Unity in Diversity? An Analysis of the Union for a Popular Movement Positions on European Integration

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NB: This paper is a work in progress, and is far from being a finished product. The data analysed in this version is only a sample of what is intended to be done. Any comments will be welcome.

Abstract

Throughout the history of the Fifth Republic, French right-wing political movements have been divided on the issue of European integration. Since its creation in 2002, the Union for a Popular Movement (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire, UMP) has consistently been considered as a pro-European party under the influence of Jacques Chirac, breaking with a Gaullist tradition that has historically opposed a federalist vision of Europe. However, in recent years, the party has been most critical of certain European policies, mostly in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Since 2012, it is constituted of five movements recognised by the party leadership, and defending diverging visions of Europe. Accordingly, how can one define the UMP's European ideology? Does Gaullism still prevail for the UMP at the European stage? This paper investigates the UMP and its movements’ positions on European integration in the context of the 2014 European elections. Using a categorisation of elite preferences based on the literature on party-based Euroscepticism and assessing the UMP’s internal divisions, it will be demonstrated that the UMP is strongly divided on the Europe issue, a feature that has been consistent within the Gaullist movement since the 1990s. This may explain the poor results obtained during the 2014 European elections.

Introduction

European integration has always been a difficult issue to deal with for French political parties, both on the left and the right of the traditional political spectrum. Throughout the history of the Fifth Republic, right-wing parties particularly struggled to manage such issues, mostly as a result of Charles de Gaulle’s historical legacy. Accordingly, the mainstream French right has been divided over the ‘Europe’ issue, from de Gaulle’s intergovernmental ‘France first’ interpretation of the European project to Nicolas Sarkozy’s most recent opposition to Schengen. In addition, in order to understand the evolution of the mainstream right European stance, the role played by political leaders such as Jacques Chirac as President of the French Republic and Leader of the Gaullist movement cannot be underestimated: from his Euro sceptic “appel de Cochin” in 1978 drawing on a traditional Gaullist interpretation of Europe, l’ère chiraquienne has been marked by a switch towards a pro-integrationist stance, materialised by his defence of the various treaties, including the short-lived proposition for a treaty establishing a constitution for Europe, rejected by the French population via referendum in 2005. As noted by Startin (2005: 65), “[t]he Gaullist movement’s ability or inability to react to [European Union] EU wide developments in an increasingly globalised world has become fundamental to its future direction”.
The Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP), a merger of several centre-right parties founded in 2002, is the most recent heir of the Gaullist movement. However, and in contrast to a strict interpretation of Gaullism, the UMP has officially adopted a rather pro-European stance from the 1990s onwards under the impulse of French President Jacques Chirac. Yet, in thirteen years of existence, the party has suffered from major internal divisions between its different political movements, from the souverainiste “Droite Populaire” to the Euro-federalist “France Moderne et Humaniste”. In addition, some external constraints to the party, such as the rise of Euroscepticism materialised through the European election results in 2014, have led to further divisions within the UMP.

Based on a qualitative discourse and manifesto analysis, this paper analyses the internal tensions over the European issue within the UMP at elite level, and demonstrates the need to deconstruct the concept of European integration in order to understand such tensions. It determines that unlike attempted by Jacques Chirac throughout his presidency, the party is far from having moved towards a pro-European united stance, and that internal divisions remain salient in the aftermath of the 2014 European elections. This contribution first discusses the operational framework used in order to assess the party and its movements’ positions on European integration, drawing on the existing literature on party-based Euroscepticism. It then draws on the history of the Gaullist movement in France, and what constitutes the European dimension of Gaullism, before focusing on the 2014 European elections within the UMP as a case study. The data used mostly draws on manifestos and press releases of each of the five movements of the party, as well as on the party’s European election manifesto of 2014.

**Party preferences on European integration: moving away from general categorizations**

Euroscepticism, i.e. “contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration” (Taggart 1998: 366), is a concept that is widely used in order to categorize party positions on Europe. Several well-established categorisations have been widely applied in the field of European studies. Among these, the ‘soft versus hard’ Euroscepticism dichotomy, proposed by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001), remains preponderant. According to this broad categorization:
Hard Euroscepticism is where there is a principled objection to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived.

Whereas

Soft Euroscepticism is where there is not a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that ‘national interest’ is currently at odds with the EU’s trajectory (Taggart and Szczersbiak 2008a: 7-8).

