ABSTRACT Many European countries have recently implemented civic integration programmes. This kind of policy requires that newcomers meet integration requirements in order to enter, reside, enjoy social benefits or naturalise in the host country. Migrants are expected to attend language and citizenship courses and/or to take tests after entering in the host country. The immigrant’s failure or non-completion of the programme tends to be sanctioned by refusal of a permit, financial penalties, a loss of social benefits, etc. The content and structure of these programmes vary widely in terms of scope, goals, target groups and institutional actors involved. In this paper, I deal with some crucial questions raised by such policies through the lens of political theory. First, what can be expected from newcomers, in terms of culture, language or skills? Second, I will show that it is relevant to reverse the point of view and to ask: what can be expected from the “old-comers” in order to integrate newcomers? What is the role of the citizenry in making (new) citizens? The question is especially important because integration has been increasingly presented as a ‘two-way process’ or as a ‘contract’ between the host society and the immigrants: what does it mean and imply? Third, the mandatory language and country-knowledge requirements are particularly significant in their scope and substance. Such a situation raises new challenges to liberal states that should find a balance between policies seeking social cohesion but being also respectful of the immigrants’ moral autonomy.

Introduction

Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are all examples of European countries that have implemented civic integration programmes. The diffusion of civic integration courses, requirements and tests for newcomers reveals a convergent trend in immigration integration policies. This kind of policy requires that newcomers meet integration requirements in order to enter, reside, reunite with their families, enjoy social benefits and naturalize in the host country (Kostakopoulou 2010). Migrants are expected to attend language and citizenship courses and/or to take integration tests after entering in the host country (since 2006 the Netherlands, pioneers in the
field, have implemented tests to be taken before and in the home country of the migrants) (Bonjour 2010). The immigrant’s failure or non-completion of the programme tends to be sanctioned by refusal of a residence permit, financial penalties, a loss of social benefits, etc. The content and structure of these programmes vary widely in terms of scope, goals, target groups and institutional actors involved. This diversity mainly derives from the different historical backgrounds, societal models, political context (for example, right-wing vs. left-wing majorities) as well as patterns and traditions of migration flows. Beyond the factual analysis of the content of civic integration programmes, my purpose is to analyse some crucial questions raised by such policies through the lens of political theory. It is a good opportunity to question the conceptual frame underpinning the contemporary civic integration discourses and policies.

Indeed, the examination of these civic integration policies raises crucial questions. First, what can be expected from newcomers, in terms of culture, language or skills? Moreover, the mandatory language and country-knowledge requirements are particularly significant in their scope and substance (Goodman 2010, 2012). Such a situation raises new challenges to liberal states that should find a balance between policies seeking social cohesion but being also respectful of the immigrants’ moral autonomy. Second, I will show that it is relevant to reverse the point of view and to ask: what can be expected from the “old-comers”, in fact the insiders, in order to integrate newcomers? The question is especially important because integration has been increasingly presented as a ‘two-way process’ or as a ‘contract’ between the host society and the immigrants: what does it mean and imply? The immigrants, the political leaders and the citizenry face a lot of challenges in order to ensure the civic integration process: how to engage newcomers with the political process? Today, civic integration policies are so widespread that it seems useful to realise a more risk-oriented analysis. In order to do so, my paper will highlight the challenges and the dangers of civic integration programmes that the immigrants and the citizenry could face.

This paper is divided into three parts. In the first section, I discuss the very notion of integration and its implications. I distinguish especially two main issues related to this concept. Next, the second section is devoted to an analysis of some concerns about the content of such programmes but also about the consequences of their binding character. Finally, I reverse the point of view on the integration debate with a focus on the citizenry responsibilities and duties, in order to answer to the two main issues highlighted in the first part of my paper. In conclusion, this paper aims at analysing the implications of the deep changes experienced by

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1 See, as instance, the analysis of the relation between naturalisation and integration policies in 29 European states: Huddleston and Vink 2013 (RSCAS PP 2013/15, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies - EUDO Citizenship Observatory).
European integration policies. Beyond the understanding of these issues, a broader reflection on the concepts of citizenship, immigration, integration and boundaries is proposed.

