Intra-camp Electoral Competition and Electoral Performance
in Authoritarian Regimes:
Evidence from Hong Kong Legislative Elections from 2004 to 2016

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Abstract:

Autocrats enhance their electoral performance through various measures such as electoral fraud and machines politics. Yet, not many works address how autocrats use electoral competition to enhance their electoral outcome. This article argues that pro-government political parties improve electoral performance through coordinated and moderate electoral competition. In contrast, political opposition suffers from losing their seats from uncoordinated and more severe competition. Using the data of Legislative Council elections in Hong Kong (2004 – 2016), we show empirically how intra-camp competition manifests itself in the pro-establishment and pro-democracy camps, and how it affects the electoral outcomes. In addition, we study how the pro-establishment camp uses electoral coordination to contain its internal competition and improve the camp’s overall performance.
Introduction

This article examines an overlooked side of electoral competition in authoritarian regimes — how pro-government political parties compete with each other in electoral arena and its consequences. We argue that *inter-camp electoral competition* — pro-government political parties compete with the political opposition — is not the only form of electoral competition in authoritarian regimes. *Intra-camp electoral competition*, that is, competition between candidates of the same camp, such as pro-government political parties and the political opposition, can also exist. This article challenges the conventional idea of highly cohesive pro-government coalitions in authoritarian regimes and provides a more dynamic picture of authoritarian politics. The consequence of intra-camp electoral competition between pro-government candidates is that it improves the overall electoral performance of the pro-government camp through coordinated and moderate competition. In contrast, intra-camp electoral competition between the oppositional candidates weakens the electoral performance of the opposition camp through uncoordinated and more severe competition.

Authoritarian regimes setup democratic institutions such as elections and legislatures to enhance regime durability and survival through mechanisms such as power-sharing (Magaloni 2006; Svolik 2012) and cooptation (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Reuter and Robertson 2015). Autocrats seek to “reap the fruits of electoral legitimacy without running the risks of democratic uncertainty” (Schedler 2002, 37) and thus they mimic democratic elections by engineering their unique form of authoritarian elections. To control elections, Schedler’s seminal work *The Menu of Manipulation* (2002) has outlined at least seven possible ways of how autocrats control the elections and secure victories and dominances, such as reserving the centre of power off from
electoral pressures, exploiting the incapability of the political opponents, censoring the voices of opposition camps, controlling the composition of the electorate, machine politics, electoral fraud, and blocking democratically elected officials from assuming offices. Because of these highly controlled nature of authoritarian elections, some see that genuine contested elections do not exist in authoritarian regimes, for example, as seen in Alvarez et al’s (1996) classification of authoritarian regimes in which contested elections is by definition missing there (also see Kono 2015). Some students of authoritarian elections challenge this thought. They believe that authoritarian elections can also be competitive and thus proposed new labels such as competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2002) and hybrid regimes (Diamond 2002). Levitsky and Way (2002; 2010) argue that the political opposition in authoritarian regimes can occasionally defeat the autocrats through “four arenas of democratic contestation” (2002, 54) — the election, the legislature, the judiciary and the media. In brief, recent advances assert that competition can meaningfully exist in authoritarian elections, and these studies emphasize that electoral competition comes from the political opposition.

To examine the effect and consequence of intra-camp electoral competition, this article provides empirical evidence to support these arguments with the case of Legislative Council elections in Hong Kong from 2004 to 2016.

In the following, before proposing testable hypotheses and approach to study intra-camp electoral competition and its consequence in authoritarian regimes, we will first draw insights from the literature of electoral competition that are largely based on
democracies. Then, we will discuss the role of intra-camp electoral competition in authoritarian regimes that is largely overlooked in the literature.

