Democratic Interaction in Mass Society, Old and New:
Karl Mannheim and Iris Marion Young

Ryusaku YAMADA
Faculty of International Liberal Arts, Soka University
Hachioji-shi, Tokyo 192-8577, Japan
E-mail: ryusaku@soka.ac.jp

Draft version. Please do not quote.

Introduction

Citizens’ interaction in civil society is not always democratic, and civil society is often ‘uncivil’ (Keane, 1998). If we can regard the actual form of civil society as urban society, how to make city life in such a society more civil and democratic would be a significant question in democratic theory. Communitarians, civic republicans and theorists of social capital seem to seek restoration of ties and associations among atomized individuals and the common good which would make democracy revitalize. However, not a few theorists who advocate pluralist society are skeptical about the restoration of traditional community or Gemeinschaft. We see both negative impersonalization and positive diversity in city life, and, when we consider such a paradox of modern society, we can find a classical term which has recently been forgotten: ‘mass society’.

It was around the 1930s and 1950s when many theorists argued ‘mass society’ (Yamada, 2006, chap. 2). The arguments might be out of date if we only regard them as the explanation of the causes or origins of fascism and/or totalitarianism. However, the theory of mass society also contained several points which still appear in contemporary political and social theory: e.g. the decline of community, atomization, anomie, mass movements, and so on. Many mass society theorists in a broad sense often insisted the significance of intermediate groups or voluntary associations and of the restoration of common life among atomized individuals (Kornhauser, 1959; Halebsky, 1976). These issues relate to discussions on civil society and democracy today. Therefore, it seems that we need to reevaluate ‘mass society’ arguments from the viewpoint of contemporary democratic theory.

This paper examines two theorists who lived in very different times and environments: the one is Karl Mannheim, a sociologist who had Hungarian-German-English backgrounds, and who coined the term ‘mass society’ in the 1930s after he exiled himself from Nazi Germany to England;¹

¹ Mannheim’s thought in his English period (1933-1947) seems to have been forgotten in political
and the other is Iris Marion Young, an American feminist political philosopher who advocated the politics of difference and communicative democracy in the 1990s and early 2000s. These two theorists have hardly been compared as their arguments about democracy seem so different. However, Young repeatedly referred to the term ‘mass society’ in her discussions about the deliberative model of democracy, although she never referenced Mannheim. While Mannheim’s idea of social reconstruction against the crisis of ‘mass society’ was a somewhat communitarian kind, Young was critical about the communitarian ideal of face-face relations and the notion of the common good. Nevertheless, it seems that both of them share a similar orientation towards a sort of citizenship education which fosters democratic interaction of citizens for co-operation and collective problem-solving in a divided ‘mass society’.

This paper first compares what ‘mass society’ meant by Mannheim and Young, then briefly reconsiders Mannheim’s social education in his concept of ‘Planning for Freedom’ as the remedy against negative mass democracy, and thirdly examines Young’s conception of inclusive democratic communication rather than deliberative democracy. Finally, it attempts to show the common understanding between both of them about norms of democratic interaction under the condition of ‘mass society’.

What is ‘Mass Society’?

Mannheim’s Case: Disintegrating Great Society

Mannheim’s basic diagnosis of modern society can be shown as follows:

Most symptoms of maladjustment in modern society can be traced to the fact that a parochial world of small groups expanded into a Great Society in a comparatively short time. This unguided transformation caused manifold disturbances and unsolved problems throughout social life (Mannheim, 1951, 4).

The origin of the term ‘Great Society’ can be found in a British political theorist Graham Wallas’ work The Great Society (1914), and its equivalent is what Mannheim called ‘mass society’ which he first used in Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (Giner, 2001).² Mannheim conceived modern society as a society which has both rational and irrational aspects in the course of industrialization. On the one hand, as a large-scale industrial society, ‘it creates a whole series of

² The original German version of this book was published in 1935 in Netherland, and in this volume the term was ‘Massengesellschaft’.

---

Footnotes:
1. The original German version of this book was published in 1935 in Netherland, and in this volume the term was ‘Massengesellschaft’.
2. The original German version of this book was published in 1935 in Netherland, and in this volume the term was ‘Massengesellschaft’.
actions which are rationally calculable to the highest degree and which depend on a whole series of repressions and renunciations of impulsive satisfactions; and on the other hand, as a mass society, ‘it produces all the irrationalities and emotional outbreaks which are characteristic of amorphous human agglomerations’ (Mannheim, 1940, 61). The antinomies of rationality and irrationality were the serious problem that would cause the total destruction of modern society. Mannheim explained that these antinomies were sustained by two principles: the ‘fundamental democratization of society’ and the process of ‘growing interdependence’. The former means the principle that a growing number of social groups, that formerly had only played a passive part in political life, come to strive for a share in social and political control and to demand their own interests be represented. However, insofar as these social groups come from the intellectually backward masses, irrational mass-psychoses would rule the world in times of crisis. For Mannheim, this brought about the transformation from liberal democracy to ‘democracy of emotions’ (ibid., 44-45). The latter principle, growing interdependence, signifies the great interdependence of all the parts of modern industrial society. He said, while modern society was much more flexible than earlier societies, the interdependence of all its parts came to make the modern order more sensitive than a simpler form of economic organization. ‘Indeed, the more minutely the individual parts of a large mechanism fit into one another, and the more closely the single elements are bound up together, the more serious are the repercussion of even the slightest disturbance’ (ibid., 50). Then, Mannheim showed his pessimistic view on mass democracy:

In a society in which the masses tend to dominate, irrationalities which have not been integrated into the social structure may force their way into political life. This situation is dangerous because the selective apparatus of mass democracy opens the door to irrationalities in those places where rational direction is indispensable. Thus, democracy itself produces its own antithesis and even provides its enemies with their weapons (ibid., 63).

He called this process ‘negative democratization’.4

In his posthumous volume Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, Mannheim enumerated much more concrete aspects of the crisis of ‘mass society’, the crisis which could be found not only in the Weimar Republic but also in modern societies in general including England (Mannheim, 1951, 3-21). I list below some points out of his diagnosis about the crisis which are relevant to our discussion here:

- New social techniques making for minority rule,

---

3 ‘Democracy of emotion’ derived from Max Scheler’s expression ‘Stimmungsdemokratie’.
4 The opposition of intellectual elites and the backward masses can be seen in Mannheim’s arguments, and this is why William Kornhauser classified him in the category of aristocratic critics of mass society (Kornhauser, 1959, 24).
Displacement of self-regulating small groups,
Disintegration of traditional group controls,
Failure of large-scale co-ordination,
Disintegration of co-operative controls,
Disintegration of personalities, and
Disintegration of consensus and of religious bonds.

Here we can see that Mannheim insisted the crisis of social disintegration, and that his ‘mass society’ signified disintegrating Great Society which needed reintegration. He regarded the emergence of totalitarian dictatorship both from left (Bolshevism) and right (Nazism) as a response to the breakdown of laissez-faire and the social destruction. Under this crisis, he came to the conclusion that ‘[w]e are living in an age of transition from laissez-faire to a planned society’ and that the question is whether it will be a good (democratic) planning or a bad one (with dictatorship) (Mannheim, 1943, 1). In his English period, he conceived the ‘Third Way’, which is different from both laissez-faire liberalism and dictatorship, as the remedy against the crisis of mass democracy: the so-called ‘Planning for Freedom’ or ‘democratic planning’. It can be said that the main purpose of his ‘planning’ was the realization of reconstruction, reintegration, coordination and even establishment of co-operation against the destruction of Great Society (Albini, 1970; Bogardus, 1951), although his diagnosis and remedy were criticized and rejected by many theorists (cf. Loader, 1985, 173-189; Woldring, 1986, 316-326), as he expressed his remedy by using the term ‘planning’ which was easily associated with totalitarianism.

**Young’s Case: Differentiated Large-scale Society**

Young lived in a very different context from Mannheim’s, and obviously she coped with different problems. Her idea of the politics of difference in the last decade of the Twentieth Century in America did not concern about social destruction and totalitarian dictatorship, but about what she called ‘structural injustice’ in liberal democracy: domination by some social groups (in particular white, middle class, heterosexual males with healthy bodies), on the one hand; and oppression of other social groups (e.g. women, workers, black, native American, gay and lesbian, et al.) which are different from the mainstream, on the other hand. Young conceived a social group as ‘a collective of persons differentiated from at least one other group by cultural forms, practices, or way of life’ (Young, 1990, 43), neither groups which are based on particular political ideologies nor interest groups. Social groups in the mainstream often take it for granted that their view, their mode of expression, or their life style are ‘universal’ and ‘standard’ one, although they are ‘particular’ in fact. Other social groups which are regarded as ‘different’ from the mainstream continue to be disadvantaged and oppressed in many faces: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence (Young, 1990, 48-63). In short, ‘different’ voices of such disadvantaged
social groups are often dismissed and excluded from decision-making process in the public sphere. Young’s critique of ‘universality’ is influenced by feminism and multiculturalism, and differs from Mannheim’s argument about social reconstruction.

However, we can find the similar understanding about ‘mass society’ between the two theorists when we see how Young used the term in her discussions. For example, her expressions such as ‘city life in urban mass society’ (Young, 1990, 238), ‘modern, mass, economically interdependent societies’ (Young, 1993, 127), ‘the facts of interdependent mass societies’ (Young, 2000, 47) and ‘complex mass society’ (ibid., 167) show that her basic image of ‘mass society’ shares with what Mannheim called ‘growing interdependence’. Young talked ‘large-scale mass societies’ without its clear definition (ibid., 8), but it seems that she inherited traditional understanding of ‘mass society’ from classical sociologists including Mannheim: the development of market economy and urbanization accompanying social interdependency in modern age brought about a ‘mass society’ or ‘Great Society’. For Young, ‘mass society’ is the precondition of ‘large-scale politics of millions of people linked by dense social and economic process and legal framework (ibid., 45). Moreover, she kept globalization in her mind and sometimes used both ‘large-scale mass society’ and ‘global society’ interchangeably, saying that ‘transportation, communication, and economic interdependence have made it unlikely that we could reverse the process of the globalization of societies’ (ibid.).

