The EU and Peacebuilding in CSDP Missions and Operations: Formulating Peacebuilding Policies

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Abstract

The European Union identified peacebuilding as one of the priorities of its foreign and security policy. Since 2003, when the EU launched its first three Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations, the prospects for the EU to pursue an individual policy on peacebuilding have increased. The involvement of the EU in post-conflict peacebuilding has become one of the major elements of CSDP missions and operations. The paper investigates the link between the concept of peacebuilding and the practice of CSDP operations and missions. It asks how the EU understands peacebuilding activities carried out in CSDP missions and operations. To examine these questions, the research resorts to an institutional analysis of the evolution of peacebuilding practices in the CSDP. The paper examines the decision- and policy-making structures responsible for the planning and development of peacebuilding activities in CSDP missions and operations. It explores how the EU institutions and policy-makers working with the CSDP structures shape and influence the understanding of peacebuilding carried out in CSDP operations and missions. The analysis is based on relevant policy documents (decisions and reports) and qualitative expert interviews with officials at the EEAS. The paper reveals that the EU attempted to resemble the UN in its understanding of peacebuilding while following and adopting the reform processes of the UN peacekeeping. The majority of CSDP missions and operations are of a civilian character. Even military operations do not include military and traditional peacekeeping or peace-enforcement elements (except EU NAVFOR – ATALANTA). These operations focus on capacity-building and training. At the same time, the EU limits its involvement in post-conflict building to specific activities only. Although the decision-making level (member states) has been crucial to the conceptualisation of the EU approaches to peacebuilding in the CSDP, the paper concludes that the EU’s understanding of the EU peacebuilding in the CSDP is also significantly shaped by policy-makers at the EU institutions and the delegations of the member states to the EU.

The development of peacebuilding

Peacebuilding is a form of post-conflict management and reconstruction that addresses the root causes of a conflict with the aim of preventing the recurrence of the conflict. It occurs in vulnerable post-conflict societies which have emerged from war but remain susceptible to the recurrence of conflict (Atack 2005; Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006). The concept of peacebuilding was first introduced by Johan Galtung in the 1970s who emphasised the need of promoting sustainable peace by addressing the root causes of violent conflicts and supporting indigenous capacities for post-conflict management.

1 I would like to express my gratitude to Dr Geoffrey Edwards, Professor John Loughlin and Professor Christopher Hill for their advice. I am also grateful to Peterhouse for providing the funding to conduct this research.

2 Initially, CSDP was known and referred to as European Foreign and Defence Policy (ESDP). CSDP is used in this paper to denote both unless it is specifically necessary to refer to ESDP.
Nonetheless, it was former United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutrous-Ghali who gave peacebuilding an international status while introducing peacebuilding to the UN in his *Agenda for Peace*. He defined peacebuilding as “comprehensive efforts ... [and an] action to identify and support structures which ... tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Boutrous-Ghali 1992, art. VI (55); II (21)). The *Agenda for Peace* also discussed other approaches to peace and security, namely preventive diplomacy, development, peace-making and peacekeeping. It highlighted the need for interconnection between these various aspects of post-conflict reconstruction in order to achieve lasting peace. In the *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*, Boutrous-Ghali defined peacebuilding as one of the “instruments for controlling and resolving conflicts between and within States” (Boutrous-Ghali 1995, para. 23). The *Supplement* highlighted the proliferation of intra-state, religious and ethnic, wars characterised by “the collapse of state institutions, especially the police and judiciary, with resulting paralysis of governance, a breakdown of law and order” (Boutrous-Ghali 1995, para. 10-14).

The *Agenda for Peace* was followed by the *Brahimi Report*, adopted by the UNSC as the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*. The Report acknowledged the importance of peacebuilding as integral to the success of peacekeeping operations. The Panel recommended a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police, other rule of law elements and human rights experts in complex peace operations (UN General Assembly and Security Council 2000). The post-9/11 global security environment has further heightened the threats that arise from state failure, underdevelopment and weak governance. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan established the *High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change* and tasked its members to examine these new threats. The Panel recommended to establish the Peacebuilding Commission to manage post-conflict peacebuilding, conflict prevention, early warning and transition processes between conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding (UN 2004b, 83). In his report *In Larger Freedom*, Annan included the recommendations of the Panel to establish the Peacebuilding Commission (UN General Assembly 2005g). The 2005 World Summit established the UN Peacebuilding Commission as body which supports “post-conflict peacebuilding” in “countries emerging from conflict” by ensuring “sustained international attention” (UN General Assembly 2005a).

According to Gross, the introduction of peacebuilding was driven by “the realisation that peacekeeping efforts [...] were insufficient to respond to conflict in a post-Cold War world that was increasingly fraught with ethnic and nationalist conflict” (Gross 2013, 9-10). According to David Hannay, one of the members of the High-Level Panel, the UN faced institutional and organisational challenges after the end of the Cold War. These problems were mainly driven by an overstretch of peacekeeping; the use of force without the legitimisation of the UNSC; and the disasters in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia. With the outbreak of several civil wars and intra-state conflicts after the end of

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3 Boutrous-Ghali's understanding of peacebuilding is almost identical with Galtung's concept of peacebuilding (see Galtung 1975).

4 The *Supplement* recommended the creation of a rapid reaction force consisting of national units. The recommendation was followed by the establishment of the SHIRBRIG (Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN operations), a rapid intervention UN peacekeeping tool in 1996, which was created after the massacre in Sebrenica. The *Supplement* document directly referred to the failure of the UN to prevent these mass atrocities. It also emphasised the need to pay attention to the deteriorating situation with regard to the safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Boutrous-Ghali 1995, para. 99).

5 The General Assembly established the Commission as a body dealing with peacebuilding exclusively and did not include the three additional tasks (conflict prevention, early warning and transition processes) suggested by the High-Level Panel into the responsibilities of the Commission. Peacebuilding has also become an important element of operations managed by DPA (peace-making and mediation missions) and DPKO (peacekeeping missions). Today, most UN peace missions are multidimensional missions integrating peacebuilding, peace-making and peacekeeping elements (UN, *What is peacekeeping?*).
the Cold War, the UN found itself with an overload of peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping lacked the civilian peace-making and peacebuilding capacity to conduct complex and comprehensive peace operations. Hannay noted that civilian aspects of peacekeeping such as police and legal advice were needed (Hannay 2013, 253-4; 2008).