This distinction between hard and soft Euroscepticism offers a valuable comparative tool for separating out those parties that are strongly opposed to European integration (i.e. ‘hard Eurosceptics’) and those that show signs of contingent opposition (i.e. ‘soft Eurosceptics’), “with attitude towards a country’s membership of the EU being viewed as the ultimate litmus test of whether one fell into the first or second camp” (Taggart and Szczersbiak 2008b: 240). This approach has however been criticized by scholars in the field. Kopecký and Mudde (2002), e.g., have argued that their definition of soft Euroscepticism is too broad, and it is therefore too simplistic to classify political parties as either hard or soft Eurosceptics (see also Mudde 2012). They have subsequently suggested a new typology which takes into account two dimensions: ‘support for European integration’ (divided between ‘Europhiles’ and ‘Europhobes’) and ‘support for the European Union’ (divided between ‘EU-optimists’ and ‘EU-pessimists’). Drawing on these dimensions, the authors developed four ideal-type categories of party positions on Europe:

• **Euroenthusiasts**: parties supporting the general ideas of European integration and believing that the European Union is or will soon become the institutionalisation of these ideas (e.g. parties defending a strong Europe or a federal vision of Europe);
• **Eurosceptics**: parties supporting the general ideas of European integration, but that are pessimistic about the European Union’s current and/or future reflection of these ideas (e.g. parties defending an intergovernmental vision of Europe with more powers for national institutions);
• **Eurorejects**: parties subscribing neither to the ideas underlying the process of European integration, nor to the European Union (e.g. parties defending a Europe of independent states);

• **Europragmatists**: parties not supporting nor opposing the general ideas of European integration, but supporting the European Union (e.g. parties not having affirm ideological opinion on European integration, but “assessing the EU positively as they deem it profitable for their own country”; Kopecký and Mudde 2002: 303).

Even though this conceptualization is analytically useful and is more specific than Taggart and Szczerbiak’s, it has also been criticized for its lack of accuracy and terminological problems. As stated by Henderson (2008: 118), “[t]he major weakness in the argument is one of imprecise definitions. What their analysis lacks is a systematic statement of the substantive attitudes towards European integration which divide Europhobia from Europhilia. The dividing line which parties do not cross is not explicitly defined”. Furthermore, it does not take into account party preferences towards differentiated European integration, which is the main focus of this article. For instance, a pro-Schengen, but anti-EMU, party would thus be difficult to place into Kopecký and Mudde’s categories. In addition, none of these predominant categorizations of European integration take into consideration the internal divisions that are likely to prevail within a party, especially among the mainstream political blocs, as a result to the size and range of movements included in such political party (see e.g. Aylott 2005). Due to the increasing segmentation and polarisation of Europe materialised by the predominance of differentiated integration as a tool to reconcile heterogeneity within the European Union (see e.g. Stubb 1996; Leruth and Lord 2015), existing categorisations of Euroscepticism tend not to reflect the reality of party support/opposition to European integration.

As a response to the aforementioned criticisms, this contribution suggests to move away from existing categorizations of Euroscepticism. Drawing on a method used by the Chapel Hill School (see Ray 1999; Hooghe et al. 2002) and based on a qualitative analysis of party and elite documents (e.g. election manifestos and press releases), this method assess party support for European integration per policy area with a high level of politicization and take into consideration internal divisions (Leruth 2015). Within the framework of this study focusing on the UMP and its internal movements, party support for integration on five key politicized policy areas will be assessed: the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), the Common Foreign

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1 In the context of European integration, politicization is defined ‘as an increase in polarization of opinions, interests or values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards the process of policy formulation within the EU’ (de Wilde 2011: 560). See also Schimmelfennig et al. (2015).
and Security Policy (CFSP), the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and EU enlargement. Accordingly, this study aims to offer a clearer view of the various trends present within the UMP in terms of support for European integration.