1. Integration: an unquestioned mantra toward immigrants?

Recently, several political leaders (Merkel, Cameron, Sarkozy, etc.) insisted on the need to emphasize citizenry and society common features rather than stressing differences, and to acknowledge the importance of integrating newcomers in the liberal culture of their host country. These European, current or former, leaders point to the crisis of multiculturalism, and express doubts about multicultural models of immigrant integration. The fast development of civic integration programmes and the increased requirements are part of the same tendency. In a same way, “integration appears to be a natural choice for political actors interested in maintaining national unity and system stability” (Kostakopoulou 2010: 945-946).

A major question concerns the notion of integration. In fact, the problem of what integration exactly encompasses and implies has always been at the core of social sciences (and even more as far as migrants’ integration is concerned). Conceived as a sociological concept at the beginning (see, for instance, Durkheim who considers integration as an attribute of the society itself\(^2\)), the current ambiguity of the term “integration” is more related to the fact that it is, most of the time, associated to immigration issues and with a strong normative orientation (Rea 2000: 13-35). According to scholars, the problems related to this concept mainly derive from the presuppositions and the expectations hidden behind its compulsive use when it concerns migrants. Moreover, the notion of integration belongs to both the political and sociological language (Schnapper 2007: 11). Generally, the observation, developed in the social sciences about the nation-building process is that integration is progressive and complex and often exceeds the scope of individual voluntary action (Gellner 1983, Anderson 1991, Noiriel 1996, Schnapper 1998, 2003 in Balint and Guérard de Latour 2013: 6).

With the current political discourses on integration policies, a new kind of assimilationism could be discerned. Brubaker (2001) already argued under the title “The return of assimilation”, that the massive differentialist turn of the last third of the twentieth century may have reached its peak, and that one can discern signs of a modest “return of assimilation”. If the concept has been transformed, as underlined by Brubaker, “normatively, it has involved a shift from the automatic valorisation of cultural differences to a renewed concern with civic integration” (Brubaker 2001: 242). In her work, Adam distinguishes four ideal-types of integration configurations:

\(^2\) Les théories de Durkheim (1858-1917), que ce soit dans La division du travail social (1893), Le Suicide (1897) ou Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse (1912), s’intéressent à cette question : par quels mécanismes les individus sont-ils intégrés à la société (Boudon Bourricaud 1994: 200) ?
interventionist assimilationism, laissez-faire assimilationism (or universalism), interventionist multiculturalism and laissez-faire multiculturalism\(^3\) (Adam 2013a; 2013b).

As this “integration” or “assimilation” notion has become so widely diffused and, to some extent, now looks like an unquestioned mantra toward immigrants, it seems useful to interrogate this concept. I will underline two main critics that I will interrogate and further develop in the paper (see the third part about the host society responsibilities).

Firstly, as underlined by Freeman, the terms (as incorporation, integration and cognate terms) used to discuss it are unavoidably value-laden: “they imply direction and intentionality, that immigrants should be incorporated into the societies to which they move, that this is a one-way process, and that the host society remains relatively unchanged if incorporation is successful” (Freeman 2004: 946). Accordingly, Seglow argues that the problem of the idea that migrants should assimilate or integrate themselves, or enjoy the particular ethos of their host community, lies in the fact that it presupposes that immigration would necessarily result in destabilizing or disrupting the national host culture rather than simply changing it (Seglow 2007: 156) In my analysis, this argument refers to the “one or two way process dilemma” and could be called: the reciprocity problem.

Secondly, Joppke and Morawska stress that the concept of “integrating migrants” assumes the subjective idea of an already-integrated receiving society “composed of domestic individuals and groups (as the antipode to immigrants) which are integrated normatively by a consensus and organizationally by a state” (Joppke Morawska 2003: 3). In their view, any vision of unity or any discourse advocating integrated societies is inherently subjective and false. Modern society should rather be thought as a whole, composed by multiple and independent fields or systems in which actors are only partially engaged. This argument leads to the question: integration into what? This debate is related to the very definition of the current of future - existing community and refers to the reference problem.

2. What can be expected from newcomers?

Regarding integration or assimilation, something is happening, whatever the term used or its exact meaning. Indeed, “civic integration policies express the idea that successful incorporation into a host society rests not only on employment

\(^3\) She argues that the degree of state intervention (interventionist versus laissez-faire) considered necessary to achieve the objectives of assimilationism (cultural homogeneity) or multiculturalism (cultural diversity) is a heuristically relevant distinction of cultural integration policies (Adam 2013b).
(economic integration) and civic engagement (political integration), but also on individual commitments to characteristics typifying national citizenship, specifically country knowledge, language proficiency and liberal and social values\(^4\) (Goodman 2010: 754). The scope of the incorporation is becoming increasingly wide and implies more and more aspects of the individuals’ life. This broadening raises a series of questions on how to justify it. By the way, more that just a political and economic incorporation, it requires knowledge of the language and institutions of the host country and emphasizes the need for shared values. In brief, the purpose of civic integration policies is usually explained in this way: on behalf of the state, to encourage and to assess the ability of a would-be citizens to take part in the political community; on behalf of the immigrant, it is a proof of his willingness to learn some political and cultural facts about the host country, and most likely a wish to participate in the community’s social, economic and political life (von Busekist, Boudou 2015\(^5\)). The problem is that the accurate study of those requirements looks like a Pandora-box – as I will try to demonstrate. The question is so broad that I will focus myself on some main dimensions in order to underline the difficulties and risks related to these programmes and their citizen-making purpose.

2.1 Concerns about the content of civic integration programmes

Let us first deal with the content of civic integration programmes. An important part of these programmes concerns language requirements, training and testing. As underlined by von Busekist and Boudou (2015), it is possible to theorize the role of language in at least four respects: “the relationship between language and economic integration (the utilitarian perspective); between language and the public culture of the host country (a more substantive or axiological perspective), between language acquisition and political rights (parity of participation); between acquisition of language skills, self respect and a significant realm of choice (the good life perspective)”. The situation could be tricky when different language dimensions and perspectives are present and inextricable. For example, it makes sense to encourage\(^5\) newcomers to learn the language of their new country in order to participate to the social, economic and political life. Nevertheless, in specific contexts, language is also a marker of identity (see the case of multinational states, as Belgium or Canada) and the issue becomes more complex. Consequently, the arguments used to justify civic integration programmes could be diversified but have


\(^5\) Again all the discussion concerns a question of degree and the difference between “to encourage” and “to force”. See the following part.
to be clarified (the instrumental\(^6\) perspective has nothing to do with the good life perspective; it could be dangerous if political leaders deliberately use utilitarian arguments in order to promote, more discreetly, a good way of life – moreover, in the case of languages, see all the debate about standard-language and the potential domination processes around it).

With regard to the institutions, the people in the receiving society have a legitimate interest in maintaining most of their institutions and practices. It could happen through the need to present and to explain those institutions and habits. To a considerable extent, it is reasonable to expect that immigrants will learn how things work in the receiving society and will conform to these formal and informal norms (Carens 2005: 44\(^7\)). In this perspective, liberal states may expect prospective citizens to consent to liberal democratic ideals and to participate, to some extent, in public life. The danger can come from the formalization of these norms and their translation into effective programmes. The balance is fragile between an assimilationist model of integration that grounds membership in the internalization of a common culture and a differentialist (communautarian) model that gives precedence to local community allegiance over shared political principles and identity. This is even more the case as fare as the so-called “shared values”\(^8\) are concerned. It is obvious that learning standards and values is problematic because it is particularly difficult and challenging to explain those concepts, which vary across contexts and even people.

More generally, about the concern on how to make citizenship: does the accumulation of factual information about the language, history, institutions, values, and ways of life foster ‘shared belonging’? Moreover, the question is even more pressing when it concerns civics examinations: is it possible to find evidences that formal history and civics examinations are accurate measures of the competencies required for citizenship?

\(^6\) I would rather call it “instrumental” than “utilitarian” (as presented in the von Busekist and Boudou’s classification) because the specific connection with utilitarianism seems vague: in fact, parity of participation might also be a way to improve newcomers’ utility.

\(^7\) He repeated the same argument in 2010: “It makes sense to encourage immigrants to learn the language of the place where they have settled. It is also good to make it possible for immigrants to learn about how things work in their new home, and to learn about common practices and attitudes, the country’s history and traditions, and so on, so long as this is designed to make them feel welcome and comfortable in an unfamiliar environment rather than as a way to pressure them to conform”, Available on http://eudo-citizenship.eu/citizenship-forum/255-how-liberal-are-citizenship-tests, 6 January 2010.

\(^8\) About this, a publication from the Government of Flanders declares: “Next to knowledge and skills, values and standards also assume a central place. It is paramount for persons integrating to be aware of the values and standards on which multicultural Flemish and Belgian society is based.” (Inburgering: integration courses in Flanders and Brussels, 2010, p. 6).
2.2 Concerns about the mandatory character of civic integration programmes

Second, we need to tackle the compulsory character of integration programmes. Obligation has progressively become the rule in a majority of European states (Carrera 2006; Guild, Groenendijk and Carrera 2009; Goodman 2009, 2010). Although those policies are quite recent in Europe, most scholars agree that compulsory language and country-knowledge requirements are increasingly significant in their scope and substance. “Integration” is presented as an immigrant obligation in order to be included and to have access to the different dimensions of the host country: enter, obtain temporary or permanent residence, have access to social benefits, etc. It is a first major feature to be underlined: those policies are linked to a large set of different dimensions and not only to citizenship, as it was the case in the past. For instance, countries require migrants to meet integration requirements in the form of language and civic orientation classes and tests in order to have access to social benefits, such as unemployment benefit, social assistance, or public housing. If citizenship could be considered as the most inclusive degree of the society and, as a consequence, may justify specific duties and certain knowledge, the debate is quite different with the other dimensions like access to the country, residential permits, social benefits, … A set of sanctions has also been implemented: financial penalties in case of failure or non-completion, refusal of permit residence, exclusion from social benefits. This specific development gives a new dimension to the debate.

Firstly, beyond the factual question as to what exactly is compulsory, and leaving the comparative and detailed factual analyses aside (Goodman 2010, 2012; Michalowski 2011; Michalowski, Van Oers 2012), it is useful to ask – from the perspective of political theory – what kind of obligations should be introduced in such compulsory programmes. In the context of this discussion, Carens, for instance, introduces a distinction between requirements, expectations and aspirations because, on the one hand, “there may well be forms of adaptation that

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9 A lot of scholars have already discussed the fairness of requirements related to citizenship (see, as instance, Wilcox 2004, Joppke 2010) but here the debate concerns a broader scope.

10 As instance, in Flanders, if a person required to follow the integration program does not attend them on a regular basis, the reception office has a duty to inform the authorities, which may impose administrative fines (from 50 to 5,000 euros). Statistically the participants of such programmes are mainly newcomers who have to follow it – more than two thirds of participants in 2010 (De Cuyper Lamberts Pauwels 2010: 9).

11 At the beginning of his paper, he specifies:

“A requirement is something that is formal and explicit. For example, states may specify conditions that must be met before immigrants obtain certain legal rights or before they become citizens through naturalization. An expectation is a norm that is enforced through informal social sanctions rather than legal mechanisms. For example the public officials or ordinary citizens in the receiving state may have
it is reasonable to expect of immigrants without constructing those expectations as requirements”, and, on the other hand, “one may hope for and even encourage certain forms of integration without using these as standards” (2005: 39). To sum up, it is one thing to consider that citizens ought to understand something, quite another to make this knowledge a legal prerequisite. There is a difference of degree between encouraging, expecting and requiring people to acquire certain sorts of knowledge or competencies.

Secondly, even if we assume that the compulsory nature of the integration policies is justified, there is an additional limit to consider. It is necessary to distinguish two kinds of obligations; indeed, the obligation can concern the means or the outcome. For example, it is not the same to require that, on the one hand, newcomers participate to civic integration courses (obligation of means) or, on the other hand, that they take and pass formal exams (obligation of outcome)12. The implementation of a compulsory process demands that the requirements are made clear and explicit. The risk is that such programmes hide over all aspirations or hopes behind legal prerequisites.

According to Joppke (2012), the challenge for liberal states is to strike the right balance between policies that are aggressive enough to further social cohesion, yet restrained enough to respect the moral autonomy of immigrants. Obviously it is a very sensitive equation. On the one hand, scholars have criticized the cultural assimilation as something that stands in opposition to the principles of modern liberal democracies. On the other hand, Joppke has described integration requirements as a form of ‘repressive liberalism’: repressive because they are obligatory and can restrict access to permanent residence or citizenship, and “liberalism because the goals pursued are those of liberalism and largely comparable with other obligatory but ‘capacity-enhancing’ (Joppke 2010) measures proposed by European welfare states’ (Michalowski 2011: 750). Some scholars insist on a kind of paradox of liberalism: “liberal states, in order to preserve what they perceive as a liberal regime, are resorting to illiberal means to guarantee liberal values” (Orgad 201013). This discussion is difficult, as there are many traditions expectations about how immigrants should behave or how they should adapt culturally, and, if these expectations are not met they may be critical of the immigrants even though no formal sanctions follow. Finally, public authorities or citizens may have hopes about the ways in which immigrants will integrate with the receiving society without thinking that these aspirations are enforceable in any sense, even through informal social sanctions” (Carens 2005: 30-31).

12 An interesting legal debate is going on before the European Court of Justice (about the two kinds of obligations, and especially the difference between “integration measures” and “integration conditions” in the European law), see the reference for a preliminary ruling: P and S, C-579/13.

13 See the EUDO debate again - Liav Orgad: Five Liberal Concerns about Citizenship Tests. For her part, Kostakopoulou is really critical about the situation and stressed in this discussion:
within liberalism itself. Which sorts of accommodations or settlements amongst immigrants are most consistent with liberal-democratic norms of justice and freedom, and which settlements would be unjust and in violation of liberal-democratic norms?

Thirdly, it is interesting to complete the overview and to look at very concrete cases in order to question the compulsory character. For example, in Belgium, a study shows that “compulsory” measures could have a counterproductive effect on the integration (De Cuyper 2010). For instance, NGOs and representatives of minority groups believe that it would be preferable if this programme did not have an obligatory status but was maintained and strengthened in its optional form. According to them, making it obligatory brings no real added value but rather stigmatises those required to attend it, giving the impression that they would be able to integrate only if they were obliged to do so. Moreover, in some cases, the obligatory courses do not fit in with the constraints which may affect some of the people required to follow them, particularly who have difficult working hours or dependent children.

“individuals should be valued, not evaluated and tested; should be respected, not presumed to be deficient, backward or inferior; should be encouraged to feel ‘at home’ in their new country, not discouraged or selected; and should be allowed to get on with their lives without having to conform to elites’ perceptions of what it means to be a ‘good citizen’ or how to be a national – perception to which a large number of autochthonous ‘citizens’ would fail to conform”.

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3. What can be expected from the citizenry?

The purpose of this section is to show that it is also relevant to reverse the point of view of the integration debate and to ask: what can be expected from the “old-comers” in order to integrate “newcomers”? What is the role of the citizenry in making (new) citizens? These questions are especially important and crucial because integration has been increasingly presented as a ‘two-way process’ or as a ‘contract’ between the host society and the immigrants: what does it mean and imply?

The idea that I would like to explore is the following: let’s assume that the “new” immigrants take part in (and successfully pass if it is required) the civic integration process, what are the problems that they could face? Or, in other words, what are also the commitments needed by the host society in order to succeed in integrating immigrants? To answer to this question, I will come back to the two main problems related to the integration concept, as highlighted in the first section of this paper: the reciprocity issue and the reference issue.

Finally, I use the notion of “old-comers” deliberately to oppose it to the term of newcomers. Indeed, integration programmes are mainly dedicated to newcomers, in other words people who arrive in a new country as immigrants themselves. Nevertheless, important questions about the integration of immigrants concern also the situation of the “old-comers”, which are the nationals (even if they did not really “come” in the country if they are born there). To be clearer and use a more fitting vocabulary, we can distinguish the “outsiders” (the newcomers) and the “insiders” (the citizenry, whatever if they are nationals by born or former immigrants).

3.1 The reciprocity issue

In this section, I would like to discuss the concept of reciprocity. What may immigrants reasonably expect from the receiving society (the insiders) and what may the receiving society reasonably expect from them (the outsiders)? Today, integration is framed, at least in official discourses and official documents, as a ‘two-way’ process or a contractual agreement between migrants and the host society. For example, the principle of integration as a two-way process of mutual accommodation between migrants and the receiving societies lays at the foundation of the EU framework on integration. Carens also argues that “the integration of

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14 There is a big difference regarding the mandatory civic integration programmes: due to European law protection, they could only be dedicated to newcomers from third-countries and not to citizens of the European Union.

15 It is important to underline that we are not discussing an immigration issue. Even if I call them “outsiders”, they have a legal right to enter and to stay in the host country for a long time.

16 “EU cooperation on the integration of non-EU nationals has developed since the Tampere Programme was adopted back in 1999. The Common Basic Principles for immigrant
immigrants depends upon a process of mutual, but asymmetrical adaptation and that is precisely because the immigrants have to adapt more that the receiving society bears a greater responsibility to take steps to promote equality between the immigrants and the existing population” (Carens 2005).

Let’s look more concretely at the contractual form because the basis of a contract is reciprocity. The idea of a contract is sometimes fictive (and used, as instance, in the rhetoric around integration) but sometimes it is real and civic integration implies the establishment of a contract. For example, in France, a “Welcome and Integration Contract” (Contrat d'accueil et d'intégration) has been implemented\(^\text{17}\). Austria, Denmark and Luxembourg also use integration contracts, which immigrants have to sign in order to obtain a secure residence status. Kostalopoulou carefully examines a set of essential characteristics\(^\text{18}\) that, according to her, a contracting relationship necessarily implies the four following features: first, contracts ordinarily presuppose a party’s freedom to enter into a contractual relationship; secondly, contracts require the existence of an intersubjective understanding among parties – they are bilateral; thirdly, contracts imply the recognition of the right to negotiate; the final characteristic of any contract is that, under normal circumstances, performance is something within the parties’ competence and control (2010: 950-952). She compares these characteristics to the terms of civic integration contracts in Europe and she rules against the existence of a real reciprocity or contract: “under close scrutiny the above mentioned assumptions prove untenable” (2010: 953). For example, about the bilateral characteristic, she writes: “Migrants do not have the power to contest, negotiate, refuse or change their terms and non-compliance carries very heavy sanctions; namely, non-renewal of residence permits, deportation, unsuccessful naturalisation and fines” (2010: 951). She also underlines that is to due to the fact that ‘integration’ is a long term process that cannot be subsumed under a contract of a few years duration and also due to the fact that ‘integration’ is not a thing-like entity that can be delivered in an all or nothing manner (2010: 953).

Finally, we can go even further in developing and thinking the reciprocity issue with this argument: if we are increasingly demanding with immigrants, it is also

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integration policy, agreed in 2004, provide a strong framework for policy-making in this area. They underline the importance of a holistic approach to integration and aim, inter alia, at assisting EU States in formulating integration policies”. See the Common Basic Principles: "Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of EU countries." Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 1 September 2005 – A Common Agenda for Integration – Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union.

\(^\text{17}\) Loi relative à l’immigration et à l’intégration, No 2006-911 of 24 July 2006.

\(^\text{18}\) She takes into account five main characteristics, I choose to only quote four of them because I am not convinced by the fourth.
necessary to be more demanding with the host citizenry. The need for reciprocity reminds to the citizenry and the state that, even if integration depends of asymmetrical adaptation, it implies mutual adaptation and that the receiving society bears a responsibility in immigrants’ integration. On the immigrant side, in addition to learning a new language, adapting to a new culture, finding a job, and starting a new life in a foreign land, they must now successfully pass integration programmes and examinations. On the citizenry side, accordingly, the society should increase the status of immigrants that have follow and pass a civic integration programme. It is a lead to explore: can we consider a “meritocratic” integration pattern? In this model, the focus is more on the immigrants’ side and on their efforts – which are underlined and appreciated. Indeed, if integration becomes a very difficult path, which requires knowledge, commitment and success, it could offer a higher status to citizens who have followed this demanding integration process – like a symbolic recognition or reward? Even more, those who follow an integration program voluntarily, actually providing more effort than individuals becoming citizens only through ius soli, could be rewarded (in the way converts are welcomed in some religions).

3.2 The reference issue

The integration debate raises as well the question: integration into what? A big assumption implicitly carried by discourses about integration seems to be: a stable society considered as coherent, unified and homogeneous. Nevertheless, the receiving society is clearly not always “composed of domestic individuals and groups (as the antipode to immigrants) which are integrated normatively by a consensus and organizationally by a state” (Joppke Morawska 2003: 3). As a consequence, the identification of the reference-society (the group to which the immigrants have to adapt or accommodate) is a crucial question, that has two key aspects: the first relates to the very definition of the existing community, while the second has to do with the never-ending migration process.

First, the implementation of civic integration programmes raises important issues with regard to the definition of the political community and its determining features. In other words, it implies a definition of the demos (that could be broad or restrictive) and, sometimes, a definition of the ethnos (as integration relates more

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19 See the work of Entzinger and Dourleijn and their sociological survey, De lat steeds hoger (2008): it concludes that the host society, the natives / the “insiders”, always “raise the bar” and, as a consequence, the immigrants / the “outsiders” can never feel themselves as integrated.

20 According to Bauböck (2014), the demos is a voluntary association of citizens who enjoy a collective right of self-determination, and membership is based on a mutual agreement to associate.
and more to language, culture, common values, etc.). We should also ask: how and what is really the reference population: the majority? the elites?

The reference issue implies a (re)definition of citizenship because civic integration policies reflect the type of citizenship a political community is advocating\textsuperscript{21}. The current focus on immigrants’ integration should not outshine an other very important political debate about the definition of our community and the ways to enhance political participation (and integration) of all citizens. To stretch my point, how to share something with immigrants if the citizenry does not share anything? If the welcoming society is segmented, to which part have immigration to integrate? Is the contract the same for ‘ordinary’ citizens?

Second, the trend of global migration also challenges the mainstream views of integration: there is no ‘final destination’ anymore. Integration policies should take this into account. For example, civic integration programmes concentrate themselves on newcomers but a lot of integration problems concern previous flows of immigration and settlements. Migrant incorporation is a long, complex and multifaceted process. The tests or civic integration policies could give the illusion that the problem is solved after passing the test or completing the program. Quite the contrary: all the knowledge may be forgotten a few months after the courses or the test. In that way, it is also important for the society to secure the adaptation for the second and third generation in a way that enhances their opportunities.

\textsuperscript{21} See the work of Ricky van Oers (2010) who distinguishes three types of citizenship (\textit{liberal citizenship}, \textit{republican citizenship} and \textit{communitarian citizenship}), and analyses how tests embody one or the other.
Conclusion

This paper analyses the political and ethical implications of the deep changes experienced by European integration policies, and offers a broader reflection on the concepts of integration, immigration and citizenship. I argue that the current diffusion of civic integration programmes is a good opportunity to put forward a more risk-oriented analysis. More than ever, “integration” has become an indeterminate concept, which can be highly ambiguous and leave discretionary power for public authorities. Integration has become a “chameleon-concept” and, today, in Europe, all these questions are and key questions remain very sensitive: What can be expected from newcomers? How to ensure the civic integration process? How can liberal states find a balance between policies seeking social cohesion but being also respectful of the immigrants’ moral autonomy?

I do not intend to paint a too-gloomy picture of the situation. Some positive aspects of inclusiveness regarding civic integration programmes have to be underlined. Citizenship testing and integration programmes can enable a government to establish clear criteria and demonstrate what it feels important for new citizens to know, while maintaining a transparent procedure; like in the case of a rite of passage (Klekowski). It could be considered as a “capacity-enhancing” measure proposed by European welfare states, similar to what is already in place in the field of employment policies. States are using civic integration policies to promote individual autonomy and common values for newcomers, in order to make them participate in the welcoming society and join the polity. Nevertheless, this paper shows that the way/the path can be tricky.

To conclude, I would like to highlight two important aspects about the challenges of civic integration.

On the one hand, in this paper, I deliberately focus my analysis on the citizenry. Too often, only the state and the immigrants are taken into account in order to evaluate the integration process. The classic framework about the purpose of civic integration programmes is the following: on behalf of the state, to encourage and to assess the ability of a would-be citizen to take part in the political community; on behalf of the immigrant, it is a proof of his willingness to learn some political and cultural facts about the host country, and most likely a wish to participate in the community’s social, economic and political life. But in my view, it is also important to add another term at the equation: the citizenry. These three variables must be studied in order to discuss the pros and cons of civic integration programmes in Europe, namely: the state, the immigrants and the citizenry. The latter, i.e. the ‘insiders’ of the welcoming society, also bear a responsibility in the integration success, in the short and long term.
On the other hand, critical scholars have demonstrated that integration is increasingly being transformed into a questionable one-way process in which the responsibilities or duties are placed exclusively on the immigrant's side (see, for example, Carrera Guild Groenendijk 2009; Carrera 2009). In a Foucauldian vision, Carrera wrote: “what is behind the term ‘integration’ is in fact mandatory assimilation or acculturation into the receiving society. Integration thus becomes the non-territorial (functional or organisational) border dividing the « inside » and the « outside », who is in and who is out, who has rights and who has only obligations” (2006: 6). The problem if these assumptions are true is that integration is based on unfair terms, because under an illusion of inclusion, the real purpose is exclusion. In a more fair perspective, if countries want to contain immigration flows, they should use explicit instruments of immigration control to regulate the size of the host society and not integration policies. The danger is that too often civic integration programmes and tests are actually meant to have positive side effects on European opinions, generally hostile to immigration. The instigators of civic integration programmes should respect an imperative of honesty, and should avoid to use civic integration programmes in a biased way, in order to only reassure the citizenry. These policies should be aimed at including newcomers, at helping them to become citizens and be considered as ‘insiders’.
Bibliography


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