**Electoral competition**

Since election is a competitive game by vote shares, electoral competitiveness can be defined as the “degree of uncertainty in the outcome of an election” (Blais and Lago 2009, 94). Imagine in an election of a single-member district – only one candidate with the most number of votes can win – with three candidates competing. If the winner takes ninety-five per cent of the votes and the other two get the remaining, the outcome of the election is very certain and thus it has very low competitiveness. Imagine, for the same district, rules and candidates, now that the winner takes only thirty-four per cent of the votes, and the other two each get thirty-three per cent of the votes. The margin of victory is only narrow to one per cent in this scenario. This election is said to be very competitive and close because each of the three candidates has similar chance of winning.

Most discussions of electoral competitiveness are developed on democracies rather than authoritarian regimes (Flanigan and Zingale 1974; McDonald and Samples 2006; Murillo 2009; Blais and Lago 2009; Kayser and Lindstädt 2015). Competition is embedded in the spirit of representative democracy. Many theorists in representative democracy always highlight the role of competition in democracy. Joseph Schumpeter’s classic work *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (2013) defined the process of selecting public choices in democracy as a political competition for the individual votes, and regime liberalization facilitates such process. Robert Dahl’s (1973) famous notion of polyarchy highlighted the role of contestation between
political actors as an indispensable component of true democracy that inspired many subsequent theoretical and empirical works on democratization and hybrid regimes. Adam Przeworski (1991) asserts that the outcome of democratic process is uncertain because various competing political forces organized to promote their own interests and values, and through competition, democracy “is a system in which parties lose elections” (1991, 10). These notable works suggest that democracy and electoral competitions coexist.

If electoral competition is essential to the existence of democracy, it raises a question of whether competition would exist in non-democracies or authoritarian regimes. Early works in authoritarian regimes assume that elections are highly controlled in these regimes and thus authoritarian elections are not competitive (Alvarez et al. 1996). This assumption fails to capture the varieties in authoritarian regimes. Scholars in authoritarian regimes and democratization argue that competitions exist in authoritarian elections and documented numerous examples of how autocrats could be defeated by the political opposition (Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002; 2010; Bunce and Wolchik 2010). A genuine electoral competition could bring threats or defeats to the regimes. It exists either because the political opposition can effectively organize themselves and challenge the status quo of the autocrats in the electoral arena (Howard and Roessler 2011; Wahman 2011), or because the autocrats strategically allow the presence of electoral competitions to favour their ruling durability by means of boosting the ruling legitimacy (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Case 2008; Svolik 2009), elite management (Slater and Simmons 2012; Morgenbesser 2014), acquiring relevant information for policymaking (Chan and Zhao 2016; Baumgartner et al. 2017), and overcoming the institutional uncertainties (Schedler
Recent advances in the literature show that meaningful electoral competitions from the political opposition could exist in authoritarian regimes, and it could be beneficial to the longevity of the political systems.

This article argues that intra-camp electoral competition in pro-government camp can exist in authoritarian elections, which is rarely addressed in the literature. The existence of electoral competitions does not necessarily lead to the divide of the elite coalition. In fact, as this article will show, electoral competition could potentially enhance electoral performance and help the coalition to secure power. Apart from electoral performance, promoting intra-camp electoral competitions has at least three advantages. Firstly, competitive pro-government camp can give an image of openness by allowing their supporters a chance to choose who to support within the spectrum of pro-government parties. This logic is similar to why autocrats allow opposition to run their electoral campaigns and it enhances the legitimacy of authoritarian elections (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009).

Secondly, political parties are key to “establish linkages with voters necessary to identify supporters and to monitor their behavior” (Magaloni 2006, 20). Through competition among pro-government parties, it reflects who or what do the supporters prefer among the pro-government choices. It reflects a signal to the autocrats what the pro-government supporters want, and consequently inform the autocrats what and how to react better. This is similar to how Western democracies constantly monitor public support and invest their attentions and resources according to the voters’ preference (Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Bertelli and John 2013). Given that autocrats suffer from information disadvantage (Chan and Zhao 2016) — the illiberal
environment that they create constrains their ability to acquire information — inter-camp electoral competition is an important source of information to test out how much support they can get with an acceptable portfolio of pro-government choices and reduce the institutional uncertainties (Schedler 2013).