The post-Cold War environment showed the need for comprehensive and multidimensional peacebuilding (Stedman 1996). Nevertheless, the changing nature of the world order and wars led not only the UN but also the EU to reconsider their approaches to peace and security (Cooper 2000; 2003). Gross noted that

“peacebuilding mirrors the simultaneous focus on a comprehensive approach to conflict management that has emerged as a guiding paradigm for the EU, individual countries and other international organisations in their respective attempts to align civil and military instruments. Such an approach combines defence, diplomacy and development” (Gross 2013, 9).

The introduction of peacebuilding was accompanied by the emergence of the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect and the concept of human security, which placed the individual rather than the state as the subject of security. These concepts came to be seen as crucial to peace and security by both the UN and the EU simultaneously (Gross 2013, 10).

The EU's influence in the institutionalisation of peacebuilding at the UN
The EU's support for and involvement in the evolution of peacebuilding at the UN reveals best the EU's position to and understanding of peacebuilding. The EU's decisions and actions in the field of peace and security reflected the reform process of peacekeeping at the UN. On the one hand, the evolution of peacebuilding at the UN was influenced by the EU's positions and interests. On the other hand, the process of the development of the UN peacebuilding influenced the conceptualisation and formation of the EU's own approaches to peacebuilding, especially in the construction of the CSDP of the EU. These developments were accompanied and supported by a process of strengthening the cooperation between the EU and the UN in peace operations. According to Hannay, it was the end of the Cold War that brought the two organisations to cooperate (Hannay 2013, 173). Novosseloff argued that the UN-EU cooperation intensified after the institutionalisation of the ESDP at the Franco-British Saint-Malo Summit of 1998 and at the European Council of Cologne in 1999. According to her, the EU had the intention of becoming a credible actor with new capabilities in crisis management. At the UN, the EU also wanted to be perceived as something more than just a “lobby group”, a “funding organisation” or a “monetary weight” since the EU is the largest contributor to the UN general and peacekeeping budget. This cooperation was also driven by the need of the UN to create effective exit strategies in post-conflict situations, for which the EU was seen as a credible actor offering a way of leaving in a sustainable way (Novosseloff 2012). Tardy also observed that the EU-UN cooperation in the field of peace and security has been accompanied by the simultaneous reform processes of the two institutions, which brought both closer to each other. This process of approaching has been characterised by an increased exchange of information, knowledge and frameworks (Tardy 2005).

Following the introduction of peacebuilding at the UN, the EU embraced and supported the idea of peacebuilding as presented by the UN. Hannay noted that Boutros-Ghali’s idea of peacebuilding was welcomed by the EU, whereas the US was more hesitant to his ideas of peacebuilding (Hannay 2008, 77 and 184). EU member states directly supported the practical implementation of the recommendations proposed by the Supplement while taking an active role in the SHIRBRIG (Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN operations). The EU influence in this establishment was obvious with 16 of 23 member states and observers of SHIRBRIG being EU member states (Koops 2011).
The involvement of the EU is also apparent in the High-Level Panel and in the process that led to
the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission. Although only two EU countries, namely UK and
France, were represented (by Robert Badinter and David Hannay) in the High-Level Panel, Hannay
himself noted that both sought to reflect the EU’s interests and needs. According to Hannay, together
with Gareth Evans, they were making the most significant contribution to the Panel’s work (Hanny
2008, 213). Hannay also noted that
“the good news is that the fit between the Panel's proposals and EU objectives is astonishingly
close, a remarkable fact since only two of the 16 panel members came from the EU. This fit
suggests potentially widespread support for the EU's aim of effective multilateralism” (Hannay
2005).

According to Hannay, EU member states were best prepared to help the UN to get out from the crisis
after the end of the Cold War. For him, UK played a special role, having a “combined position as a
country which understands and influences the evolution of US foreign policy and as one of the two
Permanent Members from a European Community which is groping its way towards a more united
approach to foreign and security policy, can be deployed and built upon” (Hannay 2013, 183).

Hannay's arguments are supported by other scholars such as Gowan who argued that “the EU’s
members were widely expected to be important drivers of the reform process of the United Nations”
(Gowan 2007). Gowan noted that there were high hopes that the EU would take a leading role in the
UN reform process initiated through the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. The
Peacebuilding Commission was widely supported by the EU member states. According to Gowan, the
EU has adopted creative approaches to the UN system. The political relevance of the UN's new
Peacebuilding Commission is decided to a large extent by the EU states, which worked with the
African bloc within the General Assembly to advocate the new body (Gowan 2007). Biscop noted that
the Peacebuilding Commission provided the EU with a new era of engagement, including with its own
military and civilian ESDP missions. He pointed out that both organisations could especially benefit
from the exchange of information and data on specific countries (Biscop 2005).

The role of regional organisations, especially the EU, was seen as crucial in the Peacebuilding
Commission in providing resources and capacities. The Draft Outcome Document of the General
Assembly noted that the UN supports the efforts of the European Union and other regional entities to
develop standby capacities. It was believed that the UN could turn to regional organisations that
possess the needed resources (United Nations 2005). The conflicts in Yugoslavia were especially
crucial for the future evolution of peacekeeping and post-conflict engagement of both the UN and the
EU. According to Hannay, the failure to prevent the mismanagement of the conflicts in Yugoslavia that
led to mas-killing was also caused by the divide between the UN and the EU. He argued that
“the existing, somewhat pantomime-horse arrangements for dividing responsibilities between the
EU (responsible for overall peacemaking in the former Yugoslavia, but with no military
capabilities) and the UN (responsible for a peacekeeping operation in Croatia, the airlift into
Sarajevo and steadily increasing humanitarian relief operations in Bosnia, but with no general
peacemaking functions) could no longer be sustained.” (Hannay 2008, 93).

