Immigrant Integration and Policy Divergence in Scotland since Devolution

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ABSTRACT
While immigration policy has recently emerged onto the Scottish political agenda, despite being an issue reserved to Westminster, its sister policy – the integration of immigrants after they arrive – has received little attention north of the border, despite being an issue devolved to Scotland. This article seeks to explore why Scottish integration policy has been so muted in comparison with the highly contested debates on community cohesion in England. It does so using the theoretical framework of policy convergence/divergence to explore the framing of integration policy in Scotland and the extent to which it has followed the UK/English model. In particular, it explores political-strategic, capacity-related and contextual factors that have influenced integration policymaking in Scotland, and situates the analysis within broader theoretical debates about the changing nature of integration policy across Europe. A key finding is that while the ‘retreat of multiculturalism’ and moves towards coercive forms of civic integration may be evident across EU states – including the UK – devolved Scottish institutions are resisting this trend by articulating the vision of a plural, inclusive society that encourages and supports newcomers to work and live in Scotland.

Keywords
Immigration, integration, devolution, policy divergence, Scotland, England

Introduction
The United Kingdom (UK) has historically embedded its approach to immigrant integration in a ‘race-relations’ model that from the 1970s prioritised the language and principles of multiculturalism, broadly understood as policies that fostered tolerance and respect for different cultures within the British citizenry (Modood, 2005; McGhee, 2008; Pilkington, 2008). Within the European context, the UK was identified as a standard-bearer for multicultural policies (Joppke, 1996; Favell 2001), which were developed in response to an increase in settlement of people from former colonies and Commonwealth countries who were already British citizens or subjects.1 This reputation for cultural tolerance was cemented through extensive UK legislation on race relations and equality, which have been recognised as constituting some of the strongest antidiscrimination laws in Europe (Collett and Petrovic, 2014).

However, since the early 2000s this race-relations model has come under attack, blamed by Labour PM Tony Blair, and now current Conservative PM David Cameron for creating ‘parallel lives’ across the UK, i.e. the (self-)segregation of ethnic minority groups from ‘mainstream’ British society (Kundnani, 2002; McGhee,

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1 This largely explains why the term ‘ethnic minorities’ rather than ‘immigrants’ was used in race-relations discourse.
In solution to the ‘problem’ of failed integration of ethnic minorities, UK elites have developed a new discourse of ‘community cohesion’, an amorphous catch-all term based on Britishness, shared values and getting along – as opposed to the recognition of diversity, race and equality (Cantle, 2001; Robinson, 2005; Pilkington, 2008; Ratcliffe, 2012). In tandem with the rise of the community cohesion agenda, scholars have noted that “multiculturalism has been marginalised substantially both nationally…and locally” (Lewis and Craig, 2014: 22).

However, while one may detect these developments at the national and local level in England – which was the subject of Lewis and Craig’s insightful analysis – it remains an open question whether the same can be said of other parts of the UK. With the creation of devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in 1998-9, in addition to the re-constitution of the Greater London Authority (GLA) in 2000, responsibility for migrant integration has been de facto decentralised. While former Labour PM Gordon Brown may have sought to define immigrant integration as a national (i.e. British) issue (see McGhee 2008), the reallocation of responsibility for integration from the Home Office (a UK-wide government department) to the Department for Communities and Local Government (responsible for English, and some Welsh, policy) in 2007 underlined the decentralised nature of integration. Far from being a ‘national’ policy, it has now become the responsibility of the UK’s territorial governments – in England (which doubles up as the UK Government on many domestic matters), Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales, and also to some extent Greater London – with no central coordinating mechanism.

The absence of a UK-wide remit on immigrant integration opens up two main possibilities for the development of policy, which Michael Keating (2005) outlined as part of his theory on policy divergence and convergence. On one hand, one might expect to see the creation of relatively separate agendas, framed in response to substate concerns, by each of the territorial governments without any clear ‘central government’ effect. An alternative scenario is that “there is a centre and that is England, whose government and departments dominate and lead the policy process, to which the other administrations must adapt” (Keating, 2005: 456). Keating, and other analysts of Scottish policymaking, have tended to focus on the ‘bread and butter’ issues of the Scottish Parliament in determining whether divergence or convergence with England exists – primarily, health, education, rural affairs, regeneration policies and housing (Keating, Stevenson, Cairney and Taylor 2006; Keating and Stevenson, 2006; Greer, 2004; Keating, Cairney and Hepburn, 20012; McGuiness, Greenhalgh and Pugalis, 2014). Immigrant integration has, however, never been touched upon.

This paper will address this lacuna by analysing the development of immigrant integration policy in Scotland in the context of devolved UK governance. It begins with a conceptual overview of migrant integration policy, differentiating between different types of policy and the trends towards civic integration across EU states. It then places the analysis of migrant integration in a multi-level framework, using the theoretical framework of policy divergence and convergence as the main point of departure for the subsequent empirical analysis. This section develops the hypotheses to be tested, and outlines key variables affecting policy development. Then comes the ‘meat’ of the article – an empirical overview of migration legislation in the UK, an exploration of the integration policy approach adopted in England, and an analysis of the strategy adopted in Scotland during the same period. Methods used for this section include qualitative analysis of primary documents, including government reports, policy guidance and legislation at the national, substate and local levels; party political programmes; relevant public opinion surveys; and elite interviews with
government officials. The final sections of the paper reflect on factors that have affected divergence and/or convergence in integration policy and consider paths for future research on multi-level integration policy in the UK and beyond.

**Migrant Integration Policy**

Immigrant integration is a relatively new policy area in Europe, which has developed in response to the arrival of newly arrived migrant groups over the last few decades (Collett and Petrovic, 2014). Indeed, integration was not within the powers of the EU until the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. But practices of integration policy have been squarely on the agendas of national governments for long before this, albeit under different names – most notably ethnic minorities policy. While most integration policies in Europe were once ‘stand-alone’ policies that focused on a targeted population, there has been a recent move towards mainstreaming integration policies in an effort to reach more people, as well as for efficiency reasons (Scholten, 2014).

What do we mean when we talk of immigrant integration? There are two types of integration policies: (1) those that are targeted at newly arrived immigrants and their families and focused on their particular language and orientation needs (otherwise known as ‘reception’ policies); (2) those that are intended towards the long-term inclusion of immigrants – including second, third generations and more – that seek to ensure the equality of opportunity for all individuals in society. The latter policies have been associated with a trend towards ‘mainstreaming’ migrant integration across policy sectors that target the general population, in addition to a focus on strengthening ethnic, community and race relations.

The dominant scholarly approach towards the study of integration – in both of its short-term reception and long-term inclusion guises – has been to view it through a ‘national models’ lens. This concept refers to the different ‘philosophies’ or ‘cultures’ of immigrant integration promulgated by nation-states (Brubaker 1992, Favell 1998, Schain 2008). Scholars have attempted to explain differences in the approaches taken by various national governments by the country’s unique historical legacy, self-understanding as a nation, political culture and identity. So, France is seen to exhibit a ‘republican’ model with state-centric assimilationist tendencies, Germany has an ‘ethnocultural’ model with ascriptive criteria for national membership, and the Netherlands has been a bastion of ‘multiculturalism’ with an open interpretation of national belonging (Brubaker, 1992; Koopmans 2002).

What is central to these scholarly approaches has been an attempt to explain why some countries pursue inclusive policies whilst others have been exclusivist, and to unpack what is meant by ‘liberal’ or ‘illiberal’ integration policies. Under the former category lie multicultural and voluntary civic integration approaches. Multiculturalism, which recognises the distinct cultural heritage of newcomers, was viewed as the ‘hegemonic paradigm’ for much of the last few decades (Ambrosini, 2012: 19). This led one scholar to declare that ‘We are all multiculturalists now’ (Glazer, 1997). However the multiculturalism model has come under attack in recent years from several EU member state leaders who have lamented the ‘utter failure’ of such policies, including the premiers of Germany, France and the UK.

Instead, across Europe, there has been a noticeable shift from pluralistic models of inclusion towards neo-assimilationist approaches, under the name of ‘civic integration’ (Joppke, 2004, 2007). These policies come under two guises: the liberal and the coercive. With regards to the former, liberal civic integration emphasises migrants’ voluntary rights to integrate and provide supportive programmes to assist integration (Joppke, 2004). These liberal integration policies may be compatible with
multicultural policies (Banting and Kymlicka, 2012). Alternatively, coercive integration is evident when countries have made integration a duty, by establishing mandatory programmes and denying access to public services or residency renewals if migrants fail to pass certain thresholds of integration (Entzinger, 2006; Joppke 2007; Goodman 2010; Zinccone and Caponio, 2012). Scholars have traced how this illiberal form of civic integration is on the rise, especially across Western Europe, which has been closely associated with a political discourse that ties migration to security and crime (Bigo 2002) as well as the rise of anti-immigrant parties (Kriesi 2006; Mudde, 2007; Koopmans et al, 2012). As a result of the ‘return of assimilationism’ – a national models-based path dependency has given way to a general trend towards coercive civic integration policies across Europe (Joppke 2004; Goodman 2010). Immigration and integration policies have generally become more restrictive in all states, erecting harsher barriers for migrants to enter and naturalise in their host country, and reducing the rights of immigrants after they arrive.

In addition to witnessing general trends in European integration policies that undermine state-centric differences, there have been a number of other criticisms of the national models approach. For instance, Bertossi and Duyvendak (2012) have pointed to the over-generalized and stylized explanations for national differences. Freeman (2004) points to the disjointedness in integration strategies, whereby ‘no state possesses a truly coherent incorporation regime. Instead, one finds ramshackle, multifaceted, loosely connected sets of regulatory rules, institutions, and practices in various domains of society’ (ibid, 956). Other scholars have criticised the assumption that there is somehow a single coherent, consistent approach that determines policymaking within a state; instead there is a need to acknowledge dynamic and complex processes of policy-framing (Duyvendak and Scholten 2011).

But one could also criticise the national models framework from a different perspective: that of territorial politics. In multilevel states, there is no ‘one’ homogenous model of integration; there are several, which take place in different territorial locations. So, as Bloemraad (2013, 9) states, “Immigrants’ lives are very different in Berlin compared to a small town in Bavaria, despite their common location in Germany.” In multilevel and multinational states – that is, states containing more than one constituent nation – the centre-periphery cleavage has resulted in the development of competing nation-building projects: one by the state ‘centre’ seeking to standardise a dominant culture, and the other by the ‘peripheral’ substate nation seeking to protect a minority identity (Keating 2004). In the present ‘age of migration’, substate nations have experienced substantial population movements to their homelands (Kymlicka, 2001). With newly decentralised powers over reception and integration, substate regions and nations must develop coherent responses to the challenges of migration which must work in parallel – but often separate – ways with central-state projects, leading to differentiated integration policies at the substate and state levels. However, because the substate level has generally been overlooked as a decision-making authority on migration in the literature (Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero 2014), we have in many cases been unable to say what these policies look like. The UK is one such case, where the overwhelming focus has been on the UK/English model of race relations and community cohesion. Far less attention has been given to how devolved regions – such as Scotland – ‘do’ migrant integration, and whether their approaches diverge from the UK model.

The Policy Divergence/Convergence Framework
One of the most popular methods of analysing and comparing different policy frames amongst nation-states and sub-state regions is the ‘policy transfer’ model (Dolowitz and March, 1996, 2000; Rose, 1993; Keating et al, 2010; Nutley, et al 2012). This concept may serve as an umbrella term for several inter-linked processes including policy diffusion, policy learning and policy convergence (Pemberton, 2009). In essence, these processes indicate the degree to which an actor/institution adopts the policies pursued by another actor/institution, on either a forced or voluntary basis. In particular, policy transfer has been used as a framework to explore mechanisms and dynamics that can lead to policy similarity (i.e., policy convergence) or dissimilarity (i.e. policy divergence) in a cross-national perspective (Nutley et al, 2012: 194).

Since the devolution reforms in the UK from 1998 onwards, many scholars have employed the policy divergence/convergence model to explain whether, and to what extent, we are witnessing an increased fragmentation in policy platforms across the substate governments of the UK – Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and England (which is represented by the UK government) – or whether there remains an underlying current of cohesion and commonality. The majority of these studies have focussed on Scottish divergence from/convergence with England on policies including health, education, housing, regeneration, rural policy, public service reform and community-based planning (see Keating, 2005; Keating and Stevenson, 2006; Cairney, 2009; Greer, 2009; Smith et al, 2009; Keating et al 2010; Gallacher and Raffe, 2011; McGuinness et al 2014, Pemberton et al 2014). In seeking to answer the perennial question of whether devolution has made a difference (see Mooney et al, 2006), studies have often found both elements to be true, whereas pressures towards convergence and divergence exist simultaneously (see especially Smith et al, 2009; Gallacher and Raffe, 2011; Keating et al, 2012). While there have been a few headline-grabbing episodes of policy divergence (such as the abolition of tuition fees in Scotland, the creation of foundation hospitals in England, the phasing out of prescription charges in Wales), there have been other quieter and more subtle processes towards convergence, owing to similar conditions and inter-dependence.

The most complete theoretical framework for understanding dual pressures and dynamics towards policy convergence and divergence in the United Kingdom is that developed by Keating (2002, 2005). Policy divergence is understood as the degree to which institutions (in this case Scottish devolved institutions) are able to make ‘distinct policy choices’. These can range from the pursuit of a radically distinct policy agenda based on the identification of entirely different issues, to the adoption of similar policies but using different instruments of policy delivery (Keating, 2005: 454). Importantly, Keating argues that divergence since devolution should not only be measured against contemporary policies being pursued in England/by the UK Government; it must also be measured against past patterns of policymaking during the pre-devolution administrative arrangements of the UK, whereby the Scottish Office – established in 1895 – had a degree of policy autonomy within the parameters of UK policymaking (Keating 2002: 3; see also Kellas, 1989; Patterson, 1994).

Keating outlines two scenarios for divergence/convergence resulting from the highly asymmetrical nature of the devolution settlements, whereby Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish assemblies were given varying degrees of power, yet no equivalent devolved assembly was established for England or the English regions (with the exception of the non-legislative Greater London Authority). The first scenario is that devolution may hasten the development of separate policy agendas amongst the territorial governments of the UK – which constitute Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and England (which doubles up as the nationwide UK Government). Thus,
policies are framed and pursued in response to substate territorial concerns, governments will coordinate ‘where necessary’ on common issues, and there is no ‘central government’ pushing substate actors into line (Keating, 2005: 456). An alternative scenario is that there is indeed a dominant ‘Alpha’ government in the devolved UK system of multi-level governance, and that is England. As England has by far the greatest policy capacity, population, resources and political clout in all of the country (which is aided by simultaneously being the government representing the whole of the UK), England’s government departments will lead the policy process and expect other devolved governments to follow and adapt.

Yet there are also other factors that intervene in determining the extent of policy divergence or convergence in the UK. Keating (2005) summarises these as (1) institutional factors, such as the legislative powers of devolved bodies, intergovernmental relations, EU constraints and shared/overlapping powers; (2) contextual factors, including a common welfare state and economic area; and (3) political factors, including party competition, public opinion and the existence of territorial policy communities. In his conclusions, Keating finds that while the consultative/cooperative policy style in Scotland has ‘produced a slow but persistent trend to divergence’, when looking at the bigger picture, the ‘policy agenda in Scotland is not greatly distinct from that in England’ (Keating, 2005: 461).

Let us now apply this theoretical framework to the case of migrant integration policymaking in the UK since devolution. The aim of the paper is to examine the extent of policy divergence and convergence in migrant integration between Scotland and England/the UK since devolution. In particular, it aims to test whether Scotland and England have developed their own distinct migrant integration policy agendas, coordinating where necessary on common concerns (H1) or whether England sets the dominant policy frame, and ‘devolved administrations are pulled along by initiatives from England’ (Keating, 2005: 456) (H2).

Following in the footsteps of Smith et al (2009), this analysis will focus on the framing and development of the integration policy issue, including an analysis of the perceived obstacles and solutions to integration ‘problems’ as well as a discussion of where responsibility is seen to lie for integration. To address potential causes for divergence/convergence, the analysis is situated within a broader political context, examining the party politics of migrant integration, public opinion, the nature of intergovernmental relations on migration policy, overlapping powers, and the European dimension. The period under study is 1997-2014, enabling a temporal comparison (before and after devolution) as well as a spatial comparison of policies and debates in England/UK and Scotland. Data is gathered from three principal sources: (1) key policy statements concerning migrant integration (which includes ethnic minorities, race relations, equalities, and community cohesion policies), including white papers, government policy programmes, and national guidelines; (2) analysis of party political programmes and media analysis; and (3) fourteen semi-structured elite interviews with policy practitioners and politicians in Scotland.

The Legal and Political Framework on Migrant Integration

Unlike many of its European neighbours, there is no UK policy framework on ‘immigrant integration’ per se (Spencer 2011a,c; Scholten 2014). Indeed, integration is a word that is rarely used in the policy lexicon in the British Isles (Saggar and Somerville, 2012). Policies that address migrants’ needs are usually subsumed within the UK policy approaches to race relations, ethnic minorities and equalities (Kofman et al 2009). In particular, scholars have demonstrated how ‘integration policy was
built around anti-discrimination law… it is ethnic diversity, and not immigration, that has driven the UK integration agenda’ (Saggar and Somerville, 2012: 11-12).

Indeed, the UK has one of the most advanced anti-discrimination legislation in Europe, which prohibits discrimination and promotes racial equality, with a particular focus on the UK’s black and minority ethnic (BME) population. Antidiscrimination law in the form of various ‘Race Relations Acts’ was first initiated by the UK Government in 1965 and subsequently strengthened in 1968, 1976 and 2000. In particular, the Equality Act (2010) consolidated all antidiscrimination law in the UK, creating a ‘broad and proactive legal framework for a range of minorities and disadvantaged or vulnerable communities’ (Saggar and Somerville, 2012: 14). The Equality Act also created an important statutory duty on public bodies to have ‘due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination, harassment and victimization; advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and those who do not’ (Shisheva, Christie and Mulvey, 2013: 29). Public bodies are now required to take action to promote race equality, which includes removing ethnic inequalities and biases in recruitment, employment and service delivery. This legal framework on antidiscrimination is supported by institutions such as the Commission for Racial Equality (now part of the Equality and Human Rights Commission) and is reinforced by the 1998 Human Rights Act, which was enshrined in UK law through the European Convention on Human Rights.

Although immigrant communities were not the target of the UK’s black and minority ethnic (BME), equalities and antidiscrimination legislation, these laws have undoubtedly helped migrants to achieve more equality in society and in the workplace (Kofman et al, 2009). However, migrants were often a residual category, and certainly not the main target of these policies, which were originally designed to address the management of cultural diversity between long-standing visible ethnic minority communities.\(^2\) Recently, scholars have argued that BME policy simply does not apply to immigrants any more, since a large percentage of migration to the UK is from Caucasians (i.e. non-visible ethnic minority groups) (Spencer, 2011).

So even though immigration has become a principal cleavage in party competition as well as a key concern for the UK public, there has been less explicit focus on immigrant integration in UK policy frames. Indeed, one scholar of integration, has even questioned ‘why the silence on migrant integration?’ (Spencer, 2011b). Despite the hysteria over rising immigrant numbers, ‘policy relating to what happens to those who come to work, study or join family in the UK has been neglected’ (Spencer, 2011a: 201). However, when reading between the lines, politicians and policymakers have not been entirely silent. Former PM Tony Blair (Labour) and current PM David Cameron (Conservative) believe that the responsibility for integration should rest squarely on the shoulders of immigrants themselves, who must meet certain requirements – linguistic, social, civic and cultural – in order to earn their stay in the UK (Blair, 2006; Cameron, 2011). This new approach fits with the popular trend towards ‘coercive civic integration’ described above and in evidence across much of Europe (Joppke, 2007).

The civic integration approach was catalyzed by the rapid increase in immigration to the UK following the 2004 EU enlargement, in addition to civil disturbances between longstanding ethnic communities in England (see below).

\(^2\) The only exceptions are policies on English language tuition which take migrants into account, along with some targeted provision in mainstream policies such as healthcare and education.
Various immigration requirements were introduced by the UK Government, including the introduction of citizenship tests and language requirements for immigrants in 2007 and the creation of ‘earned citizenship’ requirements with a three-stage entry process in 2011. Migrants are required to take the ‘Life in the UK’ test before acquiring settlement or citizenship, which involves questions based on the ‘Life in the UK Handbook’ relating to British customs, traditions, history and values, and is meant to demonstrate proficiency in the English language. Furthermore, in 2008, the UK launched a new five-tier points-based system (PBS) for migration in order to regulate immigrant arrivals from outside the EU. The PBS was designed to reduce numbers of applications from unwanted migrant groups (low-skilled workers) and, importantly, to restore public confidence in the immigration system. According to opinion polls, 83% wanted fewer migrants to come to the UK, including a majority who were themselves born abroad (Lloyd, 2010; cited in Spencer 2011 book: 1).

Tightening up immigration and citizenship requirements has had an impact on integration efforts and outcomes. According to the think-tank ‘Migrant Integration Policy Index’ (MIPEX, 2014), the UK has fallen behind significantly in its conditions for migrant integration in the last few years. The COMPAS Group at Oxford University accords this decline to the enactment of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act (2009), which came into force in 2011, and which created a ‘long and confusing path to “earned citizenship”’ (Huddlestone, 2011) that may ‘delay and discourage potential citizens and local communities from investing in integration as they had before’. The legislation resulted in a 30-point drop in the migrant integration category of ‘long-term residence’ and a 16-point drop in ‘access to nationality’ (Huddlestone, 2011). More recently, MIPEX (2013) characterised the UK Government’s new Immigration Rules of 2012 as ‘mean and heartless’, holding them responsible for ‘tearing British families apart’. This was in reference to new measures that set earnings thresholds for people wishing to sponsor the UK visas of spouses coming from abroad, making family unification more difficult (BBC, 5 July 2013).

Finally, in 2014, in direct response to the ‘contagion effect’ of UKIP, the Conservative-Liberal UK Government took a number of steps to restrict the rights of immigrants once they arrive. The Immigration Act 2014 introduced an ‘immigration health charge’, which requires migrants to pay a charge for any potential National Health Service (NHS) costs in the future, including temporary migrants and those applying for a visa prior to entering the UK (Migrant Rights Network, 2014). The Immigration Act also restricts access to justice for migrants by removing the right of appeal for most immigration decisions. Finally, the Immigration Act restricts access to private housing, bank accounts and driving licenses, by requiring landlords, banks and the DVLA to check and verify the immigration status of applicants. These measures raised strong concerns amongst migrant and refugee communities and organisations about the detrimental effect on their rights (Christodoulou, 2013).

Scholars have long pointed to UK Government attempts to reduce the rights of immigrants, possibly in order to reduce the attractiveness of the UK as a place to live.

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3 See https://www.gov.uk/life-in-the-uk-test
4 http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/files/People/staff_publications/Gidley/5630%20Compas%20Briefing%20FINAL.pdf
5 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-23198144
6 http://www.migrantsrights.org.uk/blog/2014/05/immigration-act-2014-what-next-migrants-access-nhs-care
and therefore dissuade potential migrants (Spencer 2001b). Saggar and Somerville (2012: 14) argue that ‘there has been … a sustained effort to remove or stop the accretion of immigrants’ rights – for example, the government has passed legislation to reduce appeal rights, to remove access to welfare, to limit access to the labour market, and most recently, substantially curb legal aid for immigration cases’. While antidiscrimination and equalities policies have been strengthened, these authors note that at no stage has the UK government sought to intentionally advance the specific rights of immigrants or to increase their integration (ibid).

Such sentiments are not entirely discordant with British public opinion: there has been growing public hostility to migrants who have been seen as ‘failing’ to integrate into UK society (Spencer, 2011a,b,c; Collett and Petrovic, 2014). For instance, opinion polls have revealed that slightly over half of the British public believes that the integration of immigrants is ‘poor’ (cited in Saggar and Somerville, 2012: 5). This partly explains the burgeoning success of the anti-immigrant United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in local and European elections in 2014, where it became the second biggest party in England – posing a threat to both the Conservatives and Labour – and where it won one seat in Scotland. In response to anti-immigrant public opinion and the ‘contagion effect’ of UKIP, the mainstream political left and right in Britain have both moved towards a more restrictive position on immigration control and integration (Odmalm and Bale, 2014).

However, the legislative framework on immigration and integration in the UK has undergone some changes following the creation of devolved assemblies 1998-9. Under the Scotland Act 1998 (Section 5), immigration and asylum – which covers selection and admission – is a power reserved to the UK government. As such, decisions about levels of migration and access to benefits are managed by the Home Office. However, the Scottish Government did manage to carve out a small niche for itself in the area of immigration control through its ‘Fresh Talent’ initiative, which sought to attract skilled people from overseas to come and work in Scotland. In particular, the scheme Fresh Talent: Working in Scotland (FTWiss) specifically allowed international graduates that had pursued studies at a Scottish university to live and work in Scotland for two years without the need for a work permit directly after graduation. This policy was introduced in response to concerns of a pending demographic crisis in Scotland resulting from an ageing population, high levels of emigration, low fertility and low levels of immigration (Scottish Executive, 2004). It was hoped that the policy would encourage skilled graduates to stay in Scotland after their studies and help to mitigate population decline (ibid). However, the FTWiss scheme only lasted until 2008, at which point it was mainstreamed into UK policy with the creation of the Points Based System (PBS). At this point, Scotland ‘lost its competitive edge … of attracting highly skilled labour’ (Scottish Government, 2008: section 4.79) and the post-study work visa for students was terminated in 2012.

Currently, the Scottish Government plays no significant role in determining or influencing matters of immigration control and selection. Although the UK government is committed on paper to ensuring “that the interests of those parts of the

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8 When the SNP took power in Holyrood in 2007, it changed the name of the Scottish Executive to the Scottish Government without any opposition from Westminster, though ‘Executive’ is still the officially correct term in UK legislation.
UK in non-devolved matters are properly represented and considered” (Memorandum of Understanding, 2012: 9), in practice this amounts to seeking to ensure cooperation and consent with UK-devised policies. The main area of coordination between the UK and Scottish governments on immigration relates to asylum seekers, of which Glasgow hosts about 10,000 and coordination is required in terms of accommodation and access to social services. The Scotland Act (1998) specifies that ‘arrangements for the dispersal of asylum seekers and the designation of reception zones’ are matters of ‘joint working’ in which the Scottish Executive has a particular interest. The language of ‘joint working’ is left intentionally vague; in reality it means that Scottish Executive departments will work with (i.e. be directed by) the Home Office on matters of asylum dispersal, based on the Concordat governing working relations between the Home Office and devolved institutions. Thus, in this respect, Scottish authorities must do as London bids (Kyambi, 2005).

However, the policy area of immigrant integration is quite a different matter. As mentioned above, there is no coherent immigrant integration programme or strategy in the UK. Instead, integration policy ‘has depended on the design and implementation of broad social policies that affect schooling, neighbourhoods, housing, employment, health care and so on’ (Saggar and Somerville 2012: 2). These various social policies are divided into devolved and reserved categories in the UK. In particular, Westminster has control over citizenship acquisition, welfare benefits, work permits and most employment policies. However, as devolution is based on a ‘retainer’ model – i.e. everything that is not explicitly reserved to the UK Government is in the control of the Scottish Parliament – the majority of policy areas that affect an immigrant’s incorporation into their host society – such as health, education, housing, children’s services, legal aid and policing – are devolved to the Scottish Parliament. To that end, immigrant integration can be understood as a devolved competence in the UK, determined by substate territorial governments. This is in line with other multi-level devolved or federal states such as Belgium, Spain, Italy, Germany and Canada, where immigrant reception and integration policies are the exclusive competence of substate regions (see Seidle and Joppke, 2012; Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero, 2014). However, given that citizenship and social benefits are reserved within the devolved UK state, this means that immigrant integration may be termed a ‘transversal policy issue’ (Keating, 2005) which necessitates a degree of coordination between UK-Scottish levels to make policies cohesive. Let us now assess the degree of cohesion, and its effect on policy divergence and convergence, in migrant integration policies in the UK/England and Scotland.

The UK (English) integration approach: community cohesion
At the UK/English level, there is no overt policy on integration that specifically addresses the needs and inclusion of migrants as a community as a whole. The previous Labour Government briefly flirted with the idea of an integration strategy during its last term 2005-10 and introduced a short-lived Migration Impacts Fund to help new arrivals. However, Labour’s general activities involved a mapping and ‘stock-taking’ approach rather than a ‘goal-driven’ approach with little institutional restructuring involved (Saggar and Sommerville, 2012: 12). Instead, the focus in England has been on ‘race relations’, which was the dominant idiom for trying to seek the integration of migrants (Geddes, 2010). The UK race relations model was built

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11 http://www.diploweb.com/Migration-and-Multiculturalism.html
on multicultural ideals, which in policy terms translated into respect for difference (Parekh, 2005; Meer, 2010, Modood, 2013). However, in the early 2000s integration policy underwent a radical change as multiculturalism was replaced by community cohesion as ‘the “new” framework governing race relations policy in the UK’ (Worley, 2005: 483; Kundnani, 2002; Pilkington, 2008; Lewis and Craig, 2014). This concept was introduced into the English policy lexicon following a number of civil disturbances in Northern England in 2001 that involved Pakistani-Muslim and white communities, radical-right organisations and the police (McGhee, 2005). A Commission was set up to examine the incidences, whose report was entitled ‘Community Cohesion: The Report of The Independent Review Team (which became known as the ‘Cantle Report’). The Cantle report (2001) laid the groundwork for subsequent development of the community cohesion approach. In particular, the report believed that tensions between diverse cultural communities in England could be overcome through an emphasis on common citizenship and core values.

The Cantle report marked an important departure from the previous multicultural approach, which it blamed for the creation of segregated, parallel societies in the UK. In the words of Spencer (2011: 208), multiculturalism was seen to ‘overemphasise group differences, create vested interests in local ethnic political groupings, give too much power to patriarchal community leaders and reinforces what divides rather than what we have in common.’ The review highlighted the following aspects of UK multicultural policy as warranting particular blame: “Separate: educational arrangements, community and voluntary bodies, employment, places of worship, language, social and cultural networks, means that many communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives’ (Cantle, 2001: 9). As a result, the lack of ‘contact’ between communities was seen to result in the’ non-integration’ of established migrant communities (McGhee, 2005). As such, multiculturalism was blamed for separating ‘minority ethnic groups from mainstream society’ (Lewis and Craig, 2014: 21). The new ‘community cohesion’ approach, instead, emphasised the need to foster a sense of belonging and shared values, which would hasten social cohesion and improve equality outcomes (Cantle, 2001).

The UK Home Office strongly supported the report’s findings, with Home Secretary David Blunkett arguing for ‘a strong, shared understanding of the civic realm’ and a sense of collective citizenship as an antidote to perceived social problems associated with ethnic diversity (Blunkett, 2001; McGhee, 2003). The community cohesion approach described in the Cantle report ‘bled into’ the UK Government’s immigration plans (McGhee, 2003: 2.6). In 2002, the Home Office produced the white paper Secure Borders which described the 2001 ‘race riots’ as reflective of ‘fractured and divided communities, lacking a sense of common values or shared civic identity to unite around… [we need to] renew the social fabric of our communities, and rebuild a sense of common citizenship’ (Home Office, 2002: 10).

This ‘common citizenship’ approach that underlines the community cohesion agenda was to apply as much to established ethnic minorities as to new immigrant groups. For new immigrants, the naturalisation process would be transformed into an ‘act of commitment to Britain and an important step in the process of achieving integration into our society’ (Home Office, 2002: 32). Linguistic proficiency and knowledge of British life were presented as ‘the key to successful integration of “new” migrants, as without them, according to the Home Office, migrant communities are vulnerable and ill-equipped to take an active role in society.’ (McGhee, 2005: 2.8).12

12 http://www.socresonline.org.uk/10/3/mcghee.html
To address problems between established ethnic communities, the Local Government Association (LGA) in England published *Guidance on Community Cohesion* (GCC), which defined a ‘cohesive society’ as one that was based on a common vision and sense of belonging, the positive valuation of people’s different backgrounds, similar life opportunities for all communities, and positive relations between individuals from different backgrounds in schools, neighbourhoods and the workplace (LGA, 2002). To achieve a cohesive society, the LGA recommended developing conflict-resolution strategies such as ‘myth-busting’ programmes and events that fostered cross-cultural contact, as well as targeting anti-social behaviour (LGA, 2000: 13). For McGhee, the LGA Guidelines sent a strong message that ‘cultural pluralism and integration are not incompatible. According to this document, “unity in diversity” is the theme when developing a shared vision’ (McGhee 2003: 387).

The discourse around community cohesion heightened with the London terrorist attacks in 2005, which led for an urgent need to seek reconciliation between different cultural communities in the UK. In particular, the community cohesion agenda, with its ‘feel-good factor of community’ sought to overcome segregation and better integrate Britain’s Muslim communities in the context of increasing political extremism (Bauman, 2001; McGhee, 2003; Lewis and Craig, 2014). At the time, former Labour PM Tony Blair argued that the previously dominant paradigm on migrant integration in the UK – the commitment to multiculturalism – had failed (Blair, 2006). The recognition and celebration of diversity is now seen to prevent immigrants from fully integrating in their host society, leading to the creation of segregated and parallel communities. In particular, Blair talked about migrants’ ‘duty to integrate’ into common British values, warning that the 7 July 2005 terrorist bombings had thrown multiculturalism into ‘sharp relief’ and that the solution was to prioritise common values over separate beliefs and customs (Blair, 2006). This view was later endorsed by PM David Cameron (Conservative) who argued that immigrants unable to speak English or unwilling to integrate had created a ‘kind of discomfort and disjointedness’ that has disrupted communities across Britain, thereby having a negative effect on British social cohesion (cited in Guardian, 14 April 2011).

Cameron also began to carve out his own approach to integration, building upon the community cohesion agenda, but emphasising more the language of shared values than community cohesion per se. The Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) released the report *Creating the Conditions for Integration* in 2012, which intended to set out the Government’s approach to achieving a ‘more integrated society’. The report highlighted the need for a ‘clear sense of shared aspirations and values, which focuses on what we have in common rather than our differences’ (DCLG 2012: 5). The report seeks to achieve this through the mainstreaming of social interventions to aid integration rather than targeted initiatives for migrant communities, whereby ‘Departments’ mainstream services will make the most impact on integration rather than any specific new integration activity’ (ibid: 9). In particular, the *Creating the Conditions* policy documents of 2007 and 2012 criticised the multicultural policy of ‘single group funding’ for ethnic minority groups, and Home Secretary Hazel Blears later cut funding for groups formed around ethnic or religious lines, encouraging one organization to remove ‘Yemeni’ from its name (for an excellent analysis, see Lewis and Craig, 2014: 30-31).

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13 For an analysis of the speech, see: http://www.politics.co.uk/news/2006/12/8/blair-warns-of-duty-to-integrate
In addition to facing legal challenges that moves to cut funding to single groups contravened equality legislation, the Creating the Conditions policy recommendations were criticised for failing to present any concrete policy solutions for problems of integration. As Saggar and Somerville (2012: 7) note, the document contains ‘no program of action or coordination, but rather a list of government initiatives from a range of departments of varying degrees of relevance…and clearly notes that the state’s role should be that of facilitator and, as a matter of principle, an actor only of last resort.’ Indeed, the report is noteworthy for devolving responsibility for integration to local authorities. There were also concerns that integration was presented as a one-way process (with migrants being required to assimilate into British values) rather than a two-way process of mutual accommodation (Runnymede, 2012). Finally, the language of community cohesion and equalities was criticized as it ‘downplays difference, equalizing ‘race’/ethnicity as one equality issue among others’ (Lewis and Craig, 2014: 22). Indeed, the third sector – in particular BME organisations – were not consulted in the development of this strategy. They later issued a joint statement criticising the document for doing ‘little to address the persistent racial inequalities that exist across the nation, despite the fact that the government has presented it as equivalent to a race equality strategy’ (ibid: 3).

Importantly, the DCLG also presented the document as a strategy for ‘Integration in England today’, rather than the UK as a whole (UK Government, 2012). This emphasis on England underlines the fact that immigrant integration is perceived to be a decentralized competence. This was initiated when the Home Office (a UK-wide department) handed the portfolio of immigrant integration (in the guise of community cohesion) to the Department of Communities and Local Government (an English department) in 2007. The DCLG is meant to coordinate on integration policy across departments (including the Home Office, Department for Work and Pensions, Department for Education), in line with the UK’s mainstreaming approach. However there is evidence that departments have different approaches to integration. In line with its community cohesion portfolio, the DCLG has advanced an understanding of integration as ‘what must happen in all communities to enable different groups of people to get on well together’ (DCLG 2008: para 1.3). However, the Home Office – which is responsible for refugee integration, citizenship and asylum – emphasizes the need to create conditions for refugees to become Full and Equal Citizens (Home Office, 2000) and the full empowerment of refugees to achieve their potential.

The Home Office has also produced the only explicit UK policy on migrant integration, which is specifically designed for recognized refugees. Refugees are recognised as the most vulnerable category of migrants, while asylum seekers are excluded from the strategy as ‘integration can only begin in its fullest sense when an asylum seeker becomes a refugee’ (Home Office, 2005: 3). The refugee integration strategy, Integration Matters (Home Office, 2005), outlines the services that aim to support refugees in their process of integration, and sets indicators to evaluate success, in the fields of employment, language attainment, community contact, citizenship acquisition, housing, reporting of discrimination, and access to education. The Home Offices believes that integration has taken place when refugees are

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empowered to ‘achieve their full potential as members of British society; contribute to the community; and access the services to which they are entitled’ (ibid: 14). In particular, the document emphasized the need for refugees to have ‘sufficient knowledge of English or Welsh and of life in the UK’ (ibid: 68) so they can develop their knowledge of ‘what it means to be a citizen of Britain today’ (ibid: 9). However, the Home Office states that the strategy is only relevant to England: ‘Although devolved administrations may choose to implement parts of this strategy it formally applies in England only. In Scotland, work is already well under way to implement their own refugee integration strategy, which is tailored to Scotland’s circumstances and national legislation” (Home Office, 2005: 13).

The Home Office’s view of integration, as the full empowerment of refugees in all walks of life, is clearly very different from the narrower conceptualization of integration as understood as community cohesion and ‘getting along together’ which is articulated by the DCLG (see Spencer, 2011). Although the refugee document does have a community cohesion tinge – with references to ‘contact’ with community organisations, contributing to the community and citizenship ceremonies, it clearly specified a much broader framework for integration. The different understandings and approaches to integration have confused policy development in England, whereby ‘there has been little coordination between programmes’ (Saggar and Somerville, 2012: 2), there are ‘gaps and inconsistencies’ in the policy levers to address integration (Spencer, 2011c: 4) and there is “no consensus on what the goals of such a policy might be” (ibid: 6). However, as Lewis and Craig (2014: 24) make clear, community cohesion was a ‘concept developed in England (policy is applied differently elsewhere in the UK’). Let us now examine whether these problems have beset the development of a parallel approach to migrant integration in Scotland.

**The Scottish integration approach: defence of multiculturalism**

While Britain’s biggest two parties, Labour and the Conservatives, have adopted a broadly similar (restrictive) approach to immigration and integration at the UK level – based on shared values, community cohesion and common citizenship – in Scotland a very different political and policy frame has emerged around these issues. The two biggest parties in Scotland – the Scottish National Party and Scottish Labour Party – have both subscribed to a pluralistic vision of Scotland that seeks to increase levels of immigration to counteract demographic concerns, and that celebrates cultural diversity as an asset to be enjoyed – rather than a problem to be managed. This approach was adopted in the early years of devolution, when low levels of immigration, declining fertility rates and an ageing population contributed to concerns that Scotland was heading towards a demographic crisis (Scottish Executive, 2004; Hepburn and Rosie, 2014). In response, Scottish parties developed a quiet but broadly consensual position on immigration: that it was an important economic and cultural resource for Scotland, which should be nurtured as part of Scotland’s self-image as a multicultural nation (see SNP, 2011; Scottish Labour 2005; Scottish Liberal Democrats 2005; Hepburn, 2009, 2011; Bond et al, 2010; Hepburn and Rosie, 2014).

On the issue of immigration control, both the Scottish Labour-LibDem government of 2003-7 and the SNP-led governments of 2007- have called for a differentiated approach to immigration north of the border. Every one of Scotland’s parties has argued that the country faces very different immigration needs from England. For instance, even members of the Scottish Conservatives have argued that ‘I think Scotland has benefited overall from immigrant communities wherever they have come from. I think where we have an expanding economy and skill needs, yeah,
of course we should bring people in. We have plenty of space!’ (interview with MSP for the Scottish Conservatives, 20 November 2012). Notably, while there are now unanimous calls across all mainstream parties at the UK level to drastically reduce the perceived sky-rocketing levels of immigration, in Scotland all parties are in favour of increasing immigrant numbers to Scotland in order to maintain population growth and fill labour market shortages. The two different political approaches north and south of the border couldn’t be more at odds. This led to the Scottish Labour-led government of Jack McConnell to seek partial control over work permits, by enabling overseas students at Scottish universities to extend their stay by up to two years in the hope that graduates would choose to work and live in Scotland (as part of the Fresh Talent scheme, as described above). It has also led the current SNP government to demand full control over immigration in an independent Scotland. It has consistently stated that the currency UK immigration policies are not beneficial to the interests of Scotland (Scottish Government, Scotland’s Future, 2013). For instance, in the Government Economic Strategy (GES), the SNP-led Government stated that: “The Scottish Government believes that an annual limit on immigration is too blunt an instrument to address the complex needs of an economy, and we have repeatedly made the case to the UK Government to work with us to take a more flexible approach to the immigration cap in Scotland” (Scottish Government GES 2011: 74). The various Scottish governments’ divergence from, and opposition to, UK government policies on immigration admissions and selection, have also influenced their approaches to migrant integration. It is important to note at the outset that, in similarity to UK discourse, there is no specific policy framework on migrant integration in Scotland (with the exception of refugee integration, as we shall discuss below). Immigrant integration was not on the agenda of pro-Home Rule actors in Scotland during the lead-up to devolution in the 1990s. As such, it was not recognized as a distinct policy area to be devolved/shared/reserved in the Scotland Act of 1998. Furthermore ‘[a]t no point did any politicians or senior official see the unintended consequence of that policy [of devolution] for immigration and immigrant integration. However, the Scottish Government has developed, at various points, bespoke immigration visas [i.e. the Fresh Talent scheme] with integration elements attached, and has invested in tailored schemes that are greater in scope than in England’ (Saggar and Sommerville 2012, 14). So while the Scottish government has failed to outline a specific policy framework on migrant integration, it – like England – has developed its own race-relations model in which immigrant issues are included. So what is the Scottish approach to migrant integration? While (New) Labour in Westminster was developing the concept of ‘community cohesion’ as a new framework for race relations in the early 2000s, the Scottish Labour-led government in Edinburgh was developing a very different approach to race relations during the same period. The ‘One Scotland, Many Cultures’ campaign was initiated by the Scottish Executive in 2002 – one year after the civil disturbances in Northern England that sparked the community cohesion debates. However it was untouched by the turn against multiculturalism evident in England (Lewis and Craig, 2014). Instead, the campaign aimed to address a long-standing complacency about racism within Scotland, building upon recent UK equalities and anti-discrimination legislation, and supported by the creation of a Scottish Human Rights Commission (SHRC). As an MSP for the Scottish Liberal Democrats summed up his view of the Scottish

19 http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2011/09/13091128/0
approach, ‘on the whole, we all have good story to tell, we are a welcoming and encouraging country and that’s what we have to work very hard on. We need to make sure that we keep a very firm hand on racism, on any aspect of behaviour which I think would reverse that’ (interview with the author, 14 November, 2012).

The One Scotland campaign sought to combat racism and to ‘mobilise all Scots such that they recognize racism in multiple guises and that they speak, act and think in ways that expunge it from Scottish society’ (Penrose and Howard, 2008: 108). It also focused on recognizing Scotland as a place of many cultures – a multicultural society – in which all people in Scotland needed to work together in order to ensure the best possible future for everyone (ibid: 107). As part of the campaign, the Scottish Executive also published a document on Promoting Race Equality in Schools and Pre-school Education Centres, stating that: “Scotland is a multi-cultural society. The Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 aims to make equality integral to all public services, including education” (Scottish Executive, 2006: 2).

Certainly, the One Scotland campaign was not without its problems – it has been criticized for not developing a comprehensive vision of what a Scottish multicultural society looks like (Penrose and Howard, 2008). However, placed into a larger context, where the ‘toxic legacy of multiculturalism’ was being blamed for ‘hardening the lines between ethnic groups’ in England (Telegraph, 11 February 2012), Scotland’s celebration of cultural diversity marked a very different approach.

The One Scotland campaign also segued into the Fresh Talent initiative of 2004, which focused on the arrival of newcomers rather than addressing relations between long-standing ethnic groups. The Fresh Talent: Working in Scotland report portrayed Scotland as a land of immigrants, welcoming ‘bright, talented, hardworking people who can make a positive contribution to the Scottish economy’ (Scottish Executive, 2005: x). The scheme’s attempt to increase immigration to Scotland was connected to the One Scotland campaign’s emphasis on pluralism and equality. In particular the Scottish Executive sought to portray Scotland as a land of immigrants, built on mutual respect for different cultures. This campaign was not about combating racism or building a multicultural society. As Penrose and Howard (2008: 106) maintain, ‘the Scottish Executive’s desire to establish a history of diversity can be seen as a strategy for dissolving fear of ongoing immigration and attendant social change.’ It was also part of a bigger argument to win over Scottish voters that immigration was necessary to maintain demographic and economic growth.

The language of community cohesion has been noticeably absent in the Scottish context. Whereas in England, the race relations/community cohesion policy framework was catalysed by racial tensions in northeast England and the London terrorist attacks and is focussed on shared civic values, the race equality agenda in Scotland has been focussed on combating racism towards established ethnic groups and promoting the vision of Scotland as a plural society that is welcoming of different cultures. In particular, While ‘multiculturalism is never talked about’ in England (Lewis and Craig, 2014), this concept is at the centre of the Scottish approach to race relations. According to an MSP for the Scottish Labour Party ‘I think we should be a multicultural society. … it’s one area where Labour and the SNP have actually sung from the same song sheet. I think there’s been a general willingness to talk about multiculturalism rather than, you know, I think a lot of people in England have been very negative about multiculturalism and see it as the opposite of integration’ (interview with the author, 13 November 2012). This view is reflective in the Scottish

Government’s economic development agency, Scottish Enterprise, launched ‘Talent Scotland’, which declares that ‘Scottish culture is steeped in proud tradition and ever-evolving to embrace new and wonderful customs from around the world.’ However, despite the warm welcome given to potential immigrants, Scottish institutions still have an underdeveloped policy framework on how to integrate newcomers (with the exception of refugees) into Scottish society and economy after they arrive.

However, the Scottish government has recently begun to pay more attention to recent arrivals, due to the strengthening of the race equality agenda, its economic and political focus on immigration control, and the publication of its refugee integration strategy. In 2008, the Scottish Government produced a Race Equality Statement that set out its vision for ‘[a] Scotland that embraces diversity whilst also fostering a sense of common purpose and goals…A Scotland where all of our communities are recognised as threads which make up the tartan of our nation’s life’ (Scottish Government, 2008: 1). The Scottish Government’s commitment to promoting ‘dialogue about identity the meaning of multiculturalism/pluralism in modern day Scotland and encourage the development of a strong, fair and inclusive national identity’ (ibid, 8) contrasted sharply with the attacks made on multiculturalism by UK government ministers and the focus on ‘the need to foster good relations between different groups’ as laid out in the UK’s Equality Strategy (Home Office, 2010: 10).

As a Scottish Labour MSP intimated, ‘I think that’s one of the good things because we’re not criticising multiculturalism, I think the danger in England is that “integration” comes to mean “assimilation”. I don’t think we have that view of integration here. So I think we are quite strong politically in terms of respecting different cultures and religions’ (interview with the author, 13 November 2012). In particular, the Scottish Government’s multiculturalist pledge to ‘facilitate the development of representative groups for Scotland’s Muslim communities’ (Scottish Government, 2008: 10) was diametrically opposed to the English Department of Community and Local Government’s decision that same year to withdraw funding from groups ‘formed around single ethnic or religious lines deemed separatist and against the community cohesion agenda’ (Lewis and Craig, 2014: 31), which caused some groups to even remove any ethnic/cultural identifier from their names.

The Scottish Government’s refugee integration strategy – New Scots: Integrating Refugees in Scotland’s Communities (Scottish Government, 2013) – marked a further departure from the approach taken in England/the UK. The document begins by referencing the Equality Act 2010, which provides the Scottish Government with: ‘much stronger levers to deliver change across the public sector. … This provides a real opportunity – embedded within legislation – to drive forward race equality and refugee integration’ (Scottish Government, 2013: 21-22). However, the tone of the document is built around creating a plural society, whereby ‘we see integration as being a two-way process…which leads to cohesive, multi-cultural communities’ and a recognition of ‘the contribution that refugees can make by enriching our cultural diversity, expanding the world view of our children and bringing new languages, skills and experience’ (ibid: 9, 7). This contrasts with the UK/English refugee integration strategy, with its shared-values focus on ‘promoting inclusive notions of citizenship, identity and belonging’ (Home Office, 2010: 50), and whereby the end-goal is refugee integration into Britain’s society and culture, rather than celebrating refugees’ different cultures and languages. Furthermore, while the UK strategy does not give consideration to a refugee’s sense of identity and belonging

http://www.talentscotland.com/live/living/information-about-living/scottish-culture
in Britain, the Scottish government refers to recent migrants as *New Scots*, thereby ‘suggesting that those arriving in Scotland from elsewhere could stake some sort of claim to national belonging’ (Hepburn and Rosie, 2014, xx).

Given the different approaches between the UK Government and Scottish Government to framing the issue of refugee integration (multiculturalism versus shared values/assimilation) it is no surprise that the Scottish document was not devised in collaboration with the UK Government or with an eye to the UK/English refugee integration strategy (interview with Scottish policy official, May 2014). In fact, there is no official intergovernmental ‘coordination’ on migrant integration policy with UK departments as it is considered to be a devolved issue (interview with Scottish policy official, May 2014). Furthermore, there are no formal relations or concordats between Scottish devolved institutions and the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) in England. While the Home Office – as a UK department - was ‘kept in the loop’ of policies being developed in Scotland, in particular through the COSLA Strategic Migration Partnership (CSMP), this was more about information-sharing with London rather than the actual coordination of policies (interview with Scottish policy official). Instead, the development of the refugee integration strategy was Scottish-framed and focused: the outcome of meetings with refugee-related organizations, service providers, third-sector organisations and local authorities in Scotland, which was jointly led by the Scottish Government, COSLA and the Scottish Refugee Council. The aim was to ‘map current refugee integration activities in Scotland; to promote partnership working; and to identify and promote the adoption of practical solutions to address the integration needs of refugees and asylum seekers’ (Scottish Government, 2013: 12).

The category of asylum seekers deserves special mention: whereas the UK/English strategy intentionally excluded asylum seekers from the integration strategy, the Scottish strategy intentionally included them. While asylum policy is reserved to Westminster (including control over accommodation and financial support), Scotland does exercise competence in areas that affect the asylum process, such as child welfare protection and legal representation, as well as control over social policy that undergirds integration efforts, such as health and educational services. With these powers in hand, the Scottish Government has taken the position that integration does not begin on the day on which an asylum seeker becomes a refugee (the Home Office position), but on their first day of arrival in Scotland (Scottish Government, 2013: 1). This approach is arguably reflective of a commitment to promoting ‘social justice’ for everyone in Scotland (Mooney and Scott, 2012). According to some, the principles of inclusion, compassion, and shared responsibility ‘have been championed by all governments since devolution and enjoy substantial cross-party consensus in the Scottish Parliament. Therefore, it can be expected that the policies of any Scottish Government, regardless of its political composition, will reflect these genuinely *Scottish* values’ (Shisheva et al, 2013: 29; their italics).

One area where the Scottish government does concur with its UK/English counterparts, however, is the importance of mainstreaming equalities and refugee integration across all areas of policymaking, rather than the specific targeting of services. The Scottish Government is committed to the ‘integration of an equality perspective into the everyday work of government’. It has done so by creating an Equality Unit to act as a lead on equalities outcomes and mainstreaming (which plays

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22 [http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/People/Equality/18507](http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/People/Equality/18507); [http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/People/Equality/18507/govtresponsibility](http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/People/Equality/18507/govtresponsibility)
a similar role to the DCLG and Home Office combined in England), and also by including equality outcomes in its National Performance Framework, Government Economic Strategy and the Scottish budget, by making equality outcomes integral to the agenda on public service reform and various other mainstreaming measures (for the complete list, see Scottish Equality Outcomes and Mainstreaming 2013b: 3).

However, this appears to be where the similarities end. In terms of the rights afforded to refugees and migrants in Scotland, these appear to be qualitatively different from those offered in England. Interviews with Scottish policy officials (interviews with author, May 2014) revealed that immigrants are offered greater access to health services, housing support and language-training as compared with England. For instance, refugees have more extensive housing rights as the Scottish Government has one of the most progressive homelessness strategies in Europe, and refugees are granted the same rights as Scottish nationals (see Scottish Government, 2013: 44-47) Scotland also funds greater provision of ESOL classes to immigrants, whereby the Adult ASOL Strategy for Scotland recognizes ‘the vital contribution which New Scots and settled minority ethnic communities make to our society and in the Scottish labour market’ (Scottish Government 2007: 4).23 While the Home Office sets the rules for citizenship and language courses across the UK territory, the Scottish Government has scope to tailor its levels of support for ESOL learning and the extent to which it provides courses free-of-charge, which is considered to play a ‘key supporting role in achieving the Scottish Executive’s vision for a prosperous, inclusive, diverse and pluralistic Scotland’ (ibid).24 As a result of this commitment, Scottish ESOL provision is more extensive than in England, where ESOL has received significant funding cuts and there is ‘greater rationing of free places…so that some low paid migrants can no longer access classes at no cost’ (Spencer, 2011c: 3). Furthermore, the community cohesion agenda has also faced ‘unprecedented cuts in funding’ that reflects its ‘lower priority from the coalition government’ in Westminster (Lewis and Craig, 2014: 26, 24). With regard to asylum, as mentioned, asylum seekers are granted support from their first day of entry into Scotland, including access to public services). The Scottish Government is also seeking to change the law so that asylum seekers can obtain a work permit, which is currently forbidden under UK law (Scottish Government, 2013: 20).25

Finally, the Scottish Government has also earmarked a considerable sum of money to try to alleviate the negative effects of the austerity reforms of the current UK Government on migrants and citizens in Scotland. In its document Welfare Mitigation: The Scottish Government Response (2013) it states that: ‘The Scottish Government aims to mitigate the worst impacts of welfare reform, as far as it can, within the powers it has available’.26 This includes an extra £9.2 million invested in the Scottish Welfare Fund for 2013–14, which includes helping people on housing benefit. However, there is uncertainty about how the Immigration Act (2014), which aims to introduce a new health tax for immigrants amongst other restrictive measures to immigrant rights, will affect policies in Scotland. According to one organization, “It is also unclear how the changes will impact across the four countries of the UK, as although access to healthcare is governed by devolved administrations, the provisions

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25 http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2013/12/4581
26 http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0042/00426512.doc
of the Act apply across the UK’ (Migrant Rights Network, 2014). According to Scottish policy makers, there is no evidence of ‘health tourism’ that motivated the policy in England, and instead there is a concern that the health levy will ‘put people off from coming to Scotland’, especially international students (interview with Scottish policy official, May 2014). As such, the Scottish Government, as in many immigration-related policies, has raised a number of concerns on this matter.

Explaining the Scottish difference
The preceding analysis of ethnic minorities and immigration policy in the devolved UK indicates what other researchers have found: that the ‘community cohesion’ agenda pursued by the DCLG and endorsed by the Home Office is simply not applicable in Scotland (Kintrea and Suzuki: 2008). Indeed, the approaches to ethnic minorities and migrant integration were so at odds that one Scottish policymaker felt like everyone was ‘speaking a different language’ when she attended meetings in London, whereby ‘multiculturalism didn’t work in England – but it was working in Scotland!’ (interview with Scottish policy official, May 2014). Let us now return to the policy divergence/convergence theoretical framework to consider factors explaining divergence between the Scottish and English/UK positions.

The first set of factors, as identified by Keating (2002) is institutional, including the powers of the devolved bodies, intergovernmental relations (IGR) and overlapping functions. Certainly, the fact that Scotland has de facto competence for migrant integration policy as it is not reserved to Westminster in the Scotland Act (1998) enables Holyrood to pursue a different approach from England, not least in the types of rights and access to public service provision that it offers migrants. The fact that migrant integration is considered to be a devolved area by Scottish policymakers also means that there are low levels of intergovernmental coordination in this area. According to one policymaker, it is viewed like any other devolved issue, such as education, where no coordination is required between the Scottish and English departments responsible (interview with the author, May 2014). Indeed, the Scottish Government's Race Equality Statement (2008) and Refugee Integration Strategy (2013) made no reference to working with the UK government departments: instead the focus was on building relations between organisations in Scotland. Notably, there are no concordats between the Scottish Government and the Department for Communities and Local Government – a department responsible for migrant integration in England, whose remit corresponds with its devolved Scottish and Welsh counterparts. The Home Office, which has a UK-wide remit, is consulted in the activities of the COSLA Migration Team (COSLA, 2014), however, this is solely in an advisory capacity (interview with policy official). A stronger source of potential convergence is the fact that migrant integration is a ‘transversal’ policy area – in that it affects both devolved and reserved competences. Thus, the new citizenship requirements contained in the Immigration Act 2014 will affect devolved competences such as health and housing, i.e. access to the NHS and landlord-tenant relations. However, convergence has not been evident in this area, seen in the critical approach of the Scottish Government towards UK immigration policies.

A second set of explanatory factors that Keating identified are what he calls ‘contextual factors’, that is, the existence of a common UK security area, a common economic area and a welfare state. Here, there is some evidence of IGR is on issues of labour market integration of migrants, whereby the Department of Work and Pensions is involved in setting the agenda on job search and training while the Scottish Government leads on employability, and the two institutions are committed to working together on these issues. This cooperation was particularly notable during the early 2000s, when there was party congruence between governments at the Scottish and UK levels, with the Labour Party providing a strong source of convergence (Woods, 2008). However, the current SNP-led Scottish Government has also been highly critical of the Conservative-Liberal UK government’s welfare policies, especially unemployment policies, and has sought to resist implementing these in Scotland. Indeed, the Scottish Government was able to obtain powers from Westminster to end the controversial ‘bedroom tax’ in Scotland so it can control discretionary housing payments and protect some areas of Scottish social security from the austerity cuts being imposed by Westminster (Guardian, 2 May 2014).

A third sector of factors explaining convergence/divergence may be collectively referred to as ‘political factors’ (Keating, 2002). From this analysis, it seems that these factors are the most influential in encouraging Scotland to adopt a different approach to migrant integration. Firstly, Scotland’s ‘territorial policy community’ on migrant integration has been keen to pursue a distinctively Scottish approach that prizes the vision of Scotland as a welcoming, multicultural community. Most notably, the Scottish Refugee Council is a central actor in the development of refugee policy and it had consistently advocated a Scottish approach to integration and ethnic minorities that is reflective of ‘Scottish values’, thereby pursuing an integration policy that is reflected through the prism of Scottish nation-building (Shisheva et al, 2013; Mulvey, 2013). Likewise, the Scottish Equality and Human Rights Commission (SHRC) is separate from the London-based Equality and Human Rights Commission, and it has its own home-grown Scottish National Action Plan for Human Rights. Third-sector organisation have benefited from the ‘distinct Scottish policy-making style involving consultation and working through professional networks and the usual story of everybody knowing everybody’ (Keating, Cairney and Hepburn, 2009: 57) while interest groups in England have found it more difficult to influence policy and felt particularly excluded from the development of the DCLG’s community cohesion agenda (Runnymede Trust xx).

Another set of actors that perceive migrant integration through the lens of Scottish nation-building and national identity are the political parties. The overwhelmingly positive approach of Scotland’s parties towards immigration, integration and multiculturalism has had a strong impact on the distinctive framing and development of immigration and integration policy in Scotland and clear policy divergence from England. As a former Scottish Labour Party MP argued, immigrants ‘are more welcomed than they are in England. There is quite a steam-up with the [UK] Labour Party and the Conservative Party about anti-immigration thinking. It seems populist, because that’s what people think. Clearly, it’s all about jobs and houses and whatever. Up here [in Scotland], it is slightly more complex in the sense that a lot of the jobs that Europeans are filling, especially Eastern Europeans, especially Poles, Scots won’t do…. I think the public is less angry in Scotland about immigration. I don’t think there is so much pressure on housing, and public services’ (interview with the author, 16 November 2012). Another Scottish Labour Party official – this time an MSP – confirmed this view: ‘I think that the [positive] political
Discourse around immigration in Scotland is probably because you don’t have a large body of right-wing opinion in the Parliament’ (interview with author, 12 November 2012).

Hepburn and Rosie (2014) have identified four reasons for the positive attitude of Scotland’s parties towards immigration: (1) the low barriers to becoming a member of the Scottish nation (compared to other substate nations where minority languages may be under threat by immigration); (2) low levels of immigration relative to England and a perceived demographic shortage; (3) low party polarisation on immigration (where there is no significant anti-immigrant party); and (4) Scotland’s limited control over immigration policy. The latter factor in particular allows Scottish parties to act ‘in opposition’ to Westminster, ‘to avert responsibility – and culpability – to the UK Government on unpopular aspects of immigration, and to avoid the glare of media attention on rising numbers (Hepburn, 2014b: 11). This view was echoed by a Scottish Labour MSP, who maintained that ‘It is easy for the SNP to stand up and criticize the immigration policy of the UK government. They know that they don’t have to make those decisions themselves. But if they actually had to take those decisions themselves, to what extent would they support an open-doors policy? I suspect they wouldn’t’ (interview with author, 13 November 2012). The only caveats to Scottish political support for a pro-immigration, pro-multiculturalism approach are the Scottish Labour Party and Scottish Conservative Party’s challenge of reconciling their more positive positions with the increasingly restrictive integration approach taken by their ‘parent’ parties in London in response to the UKIP threat.

A final political factor that Keating (2002, 2005) identified as having an important influence on policy divergence/convergence is public opinion. Research has shown that public opinion in Scotland is slightly less against increasing immigration as compared to England, but it is also more in favour of benefits for migrants. Thus the Oxford Migration Observatory found that more Scots thought immigration was good for Scotland (41%) than bad for Scotland (31%), 20% of Scots would support the number of immigrants being increased by ‘a lot’, which compared with only 2% in favour of increased flows in the south of England, but the majority of Scots did want reduced immigration (58%), though this was lower than England (75%) (see Migration Observatory, 2014; Hepburn, 2014b). So the overall picture in Scotland is one of broad support for reduced immigration – which is not radically different from English public opinion, and would therefore be seen to favour policy convergence. However, Holyrood’s diverging approach to immigration has not reflected public opinion, indicating that the other political factors are stronger explanatory variables.

Finally, an additional explanatory variable for divergence/convergence, and one that did not feature in Keating’s theoretical framework, is the structural issue of demographics in Scotland. As hypothesised by Hepburn (2014a: 53), substate political actors may view immigration more positively if there are low levels of immigration to the substate territory and perceived demographic decline. We saw that this was certainly the case in Scotland vis-à-vis England, whereby there are far fewer migrants in Scotland which ‘creates a different reaction’ (interview with Scottish policy official, 2014). As an MSP for the Scottish National Party sums it up, ‘immigration has been smaller and therefore the tensions aren’t that much’ (interview, 21 November 2012). In particular, attracting higher levels of migrants to come to Scotland has been ‘positioned as a key driver of population and economic growth’ (Tindal et al, 2014) and the Scottish Government has acknowledged that positive processes of migrant integration and “[a] fairer and more equal society is also a key part of making Scotland an attractive place for people to live, work and contribute.
This will help attract more people, including highly skilled migrants, to Scotland’ (Scottish Government econ strategy, 2011: 90). This contrasts sharply to the demographic picture in England, whereby the problem is seen as population excess and the perception of being over-flooded by immigrants (Spencer, 2011). This has led to demands for reduced numbers and the erection of barriers to integration to discourage potential migrants from coming to England (Saggar and Sommerville, 2012).

Conclusions
Immigrant integration is a relatively underexplored and underdeveloped policy area in the UK. Much of this has to do with the language of ‘integration’, which has not – until recently – been part of the established lexicon in British policy circles. Quite the opposite, ‘integration’ has always had negative assimilationist connotations and as such has been viewed with suspicion by civil society. Spencer (2011b) argues that this disparagement of integration has ‘let government off the hook, leaving a vacuum in national policy towards those arriving to live in the UK and public debate open to those who argue integration is solely the responsibility of migrants themselves’. As a result, UK migrant integration policy has been awkwardly subsumed into the race relations and equalities framework, which has moved in the last fifteen years from a multiculturalist model to the ‘empty vessel’ of community cohesion that has sought to include all issues of equality, race, shared values, citizenship, ethnicity, immigration, intercultural relations, tackling extremism and building community, but which has emerged as a ‘fuzzy mess’ (Robinson, 2005; Ratcliffe, 2012; Lewis and Craig, 2014).

Although immigrant integration was not a policy area considered in the blueprint for a Scottish Parliament, the retainer model of devolution has given Scotland the policy levers to ‘go its own way’ on the issue of migrant integration, which is not explicitly reserved to Westminster. However, this has not been a move accompanied by fanfare or confrontation with UK policies. Instead, Scottish policymakers have – quietly, consensually, and in consultation with a wide range of migrant organisation stakeholders – developed a different approach to migrant integration that is firmly embedded in Scotland’s unfolding nation-building project. This appears to be a serendipitous development rather than a strategic one. Scotland’s migrant integration policy has emerged out of Scotland’s principal cultural and economic policy frames, which have, respectively, placed an emphasis on creating a multicultural society whose economy is reliant on attracting and retaining migrants.

Importantly, the Scottish approach has had little to do with the divisive debates taking place about immigration and integration in England. While the community cohesion agenda was articulated in response to concerns about societal fracturing resulting from ethnic segregation and civil disobedience, the One Scotland campaign sought to tackle complacency towards racial discrimination to make Scotland a more welcoming place to live. The policy frames were also developed in accordance with different political priorities: while the community cohesion agenda marked a more assimilationist move away from Westminster’s previous multicultural approach to ethnic minorities, the One Scotland campaign built upon and expanded Holyrood’s commitment to building a plural, inclusive society. Finally, the aims of the different policies were diametrically opposed: while the community cohesion agenda was part of a package of reforms designed to reduce levels of immigration to England/the UK, the One Scotland initiative sought to increase immigration to sustain demographic and economic growth. As a result, migrant integration policy has been
framed as a ‘problem’ to be ‘managed’ in England, while in Scotland it is has been presented by political elites as a resource and strength to be enjoyed (Welsh report).

As a result, we see considerable convergence between Scotland and England in terms of the policy frames and content of policies (encouraging multiculturalism, greater migrant access to public services and language provision, and funding cultural groups in Scotland versus funding community cohesion initiatives that must involve more than one group to prove inter-cultural contact and reduced access to health and language support). There is also a noticeable difference in policy style (greater consultation of stakeholders in Scotland than in England). However, there have also been elements of convergence too. Most notably, both England and Scotland have put the equalities legislation at the heart of their race relations approach, both have prioritised the role of local authorities in developing integration policies, and both have pursued a mainstreaming approach to ethnic minorities and migrant integration.

However, scholars have argued that this mainstreaming of migrant integration has not worked effectively at all. Spencer (2011a: 20) maintains that ‘each element of migration policy is isolated from the mainstream economic and social policies than it affects, and is affected by. No effective governance arrangement has been established to address that gap, nor the equally problematic isolation from the devolved administrations and local services.’ Spencer’s argument is that migrant integration is simply not taken into account by UK departments and that the focus is instead on established ethnic and black minorities – which to some extent has also been true in Scotland. However, the difference is, while race relations policies have now been framed by a community cohesion agenda that places race as one category alongside gender, disability and sexual orientation, Scotland has continued its commitment to prioritizing race equality as evidenced in its Race Equality Statement (2008).

Has the Scottish approach made a difference to integration outcomes? Due to difficulties of analysing the dispersed mainstreaming policies that affect migrants, it is difficult at present to day. However, recent research gives us some indication that integration problems persist. In an analysis of the lives of refugees and asylum seekers in Scotland, funded by the Scottish Refugee Council, Gareth Mulvey (2013) concludes that ‘those who do manage to integrate do so despite rather than because of the British Government. The British Government claim to support integration, or at least want it, but they do not provide any financial or institutional help. They also seem to think that refugees, and indeed other migrants, will integrate into Britain, or some amorphous set of British values. The evidence is that refugees will integrate into their locality, but support for community based projects is being severely challenged in this ‘age of austerity’’ (Mulvey, 2013).

A continuing problem is that political parties have been silent on the need for a specific immigrant integration policy in Scotland as well as England (see Spencer, 2011b). From a comparative perspective, this is unusual given that immigration control is reserved to Westminster while integration is devolved to Scotland, whereby in other similar cases – such as the Belgian communities or the Spanish regions – the decentralisation of integration policy has led to more emphasis on this issue at the substate level. However, in Scotland – as in the UK – integration policy is tangled up, and often obscured by – other concepts and policies that mean similar things.

However, this may be set to change. To avoid having to deal with Westminster’s increasingly restrictive immigration, citizenship and welfare policies, which impinge on the rights and duties afforded to immigrants in Scotland, the SNP-led Scottish Government has proposed a referendum in independence on 18 September 2014 (Scottish Government, 2013: 267). The SNP wishes to increase
levels of immigration to Scotland with the aim of raising the demographic growth rate to the EU average, and to develop a more inclusive model of citizenship and a more human refugee and asylum policy (SNP, 2007; Scottish Government, 2013). This position has won the Yes campaign the overwhelming support of Scotland’s ethnic minorities, which may be motivated by a desire to distance themselves from the anti-immigrant rhetoric in England (Elgot, 2014). If the referendum fails, the Scottish Commission on Devolution (the Calman Commission) has advised that Scotland’s distinct immigration needs must be taken into account, and the unionist parties in Scotland have suggested they will look into different scenarios to achieve this if Scotland votes ‘no’. The outcome of the referendum is too close to call at the time of writing; however it looks likely that in any scenario, Scotland will obtain even greater powers over the admission and integration of immigrants. This could lead to a more strategic effort to develop a distinctive policy framework on integration in Scotland, and achieve more distance from the ‘British values’ frame of English policy.

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