Thirdly, intra-camp electoral competition is an important tool to enhance elite management and performance. To maintain ruling longevity, autocrats need a team of fully capable and loyal politicians and bureaucrats (Magaloni 2008). Schatz’s (2009) comparative study of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan highlight the importance of leaderships and administrative resources in maintaining a successful authoritarian government. Similarly, the success of Singapore’s People’s Action Party attributes to its party and elite management (Means 1996) and is a notable example for other authoritarian regimes. Through intra-camp electoral competition elections, elites compete through launching electoral campaigns, formulating popular political discourses and demonstrating leaderships and personal qualities. Elections allow voters to promote more popular candidates and eliminate poor ones. Intra-camp electoral competitions help autocrats to maintain a team of elites and politicians with higher qualities.

This section discussed the idea of electoral competition in democracies and authoritarian regimes. We also argue that electoral competition among candidates in pro-government camp can exist in authoritarian elections and highlighted their functions and importance. In the following, we outline three testable hypotheses related to electoral competitions in authoritarian regimes for further analysis.
Hypotheses

This article argues that intra-camp electoral competition exists not only in the opposition camp, but also in the pro-government camp in authoritarian regimes. These two types of intra-camp competition, however, are very different. Successful autocrats and the elites coalition are usually institutionalized with formal organizations and good administrative power – recall Schatz’s (2009) comparative study of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and Means’s (1996) study of People’s Action Party in Singapore. In contrast, many of the political opposition are less institutionalized. According to Mancur Olson’s (1965) classic collective action theory, institutionalization and coordination are costly. It is a big challenge for leaders to tackle free rider problem. In authoritarian regimes, autocrats and elites have much stronger political power and possess far more resources than the political opposition does (Wong 2014). Because of better institutionalization and access to resources, therefore, autocrats and elites are thus more likely to be more coordinated than the opposition (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Jenkins 1983). Wahman (2014) has also documented the low level of electoral coordination among the opposition in Africa. Therefore, the first hypothesis states that:

H1: Intra-camp electoral competition is more moderate in pro-government camp than in opposition camp.

Election is a strategic game. To success, it requires a good level of strategic entry (politicians coordinate who participate in the election) and strategic voting (voters coordinate who to vote to) (Cox 1997). Therefore, prior to the election, reducing the number of competitors and forming cohesive coalitions are key to success in elections. We argue that autocrats have coordinated the candidates better than the opposition
does. With higher level of coordination, pro-government camp is more likely to perform better in elections. Thus, the second hypothesis states that:

H2: Electoral performance of pro-government camp is better than that of the opposition camp.

Data and method

Hong Kong Legislative Council elections

To test each of the hypotheses, we use longitudinal design using the panel data from the past four Legislative Council elections of Hong Kong for empirical analysis. We compiled the election data of the Legislative Council elections in 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016. All data can be downloaded from the website of Hong Kong’s Registration and Electoral Office (http://www.elections.gov.hk/).

Hong Kong’s Legislative Council elections contain two main constituencies, namely, functional constituencies and geographical constituencies (Ngok 2012; Yip and Yeung 2014). Each of these two constituencies contains thirty seats (thus a total of sixty seats). The purpose of functional constituencies is to accommodate professional interests of various sectors in Hong Kong, such as finance, labour, insurance and tourism, and the constituencies also contain members from District Council, Hong Kong’s local council. Since 2012, additional five seats were added to functional constituencies. Candidates of these five seats have to be the members of district council and nominated by other members of district council. Then, they will be elected by popular votes by all eligible voters in Hong Kong. Even so, the number of electorates of majority of the functional constituencies is very small – many of them
have only about hundreds and only a few of them are over a few thousands. Because of the small number of electorates, functional constituencies can be easily controlled by Beijing and the allies (Loh and Civic Exchange 2004). Some of the seats of functional constituencies are uncontested. However, for the purpose of this article, we only look at geographical constituencies that return the seats by popular votes.