Young also referred to the decline of community through urbanization when she conceived democracy in large-scale mass societies. However, while many conservative thinkers and sociologists bewailed the atomization and impersonalization of society, Young never idealized small community nor pursued any way of regeneration of traditional community life. Indeed she was sympathetic toward communitarian critique of too much individualist liberalism which is associated with the loss of community. But, she was skeptical about communitarianism as such because, from her viewpoint, it often idealizes closed communal society with face-to-face relations and it tends to regard shared heritage, history, culture, and norms as the condition of good society. ‘The most serious political consequence of the desire for community … is that it often operates to exclude or oppress those experienced as different’ (Young, 1990, 234). Rather, Young proposed a normative ideal of city life as an alternative to both the communitarian ideal and the liberal individualism. What Young meant by ‘city life’ is a form of social relations which she defined as the being together of strangers: in the city ‘persons and groups interact within spaces and institutions they all experience themselves as belonging to, but without those interactions dissolving into unity or commonness’ (ibid., 237). She pointed four virtues of social relations in city life as an ideal as unrealized possibilities of the actual: (1) Social differentiation without exclusion: in the city, social group differences flourish; (2) Variety: diverse people can have a neighborly feeling about their

---

5 Young also called this large-scale politics ‘complex mass politics’ (Young, 2000, 121).
neighborhood through encountering one another; (3) Eroticism: in city life, people can encounter the novel, strange, and surprising; and (4) Publicity: cities provide important public spaces where people interact without becoming unified in a community of ‘shared final ends’ (ibid., 238-240).

Here we can see that Young’s understanding of ‘mass society’ is not only a complex, interdependent large-scale society but also a differentiated urban society. While Mannheim’s diagnosis of ‘mass society’ had communitarian orientation, the direction of Young’ arguments seems in opposition. She pursued how to deepen democracy in ‘mass society’, which can normatively mean a pluralistic society that enables different social groups to live together, but in which ‘structural injustice’ exists.

Mannheim’s Democratic Interaction for Social Reconstruction

Social Education and Social Awareness in the ‘Planning for Freedom’
What Mannheim pursued in his ‘Planning for Freedom’ was not only social reconstruction and reintegration but also the improvement of human ability and personality which prevents the masses from being captured by fascism. The process of the emergence of ‘mass society’, including the decline of community and the increasing bureaucratisation of life, deprived people of social bond and rendered them an uprooted, shapeless and fragile ‘crab without its shell’ (Mannheim, 1943, 95). They could easily be manipulated and mobilized by powerful propaganda through social techniques. Before leaving Germany, Mannheim already warned the irrational ‘democracy of emotions’ mentioned above, saying that ‘[t]he democratization of social life, in the widest sense, and especially the democratization of politics, in the sense of the potential co-participation of the broad masses, makes it imperative to subject the latter to sociological-civic schooling’ (Mannheim, 2001, 150).

Mannheim saw the crisis in valuation in laissez-faire liberalism: ‘there is nothing in our lives, not even on the level of basic habits such as food, manners, behaviour, about which our views are not at variance. We do not even agree as to whether this great variety of opinion is good or bad, whether the greater conformity of the past or the modern emphasis on choice is to be preferred’ (Mannheim, 1943, 14). While Mannheim was committed to value pluralism and rejected totalitarian domination of a single value, he was also critical about value relativism and showed his communitarian kind of view about valuation: ‘it is definitely not good to live in a society whose norms are unsettled and develop in an unsteady way’, and ‘even in peace-time, this variety in valuations tended to become unbearable, especially in marginal situations where a simple “yes” or “no” was required’ (ibid., 14-15). Mannheim insisted that it gradually becomes impossible to make a reasonable choice in the chaos of competing and unreconciled valuations, and that people come to share the fascist view that ‘a bad decision is better than no decision’ (ibid., 15, 25).
Therefore, Mannheim came to be enthusiastic for education which would improve in the political judgment of the average person. In fact, education was indispensable element of his ‘Planning for Freedom’. He criticized what he called the compartmental concept of education, which prevailed in the age of laissez-faire. For him, this kind of education was more or less self-sufficient, isolated from society by an absolute cleavage between home and school. In short, this over-compartmental view of education was ‘society-blind’ (ibid., 56). Mannheim argued that one of the outstanding problems is the lack of awareness in social affairs: the lack accompanied with laissez-faire liberalism which led to haphazard, unplanned dealing with the crisis of ‘mass society’. Here, ‘awareness’ is not the mere accumulation of rational knowledge: it means ‘both in the life of the individual and in that of the community the readiness to see the whole situation in which one finds oneself, and not only to orientate one’s action on immediate tasks and purposes but to base them on a more comprehensive vision’ (ibid., 61). Mannheim conceived social (and adult) education which would cultivate such awareness.