The crisis in former Yugoslavia is thus seen as the crucial moment that led to enhanced cooperation
between the UN and the EU in the field of post-conflict crisis management. In the case of the EU
engagement in the Yugoslav conflicts, Hannay claimed that
“the Europeans were clinging on desperately to the doctrine of impartiality and to their
unwillingness to be drawn into the fighting as a protagonist while all the time being compelled to
increase their presence on the ground even to half carry out the not very satisfactory mandate they
had” (Hannay 2008, 157).

Hannay noted that the intention of reforming UN peacekeeping supported the strengthening of regional
peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities. In particular, he mentioned the support for training and logistics, and willingness to provide finance for regional peacekeeping operations (Hannay 2013, 253-4). He noted that the overload of peacekeeping and the increase of the UN’s costs of peacekeeping increased justification for the involvement of regional organisations. The EU came to be seen as an important partner in the cooperation in the field of post-conflict reconstruction (Hannay 2008).

In 2004, the European Council presented the EU’s contribution to the High-Level Panel. It referred to the ESS, in particular to the emergence of new security challenges, such as ethnic conflicts and state failures, and the need for new approaches to tackle them. The paper stated that

“the EU recognises that none of the challenges can be tackled on its own, as they are often closely linked. They demand economic, political and legal instruments, as well as military instruments, and close co-operation between states as well as international organisations across a range of sectors. The UN is uniquely placed to provide the framework for such co-operation”

(Council of the EU 2004, 2).

The EU recognised the need for comprehensive approaches in post-conflict situations. In the paper, the EU referred to peacebuilding while understanding it as a process that addresses the root causes of a failure of state institutions. It associated the state failure with great human suffering, denial of fundamental freedoms, abuse of human rights, breaches of international humanitarian law, genocide, terrorism, organised crime and trafficking. Such state failures can lead to regional instability and regional conflict. These thoughts are analogous to the understanding of peacebuilding, as presented by the Brahimi report, the Agenda for Peace, and the report of the High-Level Panel.

The EU recognised the need to tackle the increasing cases of the relapses of conflicts. For these purposes, the paper stated that “the EU would welcome measures to strengthen the UN system's engagement in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, leading to enhanced cooperation between key departments within the UN Secretariat and intergovernmental bodies as well as to an effective allocation of resources amongst UN system actors” (Council of the EU 2004, 7). In fact, the objective to coordinate various actors in peacebuilding, both the UN agencies and contributing countries, became a very task of the Peacebuilding Commission.

Once the idea of a Peacebuilding Commission (EC) was presented, the EU advocated and warmly welcomed the intention to establish it. The EC particularly understood its role to be well suited to contribute actively to the Peacebuilding Commission by emphasising its experience in peacebuilding around the world, in particular in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo. For these reasons, the EC proposed that the European Community participate in all meetings of the Peacebuilding Commission (European Commission 2005). This statement clearly highlights the EC's intention in the Peacebuilding Commission. For the EC, the Peacebuilding Commission could serve as a platform for the EU's engagement in post-conflict environments. In its statement on the preparation for the 2005 World Summit, the EU Presidency highlighted “the EU's role as a peacebuilder through actions throughout the world ranging through peacekeeping, reconstruction, institution building and support for fledgling democracies” (The EU at the UN Summit 2005).

Javier Solana, former EU High Representative for the CSDP, warmly welcomed the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission. He stressed that the EU was fully supporting the concept of peacebuilding as it came to be understood by the UN. In particular, he stated that “the idea of strengthening the link between early warning, peace keeping and post-conflict reconstruction was part of the EU’s submission to the High Level Panel.” According to him, the creation of the PBC “is entirely consistent with the comprehensive approach in crisis management pursued by the European Union. We stand ready to fully and actively contribute to the work of the PBC” (Council of the EU 2005).

The active involvement of the EU in the evolution of peacebuilding at the UN suggests that the EU’s understanding of peacebuilding resembles that of the UN. Most importantly, the support of the EU
for the institutionalisation of peacebuilding at the UN created a fertile soil for the development of the EU's own activities in the field of peacebuilding.

**The EU's adoption of the UN's understanding of peacebuilding**

The consensus between the UN and the EU on the need for peacebuilding as well as the EU's support for peacebuilding as a framework in post-conflict reconstruction became apparent with the evolution of the CSDP. With the launch of its CSDP missions and operations, the EU has emerged as an important actor in peacebuilding (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006, 1). As Stewart observed, the EU conflict prevention capacity has developed from a vague notion within the development sphere to ambitious civilian and military crisis management (Stewart 2011). The CSDP represented a new security arrangement that had to be adjusted to the international system. In terms of international legal arrangements, the UN has had primacy in matters of international peace and security. Since the end of WWII, the UNSC has mainly been responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. The EU has affirmed the primary responsibility and authority of the UNSC in international peace and security. The Gothenburg Summit recalled “the United Nations' primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” (Council of the EU 2001a). From this perspective, the UN was seen by the EU as the primary actor in post-conflict rebuilding and management. As Ojanen stressed, the EU has also recognised that “the development of the EU as an international actor requires international acceptance, the only actual institutional source of which is the UN” (Ojanen 2006).

The EU envisioned its CSDP not as an alternative to the UN peacekeeping but as a contribution to its efforts. CSDP is understood as an effort by the EU to fill the gap and to strengthen “the impact of the UN without deploying directly to UN operations” (Juergenliemk et al. 2012, 20). Based on the proposal of the EU Presidency, the European Council of Nice in 2000 approved an enhanced cooperation between the UN and the EU. The EU stressed the importance of its own CSDP in contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security. The Presidency report highlighted that

> “the development of the European Security and Defence Policy strengthens the Union's contribution to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. The European Union recognises the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for maintaining peace and international security” (Council of the EU 2000, Annex IV).

