Civic pride generally presumes the presence of an uncontested heritage, common values about identity, trust in the political and constitutional dispensation, and a perception of equitable ownership of the benefits of the political and economic dispensations. South Africa’s history, however, is one of contested heritages, polarised nationalisms, wide-ranging claims on identities and counter-identities and racially-determined socio-economic inequalities. Therefore there is no ostensible foundation for a national sense of civic pride.

In response to apartheid the transitional and transformational philosophy is predicated on nation-/state-building and democratisation. It includes national reconciliation, constitution-making with a strong human rights emphasis, redress of structural inequalities, efforts to memorialise the past and an emphasis on social cohesion. Given the social engineering numerous questions arise about the role of civic pride in transitions. The research question for this study is: can civic pride be a contemporaneous by-product of nation-/state-building in South Africa after 1994 or will it only be a consequence of nation-building on the long-term (in other words, that consensus about a national identity is a prerequisite for civic pride)? Is there a qualitative correlation between the quality of democracy and the prevalence of civic pride?

1 INTRODUCTION

Civic pride is not a political concept often used in South Africa. Possibly two reasons can explain it: firstly the South African political lexicon uses concepts derived from a liberation tradition, from a transitional, democratisation and developmental era while ‘civic pride’ is arguably related to Almond & Verba’s (1965) ‘civic culture’ in a liberal democratic tradition. It does not mean that civic pride’s substance is not relevant for South Africa and similar contexts.

In the first section a working definition for this paper of ‘civic pride’ is developed. It poses several questions about it relationship with related concepts and its possible implications for other concepts. The research problem which follows from it is about how to approach civic pride in South Africa given the fact that its modern history until the 1990s was a negation of most of the assumptions of civic pride. Therefore a section follows in which a synthesis is made of the constituting elements of civic pride in South Africa, both as positive and negative factors, and how they relate to national identity and democracy.
2 CIVIC PRIDE

Like most social science concepts ‘civic pride’ is not (yet) captured in one universally-acceptable definition or description. For this purpose of this discussion it is aligned to the ‘civic culture’ as set out by Almond & Verba (1965). They described it as ‘a third culture, neither traditional nor modern but partaking of both; a pluralistic culture based on communication and persuasion, a culture of consensus and diversity, a culture that permitted change but moderated it’ (Almond & Verba 1965: 6). They emphasised the attitudinal aspect of political culture and described it as the ‘attitudes towards the political system and its various parts, and attitudes towards the role of the self in the system’ (page 12). Civic culture is therefore situated in a pluralistic and liberal tradition with no hegemonic or consensus requirements and is the product of attitudes (and therefore also perceptions).

Almond & Verba concentrated in their study of civic culture on people’s attitudes towards their political systems as a whole; to some degree comparable with the World Valued Surveys later directed by Ronald Inglehart and others. These attitudes they compartmentalised into three categories: input affect, output affect and system affect. The latter they operationalised as ‘national pride’, arguably similar to ‘civic pride’. They tested the following aspects of a nation in which people have pride: their governmental and political institutions, social legislation, their position in international affairs, their economic system, characteristics of the people, their national contribution to the arts, the physical attributes of their country, and a few more (Almond & Verba 1965: 63-64). The result in the early 1960s showed that Americans were proud of their governmental and political institutions and their economic system but not so much of their characteristics as a people, their contributions to the arts or the physical attributes of their country. The British were proud of their governmental and political institutions, their characteristics as a people and their social legislation but not about their contribution to the arts and their country’s physical attributes. Italians on the other hand, were proud of their contribution to the arts and Italy’s physical attributes but not about their economic system or their governmental and political institutions (Almond & Verba 1965: 64).

These results already provide some suggestions how to approach civic pride as a concept. It generalises about national characteristics but does not reveal any pluralistic differences. The two authors briefly referred to two socio-economic indicators as reflective of pluralistic elements: the levels of education and occupation. Their research results (1965: 68) showed that in Germany and Italy the two indicators made little impact on their sense of national pride while the expectation was that both will increase the level of pride. An explanation for these results was that both nations experienced high levels of alienation from their political systems, because it could not be explained on the basis of lack of awareness of their political systems (1965: 68). Such an explanation the 1990s or 2000s would be similar to the anti-politics (Stoker 2010), the occupy movements and the protests ranging from Turkey to Hong Kong to Brazil and South Africa.