From the viewpoint of refugee from the Central Europe, Mannheim criticized British education under laissez-faire liberalism as follows: British people tended to avoid every opportunity which might lead to a clear statement of the issues at stake. Tolerance and objectivity were confused with neutrality, which was exactly what academic teaching used to aim at. Although the meaning of tolerance is not that nobody should ardently believe his cause but that everybody should have a fair chance to present his case, ‘[t]his attitude of neutrality in our modern democracy went so far that we ceased to believe, out of mere fairness, in our own objectives’ (ibid., 7, 65, 67). As a result,

An education and training which tries to prevent us from thinking about a subject in all ramifications and from taking a stand somewhere is bound to create a human being incapable of offering real resistance when life surrounds him with an arsenal of doctrines and propaganda (ibid., 67-68).

For overcoming this negative neutrality and the crisis in valuation, Mannheim attached importance to education which would foster social awareness. This is different from political education for Marxian kind of class-consciousness, which makes a social group or class ready to fight against another class, and which blinds itself to the factors that make for cohesion and co-operation in society. Instead of such partial awareness, Mannheim insisted total awareness: ‘awareness of the total situation, as far as that is humanly possible, at a given stage of history’ (ibid., 64, my

---

6 Mannheim, in his very later years, became a professor at the Institute of Education, the University of London. He was also appointed chairman of the European division of UNESCO in the fall of 1946, few months before his death.
emphasize).

We can find the origin of Mannheim’s idea of total awareness in his sociology of knowledge before leaving Germany. In *Ideology and Utopia*, he argued that we must regard not only opponents’ but also our own ideas, thoughts, and knowledge as situationally determined ‘ideology’, which must be partial view that cannot be absolute. If someone insists that he or she has discovered some nostrum of the absolute and recommends it to others, this is ‘merely a sign of the loss of and the need for intellectual and moral certainty, felt by broad sections of the population who are unable to look life in the face’ (Mannheim, 1936, 77). On the contrary, the awareness of the situationally determined nature of one’s ideas and knowledge would open the door to the relativization of one’s perspectives, which reduces to a minimum the tendency of self-apotheosis. Through this effort, ‘the one-sidedness of our own point of view is counteracted, and conflicting intellectual positions may actually come to supplement one another’ (ibid., 76, my emphasis).

Mannheim called his intellectual position not ‘relativism’ but ‘relationism’, which signifies that ‘all of the elements of meaning in a given situation have reference to one another and derive their significance from this reciprocal interrelationship in a given frame of thought’ (ibid.). Relationism would make it possible to overcome the partiality of our idea or knowledge, and to have a total view, which implies both the assimilation and transcendence of the limitation of particular points of view. Here, ‘totality’ means neither an eternally valid vision of reality nor a self-contained and stable view. Rather, a total view represents ‘the continuous process of the expansion of knowledge, and has as its goal not achievement of a super-temporary valid conclusion but the broadest possible extension of our horizon of vision’ (ibid., 94-95, my emphasis). It can be said that Mannheim’s relationism in his German period was consistent with his conception of awareness of the total situation in his ‘Planning for Freedom’ in his English period. The purpose of Mannheim’s social education was to foster such awareness both in elites and common people.

**Integrative Behavior and Creative Tolerance**

Mannheim thought that absolutization of any partial views cuts a society into pieces and makes agreement and co-operation impossible. For him, if democracy is to survive, our society needs persons with democratic personality which accompanies the awareness of shared responsibility for social reconstruction. Then, we must clarify what kind of human behavior or attitude Mannheimian education aimed at for realizing reintegration of divided ‘mass society’.

Mannheim rejected both value-neutrality of laisse-faire liberalism and totalitarianism.

---

7 Mannheim called this kind of understanding of ideology ‘the general total conception of ideology’: ‘the ideological element in human thought, viewed at this level, is always bound up with the existing life-situation of the thinker. According to this view human thought arises, and operates, not in a social vacuum but in a definite social milieu’ (Mannheim, 1936, 71). His original German conception which signifies the situationally determined nature of knowledge is ‘Seinsgebundenheit’.
unification and enforcement of a specific value. ‘Planning for Freedom’ as the Third Way required individuals and social groups to achieve spontaneous integration of consensus in disintegrating ‘mass society’ towards the common purpose of the reconstruction of democratic society, and Mannheimian education pursued the transformation of human personality which would realize such integration. Mannheim called what he advocated as the essence of required democratic personality ‘integrative behavior’ (Mannheim, 1951, 200). According to him, ‘the important element in this conception of integrative behavior is that the person who acts in its spirit is not only unwilling to superimpose his own view and will upon the other fellow – the essence of domineering attitude – but he is tolerant of disagreement’ (ibid., 201). This ‘integrative behavior’ can be distinguished from compromise, which is mere rational adjustment between two or more opposing views and wills: ‘it is only a matter of expediency that the parties sacrifice some of the original claims. No dynamic progress, no truly creative power is expressed by compromise’ (ibid., 203). Mannheim said that integrative behavior is more than compromise:

He is tolerant not for the sake of compromise, but in the expectation of enlarging his own personality by absorbing some features of a human being essentially different from himself. Practically, this means that the democratic personality welcomes disagreement because it has the courage to expose itself to change (ibid., 201).

It means that people, through fully aware of the fact that differences of constitution and social position, of drives and interests, shape their experience and attitude to life in different ways, yet transmute their different approaches for the purpose of co-operating in a common way of life. (ibid., 203).

Rather than mere rational compromise among opposing views and exclusion of opponents, Mannheim’s ‘integrative behavior’ contained the ideal of ‘creative tolerance’, which is the task of establishing a common purpose and real co-operation with dissenters who are forever in ferment (ibid., 205).

For Mannheim, ‘integrative behavior’ was a significant element of democratic personality which is required not only for political elites in parliament but also for the masses. He insisted that ‘democracy can only function if democratic self-discipline is strong enough to make people agree on concrete issues for the sake of common action, even if they differ on details’ and that ‘this self-restraint will only be produced on the parliamentary scene if the same virtues are being exercised

---

8 Mannheim insisted that ‘[i]t is wrong to think that these integrating efforts are necessarily superimposed on natural group life, whereas the disintegrating forces, i.e. individual and group selfishness, are genuine’ (Mannheim, 1943, 29).

9 This expression derived from psychologists H. H. Anderson and D. W. Harding.
in everyday life’ (Mannheim, 1943, 27). In short, the ultimate purpose of Mannheimian education for social awareness was to produce democratic persons who embody ‘integrative behavior’ and the virtue of ‘creative tolerance’.

Now we can regard both ‘integrative behavior’ and ‘creative tolerance’ as the core of Mannheim’s requirement of democratic interaction. His requirement was based on his diagnosis of his time: in the age of interrelated ‘mass society’ which needed planning for its reconstruction, the necessity of the ethics of responsibility increasingly came to the fore. The ethic expects us to foresee some of the immediate consequences of our actions and be responsible for them (Mannheim, 1943, 112). Mannheim already referred to this ethics in his German period: the history of mankind came to a stage in which ‘action should not only be in accord with the dictates of conscience, but should take into consideration the possible consequences of the action in so far as they are calculable’ and ‘conscience itself should be subjected to critical self-examination in order to eliminate all the blindly and compulsively operating factors’ (Mannheim, 1936, 170-71). Therefore, it can be said that Mannheim’s version of democratic interaction contains some elements: the awareness of partiality of our ideas, perspectives, and knowledge through self-examination; the awareness of the total situation; and enlargement of (and willingness to change, if necessary) our view and personality.

**Young’s Inclusive Democratic Interaction in City Life**

**A Heterogeneous Public and Differentiated Citizenship**

Next, we will consider what kind of democratic interaction Young conceived in the public sphere which has the form of ‘mass society’. First of all, let us begin with examination of her understanding of public life and citizenship.

Young criticized interest group pluralism, which prevails among liberal democracies, as it tends to fragment and reduces politics only to private bargaining for the sake of private gain. So she was sympathetic towards participatory democracy and civic republicanism to some extent for the restoration of public life and citizenship (Young, 1989, 250-252). However, she was also critical about the republican kind of participation in the public sphere because she saw that it is not suitable for the reality of city life in differentiated ‘mass society’, in which some social groups are privileged and other groups are oppressed, disadvantaged and excluded under ‘structural injustice’ mentioned above. Dominating, or privileged, mainstream groups ‘behave as though they have a right to speak

---

10 Needless to say, this ethic derived from Max Weber’s notion of ‘Verantwortungsethik’.
11 This term is often used for signifying Schumpeterian kind of democracy and, as I discuss later, Young called this the ‘aggregative’ model of democracy in comparison to the ‘deliberative’ model.
and be heard’ and they ‘have the material, personal, and organizational resources that enable them to speak and be heard in public’ (ibid., 262). Such privileged groups tend to regard their particular values and perspectives as ‘universal’ and they are not aware of their unjust privilege. Therefore, Young was highly skeptical about the notion of ‘universality’ (cf. Medina, 2014).