This statement emphasised that there was no conflict of interest between the UN and the EU. With its intention to launch CSDP, the EU sought to fully comply with international law, in particular with the principles of the UN Charter. Nevertheless, the report stressed that the CSDP would mean the development of an “autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises” (Council of the EU 2000, Annex VI). The report thus presented the CSDP as an instrument compatible with the UN rules and as an autonomous capacity of the EU at the same time.

The Presidency report for the 2001 Council in Goteborg recalled the conclusions from Nice while stressing that the ESDP would

> “enable Europeans to respond more effectively and coherently to requests from lead organisations such as the UN or the OSCE. The EU is determined to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises” (Council of the EU 2001, para. 7 and 36).

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6 The EU has also engaged in peacebuilding through development, humanitarian aid and the strengthening of civil society (DG for External Policies of the Union 2010). This paper focuses on the CSDP only.
The CSDP was supposed to enable the EU “to carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks as defined in the Treaty on European Union: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making. This does not involve the establishment of a European army” (Council of the EU 2000, Annex VI). These tasks correspond to the objectives of the UN peacekeeping. Nevertheless, the UN undertook a major reform of its peacekeeping while shifting from traditional approaches (monitoring peace agreements) to multidimensional and integrated peace missions with an increased number of peacebuilding tasks.

The Goteborg Council also brought the CSDP closer to the peacebuilding framework which was gaining in importance in the reform processes at the UN. The formulation and construction of the CSDP followed the developments of the UN reform as outlined in the Agenda for Peace and the Brahimi Report. “Civilian and military aspects of crisis management”, “conflict prevention” and “regional issues” came to be seen as the main area of cooperation between the EU and the UN in crisis management. The report stressed that the evolving capacities generated by the ESDP should lead to “an intensified, mutually reinforcing co-operation between the European Union and other international organisations, including the UN, OSCE and the Council of Europe, without unnecessary duplication” (Council of the EU 2001b, para. 7 and 36).

The EU followed closely the recommendations of the UN Brahimi report. The Presidency report suggested that the development of a capability for planning and conducting police operations for international missions across the range of conflict prevention and crisis management operations should pay attention “to the experience of the United Nations, in particular the conclusions of, and follow-up to, the Brahimi report” (Council of the EU 2001b, Annex 1, para. 6). In this sense, the planning and conduct of police missions followed the ideas of the reform of peacekeeping and adoption of comprehensive and integrated peacebuilding approaches as proposed by the Brahimi report. These developments correspond to the evolution of EU’s own civilian and military capabilities within the CSDP. The EU moved to include and stressed the importance of civilian aspects of crisis management to CSDP. While analysing the reports of the Goteborg Council, Tardy noted that civilian aspects of crisis management became the most significant area of the EU-UN rapprochement (Tardy 2005).

The Gothenburg Summit recalled the intention to develop “mutually reinforcing approaches to conflict prevention” and to ensure “that the EU’s evolving military and civilian capacities would provide real added value for UN crisis management”. The conclusions re-emphasised “the commitment of the EU as well as of its Member States to contribute to the objectives of the UN in conflict prevention and crisis management, noting the United Nations’ primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. […] The Council reaffirms its determination to develop and strengthen co-operation in the areas of crisis management and conflict prevention. The co-operation should develop progressively in close co-ordination with the UN, focusing on substantive issues and concrete needs. It will increase in scope and importance as the ESDP evolves” (Council of the EU 2001).

Most importantly, the Council acknowledged “the need for an integrated approach to conflict prevention and crisis management, encompassing also development co-operation and other measures addressing root causes of conflict” (Council of the EU 2001). Again, this conclusion stressed the intention of the EU to engage in integrated peacebuilding rather than single-folded peacekeeping activities while acknowledging the importance of other measures addressing root causes of conflicts. The CSDP was set up within a peacebuilding framework.

The effects of the Brahimi report and the emphasis on peacebuilding approaches have had a fundamental impact on the conceptualisation of the CSDP. The original objective of the CSDP was to
perform the full range of the Petersberg tasks. The Franco-British agreement laid down a political path for a future CSDP while envisioning it in merely military peace-enforcement terms. It emphasised that the EU “must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.” (St Malo Declaration §1 and 2). In 1999, the European Council at its summit in Cologne declared that the EU should be able to undertake Petersberg Tasks independently by replacing the WEU. The Council adopted the goal to establish ESDP as part of the EU CFSP. The Helsinki Summit in 1999 reaffirmed the decisions from Cologne and agreed to create ESDP and a Rapid Reaction Force for military crisis intervention. While France and the United Kingdom were pushing for a more military- and defence-based policy, Sweden and Finland were in favour of civilian crisis management. The European Council in Santa Maria de Feira in 2000 discussed civilian dimension of ESDP and set up a Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. The Council defined four priority areas in the EU civilian crisis management, namely police, rule of law, civil administration and civilian protection. In 2000, the Treaty of Nice formally established ESDP as a distinctive policy of the EU for conflict prevention and crisis management. The EU officially took over the role of the WEU in crisis management.

However, the EU shifted the focus of ESDP from what it was initially intended military capacity to more soft power-based conflict prevention and peacebuilding tasks. The majority of CSDP operations and missions are not peace enforcement operations or peacekeeping missions (with the exception of EU NAVFOR - ATALANTA). Most CSDP missions and operations have been of a peacebuilding character, with some also carrying peacekeeping and peacemaking tasks. For example, the military operation in Mali focuses exclusively on training of military personnel and provides legal advice to relevant ministries. Although the mandate of the EUFOR ALTHEA operation also includes peacekeeping, the operation mainly provides capacity-building and training support for the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As Keukeleire pointed out, in contrast to what the title might indicate, the CSDP is not about the territorial defence of the EU member states. Also, military capabilities of the CSDP are not achieved by creating permanent European military forces or army. Instead, they are deployed to non-EU countries and are based on voluntary and temporary contributions of the member states. The concept of willingness ad hoc status can hamper the effectiveness of the operations: many operations could not be launched because the member states were not willing to deploy their military personnel into risky environments. In many cases, this ad hoc status makes the EU unable to react rapidly to violent conflicts (Keukeleire 2010, 61). Similarly, Mérand highlighted that the evolution of the CSDP is characterised by a shift in policy making beyond nation states. He correctly stated that the aim of the

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7 In 1992, the Petersberg Declaration opened the way for the WEU to engage in humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping task, and crisis management and peacemaking tasks (Petersberg Declaration 1992, Part II 4). With the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, the WEU was incorporated into the EU. The Treaty fully incorporated the Petersberg Tasks and emphasised that CFSP “shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking” (The Amsterdam Treaty 1997, Art. 17; see also K.E. Smith 2008).