**The European dimension of Gaullism as an ideology**

The notion of Gaullism as ideology and well-established political movement is widely accepted in French politics. Built around the grandeur of Charles de Gaulle, it is yet difficult to offer a definition of this ideology which encompasses all of its dimensions. Knapp (1994: 4-6) distinguishes four principal tenets of Gaullism: firstly, the *indipendence of France*, implying a refusal to submit France and French policy to the authority of supranational organizations; secondly, the *authority of the State*, according to which the central State and its institutions constitute the ultimate source of power and thus implying a strong core executive often considered as ‘dirigiste’; thirdly, the *unity of the French*, referring to de Gaulle’s willingness to ‘rally the French beyond the confines of political parties’, beyond right and left ideologies (a claim nowadays used by most contemporary French leaders); and finally, the *leadership of de Gaulle*, perceived as a charismatic leader who is the founder of a new relationship between the State and its citizens.

The European dimension of Gaullism is expressed in the three former tenets of Gaullism. As noted by Startin (2005: 65), they “raise fundamental questions about France’s sovereignty and her role in Europe”. The action of Charles de Gaulle in Europe goes beyond these characteristics. Though de Gaulle’s vision of Europe is of intergovernmentalist nature and promotes a ‘Europe of nations’ (or “Europe des patries”), it also implies France is an active shaper of European integration. The original version of Gaullism refuses any forms of supranational authority, without rejecting the Economic Community per se. In addition, Gaullists believed European integration should be confined to economic matters, rejecting binding forms political integration. The rejection of the Pleven plan for a European Defence Community in 1954, through a combination of Gaullist and Communist votes in the French National Assembly, was a major victory for the Gaullist vision of Europe, defending a strong independent French foreign and security policy (Guyomarch et al. 1998). In the 1960s, the ‘empty chair crisis’ again demonstrated the influence of Charles de Gaulle in shaping the European integration process, mostly as a result of the fear of other member states to see France withdrawing from the European project.

A cornerstone of the traditional Gaullist dimension of Europe is the predominance of the Common Agricultural Policy as a tool to serve French farmers. As mentioned by Guyomarch et
al. (ibid.: 141), “de Gaulle and his ministers wanted an agricultural policy for the Community based on established French practices, anticipating that such a system would not only provide outlets for surplus French production, but also ensure that French farmers would benefit greatly from the guaranteed prices”. In addition, “[d]e Gaulle not only established a firm pattern of defining joint European policies as ‘foreign’ and French inputs as expression of national interests, he also contributed to ensuring that this approach would outlive his own political demise by its institutionalization within the CAP system” (ibid). In other words, the way the CAP was introduced in the framework of the European integration process reflected the Gaullist approach, that is to use European institutions as a political asset for national interests, rather than emphasising the benefits of supranationalism and the Community Method of integration.

Following Charles de Gaulle’s death in 1970, the idea and interpretation of Gaullism as an ideology moved towards several directions. Knapp and Wright (2006: 226) list five movements which materialised from the 1970s onwards:

1. *Gaullisme de Résistance*: movement loyal above all to ‘the man of 18 June 1940’, i.e. the General who played a major role during the Second World War;
2. *Gaullisme de Gauche*: movement focusing on the social dimension of Gaullism, often linked to social democracy;
3. *Gaullisme pompidolien*: movement loyal to the legacy of Georges Pompidou, emphasising the need for France to adapt to an increasingly competitive world while preserving social peace;
4. *Gaullisme chiraquien de première génération*: movement loyal to the original populist argument advocated by Jacques Chirac in the late 1970s, characterised by a fierce opposition to European integration and the free-market;
5. And the *Gaullisme chiraquien de deuxième génération*: movement loyal to the aggressive pro-free-market and pro-European rhetoric advocated by Chirac from the mid-1980s onwards.

Until the 1990s, these Gaullist movements cohabitated in a broad right-wing political party (see Box 1).

**Box 1. List of major Gaullist political parties, 1947-2015**
To these movements, a recent trend of *Gaullisme sarkyste*, characterised by the willingness of the UMP Party Leader Nicolas Sarkozy to create a broad political movement cutting across the traditional left-right spectrum, could be discerned. In contrast, the notion of Sarkozysm emphasised the differences between Gaullism and the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy from 2007 to 2012, which constitutes “a liable set of norms, values and historical references which offers a synthesis of the three main traditions of the right, but which fails to unify them” (Marlière 2009: 375). Yet, this sixth heir movement of Gaullism is yet to be materialised, with Sarkozy’s proposal to transform the UMP into a new party named “Les Républicains”.