For Young, the problem of the republican ideal of universal citizenship is that ‘universality’ or ‘generality’ is easily identified with ‘sameness’ and ‘homogeneity’: ‘the idea that citizenship is the same for all translated in practice to the requirement that all citizens be the same’ (Young, 1989, 254). According to her, republican kind of citizenship is based on dichotomy such as universal vs. particular, or common vs. differentiated. Such dichotomy assumes that citizens who participate in public activities share a universal perspective, common interests, and a general will, and that those who have particular or differentiated needs, interests, and desires must not be included in the public sphere because they are too motivated by private interests to adopt a general viewpoint. Under the structural injustice, ‘insisting that as citizens persons should leave behind their particular affiliations and experiences to adopt a general point of view serves only to reinforce that privilege; for the perspectives and interests of the privileged will tend to dominate this unified public, marginalizing or silencing those of other groups’. Therefore, as long as universality is identified with generality, the ideal of universal citizenship tends to exclude some groups even when the members of them have formally equal citizenship status (ibid., 254-257).

Young insisted that group differentiation is an inevitable and desirable process in modern societies, and the dichotomy of the homogeneous public sphere vs. the particularistic private sphere is inadequate. Therefore, she advocated ‘heterogeneous public’ rather than homogeneous public, and ‘differentiated citizenship’ instead of universal citizenship. She criticized the assumption of universal citizenship that all citizens should have the impartial, general viewpoint as follows:

… such an impartial general perspective is a myth. People necessarily and properly consider public issues in terms influenced by their situated experience and perception of social relations. Different social groups have different needs, cultures, histories, experiences, and perceptions of social relations which influence their interpretation of the meaning and consequences of policy proposals and influence the form of their political reasoning (ibid., 257).

No groups can claim to speak in the general interest, and, Young insisted, it is required that all experiences, needs, and perspectives on social events have a voice and are respected (ibid., 262-263). In a heterogeneous public, differences are publicly recognized and acknowledged as irreducible. Although persons from one perspective or history can never completely understand and adopt the viewpoint of those with other group-based perspectives and histories, ‘commitment to the need and desire to decide together the society’s policies fosters communication across those differences’ (ibid.,
In order to realize such communication and to overcome the structural injustice, Young advocated group representation as the means to have all group experience and social perspectives voiced, heard, and taken account of in the public. Here we do not need to closely examine the institutional mechanisms of such group representation. What we need to understand is that she proposed group representation for provision of the opportunity for some to express their needs and interests who would not likely be heard without such representation. She expected that this representation would promote substantial participation and inclusion of oppressed or disadvantaged social groups (ibid., 263).

By advocating ‘heterogeneous public’ and group representation, Young did not intend to encourage the expression of narrow self-interest which would make social division unreconcilable. Rather, she said that group representation is the best antidote to self-deceiving self-interest masked as an impartial or general interest: in a democratic public ‘individuals or groups cannot simply assert that they want something; they must say that justice requires or allows that they have it’. When we confront the opinion of others who have explicitly different experiences, priorities and needs, ‘the test of whether a claim on the public is just, or mere expression of self-interest, is best made’. Furthermore, group representation also maximizes knowledge expressed in discussion, and thus promotes practical wisdom: ‘different groups have different ways of understanding the meaning of social events, which can contribute to the others’ understanding if expressed and heard’ (ibid., 263-264).

In short, what Young conceived in her ‘differentiated citizenship’ is a kind of democracy which enables citizens to think his or her needs, interests, or desires, in relation to those of others. Individuals and social groups will be aware of the partiality of their own perspectives when particular perspectives are expressed in the public sphere rather than locked up in the private sphere. Such argument by Young is often regarded as her rejection of liberal tradition (cf. Faulks, 2000, 84-88; Kenny, 2004, 129-140). From my viewpoint, however, her argument is quite similar to Mannheimian notion of relationism, especially for his requirement of the relativization of our own perspectives to reduce the tendency of self-apotheosis. Young’s statement that ‘unless confronted with different perspectives on social relations and events, different values and language, most people tend to assert their own perspective as universal’ (ibid. 262) reminds us of Mannheim’s assertion that conflicting intellectual positions may come to supplement one another when the one-sidedness of

---

12 Young’s ‘group representation’ was criticized asessentialist identity politics which is not so different from interest group pluralism (Mouffe, 1993, 85-86). But, Young asserted that a social group does not have essential, substantive identity because such a group is a product of social relations: ‘[s]ometimes groups define themselves by despising or excluding others whom they define as other, and whom they dominate and oppress’ and ‘[m]ost people in modern societies have multiple group identification … and therefore groups themselves are not discrete unities’ (Young, 1989, 260). Young insisted that a social group must be understood in relation to other groups (cf. Dryzek, 2000, 62).
our own point of view is counteracted. Both Mannheim and Young seem to share a requirement of the awareness of our situtationally determined nature of knowledge and viewpoints,\textsuperscript{13} the awareness which would lead to what he called ‘the broadest possible extension of our horizon of vision’.