8 Despite the fact that most CSDP missions and operations are of peacebuilding character, the EU does not frame them as peacebuilding missions. CSDP missions and operations are framed as crisis management. K.E. Smith highlighted that in practice, the term crisis management has been used for activities which “should […] be more properly termed conflict prevention or peacebuilding, as in its ubiquitous use to describe all ESDP missions” (K.E. Smith 2008, 180). For K.E. Smith, the terminology of crisis management and CSDP does not really reflect the reality of the EU’s engagement. The largest part of the EU’s conflict prevention policy comprises peacebuilding. CSDP operations and missions have been of peacebuilding and conflict prevention character rather than of peace-enforcement or peacekeeping character. According to K.E. Smith and Nowak, this confusion of definitions could hamper the EU coordination with other international organisations, as there are no equivalents to crisis management in the UN, OSCE or other organisations (K.E. Smith 2008, 181; Nowak 2006, 17-18).
ESDP was “not national defence but political integration” (Mérand 2008, 3). The ESDP evolved in a process of a social interaction between security and defence actors driven by “the internationalization of European defence structures and the Europeanization of foreign policymaking” and by “the declining importance of 'national defence'” (Mérand 2008, 4-5). The CSDP thus became a tool of foreign policy rather than national defence.

In this sense, Solana argued that “peace building and conflict prevention lie at the heart of the European Union's external action” (Solana 2007). The EU's own engagement in conflict and post-conflict environments came to be seen by the EU as the most important and doable contribution to the UN efforts in peacekeeping and peacebuilding. CSDP was seen not as an alternative to the UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding but as complementary to the UN efforts. In his speech in Dublin in 2004, Solana noted:

“Ultimately, I believe that the best way that Europe can contribute to building a stronger UN is by building a strong and capable Europe; a Europe firmly committed to effective multilateralism. These are not alternatives. These are complementary. Last year, the European Union was able to respond quickly and decisively to the UN’s call for peacekeepers in the Great Lakes region. This is EU rapid reaction in practice. Without [the European Security and Defense Policy], the deployment of military capabilities, and the ability to take the necessary decisions, we could not have responded to this call” (Solana 2004).

Solana saw crisis management to be directly intertwined with the ESS. He referred to the EU’s role in peacekeeping and post-conflict management, especially but not inclusively in the Balkans, while understanding it in a broader perspective. He argued that

“Bosnia will be the first case where the EU simultaneously deploys, trade, humanitarian, military and civilian instruments on the ground in pursuit of a single objective - the stabilisation and transformation of a post conflict society into one which some day can be ready for EU membership” (Solana 2004).

Although Solana did not directly use the term peacebuilding in the ESS, he followed the UN language that emphasised broader, integrated and comprehensive post-conflict management framed as peacebuilding.

In 2005, Solana made a clearer reference to the framework that corresponds with peacebuilding while emphasising the need to develop “a new paradigm. Let us develop more creative strategies for conflict prevention, crisis management, good governance, trade promotion and human rights protection.” He stressed the need for 'coherence' in policies and 'long-term development' in post-conflict crisis rebuilding (Solana 2005, 3-4). In 2008, he called again for the need of multilateralism. He stated that “Europe can and must take more initiatives is in developing new rules and institutions for a more complex and unstable world” (Solana 2008, 6). Solana's statements suggest that the EU foreign policy was closely following the developments at the UN, including the reform of the UN peacekeeping. Solana's call for new inclusive and integrated approaches in post-conflict management matches with those made by the High-Level Panel and Boutros-Ghali.

The EU's inclination to peacebuilding has been noted by Missiroli who was expecting the presentation of the Report on the Implementation of the EES to be presented by Solana at the EU Summit in December 2008. Missiroli noted that, although little was known about the report's contents, he believed it would probably focus on what the Union can do better in the broader arena of peacebuilding. It was expected that peacebuilding will dominate the content of the Report. According to Missiroli, peacebuilding is “the term that resounds most favourably with European citizens” (Missiroli 2008). The Report on the Implementation of the ESS: Providing Security in a Changing World, indeed stressed the importance of peacebuilding. It also highlighted the interconnection between peacebuilding, conflict prevention and development while seeing the CSDP as the EU's most successful
tool to address complex challenges in post-conflict societies. The report also stressed the EU’s “ability to combine civilian and military expertise” in the CSDP missions and operations (Council of the EU 2008, 9).

The UN’s response to the new CSDP was affirmative. While facing capacities and capabilities shortages, the UN welcomed the introduction of ESDP and other initiatives that strengthen the UN post-conflict efforts directly or indirectly. At the same time, the UN stressed that such efforts should take place within the framework of the international law, i.e. with the approval of the UNSC (United Nations 2004b; 2004c).

The first CSDP missions were launched simultaneously with the European Security Strategy in 2003. The ESS also showed that the UN peacekeeping reform had an impact on the EU’s own engagement in post-conflict situations. The ESS highlighted that “strengthening the UN, equipping it to ful fill its responsibilities and to act effectively is a European priority” (European Security Strategy 2003, 7). The Strategy made particular references to post-conflict management. It highlighted that “the EU is committed to reinforcing its cooperation with the UN to assist countries emerging from conflicts, and to enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management situations.” The EU’s commitment to the UN was already emphasised by Solana in the draft ESS:

“the fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to ful fill its responsibilities and to act effectively must be a European priority. If we want international organizations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security we should be ready to act when their rules are broken (Solana 2003, 14).