In summary, as a minimum civic pride is determined by sets of attitudes about at least following three focus areas: firstly, the levels of trust in and credibility enjoyed by public
institutions and public representatives and officials; secondly the level of structural or systemic legitimacy or public acceptance of national socio-economic conditions (such as inequality, unemployment, sovereign debt), and thirdly, attitudes about national characteristics (like human capital), systemic efficiency of the economy and political system, and the national beauty (national and building landscape and culture).

Arguably, civic pride makes use of the following five assumptions. The first is that civic pride is determined by the presence of either a common heritage or a diverse but uncontested heritage. The historical component of civic pride depends on a common historical memory, a common sense of heroes and villains, friends and enemies, victories and defeats. A divided society – the two Sudans, north and south Mali, even Quebec or the Basques – is unlikely to share common civic pride. Diversity is not per se a disqualification of civic pride but then the historical heritage must not be contested. Writing or rewriting history or constructing an ‘official’ history can be a source of division and not a basis for civic pride. It has implications for which history is taught at school, which national heritage sites are official and which don’t enjoy that status, which national days are commemorated and which not, and in extreme cases, which language has an official status and which not.

The second assumption is that civic pride is hugely influenced by the national identity narrative. It depends on common values associated with identity and therefore civic pride is also partly normative in nature. What are the required norms a person should have to share a national identity?: like individualism and liberty or communitarianism and equity, spiritual commitments and their relationship with the values of authority or work ethics, a republican or monarchical tradition, traditional or secular worldviews, and more. The World Value Surveys are useful sources to develop this point further.

The third assumption is that civic pride is not only about being proud of physical features, an impressive history or artistic and technological achievements but also of the efficiency of the state. Arguably, civic pride depends on a state being a functioning and legitimate social compact. It assumes a sense of national integration, of socio-economic equity and political inclusivity, and therefore structurally-determined uneven development, marginalisation or even discrimination will undermine civic pride. The procedural-substantive debate on democracy is also relevant for this assumption. In several societies, including South Africa, the presence or quality of democracy depends more on a public perception that democracy delivers positive socio-economic products than on constitutional rights.

The fourth assumption is that civic pride is also determined by the level of trust or credibility in the political system and public institutions. How much does the population trust the national constitution – is it a symbol of national unity? Are political institutions, parties and politicians trusted? Who in civil society enjoy high credibility levels? How credible are conventional participatory institutions like elections in terms of voter registration and voter turn-out? Protest politics has become embedded in many political cultures, either in the form of international NGOs or local social movements.
The fifth assumption is that civic pride as a national feature is secular, post-traditional and not parochial, ethnic, tribal, regional or religious. It is therefore being proud of the ‘public’ and not the ‘private’. Traditional societies were normally organised in terms of ethnic or tribal affiliations but with this emphasis on national values or national heritage civic pride has to be post-traditional. Ostensibly it is then in conflict with history which includes the pre-modern or traditional periods. Political unification and revisionist historiography normally serve as vehicles to reconcile traditional history with national unity. Many societies have uniquely regional features and in some instances they constitute political sub-cultures which are coexisting with a national political culture (like in Quebec or Catalonia) or which are secessionist sub-cultures (like the Kurds, Biafra, Kosovo or the Afrikaner volkstaat). In both instances civic pride can be present but its nature will differ – as either national or local. (In this paper the focus is only on national civic pride and not the local, which has presumably quite different characteristics).

Civic pride becomes more contentious in the process of determining what its normative or descriptive value is. The question, for example, is whether there are particular prescriptions or norms that a group, society or state have to comply with before they can experience civic pride? Does it need to be democratic, be nationally unified, share a common history or memory, and a common value system? What about immigrants or other persons who do not share them; are they excluded from the civic experience? Some of these aspects have been discussed as part of the assumptions. The question of democracy has specific relevance for this question. As a premise it could be argued that democracy is not a prerequisite norm, because non-democracies like North Korea or Russia certainly have a sense of civic pride. Democracy, on the other hand, as the product of a long human rights struggle, independence movement or a post-conflict transition is often regarded as a national achievement and therefore a source of civic pride. In some instances a well-functioning democracy or the experience of a successful democratic transition can also be regarded as a model and an ‘export product’ to other states, and that in itself becomes a focus of civic pride. However, democracy per se is not a normative precondition for civic pride, except if it is argued civic pride in non-democracies is actually indoctrinated nationalism and that civic pride can only be possible as a free choice in an open system.

