non-participation in CLI affairs is therefore a rational decision. So, while many people had some opinion about land ownership, and few would dismiss it as totally irrelevant, it was not top priority for many people either. To some extent, this too may be the product of the third face of power, of people becoming accustomed to a status quo where they see little prospect of alternatives, as just mentioned. But in a modern economy, with few people working the land, if someone who is quite economically successful says about land ownership:

> I don't wake up in the morning thinking about it! ('Ruaridh', Sleat resident)

this cannot simply be discounted as the product of powerlessness.
Whether taking ownership of land is the best way to advance one's interests is another key question. Thus for many active crofters, access to land is important; but they may differ whether outright ownership is necessary, or whether crofting tenure, as a very strong form of tenancy, is sufficient for their needs. Again, through local grazings committees, crofters already have access to a local body with some decision-making power over local land use. Some may see community land ownership, giving non-crofters access to such power, as actually diluting their power over land, not enhancing it:

The croft is the crofter's. The croft land is croft land. It's not anybody else's land. The landlord may think it's their land but it's not, it's the crofter's land. (slight laugh) It's not the community's land! (...) you can see where the fear, of community, comes from. In the sense of, 40 years ago the crofters were the community. Today they're not.

('Iain', Sleat crofter)

As this latter quotation suggests, land is not simply a resource for economic or social projects, of course. In the Highlands and Islands, as elsewhere, there are multiple interpretations of what land is for (OECD 2006). Woods' work (2010) on communities and attachment to place also suggests land's "communal” aspect, partly as an economic or social resource, but also as a cultural and social-historical symbol; this is alluded to also be Jedrej and Nuttall in their discussion of the significance of placenames (Jedrej and Nuttall 1996: 121-128). Overlapping these are competing claims on land as private property, and as public facility. Thus different private landowners adopt different positions towards the type of resource that land is, pursuing different management goals – profit, conservation, outdoor recreation (of more or less privatised forms), and others (Wagstaff 2013). Community landowners tend to treat land as a public, productive resource – emphasising some of the communal aspects of place attachment. Yet there are variations, even between the two in Sleat, as has been shown above; CDI places much greater emphasis on the cultural significance of land ownership than SCT.

Some crofters with local cultural roots may feel that their culture is being encroached on by others, conducting an “invisible power” grab. The social structural claim may be made that “locals” do not participate in these new movements; yet, as the analysis of the social composition of participation in CLIs suggests, this is not wholly accurate. Both positive and negative responses to the community land movement can be found among people with local family roots in Sleat: genealogy does not predetermine one's attitude to community land. Another response is more purely cultural,
denigrating activists' competence (as developers or crofters) and their moral position (“only in it to line their own pockets”). The claim of land ownership in the name of “community” might be particularly likely to provoke feelings of “encroachment upon their boundaries” (Cohen 1985: 109), and consequent attempts to redraw the boundaries of community to exclude the encroachers.

Cultural considerations may be entwined with social and economic ones. People with crofting rights already have considerable powers over land use. The legal status of these powers is further underpinned by the cultural power of crofting, with all its associations of historical struggle between the community and landowners. Crofters who are active in agriculture, who are regarded as knowledgeable, who hold positions of responsibility in grazings committees, are relatively powerful actors at the local level. The possibility of community ownership of crofting land might be seen as threatening their current position. Crofting bodies would have to share decision-making powers over land, not with a private landowner, but with a community landowner. The wider accessibility of CLI decision-making spaces gives many more people powers over land; and confers the moral status of “community” on the landowner. This multiplies the potential social risks attendant on land use decision-making, as suggested above. It may also be both culturally and psychologically unsettling; and potentially an obstacle to the principal economic power that crofting rights provide, that of selling land.

The above discussion is based largely on data from Sleat. It cannot necessarily be generalised. However, other fieldwork suggests these issues may be widespread. In an infamous case, Stòras Uibhist was taken to the Land Court by crofters at Askernish, who challenged the CLI's right to develop a golf course on common grazings land (McMorran et al 2013). Wider still, the 2012 Community Land Scotland annual conference included a workshop specifically on crofting, where the delicate politics of working with crofters and grazings committees was discussed. The same conference saw a presentation from the North Harris Trust on housing: when the speaker noted that some grazings committees had voluntarily given up land for an affordable housing project, the audience was audibly impressed. This, and other aspects of the crofting workshop discussion (e.g. several CLIs were trying to create new crofts on their land), suggest that the power relationship between crofting institutions and CLIs is not doomed to be conflictual; but that it may often be an important one for both parties.
3. Conclusion: pressures for and against participation in new local decision-making spaces

The preceding discussions illustrate, I hope, how useful a multifaceted concept of power is in the analysis of power relations in decision-making spaces. The exercise of 'visible' powers of election and contestation is influenced and constrained by relationships less apparent to the superficial observer: the behind-the-scenes encouragement of candidates, the self-censorship of community members in their public interventions, and the wider ethos of 'community' projects and feelings about land and resources. Despite talk of 'Highland culture', or divides between 'locals' and 'incomers', these pressures are felt to some degree by everyone who commits to living in a community – in the Highlands, or elsewhere.

All this does not mean that these organisations cannot function – far from it; nor does it mean that the formal, 'visible' powers of challenge and accountability will never be used. There are cases in the community land movement, even in small communities, of electoral challenges being made to an existing Board of Directors. However, unlike in much larger polities (e.g. at national level), such challenges seem to be matters of crisis, rather than routine. Again, this is not to suggest that one approach or the other is always 'better'; just to point out the different dynamics at work. They perhaps also suggest a relationship between scale of polity, and form of democratic and political interactions within it. We have seen how ideas and practices of community, and in particular multiplex personal and social relationships, might affect the conduct of ostensibly separate 'public affairs' at local level in Sleat. Elsewhere, a CLI activist has suggested that interpretations of “what democracy means” may need to adjust to “community scale” working (McMorran et al 2013: 24.) The case of Storas Uibhist is interesting here. As already mentioned, this is one of the biggest community land owners, covering 3000 people and three islands totalling over 90,000 acres. It also has one of the more turbulent political histories, and recently (2014) a group of four residents stood to challenge the existing Directors, on a co-ordinated platform. There was considerable controversy around this and they were not voted in. Nevertheless, the challenge was made very openly – in defiance of the kind of social and cultural constraints on the open expression of conflict discussed earlier in this paper. It is possible in this case that not only the scale of Storas Uibhist, but also its dynamic and bold approach to decision-making, has set the tone for its local politics. (More than one seasoned observer of CLIs has suggested to me on that Storas
takes a relatively 'non-consensual' and 'businesslike' approach, pushing decisions through and waiting for the ballot box to deliver the community's verdict; whereas other groups may engage in lengthier local consultations, and in consequence accept a slower pace of development.) These are issues which I hope to be able to consider further in the future.

Finally, I hope this paper also illustrates how much of interest to students of politics and empowerment can be found at local level, including in regions sometimes regarded as 'remote' or 'peripheral' to mainstream British politics: and that it encourages further interest in the Scottish community land movement as it continues to grow and develop.

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