The ESS was a crucial document in highlighting the linkage between the UN and the EU approaches to peace and conflict. The ESS made the EU’s relationship to the UN one of the central themes. The ESS brought the understanding of peace and conflict closer to that of the UN. The ESS understands state failure as a key threat to international peace and security, including the EU, while highlighting that the UN is the crucial authority dealing with matters of international peace and security. The ESS noted that the UN’s capacity for crisis-management and post-conflict reconstruction should be strengthened with the EU playing a crucial role. The ESS highlighted that the EU must enhance its military assets and the EU needs “greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post-crisis situations.” The need for civilian post-conflict management is justified in the ESS by the fact that military efficiency in interventions is often followed by civilian chaos, that needs civilian post-conflict management approaches. The ESS stressed that “the EU is committed to reinforcing its cooperation with the UN to assist countries emerging from conflicts, and to enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management situations” (European Security Strategy 2003, 11).

Biscop observed that the ESS came to correspond with the UN understanding of human security which he framed as Global Public Goods and which is linked to peacebuilding. He noted that the ESS contains many elements of concepts based on Global Public Goods despite the fact that these were not mentioned in the ESS. The ESS interlinks peace and security with good governance, social and political reform, the rule of law and human rights (Biscop 2005). Similarly, Bailes argued that the ESS combined the political, societal, economic and strategic dimensions of security, highlighted the need to tackle causes for conflicts from economic and social sources, and discussed non-state actors (Bailes 2005).

In 2007, a new Joint Statement on UN-EU cooperation in Crisis Management was signed by the UN and the EU. The Statement called for a renewed EU commitment to the UN and enhanced cooperation by endorsing a number of operational and practical measures. In addition, the Statement called for enhanced cooperation in areas of support to African peacekeeping capacity-building, and on
aspects of multidimensional peacekeeping, including police, rule of law and security sector reform (Council of the EU 2007). The term and description of multidimensional peacekeeping here reflect the understanding and concept of peacebuilding as it was introduced by the UN.

The above analysis highlights the consensus between the UN and the EU on the need for and recognition of peacebuilding. The EU and the UN also showed synergy in the formulation and understanding of the concept of peacebuilding. Both the EU and the UN came to see post-conflict peacebuilding as a crucial condition for rebuilding stability and peace in societies emerging from conflicts. This consensus was accompanied by the expansion of post-conflict activities into civilian aspects on both sides, i.e. in the EU civilian missions and in the UN peacekeeping missions. This consensus and synergy on a conceptual level suggest that the EU's understanding of peacebuilding corresponds with that of the UN. It also created a platform for an enhanced cooperation between the two organisations in the field of peacebuilding.

CSDP – only one element of peacebuilding

The legal and conceptual consensus between the EU and the UN resulted in a strong partnership and cooperation at the policy-making and operational level, which had consequences for the formulation of peacebuilding policies and frameworks. Such an extent and intensity of exchange of knowledge, expertise and practice necessitates the coherent understandings of peacebuilding concepts and frameworks at both organisations. The EU understands CSDP as a contribution to the work of the UN in the field of international peace and security. The UNSC is viewed by the EU as primarily responsible for international peace and security. The EU and the UN appear to be natural and compatible partners in peacebuilding and peacekeeping activities. The cooperation happens within this legal framework. In this sense, the Presidency report of the Laeken summit noted that

“the Union has begun to cooperate more fully with the United Nations in crisis management and conflict prevention concerning the themes and in the specific areas endorsed by the Gothenburg European Council. Regular contacts at different levels with the representatives of the United Nations have made it possible to keep up the necessary links on the main subjects of common interest. Those contacts have also led to examination, on the basis of the principles and procedures established, of how the development of European capabilities in the ESDP could contribute to United Nations efforts in peacekeeping operations” (EU Presidency 2001, para. 22).

The Communication of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism (10 September 2003) stressed the EU contribution to the UN governance system and presented practical guidelines for partnership between the EU and the UN. The EU-UN Cooperation in civilian crisis management operations – Elements of implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration (8 October 2004) defined practical and operational modalities of this partnership. Exchange of information and cooperation between the two organisations at decision-making, policy-making, training and operational levels have taken place regularly. This cooperation between the EU and the UN as well as the EU’s commitment to UN peacekeeping are best recognisable through the EU’s financial contributions to the UN’s general budget and peacekeeping budget. The EU member states together make the largest financial contribution to the UN’s peacekeeping budget.\(^9\) (See the Table 1.) From this perspective, the EU and the UN can be seen as close partners in promoting peace around the world. The EU’s significant contributions to the UN can also be understood as an impetus for the EU to strengthen its position in the UN, including in the

\(^9\) The EU countries jointly fund almost 40% of the peacekeeping budget and 50% of all contributions to the UN family. The European Commission contributes over €1 billion to the UN annually (European Commission 2009).
UN reform process, at the same time. For example, a communication from the Commission recommends that

“the EU must increase its contribution with a view to adopting and applying multilateral policies and instruments. […] the EU must take a more active role in the institutional reform process of the UN in order to increase the effectiveness of the system [and …] to increase the role of EU delegations to the UN” (European Commission 2003).

The European Commission (EC) highlighted the cooperation in the area of peace and security while recommending that cooperation should develop into a firm partnership. The communication noted that “political and technical cooperation must also be increased in the area of peace and security, whether for conflict prevention, crisis management or post-crisis reconstruction. This partnership must be systematically extended to the competent regional organisations (such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe)” (European Commission 2003).