Geographical constituencies cover five main geographical locations in Hong Kong, namely, Hong Kong Island, Kowloon East, Kowloon West, New Territories East and New Territories West. Candidates are elected by popular votes by all eligible voters in each of these five geographical constituencies. The seats are returned by proportional representation (PR) using the largest remainder method and the Hare quota, which tends to favour smaller party. In 2004 and 2008, there are thirty seats in total for all five constituencies. Since 2012, additional five seats are expanded resulting a total of thirty-five seats.

To study intra-camp electoral competition, one key problem is to disentangle inter-camp and intra-camp competition. Election is a dynamic game that involves multiple political parties or candidates of different camps. Competition among candidates of pro-government camp and the opposition could change the electoral strategy of each camp and alter the dynamic of intra-camp competition. Hong Kong provides an exceptional case to isolate the effect of inter-camp competition. In Hong Kong, pro-government camp is usually called pro-establishment camp. The opposition camp had long been labeled as pro-democracy camp. However, in recent years, new opposition parties such as the radical pro-democracy camp and localist camp were rising and some of them are elected as lawmakers of the Legislative Council. Thus, we adopt the
label of opposition to include the wider spectrum of all opposition parties. In the past four Legislative Council elections, the vote share between pro-government camp and the opposition remains stable as shown in table 1. Over the years, pro-establishment camp received votes share of about thirty-eight per cent to about forty-two per cent. In the same periods, the opposition camp received vote share ranges from about fifty-seven per cent to about sixty-one per cent. With this stable vote share between the pro-establishment and opposition camps over the years, it provides a good approximation to assume that the dynamic of the inter-camp electoral competition is by and large stable.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ESTABLISHMENT</th>
<th>OPPOSITION</th>
<th>NEUTRAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>38.08%</td>
<td>61.92%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>40.69%</td>
<td>59.31%</td>
<td>2.18%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>42.93%</td>
<td>57.07%</td>
<td>5.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>42.37%</td>
<td>57.63%</td>
<td>5.49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Proportional of vote share by different political camps.

We will discuss the operationalization of electoral competitiveness and electoral performance in the following.

*Electoral competitiveness ratio*

Even though electoral competitiveness is a prevalent topic in political science, there is no coherent conceptual framework across different electoral systems or for cross-national comparison due to the hefty variations between electoral systems (Kayser and Lindstädt 2015). As mentioned, we follow Blais and Lago’s (2009, 94) definition of electoral competitiveness: the degree of uncertainty in the outcome of an election. The advantage of this definition, as the two authors demonstrated, is that it is
transferrable to PR system. In a latter work, Kayser and Lindstädt also define electoral competitiveness with similar concepts and coined it as “electoral risk” — expected probability that the plurality party in parliament loses its seats plurality in the next election (2015, 243). We agree with these authors and we believe the degree of uncertainty of an authoritarian election and the chance of losing can happen in authoritarian regimes.

A common measurement of electoral competitiveness is the margin of victory or closeness — the difference in the number of votes between the winner and the first runner’s up (Cox 1988; Cox and Munger 1989; Endersby, Galatas, and Rackaway 2002). This operationalization, however, is not applicable to PR system, because there are multiple candidates competing for multiple seats. Use an election of two seats with four political parties with very close margin of victory between the first two parties as an example, the difference in the number of votes between the first and second placed parties may be irrelevant to the electoral competitiveness, because they could both be the winner in the election.

Thus, to measure of electoral competiveness of PR system, we need a good measurement tool. Greater number of candidates competing in the same district may lead to a more competitive election, but it is not necessarily always the case. Some candidates could get very low number of votes and these candidates have no chance to secure a seat in the election. They are not competitive, and are not regarded as an “effective candidates” (Laakso and Taagepera 1979), meaning that their presences do not alter the outcome of the election. In contrast, candidates that receive large portion
of votes are effective candidates. Their presences add competitiveness to the election and have higher chance to change the electoral results.

Yet, as mentioned, PR system has “many contests going on simultaneously” (Blais and Lago 2009, 97) because there are multiple seats open for contestation at the same time. Even there are many effective players in a district, it does not necessarily imply the election is competitive, and indeed, it can be non-competitive. For example, assuming that there are five seats open for contestation among ten candidates. However, only five of which are effective candidates and they equally share ninety-five per cent of the votes while the other five receive only five per cent of total votes. In this election, each of the five candidates can secure a seat safely without any uncertainty. This election is non-competitive. Therefore, electoral competitiveness in PR system is dependent on the number of effective candidates and the number of seats open for contestation. If the number of effective candidates is larger than the number of seats open for contestation, there is a higher uncertainty in the outcome of the election and thus the election is regarded as competitive.

Thus, in this article, we operationalize intra-camp electoral competitiveness in a geographical constituency as the effective candidate-seat ratio or competitiveness ratio (ratio of effective number of candidates and total number of seats open for contestation). We borrow Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) effective number of political party to calculate the effective number of candidates of a political camp and it can be calculated by $1/\sum p_{ij}^2$. $p_{ij}$ is the proportion of votes received by candidate $i$ of the same political camp $j$. Thus, intra-camp electoral competitiveness can be calculated by:
For which $N_j$ is the total number of seats won by the political camp $j$. If the ratio is below or equal one, it means that by and large each of the effective candidates of the same camp can be “allocated” with one seat. If the ratio is greater than one, it means that there are effectively more than one candidate competing for one seat in the same camp.

**Electoral performance ratio**

Electoral performance of a political camp, in the simplest form, can be measured by the total number of seats won by a camp. The more seat a camp won reflect the success they have made. However, one additional seat represents a certain number of votes, and normally the number is large. Solely looking at the number of seats fail to capture candidates’ effort to mobilize voters’ support. Alternatively, we propose to measure electoral performance with the vote-to-seat ratio (a ratio of the total number of votes received by a political camp to the total number of seats won by the camp). This measurement can capture how well the votes are utilized. The idea is similar to the idea of Anckar’s “wasted votes” (1997) – votes that cannot give a candidate or party a seat in the final seat allocation – but of the opposite. Lower vote-to-seat ratio means there is smaller number of wasted votes. Higher vote-to-seat ratio suggests that more votes failed to convert into a seat in the outcome of an election, thus more wasted votes.

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1 When the effective candidate-seat ratio is smaller than one, it means that one candidate may be allocated for more than one seat. In reality and indeed in Hong Kong's elections, more than one candidate can form a "candidate-list". Multiple candidates can join together can compete in the election.
Analysis and Discussion

Electoral Competitiveness

Electoral competitiveness represents the degree of uncertainty in the outcome of an election. More effective candidates compete for a smaller number of seats is seen as more competitive. Figure 1 shows the effective candidate-seat ratio of each political camp for each of the five geographical constituencies in the last four Legislative Council elections in year 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016. The circle points represent the pro-establishment camp, the square points represent the opposition, and the triangle points represent neutral camp – neither a member of pro-establishment nor the opposition. As noted in the data and method session, when the effective candidate-seat ratio is at one or below, competitiveness is very low. When the ratio is greater than one, it means that there are more than one effective candidate competing for a seat in the same camp.

Figure 1: Electoral competitiveness of various political camps. The size of the points represents the number of candidate-list for each camp in a constituency-year.
From figure 1, it shows that most values of effective candidate-seat ratio for the pro-establishment camp are at about one or below (fifteen out of twenty in total). Only the ratio of Hong Kong Island in 2012 (1.19), Kowloon West in 2008 (1.28), New Territories East in 2012 (1.66) and 2016 (1.62), and New Territories West in 2012 (1.24) are obviously larger than one (all calculated values are in appendix 1). It suggests that electoral competitions by and large very uncompetitive among candidates in pro-establishment camp. We can only observe limited and moderate competition in some occasions at competitiveness ratio ranges from 1.2 to 1.6, meaning that there are never two or more effective candidates to compete for a seat in pro-establishment camp. Severe intra-camp electoral competition is not observed in pro-establishment camp. There are, however, slightly upward trends over the years in intra-camp competition in pre-establishment camp, that can be observed in three constituencies, namely, Hong Kong Island, New Territories East and New Territories West.