**Communicative Democracy and ‘Reasonableness’**

Young’s critique of the ideal of universal citizenship and her assertion of ‘heterogeneous public’ lead to her conception of democratic communication in ‘mass society’. On the basis of John Dewey’s understanding of democracy as a method of collective problem-solving, she conceived democracy as ‘a process in which a large collective discuss problems such as these that they face together, and try to arrive peaceably at solutions in whose implementation everyone will co-operate’ (Young, 2000, 28), and it is well known that especially after the 1990s she committed to deliberative democracy (with reservation, which will be examined later).

Young’s democratic theory inspired those who study contemporary citizenship education. One of them, Elizabeth Frazer, summarizes implications of Young’s theory about political skills which democratic citizens must acquire through education. I list below some of Frazer’s points which are relevant to our discussion here (Frazer, 2006, 48-49, her emphasis):

1. The articulation of one’s own cultural, social, moral, political, ethnic, religious, and personal values and identity in a way that is as authentic as possible,
2. Citizen have to learn to communicate the truth of these values and identity to others who, in the first place, do not share them, and further might be antipathetic to them, and
3. There is the reciprocal obligation to learn how to listen to, and to hear, the voices, stories, narratives, protests, and indeed values and identities of others, delivered in diverse voices, voices that are unfamiliar.

This shows that Young’s theory of the politics of difference stresses not only that citizens who belong to different social groups talk, narrate, or express their own needs and experiences, but also that they hear or listen to those of others. Young did not necessarily assert that these skills must be learned and trained in school education. Rather, through citizens’ practice of discussion in the public sphere, they will be aware of the partiality of their own perspectives and learn to understand his or her needs and experiences in relation to other social groups. Here we can regard such practice as Young’s version of democratic interaction.

Young contrasted the ‘deliberative’ model of democracy with the ‘aggregative’ model, and highly regarded the former. The latter signifies interest group pluralism (mentioned above), which privatizes politics and regards democracy simply as a mechanism for aggregating subjective

\textsuperscript{13} Later, Young called particular knowledge that arises from individuals’ experience in their social positions ‘situated knowledges’ by referring to feminist epistemologists (Young, 2004), and it has substantial affinity with Mannheim’s notion of situationally determination of knowledge.
preferences of atomized citizens. ‘This model lacks any distinct idea of a public formed from the interaction of democratic citizens and their motivation to reach some decision. Thus there is no account of the possibility of political co-ordination and co-operation’ (Young, 2000, 20, her emphasis). On the contrary, the former, ‘deliberative’ model, is an alternative model of democracy which are associated with open discussion, dialogue, reasoning, and persuasion: ‘[p]articipants arrive at a decision not by determining what preferences have greatest numerical support, but by determining which proposals the collective agrees are supported by the best reasons’ (ibid., 22-23). For Young, the ‘deliberative’ model is more adequate than the ‘aggregative’ one for promoting co-operation of citizens and solving collective problems in the public sphere.

However, Young was very critical about a type of deliberative democracy which assumes homogeneity and unity of citizens for several reasons: (1) many theorists of deliberative democracy implicitly assume small-group face-to-face discussion, but this assumption seems irrelevant to ‘mass society’ where the relations among members are complexly mediated rather than direct and face to face (Young, 2000, 45); (2) deliberative democracy often assumes ‘argument’ (an orderly chain of reasoning from premises to conclusion) as the primary form of political communication, and it also tends to require participants in political discussion the norms of ‘articulateness’ and ‘dispassionateness’, but such assumption and requirement are based on the speech culture of white, middle-class men, and they can exclude those who have different modes of expression and who do not share such premises (ibid., 37-39, 48; Young, 1996, 122-126); and (3) many theorists of deliberative democracy stress the idea of the common good for achieving agreement, or assume common interests or common way of life as a prior condition of deliberation, but ‘definitions of the common good are likely to express the interests and perspectives of the dominant groups in generalized terms’ (Young, 2000, 40, 43). While Young never denied any possibilities to reach agreement through deliberation, she insisted that ‘[a] discussion is liable to break down if participants with deep conflicts of interest and value pretend they have common interests, because they are unable to air their differences’ (ibid., 44).

Young called her version of inclusive democratic interaction ‘communicative democracy’ rather than deliberative democracy (Young, 1996, 69). On the basis of the conception of ‘heterogeneous public’ and ‘differentiated citizenship’, her communicative democracy would foster communicative engagement among different individuals and social groups. There are two significant points: the one is that she considered ‘difference’ as a resource, rather than obstacle, of democratic communication; and the other is that she expected transformation of one’s own ideas, opinions, and perspectives through public discussions.

---

This paper does not discuss many variations of deliberative democracy. See, for example, Dryzek (2000); Gutmann and Thompson (2004).
If differently positioned citizens engage in public discussion with the aim of solving problems with a spirit of openness and mutual accountability, then these conditions are sufficient for transformative deliberation. They need not be committed to a common interest or a common good; indeed, their stance of openness and mutual accountability requires them to attend to their particular differences in order to understand the situation and perspectives of others. They share problems to be solved, to be sure; otherwise they would have no need for discussion. It does not follow, however, that they share a good or an interest beyond that (Young, 2002, 229).