Nonetheless, the EU’s support and commitment to the UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding, as set up in the 2003 ESS, has not always been solid. With the establishment of the CSDP, the EU member states which were previously active in UN peacekeeping seem to have shifted their attention and resources to the EU structures that deal with conflict prevention and crisis management. For instance, EU member states decided to close down the development of the SHIRBRIG (Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN operations), a rapid intervention UN peacekeeping tool once the EU battle groups were launched. According to some researchers, resource competition and conflicting political interests have been seen as major reasons for the EU shifting its support from the UN peacekeeping to the EU peacekeeping structures (Juergenliemk et al. 2012, 20-21). Koops noted that, although the EU Battlegroups were designed for UN support, they were not exclusively formed for such a purpose. The EU reserved the right to decide whether to launch an operation under the UN auspices or an autonomous operations without the approval of the UNSC. According to Koops, the EU appeared here more contra-productive rather than contributing to the UN efforts in this matter. In fact, the creation of the EU's Battlegroups created a potential for undermining the authority and legitimacy of the UN (Koops 2007).

Tardy claimed that, although the changing nature of peacekeeping led the UN to seek support from the EU, the development of the ESDP logically led the EU to revisit its relationship with the UN. While the UN's approach is inspired by an open agenda, the EU's CSDP is driven by self-interests and the necessity to respond to conscience-influenced situations. The EU places strong emphasis on its political autonomy in the area of crisis management with CSDP operations being subordinated to the Council (Political and Security Committee) rather than to the UN. Tardy observed that also the UN has become concerned that the ESDP would develop to the detriment of the UN inclusive approach and of UN peacekeeping needs. According to him, the operation in the DRC demonstrated the EU's readiness to engage in autonomous operations instead of support within the UN operation MONUC. In the case of the DRC, the EU dismissed the request of the UN to make the capabilities of the EU Artemis mission available to the UN after the departure of the EU mission. Instead, the EU continued to be present in the DRC and even requested that the MONUC should have the rules and mandate similar to those of the EU mission (Tardy 2005).

Similarly, Ojanen claimed that the development of the CSDP has increased the independence of the EU. The EU has attempted to raise its real influence in the UN to a level that corresponds with its economic and political importance, i.e. its share in the UN budget (Ojanen 2006). In fact, Mr Guéhenno, UN Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping was concerned with a tendency of regional organisations, including the EU, to get increasingly involved in peacekeeping. While praising the contributions of regional actors to international peace and security, he highlighted that this tendency
could harm the position and primacy of the UN if regional organisations acted without respect for the authority of the UN. He thus stressed the importance of enhancing the UN’s role and capacity in peacekeeping (Guéhenno 2002).

Furthermore, EU responses to requests by the UN, for example on behalf of or directly by the African Union, for help in conflict and post-conflict situations have been slow. This was the case of Darfur. Although the EU contributes to both the UN’s budget and the UN’s peacekeeping budget, EU member states have been reluctant to provide military and other capacities for UN missions. The contributions of the EU to UN peacekeeping personnel have significantly decreased over the last decade, with non-EU countries taking the lead in this area.\textsuperscript{10} (See Table 2). The UN has more experience in peacekeeping and peacebuilding and has developed a larger structure to manage these missions and operations as compared to relatively new and small EU CSDP. For instance, the UN currently deploys more than 97,000 peacekeeping personnel (United Nations 2014), whereas the number of EU personnel in CSDP missions and operations is around 4000.\textsuperscript{11} In addition, DPKO, DPA and the Peacebuilding Commission employ significantly more people as compared to the CSDP structure.\textsuperscript{12} Gowan observed that the EU limits itself to small CSDP missions, while other organisations such as the UN, AU and ECOWAS are putting far greater numbers of personnel in conflicts. He concluded that the EU’s ambitions in peace operations “are limited by economic pressures and intervention fatigue” (Gowan 2012).

Ojanen claimed that EU countries seem to prefer to participate in UN-mandated operations rather than in UN-led operations. The same could be observed with regard to civilian resources. The more the EU countries use resources in their own operations, the less these can be provided to the UN, because the EU uses for its own operations the same resources that would previously have been allocated to the UN (Ojanen 2006). For some scholars, the reluctance to support the UN operations is a consequence of EU policy-makers trying “to find a politically delicate inter-organizational balance between NATO, the EU and the United Nations rather than seeking out the most efficient and effective response” (Juergenliemk et al. 2012, 21).

The shift from the UN envisioned approaches to peacebuilding to own interest-based politics reflects the EU’s shifting understanding of peacebuilding in the CSDP. As an officer at the EEAS/CSDP highlighted:

“We do not use this terminology in civilian CSDP, although it is not delinked either. […] We speak of capacity building in post-conflict reconstruction. And we do it through security sector reform, training, mentoring, advising, - these are the terms we use. Peacebuilding as such is much more complex; it involves civil society, it involves economic development, social issues – and that what we try to do through comprehensive approaches. The UN proposed integrated planning. We do comprehensive approach and that means, that we accept civilian CSDP mission. We must ensure that the [Peacebuilding] Commission, we talk to them, and we know what they are doing and how far we can be synergetic with them. And the whole package, the whole EU engagement e.g. in Mali, in Horn of Africa, is peacebuilding. But I cannot say civilian CSDP is peacebuilding – it is one contribution to it and we do not use that term.”\textsuperscript{13}

This understanding of the role of the EU in peacebuilding in a very focused and limited capacity has been commonly accepted across the various units of the CSDP structure. The representatives of the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management as well as the Politico-Military Group share

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{10} In terms of personnel, the EU contributes only up to 10% of the UN troops (United Nations 2014).
  \item \textsuperscript{11} The number is inaccurate due to the inclusion of military troops deployed flexibly in operations in Somalia and CRA (EEAS 2014).
  \item \textsuperscript{12} For instance, alone DPKO that manages peacekeeping operations has over 470 professional employees in the UN HQ (UN General Assembly 2012).
  \item \textsuperscript{13} Interview with an official, EEAS/ CSDP, Brussels, December 2013.
\end{itemize}
similar views. The civilian rather than military understanding of the CSDP is also highlighted through the fact that the staff at the CSDP structure is very mixed, including diplomats, former staff at the EC, people with an NGO-background and military staff. Similarly, representatives of the CIVCOM and PMG are delegates and representatives from the delegations of the member states, i.e. mostly career diplomats. As a result, peacebuilding activities are developed, planned and designed through a combination of the processes of negotiations and the system of rules and structures.

Interviews with officials from the EEAS/ CSDP also confirm that peacebuilding activities are seen differently by the officials when compared with the UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. According to one official, cooperation and the need for it is mutually recognised, but often personalities may hamper it:

“We have EU-UN action plan agreed. I do not know what years ago. One point on the agenda is better coordinated planning. We have just finalised modalities paper on them how we want to do this. We are in early stages of fact finding and later operational, but neither later also conduct how it is that we work together. It is improving I would say. This is on paper. It is perfectly agreed. However, in practice, ... it depends sometimes on personalities and yes, there is always an element of concurrence, unfortunately.”14

The difference between the two organisations with regard to their peacebuilding approaches in also emphasised in the case of particular missions and operations. The officials of the CSDP structure understand the EU missions and operations to be more successful and effective than the large and multi-dimensional UN missions. For example, one official compared the effectiveness of the EU and UN missions in Mali:

“Look at the case of Mali. It is a mess – what the UN is doing. They have been unable to build the mission. They have been neither successful nor effective. And it is such a large mission. […] our mission is small but effective.”15

Novosseloff also argued that the recommendations adopted at high level seemed to have been forgotten in the context of the challenges of the UN-EU transition processes of operations in Kosovo, Chad and operations that followed. She noted that, apart from the establishment of formal contacts, and desk-to-desk dialogues between the two Secretariats, most recommendations of the UN-EU Declaration and Joint Statement have not been implemented. As a result, both organisations are deploying their missions in the same countries but not necessarily coordinating with each other (Novosseloff 2012). Govan noted that the EU-UN relationship in peace operations has developed from a period of inaction through strong institutional convergence and cooperation to declining cooperation. This recent decline is caused by the inability of institutional cooperation to be translated into operational level as well as the lack of political will at the Council level to cooperate with the UN (Gowan 2009).

This analysis suggest that the EU tends to focus on certain aspects of peacebuilding only despite the fact that several decisions of the Council aimed at the realisation of the full range of Petersberg Tasks. Although the EU still understands peacebuilding as a complex set of activities with a comprehensive approach, the limited scope of activities carried out in the CSDP suggests a changing nature of the EU's understanding of peacebuilding. The peacebuilding activities of the EU mainly involve training, capacity-building, legal advice, rule of law and policing. Most importantly, the EU staff and officials tend to make a distinction between the CSDP and the UN peace missions. The distinction is made between the EU's comprehensive approach and the UN's integrated approach. Also, the CSDP missions and operations of the EU are seen by the EEAS staff as more effective than the large-scale UN missions. A sense of tensions and concurrence between the two organisations in the area of peace missions exist as interviews with the EU officials from the EEAS/ CSDP reveal. These

14 Interview with an official, EEAS/ CSDP, Brussels, March 2014.
15 Interview with an official, EEAS/ CSDP, Brussels, November 2012
tensions demonstrate that the EU is primarily concerned with its own policies and approaches rather than goals agreed internally at the UN level. The decreasing contribution of the EU to the military peacekeeping personnel in the UN peacekeeping missions supports this tendency. The EU has followed its own interests in the partnership with the UN rather than agreed objectives.

Conclusion
The paper discussed how the EU understands peacebuilding carried out in CSDP missions and operations. The paper claimed that the EU supported the development and adoption of peacebuilding at the conceptual, normative and implementation level at the UN. During the period of the evolution of peacebuilding at the UN, the EU planned and launched its own policy in post-conflict management. New security challenges and the need for comprehensive peace operations encouraged the EU to interact closely and intensively with the UN. The EU’s support for peacebuilding at the UN was influenced by a number of events concerning the EU’s own security such as the wars in the Balkans. These events, which were closely followed by the media, encouraged EU member states to act more effectively in matters of international peace and security. Peacebuilding evolved as one of the practices to deal with post-conflict situations, violence and failed states. The EU-UN partnership provided a platform for the development of the peacebuilding framework and practice, resulting to almost identical understanding of peacebuilding.

At the political level, both the EU and the UN stressed the compatibility, coherence and cooperation between the UN and EU in peacekeeping, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. This consolidation of the UN and EU approaches to peace and security created a platform for a strong partnership and cooperation between the two organisations in peacebuilding. The EU contributed to the UN’s efforts in peacebuilding through its own CSDP missions and operations. Through the EU-UN relationship, the EU had the opportunity to follow and imitate new ideas and approaches that the UN developed in post-conflict peacekeeping. The documents that gave way to the development of the relationship between the EU and the UN in crisis management reveal that the EU embraced new ideas and approaches in post-conflict peacekeeping, including peacebuilding. The EU CSDP was influenced by the conceptualisation of the UN peacebuilding framework that was generated by the reform process at the UN. While establishing its own CSDP at the conceptual and operational level, the EU followed the UN approaches by embracing the ideas of the reform initiatives at the UN such as the Brahimi report. At the same time, this partnership served as a doorway for the EU to contribute with its own CSDP to the UN peace efforts. The UN recognised the crucial value of the EU contribution to international peace and security through its own CSDP. The synchronisation of activities in post-conflict management was envisioned and proposed by a number of agreements at decision-making and policy-making levels.

Nevertheless, the shifting focus of the EU to its own CSDP missions and operations demonstrates that the synergy in the understanding of peacebuilding has not been fully achieved. The practical implementation of peacebuilding in the CSDP does not fully correspond with the UN’s idea of peacebuilding. The EU is involved in a limited number of peacebuilding activities, the core structure of which is repeated in different missions and operations. This limited focus suggests that the EU has been following its own interests rather than commonly agreed objectives. At the same time, the development of the CSDP created a more autonomous sphere for the EU and its policy-makers to engage in post-conflict situations. The EU officials understand the EU’s own engagement in peacebuilding, though its CSDP missions and operations, to be more successful and effective than that of UN missions.
Table 1.

### Top 15 Financial Contributors to the UN Budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.

### Top 20 Contributors of Uniformed Personnel to UN Peacekeeping Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Uniformed Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China (Special)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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