As far as the ‘Europe’ issue is concerned, there is a sharp contrast between the two versions of Gaullisme chiraquien. In 1978, Chirac’s “appel de Cochin” reflected Charles de Gaulle’s vision of Europe:

La politique européenne du gouvernement ne peut, en aucun cas, dispenser la France d'une politique étrangère qui lui soit propre. L'Europe ne peut servir à camoufler l'effacement d'une France qui n'aurait plus, sur le plan mondial, ni autorité, ni idée, ni message, ni visage. Nous récusons une politique étrangère qui cesse de répondre à la vocation d'une grande puissance, membre permanent du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies et investie de ce fait de responsabilités particulières dans l'ordre international.
C'est pourquoi nous disons NON.
NON à la politique de la supranationalité.
NON à l'asservissement économique.
NON à l'effacement international de la France (Chirac 1978).

However, his subsequent decisions to support the processes of deepening and widening the European Union through the ratification of the Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice as well as the short-lived ‘Rome 2004’ treaties, demonstrates an ideological U-turn. The discourse given by Chirac before the Bundestag in June 2000 illustrates this major switch:

Nos nations sont la source de nos identités et de notre enracinement. La diversité de leurs traditions politiques, culturelles, linguistiques est une des forces de notre Union. Pour les peuples qui viennent, les nations resteront les premières références.
The ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, which paved the way towards a political union, triggered tensions within the Gaullist movement. In this context, with the European Union being one of the most divisive issues within the mainstream right combined with an increasing Europeanization of French politics and legislation, defections appeared inevitable. The cohabitation between pro-integrationists and Eurosceptics became even more fragile, and led to the creation of three splinter parties in the 1990s: the relatively low-key Rassemblement pour la France, founded by Nicolas Stoquer in 1992 to oppose the Maastricht Treaty; Philippe de Villiers’ “Mouvement pour la France”, founded in 1994 following the success of the “Majorité pour l'autre Europe” list in the European elections; and Charles Pasqua’s “Rassemblement pour la France et l'indépendance de l'Europe”, founded in 1999 to unite souverainistes defectors from the RPR. These Eurosceptic splinter parties were thus founded as a response to the Gaullisme chiraquien de deuxième génération, which became predominant within the RPR: “[f]or Gaullist diehards, the transfers of sovereignty to which Chirac consented in the treaties of Maastricht and of Amsterdam were breaches of the essential Gaullist value of national independence” (Knapp and Wright 2006: 226-27).

As a response to this division, combined with the disastrous legislative elections of 1997 which led to a new cohabitation with the Parti Socialiste, the UMP was founded in 2002, originally standing for “Union pour la Majorité Présidentielle” but renamed “Union pour un Mouvement Populaire” in the aftermath of the legislative election in May 2002. This new political party combined both Gaullist and non-Gaullist movements (including most of the centrist Union pour la Démocratique Française [UDF] and Démocratique Libérale [DL]), with the objective to consolidate Chirac’s leadership and to “monopolise the moderate Right’s share of public political finance” (ibid: 234).

Accordingly, the UMP is not the direct successor of the Gaullist movement, but a merger of various political parties aiming to become the largest right-wing movement in the French political landscape. With regards to its position on the European Union, while most of its members at the elite level were pro-integrationist, the UMP still included some souverainistes and traditional Gaullists. How did the newly formed UMP manage potential divisions on European integration, in order not to appear weakened as the Gaullist movement did in the 1990s? The following section analyses the party manifestos within the framework of three European
elections, held in 2004, 2009 and 2014. An overview of the internal groups and their positions on European integration is also provided.

The UMP and its factions: unity in diversity?

In order to cope with the various trends within the newly formed UMP (especially with regard to the ‘Europe’ issue), the party leadership decided to follow a model introduced by the Parti Socialiste: the institutionalisation of political groups, or “mouvements”. These movements were effectively launched on 9 May 2004 during the national committee meeting. In practice however, these movements became an integral part of the UMP in 2012, in the aftermath of Nicolas Sarkozy’s defeat against Francois Hollande in the second round of the presidential election. This was one of (then) Party Leader Jean-François Copé’s initiatives in order to prevent defections before the legislative elections held in May. Article 28 (formerly 15) of the UMP statuses defines the role of these movements within the party:

Les Mouvements expriment la diversité des sensibilités politiques, historiques, philosophiques ou sociales qui animent la vie politique française et composent l’Union. Ils contribuent à la richesse du débat démocratique et intellectuel et à la représentation du plus grand nombre de Françaises et de Français au sein de l’Union.