Here, Young insisted that what different citizens and social groups share is not a common good but problems to be solved, and how to understand and interpret the problems depends on each citizen or group. Therefore, communication among difference is required, and it is difference which is resource and precondition of such communication. Through the practice of public discussion, citizens would relativize their own perspectives and their openness and mutual accountability would be developed. Young never advocated any kind of citizenship education which infuses a common good into the minds of citizens.

Young conceived four normative ideals for her inclusive democratic communication as follows (Young, 2000, 23-25): (1) Inclusion: all those affected by a decision are included in the process of discussion and decision-making; (2) Political equality: all those who are included in decision-making ought to have an equal right and effective opportunity to express their interests and concerns, as well as to question one another; (3) Reasonableness: people need to be willing to listen to others who want to explain to them why their ideas are incorrect or inappropriate, and also to be willing to change their opinions or preferences as a result of respectful persuasion by others; and (4) Publicity: the interaction among participants in a democratic decision-making process forms a public in which people hold one another accountable, and in which they speak with the reflective idea that third parties might be listening. Here, ‘reasonableness’ is the requirement of transformative deliberation (mentioned in the quotation from Young above), and it seems to signify the indispensable aspect of the democratic interaction: the process of democratic discussion consists not only of expression but also of transformation of the preferences, interests, beliefs, and judgments of participants (ibid., 26).

Inspired by Chantal Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism, Young regarded the normal condition of democratic debate among different social groups as a process of struggle, which is a process of communicative engagement of citizens with one another. ‘The process of democratic struggle is an attempt to engage others in debate about social problems and proposed solutions, engage them in a

15 ‘[W]ithin the context of the political community, the opponent should be considered not as an enemy to be destroyed, but as an adversary whose existence is legitimate and must be tolerated. We will fight against his ideas but we will not question his right to defend them’ (Mouffe, 1993, 4).
project of explaining and justifying their positions’ (ibid., 50). ‘Reasonableness’ is required here: the reasonable person is obliged to try to persuade others of the justice of his or her claims and to exhibit a willingness to be persuaded by them (ibid., 48). Furthermore,

Being reasonable … entails expressing persuasive disagreement in terms of basic respect: one cannot express disagreement with, or criticism and judgment of, the actions and opinions of others in terms that imply that one’s opponents are less than human or that their views do not deserve an equal hearing because of who they are—as long as they are willing to listen in turn. Thus ‘hate speech’ … is rightly condemned as ‘uncivil’ (ibid.).

It can be said that Young’s requirement of ‘reasonableness’ is virtually same as Mannheimian notion of ‘integrative behavior’ and ‘creative tolerance’, which admits to a possibility of being persuaded by others (hearing or listening) and to a transformation of our opinions (relativization of perspectives). We need to recall that Mannheim’s ‘creative tolerance’ signifies the task of establishing a common purpose and real co-operation with dissenters who are forever in ferment.

Conclusion

Traditional ties among people have been weakened, and the homogeneity of society cannot be assumed – this is the fact of ‘mass society’. How to evaluate this fact must be ambivalent. As Mannheim saw the disintegration of society and negative mass democracy in the fact, ‘mass society’ can be a hotbed of various social pathology including fascism. On the other hand, as Young preferred the ideal of city life rather than community, ‘mass society’ can be a pluralistic society which includes diversity of culture and way of life. While Mannheim pursued communitarian kind of social reintegration against value relativism, Young rejected the common good and rather attempted to make oppressed difference visible. Nevertheless, Mannheimian emphasis of reintegration and Youngian emphasis of difference are not always contradictory: Mannheim thoroughly rejected monolithic domination of a single value, and he committed himself on value pluralism while rejecting laissez-faire liberalism; and Young pursued social inclusion and co-operation without assimilation of the others, and she never affirmed social disintegration, fragmentation or separatism. Even if the term ‘mass society’ is rarely used in contemporary political theory, the sociological insight about ‘mass society’ is still relevant when we consider social precondition of democracy.

What Mannheim and Young have in common is an awareness of the dangerousness of absolutization of partial views, perspectives or understandings on politics and society under the
condition of ‘mass society’. For making interaction among people or groups democratic, both theorists showed their ideals such as ‘integrative behavior’ and ‘creative tolerance’ (Mannheim) and ‘reasonableness’ (Young). Both of them seem to espouse norms of democratic interaction as follows: (1) hearing the other side: all of needs, interests, experiences, and perspectives should be presented and heard in the public sphere; (2) the awareness of the partiality of one’s viewpoints: all of them must be understood in relation to others; and (3) self-examination and relativization: any parties must be ready for self-transformation through communication with others.

References

Mannheim, K. (1936 [1929]), Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge, London:


