The central analytical focus of this paper is the role of rhetoric in the political process, and in particular its place and importance within the British left. A related concern is to understand the nature of the relationship between rhetoric and performance: how the left, and in particular the Labour Party, ‘imagines’ or ‘constructs’ itself and the world and rhetorically makes claims to its national leadership vocation; and how political leaders and others of the left use these ‘imaginings’ and ‘constructions’ rhetorically and project themselves and their doctrines and ideas in a range of ways (and with varying degrees of success) in order to claim or assert or strengthen their own left leadership status, or else influence debate and its outcomes, and fashion and communicate practical policy proposals, and achieve other rhetorical targets like widening support or gaining votes.

An initial challenge for our analysis – it is almost an irony – is that neither of our central concerns, namely rhetoric and its ‘performance’ through leadership in particular, is unquestionably established within the social or political sciences. A further challenge and perhaps even greater irony is that, in the political world, the value of these phenomena is probably questioned most, even disparaged, on the left itself. The political right is far more at ease with notions of the value of rhetoric itself, as well as notions of assertive and persuasive leadership, and the desirability and value of each. But in the social
sciences generally the importance of rhetoric is far from universally appreciated. As regards political behaviour and political relationships far more ‘reliable’ and measurable/quantifiable indices hold sway in the discipline: income, age, family, education, gender, class, and so on are seen as more explanatory of what, for example, gets us out of our seats and down to the polling station, than are catachresis, metaphor, alliteration and their political effects.

In fact, rhetoric and its use are often seen – to the extent that they are given consideration at all - as illusory, even as ‘empty’ at worst, and at best secondary to real politics; that political rhetoric provides mood music where necessary to what is really going on. Let us say in parenthesis that we are not arguing that income, gender, class etc. are not formative of political choices; they are part of a matrix of influences in political comportment; although we should also stress that these too have ideational frames (see below) and often a rhetoric – the rhetoric of gender, class rhetoric – that is interpolated (or not) and deployed in the public arena and in the political imagination. In fact, rhetoric is everywhere if we see it as part of the ‘order of things’ in a Foucauldian way [note L’ordre du discours], and is therefore fundamental to political exchange and political outcomes. This is our most important claim, that political rhetoric not only expresses politics, it has consequent political effects and is therefore crucially involved in effecting political change. This means attention to it is central, and this particularly because until recently it has been neglected in political studies.

If it is the case that rhetoric can have political effects, it raises the central question of its use, its practice, and most importantly, its potential, because if political rhetoric cannot simply move us but move us to act (the double use of the meaning of ‘move’ here is a syllepsis!), or to persuade us even to shift from one rational or emotional position to another – and this on a scale of responses
which run from indifference to allegiance, from hostility to followership, then this raises a series of important questions regarding good (consequential) rhetoric as opposed to bad (or not so good), and therefore the question of a) rhetoric’s relation to ideas and b) its relationship to agency.

We need, therefore, two discussions, first to identify what we mean by, and to demonstrate and justify the importance and role of rhetoric; and second having, we hope, shown how it is a creative and agential part of the political process, what this means for an analysis of the UK left, and in particular the British Labour Party.

1). Rhetoric: What is it? What does it do?
The first issue concerns rhetoric’s relationship to the ideas it expresses and the ‘rhetor’s’ scope for using it to purpose. This raises questions of rhetoric and ideology and, in performance, the relationship between – and play of – structure and agency. What we hope to show is that political rhetoric demonstrates not the dominance of structure over agency or vice versa, but their interrelationship and the conditions of possibility for agency’s use of structure; here, the influence of ideas informing rhetoric, the role of agency in the interpolation of ideas, the institutional and cultural conditions of rhetorical performance, and therefore its scope – in the performance of rhetoric itself - for exploitation and transcendence in the forging of new political relationships and change.

Let us then identify what we take rhetoric to mean, paying particular attention to its creative agential nature and look at some of the most recent theoretical contributions to the definition and function of rhetoric, in particular the work of Finlayson and Martín.
Issues emerge (usually in the form of rhetoric itself) and have to be responded to rhetorically. Rhetoric is not just words and emotion, nor just the logic of an argument; it is an ‘event’ to which political actors have to respond. This event can be someone speaking and performing but can be evident in other forms. At its simplest, it is what is said or written down or displayed, and is the structure and performance of what is said or written down or displayed; and it is the context within which these take place – the conditions of rhetoric – institutional, cultural, ideational, historical, and so on. And it is ‘performed’ to and received by an audience – listener, reader, viewer.

Rhetoric is everywhere. Virtually nothing exists in interpersonal and social interaction without it (Leith, 2011). We ourselves do not make a substantive distinction between spoken and written rhetoric, the latter in our view having as much a structure as the former (Booth, 1961; Eagleton, 2008; Empson, 2004; Hyman, 1962; Ramage et al, 1995; Williams, 1987). One could argue that everything has a rhetoric: music, advertising, science, relationships, Plato’s discoursing against rhetoric; even spaces - a Conference Hall arguably has a rhetoric as well as being one of its ‘conditions’. It has an architecture, and architecture a rhetoric. Our emphasis here, for the purposes of illustration, will be upon the fundamental role of the ‘author’ or ‘origin’ of spoken and written rhetoric and their aim to demonstrate and persuade.

All rhetoric is, in some form, the art (or, for some, science – perhaps both) of seduction, of ‘moving’ (creating affect); and as often as not, perhaps more often than not, the ‘mover’ intends to deceive, sometimes intending something other than what the ‘affected’, upon sober reflection, might perceive as their own good. But this is a moment or point on a scale of persuasion. It may be exactly what an audience wants – needs even – to be ‘moved’. We should also not underestimate the ludic aspect of these ‘events’; this is severely underestimated
in the discipline of political science. Being persuaded can be fun. And fun is... fun. This perhaps collapses the problematic distinction between rhetoric and demagoguery, or at least puts them on a shared scale. By definition s/he would have us in another place to where we would be without the rhetorical appeal or exchange. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the rhetoric of crowds and of state propaganda brought, as often as not, ruin. The rhetoric inviting us towards the good life (for Aristotle, enlightened aristocracy, for us enlightened democracy (Uhr, 2013)) is usually more subtle and more quiet and, because less passionate, has gone hand in hand with evidence of both its arguments and its consequences: higher living standards, relative freedoms, education, security, and the aim of social harmony; although, we need to add that passion here too - alongside a rhetoric ‘quietism’ - has been of the essence: nothing, as Emmeline Pankhurst told us, was ever gained from the British government without something approaching a revolution. The rhetoric of the democratic state seems generally, however, less ‘empty’ than the ‘signifieds’ of demagoguery. Since the Enlightenment, the drive towards democracy has, however, in spite of the struggle for democracy, been ever prey to the rhetoric of populism (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). What we are arguing here, and proposing methodologically, is that the distinction between rhetoric and demagoguery is a false dichotomy. Indeed, we would probably not have attained the levels of democracy we have without either of them. Perhaps, if we cannot quite free analysis of the haunting presence of the normative, then we need to recognize that rhetoric is an emotional issue (Marcus, 2002). But the essential issue here is to transcend the normative, particularly as it will help us better understand Aristotle today, particularly the nature and thrust of his most important rhetorical categories, the triptych ethos, pathos, and logos.

The emphasis within rhetoric (epideictic, forensic, political and demagogic (we are modifying him already)) upon persuading people to do, think, or feel
something other than what they are doing, thinking, and feeling (or to remember or relive already experienced thought or feeling) brings us to a second and related point. The analysis of rhetoric is ever-subject to an understanding of, and the evolution of, the social, cultural, institutional, and political conditions of rhetorical production and the relationship between speaker and hearer, both in the minds of each and in the rhetoric itself (Kane, 2001). In fact, as both Finlayson and Martin point out (see below) the conditions of rhetoric are so different from those of classical rhetoric that today it is in many ways a different rhetoric. Second, in order to understand the tale, we must inevitably understand the teller or at least his/her relationship to those they are telling their tale to, so that concern with the relationship between (or, rather, imagined relationship between) speaker and listener (writer and reader or message/image sender and receiver) is a constant (Gaffney, 2001). And fundamental to that relationship, in order that it be lived as ‘real’ and to purpose, is the question of trust. In the contemporary period this is one of the fundamentals of persuasion. Trust or empathy is perhaps essential to rhetoric’s effectiveness upon the listener, but upon the analyst too in a strange sense (Warren, 1999). Imagining oneself capable of persuasion or acquiescence is probably facilitating of rhetorical analysis.

Just as the normative does not determine rhetoric or its analysis today but are its ever-active context, so too are emotions such as desire (to be persuaded or delivered or included), sorrow, need, exhilaration, trust, and so on: emotion is ever-present in or around the rhetoric (and boredom is an emotion; more importantly as regards logos we could argue that agreement is an emotion). This brings us to Aristotle’s categories of ethos, pathos, and logos. Contemporary rhetorical studies emphasize particularly the latter two, and in particular how, to good or bad purpose, they interact with one another: how argument and emotion interact with one another to consequential reaction. What has been less focused
upon (and often taken out of the Aristotelian triptych and treated separately as ‘image’, persona, or character, particularly in the ‘new age’ (from circa 2000) of ‘celebrity politics’ [refs. Street + BJPIR]) is ethos. This is in part because, unlike Aristotle, we are less interested today in the standing of the speaker and whether or not he (then, only he) is worthy etc., and, paradoxically, more interested in leadership image. But the standing of the speaker in the rhetoric and, therefore, ethos as a relational term (to pathos, logos and the audience) are crucial to the contemporary analysis of rhetoric. In fact, I would argue that not only is ethos the least accurately focused upon today (‘The medium is the message…’ [ref]), or was until the resurgence of research over the last decade or so, it is the most important element, overwhelming ideology at times (here logos) and ideology expressed with emotion (pathos). Ethos is the fundamental component of rhetoric: the imagined persona of the speaker as an active, enacting part of the rhetoric, and his/her imagined or perceived relationship to normative issues, to emotion, to argument and, especially, to the audience, are the keys to contemporary rhetoric. We shall come back to this below.

In the twentieth century, the decline in or vacuum left by rhetoric as a discipline was replaced, in part, because of changes in how language itself was perceived (and, negatively, how rhetoric was perceived). Developing out of Saussurean linguistics (Saussure, 1995) the focus of twentieth century enquiry was upon the system (langage) which expressed itself through parole (speech). One of the most thorough revisions of the study of language as rhetoric was the arrival, in the 1950s and 60s (drawing explicitly upon Saussurean linguistics), of Structuralism. Structuralism colonized just about everything, but in our field, its essential effect and purpose was – to cut a long story short – to demonstrate that people don’t use language, language uses people. The extension of linguistic study in the social sciences saw a radicalization of this approach through the development in the 1970s and 1980s of discourse analysis and then from the
1990s onwards, critical discourse analysis (CDA). With the latter, there has been a lot of exciting work, sometimes bordering on rhetorical analyses, which demonstrates the how of (the rhetoric of) the interpolation of language (Wodak, 2009; Van Dijk, 2008; Fairclough, 1995). The overall Saussurean structure remains, however, and is adapted to the extent that, rather than simply demonstrating how speech (*parole*) mediates language, CDA emphasizes how *parole* mediates power relations. This has a relevance to rhetorical study in that rhetoric too is clearly about power as well as claims to legitimacy and appeals to authority; but CDA takes the preoccupation to a fundamental level of power relations so that, when examining Tony Blair’s discourse of New Labour, for example, CDA’s preoccupation is less with how Blair persuades (which is Finlayson’s preoccupation). [Ref.] than with how his discourse is the giving of voice to an underlying ideology (Fairclough, 2001). This may be so but our preoccupation is less with ideological interpretation than with persuasion. This also raised the problem of ideology itself (see below), so we shall also come back to the question of how underlying ‘underlying’ is.

One of the essential features underpinning ‘European’ discourse studies was and is its preoccupation with social questions, wider than rhetoric, even wider than language itself (and yet rooted in linguistics), this in part, as we have mentioned, because of the seminal – and determining (!) influence of the Saussurean thrust of discourse studies (*langue* as preceding *parole* ontologically). It is also partly the result of the post-war influence on all European thought of Marxism, particularly upon Cultural Studies (Williams, 1987; Hall, 1980; Barker and Galinski, 2001). This means that a lot of discourse analysis, and especially Critical Discourse Analysis is political, even ‘committed’ in not just a Sartrean sense, but in a deeper (underlying) critical theory sense: that to not be ‘critical’ is to be… uncritical (and therefore complicit). European feminist research is, like American (Butler, 2006),
informed, perhaps inevitably, by this political dimension (Baxter, 2006; Shepherd, 2008). It also means that a lot of the focus is upon meta-narratives (of a Foucauldian type), meta-discourses, and so on, rather than upon rhetoric as performance.

The United States – in part through the active research forums of the National Communication Association and the Rhetoric Society of America – has a thriving rhetorical studies community. In many ways, the kind of hands-on rhetorical analyses advocated in this paper are exactly what has been being done in the US for decades. Much of it is due to the seminal and consequential (phenomenal, in fact) influence of Kenneth Burke (1897-1993) (Burke, 1969), and his approach to rhetoric which situates rhetorical acts by means of his ‘dramatistic pentad’ (Act, Scene, Agent, Agency, Purpose) which has resonance in Martin and Finlayson’s approach. In the more recent period, a range of figures with major academic influence have further shaped rhetoric studies (Brock et al, 1990). Perhaps the most prestigious and influential has been, since the 1980s, Kathleen Hall Jamieson who, along with others, redefined the study of leadership rhetoric as it moved through its classical period (1940-1970) into the Reagan and post-Reagan eras, the ‘Electronic Age’ (Hall Jamieson, 1988). As regards presidential rhetoric, much of this scholarship focuses upon ‘Presidents creating the Presidency’ (Kohrs Campbell and Hall Jamieson, 2010). In this way, a lot of its emphasis is ‘performative’ in the Austinian sense (Austin, 1975): by speaking, the President becomes the presidency (and vice versa).

We need to say three things about this US research as regards our analysis here, or four rather (the fourth being how helpful it is in bringing leadership and rhetoric together as it does so competently). Our three main points are that, first,
it is almost exclusively American, in that it is concerned with America, which means that both institutionally and culturally it is of another order to European and other non-American rhetorics – though, in this, is perfect for comparative analysis. Second, because a lot of it is focused on the presidency, it places great emphasis upon presidential leadership discourse as a generic phenomenon. If focuses particularly upon, as we have said, in the words of its best authors ‘Presidents creating the Presidency’ (Kohrs Campbell and Hall Jamieson, 2010) and in this sense its emphasis is ‘performative’ (Austin, 1975). For us, rhetorical situations are not ‘given’, but ‘negotiated’, gambled even, and success achieved (or not). [note] Not all US research is on the presidency. There is a strong tradition of the analysis of, for example, African-American rhetoric (Richardson and Jackson, 2007; Jackson, 2003), and feminist rhetoric (Butler, 2006; Gutgold, 2012), but the emphasis upon the presidential is concerted.

But the final point I want to make – or rather restate Finlayson’s point [ref.workshop] and which in some ways draws us back towards the more European ‘critical’ approach, is that American rhetoric studies tend to take as given the conditions of rhetoric. Presidential rhetoric is seen as almost ‘natural’ rather than a performance in a formative context. There is a sensitivity to antecedents (in particular JFK, FDR, Lincoln, and the Founding Fathers) and to the myths informing US society (frontier myths *inter alia*), but there is far less attention to other historical, institutional (although there is a strong focus upon the media as a formative institution), cultural, and social conditions of performance and its reception. While we are at pains to free agency from structure’s grip, this does not mean that the latter is not there or is not a formative condition. And we should see Finlayson, Martin and others (refs) in this light, in order to establish the role of rhetoric (under-researched) in terms of its true relation to both its context and effects (Martin p. 10).
In European discourse, especially in UK scholarship, there are the beginnings of a major renaissance, in part through scholars like Martin and Finlayson setting out to demonstrate how what I said above about how the ‘given’ and the ‘negotiated’ actually take place. There have been recent innovative developments in the European literature, almost exclusively for the moment in the UK, which bring to the fore the role and function of rhetoric in the wider political process. These amount in fact to an appeal for the study of politics itself to be recast and viewed in a different, new way. Part of what we might call this disciplinary initiative is a discussion about the nature and provenance of political rhetoric itself: how ‘agential’ is it in relation to either the structures it takes place within, against, or upon, or the ‘discourse’, ideas or ideology/ideologies it is fashioned from and interpolates; that is to say, and to put the two disciplinary discussions the other way round, how much agency is there in the creation and performance of rhetoric, and how consequential are their effects? In order to identify the thrust of our approach, let us look at the two recent and most paradigmatic contributions to this evolving literature, those of James Martin and Alan Finlayson, [note sources x 2 PS articles].

Martin (and Finlayson) addresses both of the above discussions, that is to say, both the context and the performance of rhetoric. For Martin, ideas and their rhetorical expression are ‘acts’ (p.2), and they are sent into the political space as ‘projectiles’ (p.2). This bold imagery serves to underline Martin’s idea, adding further to Hay’s argument [source] that consequential cognitive ideational frames intervene in the political (and are themselves instances of action), that the use of rhetoric as ‘acts’ means that these ‘frames’ are less stable (and therefore less determining) than they appear (though less stable they are no less consequential). One could argue from this that the structure-agency debate is itself slightly misleading, if we take ‘frames’ in this instance as structure, in that (as Hay has argued in fact – note 1988) structure and agency interact, and are
not really in opposition to one another but are mutually dependent. We shall return to this below.

Martin also points out that rhetorical re-enactments (e.g. the discourse and rhetoric of a bureaucracy, the ‘routinized processes and behaviours of social and political systems’ (Martin, p.9)) are, in fact, also acts of agency, although ‘layers of custom’ (p.7) are resistant to change (they ‘constrain’ p.8). On the other hand, the chances of rhetorical acts being able to effect change or even effect their own immediate desired outcome (e.g. be a good speech!) are dependent upon many things, other than the performance of rhetoric itself. Structure weighs. Nevertheless, the transcending of the reductionist nature of much of the structure-agency debate is crucial here. Structure is the resource of agency – hence the role of the analyst is to identify the degrees of their interaction and relative strengths. We need to stress once again that to assert the ‘agency of agency’ is not a return to a nineteenth century liberal view of freedom to act. We are simply asserting that structure is the condition of agency. Electricity existed before Edison [ref. Bob Dylan!]. It did not constrain him, on the contrary, it was the condition of his agency.

Rhetoric does not come in from nowhere, but has as one of its conditions of production and performance the ideas and discourses that constitute its rhetorical environment. Martin uses the example of Tony Blair and how in the 1990s, he rhetorically embedded this drive for modernization in (aspects of) established left and Labour values and doctrine.

For a great deal of discourse analytical studies, all of critical discourse analysis (CDA) and even some rhetoric studies (Laclau, Howarth), structure dominates rhetoric as agency – dictates would be going too far in many cases (for there is space for resistance in CDA). But in both critical theory and in CDA, analysis
‘reveals’ the underlying structures (of power) which are ‘performed’ through rhetoric. Fairclough’s own analysis of Blair’s rhetoric is an illustrative case of CDA in this respect. Indeed, in terms of power and language, rhetoric or enacted discourse is an expression of an underlying (or overarching) structure (power, class, or gender relations, for example) and system – discourse analysis following quite loyally a neo-Saussurian belief in system (*langue*) interpolating its expression (*parole*). For us, this is not appropriate (indeed I think it is the other way round) because it implies, explicitly states even, that in the last instance (i.e. in the first) as we have already said, people do not use language, language uses people. What we need to theorise – in line with Martin’s idea of rhetoric *disturbing* (p.1 and p.4) ideational frames and frameworks through acts – is the idea of rhetoric as a creative rather than a reproductive act (in the Bourdieuian sense) [note]. We shall come back to Martin’s findings and conclusions later in this paper.

**A parenthesis on Ideology**

This brings us to a further concern and possible or potential confusion in the epistemology of rhetorical studies. The term ideology is quite widely used in contemporary rhetorical studies and, generally speaking, it refers to ideology as defined or characterized by Michael Freeden [note]: clusters of ideas with a varying range of proximity to a ‘core’, some central, some ‘adjacent’ and others on the ‘periphery’ of an ideational cluster/ideology. Here and in rhetorical studies generally it is akin to, although not synonymous with, political doctrine; ideationally it is arguably ‘further down’ (socially, psychically) than doctrine. The problem here and a possible source of conceptual confusion, particularly regarding the relationship of structure to agency and rhetoric to power, is that ‘ideology’ plays an even more fundamental (even further down) role in discourse analysis, in post-Marxism, and in critical theory. If Freeden’s ideology is deeper (socially and psychologically) than is what I have above
called doctrine (or perhaps ‘doctrinal narrative’), Fairclough’s and CDA’s is deeper still, determining structures of thought and their expression in discourse. Perhaps the ‘deepest’ (perhaps ‘surround sound’ might be a more appropriate metaphor) imagining of ideology lies in Louis Althusser’s neo-Marxism. Althusser’s seminal 1970 article ‘Idéologie et Appareils Idéologiques d’Etat’ on Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) (La Pensée, 151, June 1970, pp. 3-38) is arguably the most influential and among the most sophisticated elaborations of the notion of ideology. His starting point is that the means of production necessitates its own reproduction. In the modern period it does this through two sets of apparatuses, both of which involve the state (the public domain), although one of the sets, involving ideology, is lived as belonging essentially to the private. The state, representing the interests of the dominant class (or class fractions), has a range of state apparatuses (SAs): government, bureaucracy, army, police, judiciary, prisons, and so on, which are based upon violence, they ‘fonctionnent à la violence’ (p.14 – all translations are mine).

In order to legitimate and service both the state and bourgeois dominion, the state must undertake the ‘reproduction of a diversified and qualified work force’ (‘reproduction de la qualification (diversifiée) de la force de travail’) (p.6). In order to do this the state also creates (or takes over) a set of Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) - the only places where ideology can truly function: culture, family, religion, for example and, above all, the education system. SAs and ISAs have elements of each other (e.g. the family can exercise ‘hard power’ – punishment; the army soft in the form of, for example, esprit de corps, or loyalty); but the ISAs, unlike the SAs, function essentially ideologically (‘fonctionnent à l’idéologie’), and it is through hegemony upon and in (‘sur et dans’) the ISAs that class domination is maintained and reproduced through time. SAs and ISAs interact, the latter serving essentially a legitimating role.
Ideology for Althusser is not ‘just’ false consciousness as it was for Marx (*German Ideology*, pre-epistemological break), but a ‘representation’ of the ‘imaginary relation of individuals to the real conditions of existence’ (p.24), i.e. is an ‘illusion’ but one which also has an ‘allusion’ to reality (p.24). Its function, and the reason why ‘individuals’ do not truly have ‘ideas’ (when they think they have) is because what they are actually doing is re-enacting the ‘rituals’ (p.35) of the ISA; it is the ISA that, for example, even before birth into the family, constitutes and interpolates (p.27) individuals as subjects. In that sense subjectivity is an ideological effect (p.30), even though it is lived as (if) ‘operating freely’. Althusser uses the bizarre term here, reminiscent of puppetry or the Stepford Wives: constituted subjects ‘walk unaided’ (*marchent tout seuls*) – the ‘as if’ qualification lying in his use of quotation marks. Althusser recognizes Gramsci’s contribution here through his insight that ‘civil society’ (e.g. the church, family, trade unions) accompanies the state’s repressive or coercive function; but Althusser’s characterization is – to use his own cherished expression – in the last instance – unhelpful to us in that the structure of the overdetermining ‘apparatus’ prevails over agency, whose only ideational authenticity lies in ideology’s reflecting the reality of domination. In his seminal article he does not actually use the term ‘overdetermined’ but from our discussion we can see that ISAs are really a refining of his 1965 view – where he does use the term (ref. *Pour Marx* (1965), Paris: Maspero). It is true that, for Althusser, overdetermination (originally a Freudian term) can lead to change, e.g. overdetermined alienation (i.e. multiple causes and sources for one phenomenon) can transform a revolt into a revolution; but essentially for Althusser ideology creates the illusion of agency precisely to deny it reality. Our view is that agency is the only reality (cf. Sartre’s *Jamais nous n’avons été*
plus libres que sous l’occupation allemande’ ‘Never were we so free as under German occupation’–ref *Situations 5*).

In Marxism generally - although arguably not in Marx – [ref][note Larrain] ideology is embedded in class and determines thought and reasoning (hence the need for ‘the critical’ to counter it, in alliance with the ideational conflict of class struggle). For Althusser, because of state involvement in the class distribution and exercise of power (Education especially) but also the Church, the family, and culture generally, given the power that the state (and ruling class/class alliances) can exercise, ideology not only determines but overdetermines agency (there is no escape). This is not how ideology, discourse, and rhetoric are for us, with the caveat that I do not know how far down it does go (how determining it is); the role of rhetorical analysis is to try to determine just that. It is indeed debatable how far ‘down’ doctrine or ideology goes. And in some places (religion?) and historical moments (e.g. before The Enlightenment) or ‘levels’ of thought or doctrinal intensity (e.g. political liberalism versus Maoism), the depth and therefore determining influence of structure varies. [Sum up Martin] Let us now look at the formative contributions of Finlayson.

Bearing in mind our hesitations about how to conceive the term ideology, and stressing here our own preference for the term doctrinal narrative – let us examine, alongside Martin’s analysis, a second formative text in the recent development of political rhetoric, Alan Finlayson’s 2012 article on ideologies [PS source].

Like Martin, Finlayson’s concern is to dynamise the study of politics by making political science ‘see’ the political process in a new way, by demonstrating that
the articulations of political ideologies, what we might call the rhetorical moments in the political process or political space, are ‘creative acts’ (p4), and are arguably the most important elements of politics.

He does this first by distinguishing political ideology from political philosophy and epistemology, the former being the real concern for political analysis, drawn from the doxa, the myriad or matrix of ideas informing and expressed in everyday social (and political) life. We might venture here also that the two, doxa and episteme, are not necessarily exclusive categories, and that rhetoric often takes place ‘between’ them, each echoing the other and justifying itself in relation to the other – the doxa by claiming, the episteme by disclaiming. We could also add that, contrary to the - Finlayson quoting Freeden - ‘flight from the political’ (ideological) and towards epistemology (p2) of its own disclaimers, a Plato, Kant, Marx or Freud, have nevertheless, in their own thought or writings, a rhetoric, in some of them a very strong one [note S.E. Hyman], and this even more so when, say, Marxian becomes Marxism, Plato becomes Platonism etc..

Central to Finlayson’s characterization (and development) of the rhetorical conception of political ideologies is his addition to Freeden and Laclau’s conceptions of, respectively, ideology and discourse, namely, the crucial idea of political argument. In so doing, Finlayson, like Martin, ‘shakes up’ our perception of ideology in that argument and its rhetoric make the systems of thought more fluid, more negotiated in the moments of their interpolation, in the rhetorical ‘here and now’; Finlayson adding a certain vigour to Freeden’s ‘Relatively determinate but nevertheless shifting organizations of political thought’ (p2). But for Finlayson as for Freeden (as for me), ideologies offer coherent ways of understanding and rhetorically politicizing the world while allowing for, indeed requiring, such constitutive elements as ambiguity, a
classic example of this latter being French Gaullism and its ambiguous rhetorical reconciliation of republicanism and personal leadership (source).

In this, Finlayson’s insight lies in seeing what these qualities of ideology mean when transformed through and expressed in political rhetoric; for organized through enthymeme, they have an Aristotelian *logos*, and draw much of their persuasive power from *pathos*. The standing of the speaker/rhetor (*ethos*) is the means by which the rhetoric/ideology is (literally) given voice. We shall come back to this and Finlayson’s discussion of it below. Finlayson’s general point is that ideology and its rhetorising is not a malfunction of politics but an essential property of it (p3).

Given Finlayson’s concern to demonstrate the plasticity and mutability of ideology through rhetorical performance we can make four points that may contribute to the debate.

First, as Finlayson argues, features such as ambiguity serve the purpose of linking up or allowing to coexist ideas that might not necessarily follow one another epistemologically; and in this they serve the political function of widening support for a claim or appeal. One can take this further and say that, for example, ambiguity also mediates opposites, often incompatible or even perhaps irreconcilable ones (irreconcilable ‘outside’ through rhetorical reconciliation or ‘inside’ through ambiguity (see below)). If this is the case, it may also be the case that these coexist *within* ideologies. This would modify Freeden’s core and periphery notions of necessary coherence (or perhaps the opposites might be at opposite ‘ends’ of an ideology). Whatever is the case, one is struck by the fact that the most compelling ‘ideologies’ all seem to mediate opposites: mercy/retribution, trials/deliverance, individual/collective, penance/celebration, journeys/arrivals, darkness/light, sorrow/joy,
kindness/severity, millenarianism/pragmatism, individual courage/succour,
tolerance/justice, temptation/fortitude, struggle/resignation, and so on; these
seem not simply opposites from the ‘outside’ that are constitutive of ideology
e.g. justice to overcome injustice, but actually coexist within (on the inside).
This perhaps therefore is another of the bridging functions of the ‘play’ of
things such as ambiguity, as well as – as Freeden and Finlayson point out (p5) –
the need within ambiguity of meaning to persuade an audience of the actual
meaning of an idea or term in a particular rhetorical instance, through
ambiguity’s role as a signifier acting as an agent between two (at least)
signifieds.

These opposites are mediated by pathos particularly; because they are opposite
they have heightened emotional charge; and by logos through enthymeme (the
two really back each other up). Through their interpolation through ethos, which
we shall discuss below, significant transformations in ideology can be made,
particularly given that such performances, involving strong or strongly
juxtaposed emotions often take place in a dramatic rhetorical setting. In a sense
our point is a truism: emotion = drama. Finlayson signals this point in his
reference to Palonen and politicians’ ‘performance’ (p4).[KG explain]

The second point we can make regarding Freeden’s ‘core’, ‘adjacent’ and
‘periphery’ concepts – in fact, we have already made it regarding the influence
of myths – (we have?) is that, and if Finlayson’s point is correct - rhetoric puts
this threefold entity into ‘movement’, as it were - ideologies are more
vulnerable to influence than they would have themselves; this is perhaps, in
part, how they change over time. We can add that it is arguable that it is not
only at their edges that they interact with other ideologies i.e. at their least
‘ideological’ point, but also in adjacent and core ideas. Perhaps a good
illustration of this would be the way in which French socialism in the 1970s
rhetorically adapted to French Gaullism by *intensifying* its use of *pathos* and especially *ethos* [source JG in GR] and its mythological and narrative affinities with the Gaullist narrative [ref. JG].

If this is true, it follows that some of the arguably core ideas of ideologies, a millenarian disposition, for example, can travel through to other ideologies through ‘worm holes’ in ideological space-time, reappearing actively – and often virulently - within another ideological formation. In the case of French socialism it is arguable that the majority cluster of ideas of socialism (from Jaurès to Mitterrand) went through a worm hole – on the wings of ambiguity - reappearing as an ideology which could function ideationally in the highly personalized Fifth Republic. Regarding Finlayson’s discussion of Ernesto Laclau’s approach (esp pp5-7) and the idea that ‘signifiers’ name ideas – and therefore exercise control over their meaning and connotations, rhetoric’s battle is over who gets to name, or rename, and it is rhetoric itself which is the battleground for this; so that naming or renaming (possibly though not inevitably ‘overdetermined’ by who ‘holds’ power) is a rhetorical challenge and site of nominative conflict, ambiguity being one of the crucial weapons of this struggle. Another French example of this in practice might be the very leftist idea of the *rassemblement populaire* and its subtle rhetorical adaptation (in the personalized Fifth Republic) to a *rassemblement* (rally) around a person.

A third observation we can make regarding Finlayson’s identifying the mutability or porousness of ideology, and our own view that ideas can space travel, as it were, is that ideologies are passing each other and resonating in one another all the time; although this, probably only according to the conditions of compatibility as developed by Freeden in his ‘Morphology’. [ref] The ‘millenarianism’ in Socialism, for example, *resonates* with the millenarianism in Christianity (irrespective of their *actual* related doctrinal origins). In this
way, a whole series of other-ideological or non-ideological ideas and
dispositions which no doubt are cultural and institutional and of course
historical and ‘philosophical’ will interact along both constraining and
facilitating morphological lines. Illustrations might be the strength of the
chivalric tradition in French politics (e.g. lonely quests and saving princesses),
the optimism of the left given migration myths that inform it, the sense of
‘place’ rather than time informing the right (because for the right, time does not
go forward but ‘re-enacts’ the triumphs and tragedies of human wisdom and
folly). Myths, fables and fairytales also have a psychic dimension informing the
narratives that inform rhetoric, which themselves, like tales, have a structure
[ref. Propp]; so it is possible that these narrative structures enter into ideology
(or are at least rhetorically very close to hand!), fashioning the doctrinal
narrative and influencing the rhetoric’s ideational range. The best rhetors
persuade by telling stories, even in short slogans (e.g. ‘things can only get
better’...) implying longer (deeper set) stories which offer explanations of the
world and its or our purpose. And if, as Martin and Finlayson argue, both
ideologies and ideational frames are less closed, coherent, and static than has
been hitherto held as being the case, then these will be even more susceptible to
interaction with – sometimes even duetting with – other narratives such as
legends and fables, as well as other ideologies which share/are vulnerable to the
same ambiguities, fables, and so on.

A relevant parenthesis here on both Martin and Finlayson’s ideas about the
doxa, a kind of prevailing ‘everything’ of discourse, ideas, predispositions,
predispositions, received views, maxims, myths, fables, fads, assumptions, non-dits
and ‘presupposeds’ (ref Bourdieu, Barthes) which inform social life; it is like
the sky above us. Given the mutable and porous nature of ideology which lends
itself to other narratives, perhaps it is here too that it lends itself/is susceptible to
‘common sense’ (‘sensus communis’ p.12, contra Kantianism) i. e. that the doxa
and doctrine can, and should, be equally vibrant. And we can add that it is here that the left, bizarrely, so often fails to prosper rhetorically.

Finlayson also devotes attention to the Aristotelian agencies of ‘proof” used in persuasion, *ethos, pathos, and logos*. We have touched upon the latter two, and one cannot but agree with his characterizations of these, particularly the idea that what he calls ‘emotional tenor’ (p11) will differ according not only to circumstance but also to ideological type. A further insight is his idea that the shifting ‘moods’ in socialist rhetoric reflect an uncertainty regarding the conflicting ‘moods’ of, for example, resentment and solidarity (I would stress that these conflicting unhappy moods are interdependent). On *logos*, Finlayson argues that the different political situations pertaining in the present period (as opposed to the classical where all rhetoric was organized around three occasions: debate, judgment, and celebration), the *logos* of today means that rhetors will try to represent the structure of reality, as they see it, especially as there is now great dissensus on that structure. We could add to this in a slight further distortion of Aristotle that *logos* now reflects not just the structure of the argument but the structure of the speech or rhetorical event itself, its ‘architecture’ and ‘grammar’ as a means of persuasion, so that part of its ‘argument’ is its ‘shape’. Martin Luther King’s ‘I have a dream’ speech, for example, [ref] with its varying intensities, highs and lows, repetitions, visual metaphors, movement and rhythms, can be analyzed like a musical score which ‘structures’ the *logos*.

What is of greatest interest – and again arguably a nuance on Aristotle – is the contemporary nature of *ethos*. For him, rhetoric underlined and displayed the good ‘standing’ of the speaker (and his knowledge, experience, wisdom and probity). For Locke in the 17th century, as Finlayson points out, even such appeals were considered inappropriate – the ‘authority’ of the speaker being
beyond question. Finlayson points out how much more complicated modern *ethos* is with the rhetor (often depending upon the type of ideology) using a complex set of figures to show his/her honesty, expertise and so on (all this is much less demanding in classical rhetoric). We can also see - given more recent scientific developments (e.g. in cognitive psychology [ref]) regarding leadership and followership – how the rhetor depicts or tries to depict him/herself as the ‘embodiment’ of ideas, *as well as being* both ‘like’ the members of the audience (each identifying with each other) and yet unlike the audience through the claim to leadership. This also raises the issue – especially since the literature of the twentieth century, Max Weber in particular – of charisma and its rhetorical deployment. [Ref. OUP].

I may be adding something new here, or may simply be bringing out something implicit in Finlayson’s argument, but all of the above means that the rhetor has become a veritable ‘character’ in the speech, like a character in a novel, and this often to the point that the deployment of the *ethos* of the speaker is political rhetoric’s essential function, although that function is not necessarily always (although perhaps in the last instance it is) that of the enhancing *ethos* itself (*ethos*, for example, may deliberately undermine itself to rhetorical purpose).

In this new complexity, however (and therefore), *ethos* is not only about *ethos*, that is to say that, paradoxically enough, the ethos of the speaker becomes a major character within the rhetoric and is now used for the purposes of *pathos*, *logos* and the fashioning not just of *ethos*’ identity but that of the audience (and vice versa). Two brief illustrations here would be Churchill’s identification with his audience, their and his ‘mythification’ (through anticipated – and imposed – notions of sacrifice): ‘We shall fight them on the beaches... we shall never surrender.’) and therefore their utter dependency upon him for deliverance. The second, de Gaulle’s (constant) mythification not of his audience (the French)
but of France itself, the depiction of his devotion, and the assumption of theirs. In each case ethos is being used to other – and brilliant – rhetorical effect. To this we can stress the importance of Finlayson’s point (p13) – especially as rhetoric now, as we have seen, goes beyond its classical uses - that ‘characterizing’ the audience is now as consequential as characterizing the speaker. In both the above illustrations the ‘success’ of the rhetor is strictly dependent upon how the audience – after being invited to or depicted in a particular way – imagines itself.

So what we have (or would like to have!) is a form of rhetorical action which stresses agency without denying the role of structure, or agency’s ‘conditions of performance’. As the mystical philosopher Simone Weil said, not anything is possible but nothing is determined. And as Martin pointed out, even reproduction is a form of production. Conditions and performance, like Martin’s ‘inventive reconfiguration’ (p2), involve a certain reimagining of political performance. And the conditions are many and constitute ‘the stage’ upon which rhetoric is performed: institutional (‘institutions involve numerous formal layers of custom and practice’ p7) (ref, ref also or discuss March & Olsen etc.), cultural (e.g. French heroic tradition), historical (historical conditions and rhetorical traditions) and rhetorical (‘rhetoric combines continuity with provocation’ (JM p4 – check quote)). Often routine is the condition of rhetoric, ‘rhetorical situations tend to emerge in the context of the routinized processes and behaviours of social and political systems’ (JM p?).

Our approach therefore is close to Sartre’s ideas about action (freedom of) in both Being and Nothingness (1943) and The Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960) – although the other way round from his, that is to say that rhetorical performance is like the pour soi (‘for itself’) reaching forward towards the future, away from, tearing itself away from but on the basis of, the practico-inert (a ‘social’ version of his earlier en soi (‘in itself’)), itself a constraint, as it
is traditionally viewed, but also an opportunity, in that, contrary to many characterizations (although not Sartre’s own), the *practico-inert* is the assembled collection and consequence of all previous acts of agency (praxis?), therefore offering exemplars, justifications and, in our case, a rhetorical archive. And in many ways when an institution e.g. the bureaucracy, the army, or Althusser’s ‘apparatuses’, ideological or other, are depicted as ‘inert’, they only *appear to be* structures but are a summum of agencies that ‘would have themselves’ performing in unison.

A final theoretical point regarding the lessons to be drawn from Martin and Finlayson’s formative research: Martin identifies context, argument, and effects when looking at rhetoric. We have termed the first ‘conditions’ (of ‘argument’ or performance), and would include Martin’s focus upon the ideational context. One thing we would add or draw out, implicit in both Martin and Finlayson, is that context, conditions, or the *practico-inert* may facilitate (e.g. dramatic leadership tradition) or constrain (e.g. bureaucracy) rhetorical innovation; context is not ‘just’ context but part of the discursive ‘moment’ of the rhetoric itself. Both Martin and Finlayson stress ‘argument’ as the ‘moment’ itself of rhetorical expression (cf. Martin’s analysis of JFK’s Inaugural). Their notion of argument is more or less synonymous with ours of performance, Martin stressing both ‘style’ and ‘delivery’ as elemental. It is arguable, however, that some rhetoric, although not ‘empty’ in the performative sense, has no ‘argument’, but another purpose – the ‘introducing’ of a new speaker, for example, or the mythification of the audience (‘Let us prepare ourselves’…), for example, or the (dissimulated) celebration of the speaker (King’s eight iterations of ‘I have a dream’ are as much about the ‘I’ who dreams as they are about the dream dreamt).
This leads us onto Martin’s third category, the crucial, and elusive, question of ‘effects’. He looks at the first dichotomy between the immediate and longer-term effects of a rhetorical act (e.g. the use and effect of ‘peace process’ on the Northern Ireland... well, peace process! Or the effects of JFK’s Inaugural on and in the Cold War). This raises the vexed question of if what was intended by a speech, for example, did not happen, was the speech a ‘failure’, or at least was it less successful that it would have itself as being? Or are its ‘effects’ unrelated to intention? (Although, in parenthesis, one might also argue that JFK’s Inaugural is a typical and potentially very belligerent Cold War speech). The question here, however, is that it is crucial, as Martin urges, to examine what the identifiable effects in the longer-term political process might be. (Churchill’s rhetoric almost certainly kept Britain in the war; de Gaulle’s almost certainly helped bring the French Fourth Republic down; Eva Peron’s almost certainly politically mobilized a majority of Argentine women...). There is also a second way, omnipresent and implicit throughout both Martin and Finlayson’s approaches – indeed it is the driver of their revival of political rhetoric studies, a second way in which ‘effects’ can be identified and appraised – although arguably still inferred rather than demonstrated (although the ‘scientific’ measurement of this is possible and practised in some approaches), namely, the appraisal of ‘effect’ in terms not just of whether an audience or audiences is/are moved to action (e.g. responses to Luther King by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations) but whether (and of course how) they are moved at all. Measuring the effects upon all of those who heard or who have ever heard the ‘I have a dream’ speech, is utterly impossible, but this not because it had no effects, but because it had countless millions of effects.

Institutions and the institutional context of leadership performance can be understood as a range of things, from the conventions of leadership performance, to the nature and conditions of, say, executive office, to political
parties, the media, the education system or, more immediately, the television studio, the convention hall, the Congress, the House, the Agora, and so it could go on: sites and practices which, over time, become where performances take place. For the purposes of analysis here, we can take institution to mean the conventions and places which pertain to, by framing, rhetorical ‘acts’; for example, the presidency (bearing in mind what we said above about an institution as a ‘practice’), the government, the party, the public, the media; or processes – conventions and traditions, a dominant leadership mythology for example; these can each be seen as a contextual and consequent institution. A President, for example, will ‘perform’ in a different configuration of institutions to a Prime Minister; and leadership performance will normally – not always – be different in ‘the House’, from the performance to the party, or from performance to the public. The performance will be different also depending upon the media or medium. Recent research (Cohen, 2013) has shown that presidential speeches shifted dramatically in number, type and effect after the advent of cable TV, and that social media brought further major evolutions (Cohen, 2013; Gaffney, 2012). And you cannot be President without a presidency; and there will be institutions within the institution, and expectations and conventions of the office [OUP ref. develop]. At their most extreme, circumstances can inform the institution or configuration of institutions dramatically, e.g. war in the case of Churchill in 1940, or a collapsing regime (a collapsing set of institutions and the configuring of new ones), as in the case of, say, de Gaulle in 1958. Institutions that change ‘easily’, moreover, differ from ones that do not, and the mutability of institutions is often related to history and culture. All of this ‘architecture’ becomes the site where rhetoric is performed. Leadership performance and the configuration, or reconfiguration, of institutions can be sharply influenced by drama and dramatic circumstances, and we should interpret the former (performance) while bearing in mind the latter (drama). We could take this a helpful stage further as regards culture, and
say that ‘drama’ is part of the political culture of politics, hence the recognition when in dramatic crisis of the (need for) dramatic crisis leadership rhetoric, and also, in some politics/polities, the ‘recognition’ of the Cassandra figure and the ‘saviour’. These elements are often part of the culture in which the institutions (and the leader, and the leader’s performance, and the audience, and the rhetoric) are embedded.

Let us then return to Aristotle and update his three categories to contemporary purpose or, rather, to our purposes (Aristotle, 1991). We can leave pathos relatively intact. For us, as traditionally, pathos is the means of persuasion by which a whole range – perhaps the whole range – of emotions are evoked and exploited. Logos, rather than being the logical argument of the speech wherein facts and examples are given, in order to persuade with supporting evidence (although for Aristotle logos is indeed also used to enhance the status of the speaker, as well as being, crucially, for him and for us, not simply logical but logical in terms of and for the purposes of the rhetoric), we should see logos as all these but also as the architecture, the structure of the whole speech, as it is performed. That is why the musical analogy is apt. Logos has become in part the playing of the score, the dynamic shape of the speech, its grammar. The endings, the dénouements, of speeches, for us and for Aristotle, lend themselves particularly to this use of logos.

What is of most concern to us here, however, is the rhetorical category of ethos, much less addressed in contemporary rhetoric (outside business studies and marketing where it is synonymous with ‘credibility’ which explains little, and besides is fundamentally prescriptive). We shall take ethos to mean the persona of the speaker, both performed in and imagined outside the speech. Ethos refers to all the aspects of the character and performance of the speaker which
contribute to the speech’s reception. The character will be a composite constructed by both the speaker (which might itself be a composite of him/herself and speechwriters and advisors) and the audience (which itself is, by definition, composite).

A parenthesis on audience

The audience, like leadership persona but in a different way, is both outside and inside the speech. Leadership persona in the speech is depicted through ethos, but is imagined by the audience as existing outside the speech – before and after it. Conversely, the audience is, as it were, imagined outside inside the speech itself.

Outside: In the case of, say, a speech by Churchill or de Gaulle, the audience is deliberately national, at least is imagined as and intended as a speech about the national, and to a national audience. Martin Luther King’s rhetoric is national in the sense that, constantly implied in his speeches, are two audiences, black and white (Southern blacks and Northern white ‘opinion’) who together constitute an ideal America. For Eva Peron, there is an imagined national female community, and in her case, two, i.e. urban (Buenos Aires) women, and small town, far flung, isolated Argentina, brought together as a single, national, female audience, especially via radio, and sometimes – this rhetorically staggering – referred to in the singular ‘tu’, tus, ‘el tuyo’, ‘la tuya’, as if she were talking to just one woman (check Sp.Argentine) (Peron, 1987; Madsen and Snow, 1991).

The audience, therefore – and, in the perception of the speaker, the imagined audience that his/her speech is ‘talking to’ (these may or may not be coincident) – will normally have a cultural memory of some kind; it will know what it means, for example, to be constructed as national. It will normally have degrees
of familiarity with the leader/speaker, and degrees of enthusiasm based upon knowledge, although ‘unfamiliarity’ can also play a strong rhetorical role.\textsuperscript{ii} Beyond this, however, in many, perhaps all, audiences – those that give their attention – there is often something desired, something missing, something wanted, that the speaker responds to or provides; perhaps a sense of belonging, or reassurance in the face of fear, hope, sublimation of desire, or violence, and so on. Many ‘audiences’, many individuals, desire some kind of ‘return’ (to something or somewhere) -emigrant communities are a classic example, but a political party in the ‘wilderness’ will respond in the same way.\textsuperscript{iii} There is, therefore, very often, the potential for an active emotional process with the leader/speaker particularly as a speech begins or ends.

Speaker ‘vision’ (inside, interpolated and outside, imagined) also evokes emotion and a speaker/audience relationship of proximity, empathy, and even intimacy. There is an irony here. Envisioning is crucial to the valorization of the persona of the speaker, akin to Aristotle’s notion of noble status in its effect. It can span a whole range of perceptions from visions to insights, depending upon the nature of the occasion and the community. It can be vision at its ‘highest’, e.g. de Gaulle contemplating history, at a lower register – the vision of the new managing director of a company; but there is a constant puzzle in leadership studies, as well as in daily conversation, that the speaker/leader is ‘like us’ and yet different [ref. error of cogn psy?]]. They have to be like us for us to identify; unlike us for us to confer or recognize leadership. It is the envisioning that allows for this powerful duality. Enough of the content of the leader’s vision is offered to the audience for the audience to ‘see’ the content of the vision (‘a nation where they will not be judged by the colour of their skin but by the content of their character’) (Washington and King, 1986). But the vision is only partly seen; and even to see the part, the speaker is needed. It is the speaker’s vision, not the audience’s (‘I just want to do God’s will. And he’s allowed me to
go up to the mountain. And I’ve looked over. And I’ve seen the Promised Land’ [ref.]). The audience gets a recounted version of another’s vision. And to be ‘delivered’ or given the means of achieving ‘the Promised Land’ or other, involves acquiescence in the vision of the speaker. Acquiescence is a prerequisite to the fulfilling of desire. So, to a certain but fundamental degree, the speaker, contrary to received opinion, must maintain what he/she knows as somehow unknown. Emotion is partly based upon ineffable vision. The audience, paradoxically, feel an affinity with the speaker because he/she can ‘see’ something that they cannot see. So emotional dependence creates a range of dependencies, and it is important to say here that leadership performance will exploit this emotional context rhetorically. This will be particularly problematic for a leftist party, for in the ‘social democratic’ part of doctrine, its ‘ethos’ (in its ethical, normative sense) has very little ideational space for such notions of vision and destiny, and particularly for envisioning and destined individuals; here is often where leftist rhetoric will draw upon its millenarian tradition and migration myths, or else not ‘go there’ at all, closing off this rhetorical space, or – and this is the dilemma – leaving it to others to fill.

Inside: So what do speakers do with the audience in the speech? One way of looking at this is to ask what audiences ‘see’. We shall come back to this, but can say here that they ‘see’ (and help construct) the picture the speaker paints, of them, of him/her, of the world, of the trials, of the solutions, of the future, and all this for the audience. This dominance of the speaker and interrelationship with the audience is often like a choreographed dance of pronouns. Pronouns are fundamental to the speaker/audience relationship because they frame it. They allow for the proximity, even sense of intimacy of the speaker and the audience (often in a dynamically choreographed way) through the structured interplay of I, you, and we (and they). And, because I and you are not the same thing, they are distinct things. Of course I and you can
make we; I and you are prerequisites of ‘we’; each is needed for the we to exist. Hence often, the rhetorical device used by many speakers – in a near-evangelist way – of the (feigned) need for I to draw upon the strength of you in order that I be I, on behalf of and in the name of you, and in order that ‘we’ fulfil our mission.

The implications of some of these findings for an analysis of how the UK left functions rhetorically are far-reaching because as we said at the beginning of this paper, in political studies generally political rhetoric is under-researched (and very misunderstood), and in the analysis of the left (and by the left) neglected. This is why Finlayson and Martin’s revival of political rhetoric studies is so important. There has also begun a new thrust in studies of the UK left, particularly although not exclusively leadership-related (refs Wickam-J, Crines maybe list all). Let us now turn to this.

2). Left Rhetoric: What is it? What does it do?
In this second part of our discussion what we shall do is examine Labour Party and left rhetoric and ideas from the perspective of our theoretical discussion, in particular from the perspective of our discussion of ‘doctrinal narrative’ or ‘ideology’ and their rhetorical interpolation by our adapted Aristotelian categories. We are, therefore, less concerned here with a doctrinal history of the left than with how doctrine impacts rhetorically and performatively. Both theoretically and practically, moreover, we shall see that the Labour Party and the left generally act as examples through which we can better understand the significance of contemporary political rhetoric. Practically/empirically we are interested in the Labour Party and left as ‘performances’; and these in particular as regards leadership - leadership and its rhetorical interpolation as a (relational) ‘event’. It is perhaps helpful to see the Labour Party – its conventions, doctrine,
and past performances - as a kind of *practico-inert*, and rhetorical performance as a kind of *pour-soi* for itself reaching rhetorically and performatively forward.

We do not here mean that the past-as-structure treated in this way means that agency is ‘free’. It is free in the sense that it can be creative, but it is not free of its past. As the American writer William Faulkner said ‘The past is never dead. It’s not even past’; or the symbolist poet Mallarmé; ‘Deluded is the man who thinks he is a contemporary of his time’. And in a doctrinally rich and deeply ethical tradition this is even more the case [ref. ER], but it is important to see the UK left itself as the resource of agency. In the UK left, as well as *in* the present and *towards* the future, the past needs to be performed *to*. Let us now turn to a discussion of the rhetoric of the left in the UK and its relation to doctrine and ideology. This area of enquiry will be dealt with more exhaustively and indeed in different ways in several of the chapters in this volume, but we can make eight essential points here; then we shall address the issue of the left’s performance of its rhetoric.

**Doctrine and Rhetoric**

First the trade unions – and all their history, doctrine and rhetoric – play a strong role in the party’s mythology. Gaining political representation for and via the early trade union movement – and by implication the vast majority of working people, mainly although not exclusively men - was why the party was formed. And the unions’ history is a particularly valiant one, especially in its nineteenth and early twentieth century period. It is fair to say that its values became part of the ‘fabric’ of UK values and normative its struggle against the brutality of capitalism, and in favour of a society of fairness, justice and prosperity for all. This was a two-way process between unionism conferring values and reflecting values that were emerging dramatically in liberal and enlightened circles. These values became exemplary in the national
imagination. Their direct influence has diminished, and the ‘embourgeoisement’ of the left’s leadership, and arguably the nation, throughout the twentieth century altered the style and doctrinal reference points of the party in terms of its relationship to the unions. From the 1970s onwards, moreover, the unions were seen often (and were portrayed by the media) as regressive and sectarian nationally, and this even sometimes within the party and amongst supporters and voters, and even among union members. The unions also adapted very badly in the post-war period to the new rhetorical conditions of political communication and the media. One result, perhaps even a cause, was Labour’s attempt to find new, more attractive rhetorical sources and find ways of renewing its ‘voice’ and better embrace the new conditions it found itself in; a second, however, was the lingering and formative echo of an alternative, ‘authentic’, workerist rhetoric that sometimes enhanced but sometimes haunted the search for a newer style [note today McClusky/EM]. It is arguable that the ‘Capital v. Labour’ divide in UK politics still strongly informs party identity and rhetoric (more than is realised), and that such has impeded the real emergence of a rhetoric more suited to today’s highly complex society.

Second, over and above this or these ‘discursive strains’, the left in Britain and quintessentially the Labour left has a doctrinal tradition that is extremely rich and textured, over and above its pragmatism and union roots. For fifty years or so before the emergence of the party itself (1900) a series of thinkers and activists had created what we might call a landscape of ideas and rhetoric that would become formative of a compelling doctrine and a very ‘British’ one (Ruskin, Morris, Martineau etc. more). Unlike much of European leftism, moreover - which also was often virulently secular, both ideationally and morally - it was very much coincident with/aligned with British cultural values as well as religious ideas (in particular non-conformist Christianity and again in particular Methodism), and a deep moral emotionalism reflecting of an
emerging Dickensian-type ‘social conscience’. The developing doctrine of ‘Labourism’ was, therefore, vast, coherent yet extremely eclectic. This ideational development accompanied a series of major events relevant to the movement – e.g. the Matchgirls’ strike of 1888, the 1889 London Dockers strike etc., each of these (and many others) highly public events shaping of social attitudes. This ‘discursive tradition’ was carried and amplified throughout the twentieth century (refs. Webbs GDH Cole more) into a commanding and, in a Gramscian sense, socially hegemonic rhetoric which triumphed in 1945 (partly because of Labour’s participation in the wartime coalition), and became the essential element of a post-war discursive settlement (across the political spectrum – in part through the ‘Butskellist’ settlement [ref]) for the next thirty years. The Labour Party created, and was at the centre of, in Freedeen’s [ref] sense - a ‘core’ of ideas, e.g. role of the state, trade union relationship, welfare system, the democratization of education (and culture) and variations within all these but all within a ‘family’ of ideas (e.g. cooperativism, pacifism, anti-fascism, communities, the WEA (libraries, self/collective-help (Friendly Societies, Clarion cycling clubs, the Woodcraft Folk), evening classes, Ruskin College)…) [refs]. Over and above this, there were other ideas associated with this core, and these too were often very ‘British’ ideas, e.g. attitudes to Germany, to Europe generally, to the Russian Revolution and emergent Soviet Union, to Ireland, to Marxism, to strikes even, to everything. There was a certain left radicalism informing Labour discourse which echoed the Marxism of European socialism. In part this gave further rhetorical range and an insurrectionary flavour – the Red Flag was adopted by the party at its beginning and is still sung today (reluctantly by some). Clause IV, calling for (arguably ambivalently) the complete nationalisation of the means of production, distribution and exchange, lasted from 1918 until 1994, was Marxian in essence. Such a radical register also existed throughout the twentieth century in significant parts of the trade union movement, and saw perhaps a last defiant
hurrah in the 1984 Miners’ strike [refs]. Overall, however, the party’s radicalism was muted. Having said this, all of Labour discourse, perhaps because it was for a long time close to, reflecting of, the prevailing national doxa and with ‘popular’ ideas, also had a darker side, its ‘dark matter’ almost, and which it has to be said has often caused rhetorical difficulties for mainstream Labourism, particularly the ‘politically correct’ rhetoric of the 21st century, but lies within or close to Labour’s ideational frameworks precisely because of its proximity to common sense (itself not always sensible) and the doxa: negative attitudes to immigration, a historical ‘little Englander’ trait, sexism (male-centrism at least), anti-cosmopolitanism, a tendency to ‘bossism’, social conservatism, and so on.

A third and paradoxical point to make is that although Labour has a rich doctrinal tradition, today it is sometimes arguably often neglected, ignored even. This is in part because of the changing nature of the party and of society: and in a sense one can see how a Michael Sandel or Thomas Piketty has more to offer a modern UK Labour Party than Beatrice Webb and R.H. Tawney. It is also partly due to the nature of Labour doctrine itself, namely, that it is despite – perhaps because of – its richness not particularly doctrinaire or theoretically purist.

Finlayson in a 2015 review article (ref. Labour’s New Identity Politics, Renewal, March 2015) argues that, in fact, doctrinal differences are often based upon variable use of and emphases upon ‘shared terms’ and variations within ‘inward facing affirmations of identity’. So that in his (highly critical) review of three recent party books (ref. One Nation: Labour’s Political Renewal, Jon Cruddas and Jonathan Rutherford, One Nation Register, 2014, Our Labour, Our Communities, Edited by Lisa Nandy, Labourlist, 2014, Laying the Foundations for a Labour Century, Edited by John Woodcock and Liz Kendall, Policy
Network, 2014), various rival strains within the party (Third Way, Miliband One Nation, New Left, Blue Labour, Social Democracy) all co-exist easily as doctrinally and rhetorically-informed party debates. And these interweavings exist not just within groups of authors but within individual authors themselves. And unlike other parties of the left there has never been a party line. It is historically closer to the post-war rhetoric of the German SPD than to French Socialism, for example. In fact, it never needed its Bad Godesberg [ref] moment as it was, although always ‘inspired’, always ‘rhetorical’ (more so than the SPD), always doctrinally pragmatic and social-democratic (in today’s sense). In this it reflected UK society more generally and an approach to politics that was pragmatic and generally consensual, theoretically modest and reflective of its strong practical alliance with the trade unions, themselves leagues apart doctrinally and strategically from European syndicalisms (I put this in the plural because of marked differences here too, e.g. between Spanish and French syndicalism, the first strongly influenced by anarchism, the second by the Third International). In spite of the Labour Party connection with unionism, British unions were traditionally more concerned with decency and fairness in the economic sphere than with political power. We can note here two things proceed from this.

First – and this is our fourth main point - from the 1950s through to the 1990s this theoretical modesty was challenged by the ‘New Left’ [ref. Madeleine Davis, NLR etc.] and a certain theoretical (and generational) import from continental socialism/s which added to and heightened - across the party – attention to deeper social and economic analyses [ref. S. Hall etc.]. This was accompanied by a widespread increase in academic interest and academic involvement in the party, and the revitalisation of the Fabian Society, and later a range of thinkers (refs Lukes, Marquand etc.) who would quite radically ‘update’ party thinking in the 1980s (ironically, from the right of the party); and
later still the emergence of a range of new ‘Think Tanks’ associated with or close to the party.

The second effect – and our fifth point - of the party’s doctrinal richness yet eclecticism was also paradoxical in that it intensified, usually at major moments of change, doctrinal clashes within the party. As we noted earlier, although doctrine in its overall volume and quality is intellectual, philosophical, and rational, it has informing all of it myths, legends, and symbolism from other narratives (we shall develop this idea below) and the extremely strong influence of ethics; in relation to the ‘call’ of radicalism, one strong feature (a rhetorical resource but also often a challenge) was the constant idea of ‘return’ to truths lost. [Talk about trade unions [ref Pelling]] . This often takes the ‘practical’ form of urging the party to return to its original purpose (defending working people, or the gains of the twentieth century – welfare, the NHS) but the notion of return also has a strong semi-mystical, religious connotation. This means that a strong feature of leftist rhetoric is that it must always go back to justify going forward, seeking out the doctrinal (and mythical) ‘sources’ (like tributaries and upstream headwaters of a river) of its legitimacy. [ref. ER ‘Past rhetoric]

Sixth, and relatedly, the British left was influenced a great deal by non-conformist Christianity. This means that part of its ideational frame is ferociously ethical and transcendental, and two of its strongest rhetorical devices are the idea of earthly justice as a celestial imperative and some form of ‘deliverance’ for the just in the future, and society’s, the party’s even, having, as we mentioned above, somewhere deviated (often through foolishness of greed) from the ‘true path’. [refs] These are, however, not only ‘devices’ but ways of seeing the world, part of its ‘ideology’, ultimately optimistic (in contrast to most rightist ideologies), collective (with a tendency to idealise), and with a tendency to millenarianism. Having said this, Methodism – in its social convictions was
(and is) no cakewalk, and its prescriptions – and therefore input – are morally and therefore rhetorically very assertive. [refs]

Seventh, in terms of party conflict this (mythically-informed) doctrinal conflict has traditionally taken two polarizing rhetorical forms, the first important rhetorically though trivial politically, a kind of tug-of-war between right and left (this is universal in left parties particularly), the second much more important doctrinally and arguably, over the long term, rhetorically.

The first was perhaps best illustrated in the recent past in the UK by the phenomenon of ‘Bennism’ in the 1980s and 90s – the influence and rhetoric of Tony Benn – whereby the main rhetorical device was essentially moral, evangelical even; that is to say that factional conflict took moral form, e.g. ‘we are more radical, more courageous, more moral; you are complicit, dazzled by false idols, and in collaboration with the forces that would deceive and dominate the people and ‘the Good’’ (this still informing the party strongly today) [ref. BL + the ‘Common Good’ group + ref. Militant/ nb too how moral indignation informs all ‘wings’ of the party]. The reverse of this, its rhetorical opponent really, has in the UK had only a muted lyricism (Crosland? Hattersley ? refs). Far more rhetorically eloquent has been its continental versions as can be seen in the thought of leftist thinkers like Jean Jaurès or Léon Blum with his distinctions between ‘the conquest of power’ and ‘the exercise of power’, and his huge textual output [refs]. It does, however, in any populist setting carry the rhetorical disadvantage of its ‘reasonableness’, and even of its ‘caution’ (e.g. Blum and problem of support for the Spanish Republic).

A second rhetorical form has characterised the party over the last decades, namely the idealisation of pre-war Labourism, post-war Labour, or else New Labour. In one sense, the second two came first. The post-1945 settlement, a
state-driven, national social democracy was dominant, then very gradually contested, and then replaced by New Labour (Crosland acted as kind of bridge between the two). New Labour had its own lyricism and mythology; ‘One Nation’, for example, was a term used by Blair [ref], but was ‘modern’ in its diminished stress upon idealism (here, Neil Kinnock (leader 1983-1992) was the bridge; and he also used the term One Nation [ref. MW-J]). Old Labour had become a very pejorative term – stressing beer and sandwiches, back-room bargaining, and trade unions who by the 1970s were beginning to be decried nationally, certainly by the increasingly influential media [ref Red Robbo etc]). Old Labour was seen as in part responsible for the national lurch to the right in and after 1979 and the development of ‘Thatcher’s Britain’. New Labour found its justification in addressing this problem in Labour’s ‘wilderness’ years (1979-1997). There is always, however, more continuity than appears given in large part the shared past and shared values. Nevertheless, Blair’s task was easier in that his rhetorical adversary - Attlee – was a long way in the past, and he, Blair, offered the left a return to power; Miliband, although with the rhetorical advantage of depicting New Labour as a rightist ‘deviation’, was the leader of the party which had just lost power (and this after three consecutive victories).

However, when Ed Miliband took the leadership in 2010, neither of what we might call these ‘discursive strains’ or discursive reservoirs was available to him, the former (‘1945’) because it was now somewhat archaic in post-privatisation UK (although could probably have been rescued to rhetorical advantage); the latter because it had become tarnished in the dying days of Gordon Brown’s premiership and, internally, since the Iraq war, in Tony Blair’s premiership. Besides, new leader, new narrative.

Eighth, Miliband’s leadership also demonstrated that leaders, especially new leaders, need a narrative (we shall go into the quite complex reasons for this in
our own case study in chapter N – say here that given celeb pol etc this now v complex phenomenon). What Miliband did was to reach back to an earlier Labour Party doctrine of pre-World War II Britain, in many ways a near-Arcadian Britain of small communities, mutualism, cooperation, and local life, doctrinally ‘filled out’ with philosophical input from thinkers such as G.D.H. Cole [ref. to ER ‘pamphlet wars’] – plus refs to 1979-2010 and neo-liberalism. [ref. PQ art]); and a discreet ‘updating’ by using some of the ideas of German social democracy – regional banks, contributive financing of public services, a better relationship with business, especially small and medium-sized firms, and so on.

To sum up our points, Labour has a doctrinal tradition which constitutes the ‘world’ of its rhetoric, and because of the nature of rhetoric and its related doctrine, the rhetoric in turn fashions and shapes doctrine: a strong trade union connection which has in the past been a driving resource, less pertinent now but still rhetorically ‘available’; a long and eclectic intellectual tradition; a pragmatism and ‘reasonableness’; a ‘New Left’ influence from the 1960s which has informed analysis; doctrinal ‘clashes’ often organised around intellectual and sentimental allegiance to ‘1945’, ‘Third Way’, or latterly an earlier pre-war socialism; a strong Christian tradition which strongly underpins the ethical register in leftist rhetoric; a national ‘vocation’ and the characterisation of a range of imagined social ‘models’ (how society should be organised); and finally, an associated and rhetorically penetrating – and possibly infinite range of myths and legends linked to the wider myths bristling throughout the social doxa – often in the form of stories ‘I met a man the other day who told me about growing up in the East End before the War…’; myths and stories relating to courage and heroism, solidarity and sacrifice, kindness, fortitude, justice and deliverance. It is Labour discourse’s traditional proximity to this prevailing
mythology, as well as its fundamental optimism as a philosophy which lends it its potential (not always rhetorically fulfilled) as a compelling national rhetoric.

*Rhetoric, Leadership Performance, and the Left*

The case of Miliband (and Blair as a good example and Brown as a bad) and several of our case studies illustrate an issue we raised earlier, namely, performance and its relation to rhetoric. In one sense rhetoric has to be performed in order to be. But in Miliband’s use of it (his finest hour, the 2012 Manchester Party Conference speech) we can see how structure and agency interact through performance, and in the 2012 case how Miliband used the doctrine and mythologies of the past, and by personalising them (*ethos*) and arguing (*logos*) and ‘emotionalising’ (*pathos*) his rhetoric, projected a performed leadership image of himself that was a triumph [ref G&O]. It is arguable that the failure to develop this interactive trio after the 2012 conference led to a further decline in his popularity.

There are two further factors to consider when looking at the rhetoric and performance of the left. The first we alluded to earlier, which is that although it remains a rich resource, particularly in terms of its resonance within the party and the Labour movement generally (and is still of great interest to researchers, political philosophers, and intellectuals), it has lost much of its significance beyond the party, given the passing of time, changes in social structure, and in party membership, party allegiances, and party life generally, and in the economy, and the cultural (and rhetorical) changes in British society and, it has to be said, the left’s own failings and sometimes often lack of imagination. It is as if the interrelationship between the British left and a prevailing national political culture and values has seen the former, the left, drift away from the latter, from around the 1970s onwards. New Labour and Blair’s popularity in
the 1990s saw a reversal of this decline, but also a reversal in Labourism’s doctrinal intensity. The second factor concerns leadership persona itself.

It is clear that New Labour accepted many of the reforms brought in by the Thatcher period, and this to the extent that New Labour was seen by parts of the left as Thatcherite or at least complicit in an overall neo-liberal agenda and, more importantly after 2010, could be depicted by Milibandites in the post-2010 period (even though he had been part of New Labour) as a kind of second phase of neo-liberalism (1997-2008) after Thatcherism (1979-1997). But our essential point regarding the projection of leadership is that the person, the persona herself, Margaret Thatcher, also dramatically influenced Labour’s rhetorical identity; and for us this is more important politically than the idea of New Labour extending Thatcher’s neo-liberalism [ref. Finlayson believes opposite Renewal art.??]. She was a rather bizarre ‘character’ in herself, in many ways a throwback, even in Conservative Party terms, to the 1950s, and the way she spoke was caricatural in the extreme; but her persona and perceived character traits were projected into the public sphere, enhancing a revived version of, while distancing her from, traditional conservative doctrine through – paradoxically - making her ‘political self’ in many ways ‘unpolitical’ (e.g. her appearance on the Jimmy Young show on Radio 2 [ref], her depiction of the economy as a kind of housewife’s (her?) budget). No leader had done this before in the modern period [ref. cf. Walpole, Wellington, Disraeli, L-G], namely, projected their character into the public domain to such political effect (except perhaps Wilson in the 1960s to a certain extent on the left and, exceptionally, Churchill in the late 1940s, because of his war role, on the right). Blair did not copy the Thatcher character (not at all – he, in fact, jumped, at least, a generation in terms of rhetoric and style), but he did copy its underlying elements: relationship to/distance from traditional party, public performances of a particularly – even populist – kind [ref. Finlayson, A. (2002). ‘Elements of the
Blairite Image of Leadership’. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 55(3), pp. 586-599.] self-referencing, and a new sensitivity – from Neil Kinnock onwards – to PR and ‘communication’; and all of these having a profound long-term effect upon both the Labour Party and Labour leadership (in particular upon Brown’s premiership and Miliband’s party leadership) and upon their relationship to the party’s doctrine and rhetoric.

It is arguable, as Finlayson has argued [ref workshop], that after Blair, the party somewhat lost its way on this question of the performance of leadership character. Brown was a catastrophe once he took the premiership in 2007 (and a phenomenon deserving of much more research than the 9 o’clock quarter-back received wisdom of the media and others [refs. Books/arts on GB]) but, for Finlayson, Miliband’s leadership, on the contrary, was focused upon ‘image’ (and not very successfully) and not enough upon forging a character through incremental policy elaboration (a logos as that which ethos speaks about). [AF true?]

Leadership became more of a focus for ideological dispute during and after Thatcher’s premiership, both in political parties and in the wider culture. So, ethos came to have a different kind of weight from this period onwards. Labour politicians arguably made a strategic mistake in trying to cultivate successful, fully formed images – focusing too much on the image of the leader ‘as leader’, and thus divorcing acts and actions of leadership from the image of the leader, particularly as he – or rather, this image – was more and more contested in parts of the party and disparaged in the media; this faltering, through focusing, begins with Neil Kinnock who – again paradoxically, in an effort to address the situation – was reacting to Michael Foot’s poor leadership image. We can see, however, a real disarray informing Miliband’s leadership in terms of the proper interplay of Aristotle’s categories. In many ways, Blair had shifted the
relationship between the leader’s ‘character’ and the party narrative, but the left generally has reflected very little upon this phenomenon, emphasizing either policy positions or leadership image rather than the relationship between the two, and how their interaction might help to constitute the ‘map’ of Labour rhetoric and its performance. The result has been quite a lot of rhetorical and strategic confusion.

It is true that from 2010 Labour attempted to create a new narrative in order to provide a sense of identity to its post-New Labour departure. Narratives of renewal are by their nature critiques (of other narratives), and the One Nation narrative was itself both uniting and divisive. Its very title is an act of reconciliation, and it united the party to a great extent; but it was divisive within the Shadow Cabinet and between the new intake of MPs and older New Labour MPs – in the immediate term One Nation enhanced Miliband’s image, but over time it faded as a prominent theme, and became less useful in bolstering his leadership. It was also problematic as regards Scottish, Welsh, and Irish identities. Centrally, however, for many reasons [ref JG book] it lacked rhetorical power.

One Nation was relatively successful within the party at a particular moment, drawing together disparate ideas and offering Miliband a particular voice and relationship to the party’s doctrinal narrative. However, Miliband’s rhetoric revealed a series of tensions – he needed to convince the people, convince the party, and convince the party that he could convince the people – in contrast to Blair who had to convince the people that he could convince the party to change. Itsel itself a unifying theme, by definition, it was a personalized version of the narrative development that had been taking place since 2010 (just before, in fact [ref PQ art]. It was constructed around the ideas of inter alia Jon Cruddas, Jonathan Rutherford, and Maurice Glasman, a reaching back to an earlier
communitarian socialism. It was only marginally supported by most of the shadow cabinet: Ed Balls, Yvette Cooper and others, never mentioned it. It was also an implicit criticism of New Labour. Miliband failed to develop One Nation with a clear set of ‘One-Nation-related’ policy proposals, so that by 2015, Miliband’s own One Nation’s ‘rally discourse’ had dwindled to virtually nothing.

A further issue beyond the creation of a party narrative and its relation to the leader is the question of aligning it with or projecting it towards the wider public (nb. Martin’s ‘projectiles’). As Martin has remarked ‘Who is the narrative trying to please? Who is it for?’ [ref. workshop]. So ideally, both ethos and logos of the political party use pathos for outreach and for aligning logos and ethos with wider preoccupations outside the party in the wider public. It is arguable that alignments, like Baudelairian ‘correspondances’ [ref.], namely, ideas that imply one another in a myriad of ways – in sound, writing, meaning, association, context etc – but in so doing move ‘up’ towards higher levels of meaning and understanding - had existed from 1945 to the 1970s, but then began to ‘disconnect’ for a range of reasons both outside and inside the party, and because of evolutions in the nature of doctrine and the demands of leadership.

The personification of a political leader or stress upon the character of the leader can be a statement about what an ideology or doctrine is and involves the notion of the leader ‘embodying’ the party. It can also increase admonition, particularly on the left – e.g. Blair’s approach was antithetical for many to what it meant to be a socialist (as were, for some, Attlee’s, Gaitskell’s, Wilson’s, Callaghan’s, and so on). Even looks can have relevance here; the iconic case being Che Guevara and his stunning embodiment of Latin American revolutionary socialism; but this prevails throughout politics. Nye Bevan
‘looked’ (and sounded like) the embodiment (and the voice) of post-war leftist populism. Attention to this aspect of leadership is seriously under researched.

The idea of having a narrative raises the question of which narrative and its relation to party doctrine on the one hand, and the Aristotelian categories on the other, the relation of the party’s 2015 narrative, for example, to its historical ‘doctrinal narrative’ and the ‘performance’ of this. If there was a disconnect, this was perhaps why the party was in such difficulty, because Miliband’s Labour had a narrative, but perhaps not a concerted deployment of logos, arguably not an ‘ideology’ for change (nor arguably a pathos to ‘illustrate’ it) – hence it had a story of the need for change, but not an action-orientated programme for change, and this, in part, because its ‘purpose’, to distance itself from New Labour, did not place an equal emphasis upon what, in policy terms, it would replace it with. This, apart from doctrinally, was a major strategic miscalculation.

Over and above this, however, there is the wider question of the Labour Party’s disconnect with the wider ideational frameworks within society. This has arguably become an increasingly chronic issue over the last thirty years or so with changing social structures, social attitudes, attitudes to the political class, and changes in the composition of the political class itself, the doctrinal challenges of Europeanization and globalization and the shifting of the conditions, content, and structure of political rhetoric, and of shifting social attitudes to political rhetoric and ideology.

More recently, Labour in part became entrapped by two difficult questions. It outlined a narrative of change but became rhetorically constrained putting it into (rhetorical) practice first because, quite simply, it is difficult to do so, but also because calling for certain kinds of change (e.g. challenging the markets, greater
state intervention in the redistribution of power and wealth) was too associated with ‘Old Labour’ and what we might call an ‘ideological party persona’ that the party was striving to get away from. This raises the question of identifying audience, and identifying not only what an audience wants from political rhetoric but also what a rhetoric ‘wants’ from its audience (i.e. how rhetoric wants its audience to imagine it imagining its audience). Often people ‘want’ ideology in that it helps in the ‘recognition’ of policy, and it would be easier to recognise if a policy was articulated as an ideology (‘we will protect the NHS because…’) [ref. ER or KD? Workshop]. However, talking ‘to the people’ with ‘common sense language’ has become problematic for Labour as it now has difficulty formulating a realistic conception of ordinary people (and a rhetorical/ideational conception of them), with a resulting stilted rhetoric because ‘the public’ as imagined, does not map onto ‘the public’ in reality: what is or rather who is a ‘hard-working family’? Who are ‘the vast majority of the British people’? And so on. This is not only an issue for the left but across the political spectrum, but it raises the question of who the audience is in the rhetoric, and what the rhetorical effects of this are in terms of aligning an imagined audience and the rhetorical ‘imagining’ of a ‘real’ audience.

In the 2010-2015 period, Stewart Wood, a close advisor to Ed Miliband, [ref. 1 Nation QMC conf/PQ art] argued that the party had a great number of policies, but even by the 2015 election campaign, there was little public sense of a policy ‘package’ beyond the defence of the NHS. [ER Policies, moreover, can sometimes be arguments in themselves – there is little evidence that narrative is needed first (?), policies can speak for parties. + use of emotionalism ideological. Redo.ER ref and ask] What happened was the creation of a new One Nation narrative and, in 2012, its interpolation as a personal narrative by Ed Miliband, so that he became its principal author. Rhetorically, this was very astute and effective [ref. G&O art]. However, given the problems surrounding
One Nation which we identified earlier, the rhetorical follow through, a policy-driven *logos* repeatedly given *pathos* and ‘voice’ (literally) by Miliband did not emerge decisively, did not occupy the discursive and rhetorical space of the party (as it had, in contrast, around François Mitterrand in the French Socialist Party in the 1970s, or around Tony Blair in the early 1990s). This partial exploration of Aristotelian categories meant that the success of One Nation was itself only partial.

Analysis could take the classic texts of the Labour Party and do a doctrinal and rhetorical analysis of these texts – e.g. look at Hardie, Lansbury, Tawney, Crossman, etc. – and configure the arguments (in both an epistemological and in Martin and Finlayson’s characterisations of the term) made by these thinkers and examine how a kind of doctrinal cosmology has been established, how they are used by subsequent politicians, but *also* how they are underpinned, rhetorically and ideationally framed, in fact by myths, legends, dispositions and the ‘dark matter’ we identified, and in particular – often related to this - the things implied and the things that cannot be said; for ideology is also about what is sayable and what is unsayable – and sometimes it is not clear what is not acceptable until it is said [ref. JM workshop]. But if we take into consideration the *actual* ‘philosophy’ of the left, we can also identify the ideational underpinnings which have strong rhetorical resonance, irrespective, or over and above, or rather alongside, or rather intertwined with doctrine and philosophy but which are informed by myths and dispositions and have become part of the *practico-inert* of and for Labourism. From that point of view, namely the mixed perspective of Labourism as both a doctrinal ‘cosmology’ and a mythology, we can characterise the ‘conditions of its performance’ thus:

- UK leftism is fundamentally an optimistic ideology (but it has constantly to ‘propose’);
• Its attitude to leadership is muted and negative (and its understanding partial);
• British leftism is British, English even for the most part - with, as regards its origins, a strong Welsh and Scottish discursive source; but is not ‘continental’ to any significant degree (with the exception of its presence in European institutions which have had effects);
• It has a ‘Mission’ (to right wrongs), and its rhetoric is infused with ethics, even righteousness (which can turn in on itself and deploy – often destructive – notions of ‘betrayal’);
• Its ‘humour’ is based on caricature/derision of its opponents. It is quite archaic, but is given subtlety and a contemporary flavour through personal humour – e.g. at the conference fringe, or, for example, through self-deprecation by Miliband (e.g. recounting funny encounters with members of the public);
• It has a dual concern with (and tension between) the State and the local. This is a real dual rhetorical resource but can become a site of internal conflict;
• It is Christian in much of its ethics and Christian ethics underpins much of its moral thrust;
• It is reformist (and this sometimes in a near-Reformation Protestant sense). Today, social Catholicism informs the supporters of the ‘Common Good’ revival in and close to the party;
• It is Millenarian (this co-exists with its pragmatism);
• It is sometimes rhetorically insurrectionary (this is present rhetorically although now non-existent in practice);
• There are many doctrinal strains within Labourism, but it is always preoccupied with the Old, the New, New Times [ref JA], Renewal, finding the true (original) path, and ‘The Journey’;
• The lack of a clear *direction* is part of a constant condition if not flaw of Labourism, and it is difficult to negotiate and renegotiate the constraints and demands of markets and impose a leftist social project upon, without seriously undermining, capitalism.

• It is (rhetorically) committed to and informed by Feminism (of both ‘middle class’ and ‘workerist’ types and registers), and anti-racism, anti-disablism, etc.;

• It would have itself ‘politically correct’, has rules and conventions (and therefore rhetorical no-go areas – the immigration debate poses real problems);

• It embraces the Collective, the Welfare State, State Education System (undermined by some of its prominent leaders using private education) and Modernisation (‘1945’ Labour and New Labour particularly);

• It would have itself morally (and technologically, practically etc.) exemplary;

• It is imbued with legends and myths (from a range of sources – national, religious, fairy-tale, chivalric, *inter alia*) which inform its doctrine and, by extension, its rhetoric.

**Section 3) The Chapters (summaries of/how fit together)**

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1 This Chapter owes much to a day workshop on 16 September 2014 on ‘Voices of the UK Left’ hosted by the Aston Centre for Europe and funded by the Leverhulme Trust as part of a wider project on the UK Labour Party. The workshop comprised Judi Atkins, Kate Dommet, Alan Finlayson, John Gaffney, Amarjit Lahel, James Martin, David Moon, Emily Robinson, and Ben Worthy.

2 One thinks of ‘My name is Jimmy Carter and I’m running for President’, or Obama when a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2004, and of de Gaulle in 1940 (he was completely unknown). Or Nick Clegg in the 2010 TV Leaders’ Debates.
Irish and Scottish songs about the homeland and return are highly charged with sadness and powerfully emotional, e.g. ‘My Ain folk’ or The Proclaimers’ ‘Letter from America’.

References to follow