A rather complex aspect of civic pride is its relationship with nationalism, patriotism and war. Nationalism and patriotism are both concerned with the nation and/or the state and in that respect they overlap with civic pride. Ethnonationalism as a sub-group of nationalism would be less relevant for civic pride than for example ‘civic nationalism’ (Degenaar no date) which depends on the unifying power of state symbols, or Benedict Anderson’s (2000) ‘imagined communities’. Nationalism as a programme of action to achieve national self-determination glorifies national and culture features, accentuates their uniqueness, emphasises historical against the nation, and therefore depends on civic pride. Patriotism is a narcissist love of your state and is therefore in some respects synonymous with civic pride. War shares a symbiotic relationship with patriotism, except in the case of ‘democratic peace’ or the contention that democratic states don’t engage in war with one another (Russett et al 1995). Military service in democratic states is, however, considered as a form of patriotism, and often the military
articulates a sense of national power or civic pride and civic duty. On the other hand, the military is not always regarded as a source of pride and a benevolent national agency for security but in many developing states as part of a patrimonial state motivated by political and material self-interest. The problematic relationship with nationalism is whether civic pride can be experienced exclusively on the individual level without any collective association such as the ‘nation’ of nationalism – in other words, can it be experienced at the individual level or only in a collective context?

Paradoxically, civic pride can also be associated with public humiliation, such as a war defeat, occupation by a foreign force or by discrimination. Pariah states such as Taiwan, Iran, North Korea or South Africa in the past often experience high levels of civic pride, because of their perception that the world ‘discriminate’ against them while they represent a noble cause. Their unique situation is then a source of civic pride. Suffering on a large-scale (such as the Holocaust, genocides or concentration camps during war periods) becomes symbols of national survival and therefore civic pride. Humiliation by war defeats (such as Versailles or the Battle of Kosovo for the Serbs) is often converted into motivations for nationalism and ultimately civic pride.

This section has set the parameters of civic pride for a more specific look at South Africa. In the following section the dilemma of civic pride in South Africa is presented.

3 A DIVIDED SOCIETY AND CIVIC PRIDE

South Africa’s history is one of discrimination, prejudice, prescribed identities and divisions. The result is separate notions of history and heritage, contesting nationalisms, wide-ranging claims on identity and counter-identities, racially-determined socio-economic inequalities and according to the South African Communist Party (Bunting 1981: 299-300), a national question characterised as ‘colonialism of a special type’. It was special because the coloniser and colonised share the same country, and ‘White South Africa’ was typical of an advanced capitalist society while ‘Black South Africa’ was typical of a colonial situation. Is it possible for a national civic pride to emerge out of this?

Between 1990 and 1999 a negotiated transition towards democratisation transformed the situation. It was underpinned by a transformational philosophy of nation-/state-building which included national reconciliation, constitution-making with a strong human rights basis, redress of structural inequalities (land, employment, business ownership) and efforts to memorialise the past (such as Freedom Park, Apartheid Museum, new town and street names, heritage sites and monuments).

The research question derived from this background is: can civic pride be a contemporaneous by-product of nation-/state-building in South Africa or will it only be a consequence of nation-building on the long-term? Does it imply that a consolidated national identity is a prerequisite for civic pride? Moreover, is there a qualitative relationship between the quality of democracy in South Africa and civic pride?
Since 1994 a tumultuous period transition politics followed: on the one hand its successes were described as a ‘miracle’; on the other hand South Africa has become the most unequal society in the world. On the one hand it established a human rights based constitution protected by an impressive Constitutional Court; on the other hand xenophobic attacks in 2008 and 2015 or police abuses have undermined a human rights culture. On the one hand South Africa is the 27th biggest economy in GDP terms and a member of BRICS and the G20; on the other hand its governance capacity is limited and electricity interruptions undermined confidence in public management and caused wide-spread service delivery protests. Domestic violence and corruption and the legacy of apartheid violence undermine the society’s social fabric. The release of police Colonel Eugene de Kock in 2015 after 20 years’ imprisonment for apartheid crimes reignited debates about transitional justice and the fact that many perpetrators of human rights violations escaped any form of judicial actions. On the other hand, President Zuma, earlier involved in the ANC’s intelligence and constitutional negotiations, also challenged the moral legacy of the transition with his incrimination in corruption and nepotism. This sketch poses the challenge whether democratisation and the transition have made a significant difference and promoted the likelihood for civic pride to emerge. It also poses the question: is civic pride indispensable for South Africa? This question should be tested against the function that civic pride is supposed to fulfil in a society, namely that of political socialisation. In South Africa socialisation would be to transmit democratic values from the older generations to the younger ones, and to inculcate them with the values of the transition (or South Africa’s social contract).

4 SOUTH AFRICAN FRAMEWORK FOR CIVIC PRIDE

Though civic pride is not part of the political lexicon in South Africa its meaning resonates with several features and initiatives in the public sphere or taken by civil society. A framework for civic pride can therefore be established which can identify the issues and areas most relevant for it.

A recent indicator of national issues has been the State of the Nation address by President Zuma on 17 June 2014 in Parliament. This is the clearest suggestion in recent times that the government wants to promote the sentiments of civic pride. The following are excerpts from the speech:

The South African National Defence Force has been a source of national pride (my emphasis) as it participated in peacekeeping missions in the continent. …

Looking back at one of the worst horror stories in recent history, we are reminded of the fact that we need to prioritise healing and nation building (my emphasis) more than ever before.

We must continue to build understanding, tolerance and reconciliation, and together fight racism, xenophobia, homophobia and all related intolerances.
The use of *sport and culture* (my emphasis) as a unifying factor in our country will continue during this term. We will also continue to promote the *Constitution* (my emphasis) in schools and ensure that our children grow up with *positive values and love* for their country and its people (my emphasis).

We will continue to build *inclusive heritage* (my emphasis) over the next five years through building monuments and other symbols that honour the heroes of the struggle that delivered the freedom and democracy we enjoy today. …..

This year will also see the listing of the CODESA *Multi-Party Negotiating Forum* (my emphasis) Records in the International Memory of the World Register.

Next month the country and the world will mark International *Mandela* day (my emphasis).

Let us begin planning for a major clean-up of our cities, towns, townships, villages, schools and *beautify* (my emphasis) every part of our country (Zuma 2014).

By grouping the emphasised words together an impression emerges about how civic pride is perceived or envisioned in official circles at the moment. A comparison with the same agenda twenty years ago under President Mandela’s lead will indicate some similarities but also some significant changes in emphasis. Currently the official emphasis is on political aspects and the transition, sport, culture and heritage, as indicated by the Zuma speech. When compared with the views of South Africans in general, their emphasis on what makes them proud is slightly different. A survey at the end of 2012 concluded that national pride was focused on cultural diversity (28%), the achievements of the South African democracy (18%), the beautiful landscape (15%), and the people in general (14%) (De Kock 2013: [4]).

These survey results introduce consideration of the possible impact of international perceptions about South Africa (and Africa) and the tourism marketing approach on domestic perceptions of civic pride. Tourism marketing is the field most susceptible to notions of civic pride and Africa is presented mainly in terms of wildlife, landscapes and cultural experiences. The exotic experience of the African bush and traditional lifestyles is reminiscent of Edward Said’s argument in *Orientalism* (1978) about the stereotypical views of the Middle East. A similar logic applies in assuming that popular external stereotypes about a country like South Africa are what make it attractive for outsiders and therefore they could become important components of civic pride for the insiders.

In the next sections specific aspects of civic pride in South Africa are considered. The first is the theme of nation-building, cultural diversity, the ‘rainbow nation’ and the official coat of arms’ call for ‘unity in diversity’.
5 NATION-BUILDING AND DIVERSITY

President Mandela is associated with a policy of nation-building which was supported by former Archbishop Tutu’s celebration of the ‘rainbow nation’. South Africans believe that the country’s main achievement was that it could convert apartheid (as an articulation of mutually exclusive cultural entities) into a democratic state which can accommodate the diversity in a unique way – for example, to have 11 official languages or to have a national anthem consisting of four languages. In view of the current global turmoil and religious polarisation, South African Muslims and Christians together with Hindus continued with a long tradition of religious co-existence and almost no politicisation. The mentioned opinion polls (2012) indicated that South Africans are proud of this cultural diversity, as well as the national achievement since 1990 to synthesise it into a holistic unity. Often in the South African media it is praised as a model for others. At the same time South Africans are acutely aware the fact that this cultural inclusivity is not yet synonymous with national unity and therefore nation-building remains a priority.

The Government’s National Planning Commission published in 2011 its Diagnostic Report in which it identified the main national issues that had to be addressed in a long-term planning framework. It dedicated an entire chapter to nation-building and its diagnosis was ‘that while South Africa has made progress in uniting people behind the new national symbols such as the flag and the Constitution, expanding political freedoms and improving access to the social wage, the country is a long way from achieving social cohesion. …. The country must continue with measures to heal the wounds of the past while reducing economic exclusion, inequality of opportunity and outcomes. This means resolving the inevitable tensions between equity and redistribution on the one hand, and inclusivity on the other’ (National Planning Commission 2011: 1). The report identified three focus areas for nation-building or social cohesion. The first is that it should be guided by common values and ethics, mainly non-racism, non-sexism, social solidarity and democracy. Secondly, it should concentrate on values that emphasise unity and thirdly, it propagated a social contract for equity and inclusion (National Planning Commission 2011: 13-16).

The next section considers democracy as a focus of civic pride in South Africa.

6 DEMOCRACY AND CIVIC PRIDE

Earlier it was mentioned that the presence of democracy per se is not a prerequisite for civic pride. However, in some societies (such as the UK and USA in the 1960s, according to Almond & Verba 1965) their political and value systems are a source of national pride. According to the 2012 survey the same applies to South Africa. About 18% of the respondents were proud of the democracy achievements in South Africa. It is often claimed in public that the South African democracy is very modern for a developing state, is founded on a sophisticated and very liberal Constitution and that it is the leading democratic system in Africa. (Freedom House, the Mo Ibrahim Index, Democracy Watch and others regard states like Ghana, Cape Verde, Mauritius or Botswana as more democratic). The South African
democratic dispensation is a direct product of the constitutional negotiations in the early 1990s, which is in itself regarded as a major source of civic pride.

Some of the most important symbols of the new democracy are in themselves foci of civic pride such as the 1994 general election, the new national flag, the Constitution and institutions like the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). Twenty years after the event the 1994 elections are still regarded by most South Africans as an exceptional achievement. Efforts by the radical right-wing to sabotage it, brinkmanship by the Inkatha Freedom Party by refusing to participate until a week before the elections and logistical crises could not prevent the peaceful transfer of power by the National Party. It established a tradition of elections jealously protected by most South Africans.

At the same time a new national flag was unveiled by the negotiators. Initially it was presented as an interim flag but its popularity has overtaken it temporary sojourn. Cyril Ramaphosa, the ANC’s chief negotiator and today the national Deputy President, wrote the following in 2002 about the flag (Beckett 2002: [9]):

> Few would have imagined almost a decade ago that this collection of colourful shapes could become such a potent symbol of unity and progress. But then fewer still would have thought that a country torn apart by decades of racial oppression could transform itself into a beacon of democracy and hope.

> It was difficult to imagine, back then in the days of negotiations, that this assortment of shapes and colours we had before us would become such a central part of defining and identifying a new nation.

The IEC has developed a reputation for innovations in electoral management, independence from the Executive and organisational efficiency. The former chairperson who laid the foundation of the IEC, Dr Brigalia Bam, claims that the South African commission attracts visitors from across the globe to share in the commission’s experience (personal interview, Pretoria, 10 October 2014). She also became a member of the African Union’s Panel of the Wise specifically to assist with election-related issues on the continent. The IEC’s popularity is reflected in the results of a credibility and trust attitude survey of South African institutions. During 2003-2012 the IEC was consistently the institution with the second highest trust levels after religious organisations (Roberts, Struwig & Gordon 2014: slide 8).

This discussion does not automatically imply that South Africans are satisfied with the functioning of democracy in South Africa. The first objective is to determine what South Africans’ perceptions about democracy are. In its most elementary form the following results of an Afrobarometer (2013: 35) survey amongst 2 400 adult South Africans focused on their satisfaction with democracy, whether they regard it as already a ‘full’ (consolidated) democracy with only minor problems, and whether elections are free and fair with only minor problems. The results were the following:
The graph presents two ostensibly contradictory trends: the one is that the respondents acknowledged existence of the formal or procedural elements of democracy and are relatively satisfied with them (at about 60% level and in the case of elections at about 70%) but the other trend is that this satisfaction is lower than their appreciation of the presence of a ‘full’ democracy. Therefore though the formal aspects are present the respondents are not yet sufficiently satisfied with their functioning. The graph also indicates volatility in the responses: they might be explained by the effect of internal developments in the ruling ANC (such as its National Conferences in 2002 and 2007 or the ‘recall’ of President Mbeki in September 2008) or the controversies in elections (2004, 2009, 2011) on the respondents. It implies that South African democracy is not yet regarded as a consolidated and institutionalised dispensation autonomous of political dynamics.

In addition to the attitudinal assessment of the quality of democracy, Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino’s (2005: xii) eight dimensions of democratic quality can also be considered in a qualitative sense. They are five procedural dimensions (i.e. rule of law, participation, competition, and vertical and horizontal accountability). Two substantive dimensions are respect for civil and political freedoms, and progressive implementation of greater political, social and economic equality. The last one is responsiveness or the extent to which public policies correspond to citizen demands and preferences.

Parliament encapsulates a number of the procedural dimensions. Since August 2014 the South African Parliament has been in a turbulent mode as a result of the new party political dynamics after the general election in May 2014. The official opposition party (Democratic Alliance) increased its support while the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) emerged as a
vibrant new party, broken away from the ANC. During the past nine months events like the parliamentary question sessions direct to the President, his State of the Nation address, a proposed motion of no confidence in the President and the functioning of parliamentary committees to discipline the EFF parliamentarians and to determine the parliamentary response to the Nkandla saga all contributed towards reconfiguring the role of parliament in the South African democracy. Differences of opinion exist about the intrinsic value of these events but the public opinion as articulated in the media appreciates that a more democratic dispensation with stronger powers of accountability might emerge from it – therefore a strengthening of democracy quality.

Related to this point is the government-opposition relationship as well as the dominance of the ANC as governing party for twenty years already. In this respect it is questioned whether democratic quality can be determined by the ‘quality of contestation’. This concept tests the premise that stronger opposition parties indicate a strengthening of democratic quality; the same applies to an increase in intensity of electoral contestation.

Based on experimental work the proposal is made that the ‘quality of contestation’ can be calculated by the following equation (Kotzé 2009: 9-10):

$$\text{Quality of contestation: } c = \frac{\sqrt{a}}{b}; \text{ in which } a \text{ and } b \text{ are –}$$

Intensity of competition: $$a = (\text{percentage of strongest party}) - (\text{percentage of } 2^{nd} \text{ party})$$

Density of competition: $$b = \frac{a}{(\text{number of parties within 15% of the strongest party}) + 1}$$

An application of the suggested formula for determining the quality of contestation (for legislatures) in some African countries (Kotzé 2009) concluded that there is a limited relationship between parliamentary contestation on the one hand, and political rights, civil liberties, quality of life, corruption and good governance on the other hand. Conventional assumptions about democracy in terms of strong opposition and highly contested parliamentary elections are not supported by the results and therefore they are not necessarily a prerequisite for, or an indicator of, the quality democracy (Kotzé 2009: 13). These conclusions accordingly lend more support to the importance of the substantive elements of democracy in determining its quality. This corroborates the Afrobarometer trends about acknowledging a full democracy and being satisfied with it.

An aspect not discussed in this paper but relevant for the topic is the importance of South Africa’s democratic transition for South Africans and how it has become a source of pride for them. Many believe that the approach followed in South Africa constitutes a model which is often ‘exported’ to other transition processes in which South Africa plays a mediating role, such as in the DRC, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Madagascar and Lesotho. That ‘model’ includes a two phase transition, a government of national unity, transitional justice in the form of a truth commission and amnesty, entrenched transitional principles or a binding roadmap, and an election. Prominent negotiators like Cyril Ramaphosa and Roelf Meyer were regularly consulted about peace processes in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Middle
East (Israel/Palestine) and Spain (Basques) while Judge Richard Goldstone was the first prosecutor of the Ad hoc International Tribunal on Rwanda and involved in the ICC’s Rome Statute.

7 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AND CIVIC PRIDE

In section 3 the dilemma of apartheid and post-apartheid national identities were presented. Sections 4 and 5 presented the official narrative of how to forge a new national identity associated with national pride. The question is however: what is the public opinion in this regard? Do the official narrative and public opinion converge, overlap or diverge? The answer will provide some conclusion on the research question whether civic pride is a contemporaneous by-product of nation-/state-building or completely independent of it.

In figure 2 below the positive association with being a South African varied between 87% and 92% between 2010 and 2012. The highest percentage coincided with the FIFA World Cup 2010 in South Africa. Another high mark was the local government elections in May 2011 (90%) while a lower mark was during the ANC’s National Conference in December 2012 (88%). The Marikana massacre (August 2012) is unfortunately not included in the survey and therefore it cannot be determined whether a tragic event can have an impact on a national association.

Figure 2: “Proud to be a South African”

(Source: De Kock 2013: 4)
Figure 3 presents a test of attitudinal associations and by implication also focus areas of pride. The strongest association is that ‘South Africa has a rich diversity of people and cultures’ and that the country ‘has a great potential for its own citizens’.

Figure 3: Attributes associated with South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>% Believe</th>
<th>% Disbelieve</th>
<th>% Don't Believe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SA is a country that continuously achieves its goals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA is a country that will take its place as one of the top countries in the future</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA is an influential country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA is dynamic and upcoming</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA will succeed in the future</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA is an environmentally conscious country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The people of SA embody the spirit of ubuntu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA has good foreign investment opportunities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA has a lot of possibilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA has a great potential for its own citizens</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA is a good place to travel to for international tourists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA has a rich diversity of people and cultures</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: De Kock 2013: 5)

A combination of the two figures suggests high levels of pride in national identities while section 5 presented a view of nation-building as incomplete and with fundamental aspects still to be addressed. The conclusion is therefore that significantly high levels of civic pride about cultural diversity exist while nation-/state-building is still in progress. It implies that civic pride is not entirely dependent on a unified nation but can be understood as a contemporaneous by-product of nation-building.

CONCLUSION

The official government view is to link social cohesion to nation-building, and to link them to civic pride. It therefore leans towards the idea that civic pride is a consequence of nation-/state-building. It would therefore be a long-term process for civic pride to emerge, because it is linked to a decline in social inequalities.

The public opinion surveys presented slightly different results, namely that civic pride is already well pronounced but mainly in terms of people, cultures and diversity, and secondly
in terms of democracy but not in terms of history, memory or heritage. They support therefore more the conclusion that civic pride is a contemporaneous by-product of nation-/state building and not completely dependent on it.

The contribution of the quality of democracy to civic pride in South Africa is that it is strongly linked to the legacy of the democratic transition. South Africans also acknowledge the presence of a ‘full’ democracy, mainly in procedural terms, but they are less satisfied with its performance, presumably because the substantive elements (especially equality or equity) have not yet been realised.

This discussion demonstrated that the emerging civic pride in South Africa is partly a product of social engineering (such as nation-building), also partly of the most recent history since 1990 based on national experiences and symbols of democratisation (such as the 1994 election, the new flag or President Mandela) and partly a product of South Africa’s demographic and cultural diversity, which was during apartheid its Achilles’ heel but is experienced now as an example of harmonious coexistence in a world increasingly beset by problems of cultural, religious or national intolerances.

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