In other words, the recognition of such movements within the UMP aims to represent and legitimise the various “school of thoughts”, following a congressional vote in which each movement should get at least 10 per cent of votes.

On 18 November 2012, five movements (out of six) reached the 10 per cent threshold and were thus officially recognised as part of the UMP: la Droite Forte (27.77 per cent of votes); la Droite Sociale (21.69 per cent); France Moderne et Humaniste (18.17 per cent of votes); Gaullistes en Mouvement (12.31 per cent); and la Droite Populaire (10.87 per cent). La Boîte à Idées, though being supported by some key leaders within the party (such as Alain Juppé and Edouard Balladur), only received 9.2 per cent of votes (Le Monde 2012). The following sub-sections analyse the ideology and major political trends within each of the recognised movements, as well as their positions towards European integration in the context of the 2014 European elections.

La Droite Forte

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2 Article 29(2-4) of the UMP statuses describes the conditions upon which a movement can be recognised: “2. Pour être reconnu en tant que tel, un Mouvement doit présenter au Congrès une déclaration de principe définissant ses orientations politiques et être parrainé par un nombre minimum de 10 parlementaires adhérant à l’Union représentant au moins dix Fédérations départementales. Un parlementaire ne peut parrainer qu’un seul Mouvement. 3. La déclaration de principe du Mouvement est soumise au vote du Congrès après débat. 4. Un Mouvement peut être constitué dès lors qu’il a recueilli au moins 10 % des suffrages exprimés au Congrès.”
Proposed by Guillaume Peltier, who was one of Sarkozy’s spokesmen during the 2012 presidential campaign and started his political career with the Front National, la Droite Forte (originally named “Génération Sarkozy”) defends a right-wing populist line within the UMP (Knapp 2014). Rather than finding its roots in Gaullism, this movement follows the legacy of Nicolas Sarkozy’s 2012 manifesto entitled “La France Forte”. The raison d’être of this movement is defined as such: “Rassembler politiquement tous ceux qui, dans la lignée de Nicolas Sarkozy, veulent construire une « France forte » ; la Droite forte souhaite offrir une perspective d’espérance à travers une droite juste, forte, populaire et protectrice” (La Droite Forte 2012).

This movement has been criticised for copying an important part of the programme advocated by the Front National, and for defending a strong “droitisation” of the UMP. A study from Médiapart (2012) outlined the “copy-paste” character of its founding manifesto, especially with regards to issues such as secularism, fraud, trade unions and civil society.

With regards to its position on European integration, la Droite Forte is a reformist movement. Indeed, it defends the most recent political line promoted by Nicolas Sarkozy with regards to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, through the suppression of the Schengen Agreements and the introduction of a points-based system to control immigration within the borders of the European Union. The movement also defends a Gaullist legacy by referring to the empty chair crisis, in case an agreement cannot be reached:


La Droite Sociale

This movement, initially launched as a “club de réflexion” in 2010, is located towards the centre-left of the UMP. Its main objective is to gather Christian Democrats, Gaullistes de Gauche and Centrists around a project dedicated to the middle class. However, since the return of Nicolas Sarkozy as leader of the UMP in November 2014, this movement has been relatively inactive.

As la Droite Sociale is mostly focused on domestic economic affairs with a programme tailored for a specific fringe of the UMP electorate (i.e. the middle class and small-medium businesses),
European integration is not a key issue addressed by this movement. Ahead of the 2014 European elections, the movement’s leader, Laurent Wauquiez, campaigned on the grounds that “l’Europe ne marche plus; […] il faut tout changer” (Zagdoun 2014), and advocated a series of reforms for the European Union, from France’s withdrawal of Schengen to the creation of a hard core of the six founding member states within the Union. Several representatives of la Droite Sociale and the Gaullistes en Mouvement co-signed an opinion column in Le Figaro (2014), calling for a reform of the European project:

La libre circulation poussée à l’excès qui interdit tout contrôle des déplacements de populations à l’intérieur de l’Europe pouvant mettre en péril la cohésion de nos sociétés et qui va jusqu’à mettre en concurrence, sur notre sol, nos salariés avec des salariés qui supportent trois fois moins de charges sociales, ça ne peut plus durer. Le dumping fiscal et social à l’intérieur de l’Europe, ça ne peut plus durer. Les frontières extérieures de l’Espace Schengen qui laissent passer des flux d’immigration incontrôlés, ça ne peut plus durer. L’élargissement sans fin, ça ne peut plus durer.

In sum, la Droite Sociale (mostly through its leader Laurent Wauquiez) adopted a populist and reformist discourse throughout the 2014 election campaign, criticising the current state of European integration, especially with regards to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.

**France Moderne et Humaniste**

Led by two tenors of the UMP, former Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin and Luc Chatel, France Moderne et Humaniste is a moderate left-centrist movement within the UMP. It is mostly composed of former members of the UDF and DL, before these two parties merged with the RPR in 2002. Yet, though the UDF and DL were non-Gaullist parties, France Moderne et Humaniste is also composed of some Gaullistes de Gauche, and defends a social, liberal and European humanism.

Unlike la Droite Forte, France Moderne et Humaniste promotes a stronger and federal European Union. Its European policy is summarised as such:

L’Union européenne doit peser davantage sur la scène internationale et être capable de protéger ses frontières ainsi que son activité économique en imposant le principe de réciprocité. Nous sommes partisans d’une Europe fédérée, qui n’a pas peur d’élargir les domaines de souveraineté partagée, ni d’ériger une Union budgétaire, fiscale et sociale. Cela suppose une impulsion démocratique forte avec la création d’un gouvernement de l’Union et le renforcement du rôle des parlements nationaux et européen (France Moderne et Humaniste 2012).
The movement’s vision of Europe is closer to the one which was advocated by centrists in the 1970s, under the presidency of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. It is not opposed to the current principles of European integration and even calls for extending the competences of the European Union. No reference to a “Europe des patries”, a key concept of the various forms of Gaullism, is made. Among the current movements officially recognised within the UMP, France Moderne et Humaniste is the most pro-European one, reflecting on the centrist historical legacy.

**Gaullistes en Mouvement**

Founded in September 2012 by Michèle Alliot-Marie, Roger Karoutchi, Henri Guaino and Patrick Ollier, les Gaullistes en Mouvement (formerly named “le Gaullisme, une voie d’avenir pour la France”) is the main movement representing the heirs and defenders of Gaullism within the UMP. The four dimensions of Gaullism (the independence of France, the authority of the state, the unity of the French and the grandeur of de Gaulle) are key values constituting the main raison d’être of this movement:

> Nous avons la conviction, qui était celle du Général de Gaulle, que la politique peut et doit encore influencer le cours de l’Histoire et qu’elle ne doit pas suivre l’économie et la finance mais les précéder. […] Nous aspirons à la restauration de l’autorité d’un État centré sur ses compétences régaliennes, à l’ardente obligation de défendre les valeurs républicaines de réussite, de travail, d’effort et de promotion au mérite (Gaullistes en Mouvement 2012).

As far as the ‘Europe’ issue is concerned, which caused internal divisions within the Gaullist party from the 1990s onwards, the Gaullistes en Mouvement defend an intergovernmental vision of Europe, based on de Gaulle’s “Europe des patries” and opposing any forms of federalism at the European level: “Nous voulons une Europe où nous décidons ensemble et nous récusons l’Europe des institutions supranationales qui déciderait de tout à la place du peuple français” (ibid). In addition, some of its members (including Henri Guaino) want to put an end to the Schengen area, thus promoting a form of disintegration in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Yet, some important differences with the de Gaulle’s vision of Europe need to be discussed. Firstly, and in sharp contrast with de Gaulle’s opposition to the Pleven plan in the 1950s, the movement is in favour of a European Defence Community, and favours the current Common Foreign and Security Policy. Secondly, it does not oppose to enlargement per se, but advocates a full assessment of the European institutions before resuming this process. Thirdly, and also in contrast with the position defended by la Droite Forte, the party does not advocate the empty chair as a solution to defend national interests, but instead promoted consensus at the European level.

**Droite Populaire**
The last movement that reached the 10 per cent threshold in 2012 is la Droite Populaire, founded in 2010 by former Minister Thierry Mariani. This movement is ideologically close to la Droite Forte, located towards the right wing of the UMP, and calls for a broader “droitisation” of the party line. It has also been criticised in the media and within the party for copying aspects of the programme defended by the Front National, though to a lesser extent than la Droite Forte (Le Monde 2011). The legacy of de Gaulle is also claimed by this movement, as indicated in the motion presented before the party’s congress: “Aujourd’hui, la Droite Populaire entend poursuivre sa lutte contre la Gauche et faire prévaloir, au sein de l’UMP, la priorité de l’intérêt national, dans la continuité des principes légués par le général De Gaulle” (Droite Populaire 2012).

As la Droite Populaire is essentially composed of souverainistes, the party defends a European Union with limited powers and where nations prevail: “Fidèle à l’héritage du général De Gaulle, la Droite Populaire défendra l’idée d’une Europe des Nations, seule capable de relever les défis de la mondialisation. […] Nous croyons en la France indépendante, maîtresse de ses décisions, puissance d’équilibre aux yeux du monde et en une Europe forte, fondée sur les peuples.” (ibid). As such, it advocates a reform of the European institutions, with stricter border control, tougher regulations and favouring economic above political integration.

The UMP European manifesto

On 16 April 2014, the UMP presented its manifesto for the European elections, entitled “Pour la France, agir en Europe”.

Table 1 examines the party positions on European integration per selected policy areas, in order to compare them to the ones advocated by the movements.

Table 1. Preferences on key European policy areas within the UMP in 2014, per movement

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<td>Further integration</td>
<td>Further</td>
<td>Continue</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 The 2009 manifesto was entitled “Quand l'Europe veut, l'Europe peur”.
et Humaniste | integration | integration | integration | integration |
---|---|---|---|---|
Gaullistes en Mouvement | Disintegration / reform | Further integration | Status quo | Stop |
Droite Populaire | Disintegration / reform | Disintegration / reform | Further integration | Status quo | Stop |

This table demonstrates the divergences between the different movements of the UMP, but also how the 2014 European elections manifesto tried to find consensual grounds. The party’s position on integration in the Economic and Monetary Union is the only selected policy area mirroring all movements’ preferences, i.e. deepening integration and promoting further coordination in terms of economic policy within the Eurozone. The party also followed the majority of its movements’ positions with regards to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, by suggesting a series of reforms for the Schengen agreement and by mentioning the possibility of disintegration should no reforms be implemented: “Sans progrès sérieux dans les 12 mois, nous demanderon la suspension de la participation de la France aux accords de Schengen” (UMP 2014). The party follows the same logic with regards to its position on further enlargement (“Nous souhaitons donc arrêter l’élargissement de l’Union européenne après l’entrée de la Croatie au 1er juillet 2013”) and on the Common Agricultural Policy (“nous devons plus que jamais exiger le maintien d’une politique agricole commune forte, durable et dotée d’un budget ambitieux”; ibid). In contrast, with regards to the divisive issue of integration in the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the party promotes further integration, especially with regards to defense policy: “L’Europe doit se doter d’une politique et de moyens de défense communs car la sécurité des citoyens fait partie de ses finalités et parce qu’elle ne peut peser politiquement dans le monde si elle n’est pas capable d’envoyer des forces pour tenir ses engagements internationaux et défendre ses valeurs, notamment face aux menaces terroristes” (ibid). This statement follows the positions adopted by the federalist France Moderne et Humaniste, as well as Gaullistes en Mouvement.

**Conclusion**

This paper analysed existing divergences over the ‘Europe’ issue within the UMP, and the legacy of the European dimension of Gaullism in existing movements. It demonstrated that amongst the five recognized movements within the UMP, there is a lack of consensus over the future role and shape of the European Union, especially with regards to two policy areas: the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (mostly through the future of Schengen) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Some movements defend a position close to the one advocated by Charles de Gaulle during his presidency (i.e. la Droite Populaire), while others opted for a federalist vision of Europe (i.e. France Moderne et Humaniste). These divergences, as explained by Knapp (2014: 484), constitute an explanatory factor for the poor result obtained by the UMP in the 2014 European election: “the UMP’s European election campaign was unsuccessful in part because the party, unlike the Centrists, had no united message on Europe”.
In 2015, the UMP is at crossroads. Since these election results, Nicolas Sarkozy won the leadership elections, and the UMP won a series of low-key elections at the local and departmental levels. Nicolas Sarkozy defended his willingness to see existing movements disappear, in order to create a united movement cutting across existing cleavages within the right-wing political landscape in France. It remains to be seen whether he will succeed in conciliating diverging views on some sensitive issues, including European integration.

Bibliography