Intra-camp electoral competitiveness in opposition camp looks a lot heftier than in pro-establishment camp from figure 1. Only in a few occasions, the value of the electoral competitiveness ratio is at about one or below (six out of twenty in total). Many observed value of electoral competitiveness ratio are obviously greater than one. Eight observed values are at around 1.5 or above. They are Hong Kong Island in 2016 (1.66), Kowloon East in 2008 (1.77), 2012 (1.95) and 2016 (2.32), Kowloon West in 2008 (1.45) and 2016 (1.49), New Territories West in 2012 (1.47) and 2016 (1.69). It reflects very severe competition among candidates in opposition camp, meaning that about 1.5 to 2.3 candidates compete for a seat is frequently observed in the opposition
camp. Notably, in each of geographical constituencies, there are clear upward trends, meaning that the intra-camp competition is getting more severe from year to year.

For neutral camp, as they never win a seat in the elections, all values of electoral competitiveness ratio of the neutral camp are at infinity (because the denominator is zero), except for Kowloon East in 2004 and 2008 and Kowloon West in 2004 because there were no candidates from the neutral camp.

In brief, figure 1 reflects that intra-camp electoral competitiveness in the pro-establishment camp is lower than that in the opposition camp in most constituency-year. It means competition in the opposition is more severe while that in the pro-establishment camp is more moderate. It provides evidence to support that there is a more careful and moderate coordination among candidates of the pro-establishment camp. This aligns with the expectation of H1.

Electoral performance

We measure a political camp’s electoral performance by vote-to-seat ratio – total number of votes received by a political camp divided by the total number of seats won by the camp. Figure 2 shows the vote-to-seat ratio of each political camp for each of the five geographical constituencies in the last four Legislative Council elections in year 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016. Appendix 2 contains the values of each of the vote-to-seat ratio. Similar to figure 1, the circle points represent the pro-establishment camp, the square points represent the opposition, and the triangle points represent neutral camp – neither a member of pro-establishment nor the opposition. As mentioned in the data and method session, when the vote-to-seat ratio is low, it means
votes are converted into seats efficiently. When vote-to-seat ratio is high, it means it requires more number of votes to secure one seat, meaning more wasted votes.

Figure 2: Electoral performance of various political camps. The size of the points represents the number of candidate-list for each camp in a constituency-year.

Recall that hypothesis 2 asserts that pro-government camp has better electoral performance than the opposition. In figure 2, pro-government camp performed better in eleven constituency-year out of twenty (by counting the occurrence of lower vote-to-seat ratio over the years). It seems that pro-government camp does not outperform that of the opposition. However, if we focus on the two elections in 2012 and 2016, pro-government camp performed better in seven constituency-year out of ten. It shows some evidences that pro-government camp has improved its electoral performance in more recent elections.
Again, as neutral camp has never won a single seat in the elections, all values of electoral performance ratio are at infinity (because the denominator is zero), except for Kowloon East in 2004 and 2008 and Kowloon West in 2004 because there were no candidates from the neutral camp.

A plausible explanation of why autocrats have improved electoral performance over the years is that pro-government camp has managed to maintain the level of strategic coordination and has strong and cohesive coalition (as shown in figure 1). In contrast, the opposition has suffered from increasing intra-camp electoral competitiveness over the years (again in figure 1). The consequence of this is that it results in an improved electoral performance by the pro-government camp (in other words, a worsened electoral performance by the opposition camp). The finding echoes with Schedler’s *The Menu of Manipulation* (2002) that the autocrats would take advantage of the weaknesses of the fragmented opposition camp.

**Conclusion**

Recent advance in authoritarian regimes suggests that competition can meaningfully exist in different “democratic” arena and the autocrats could be defeated (Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002; 2010). Surprisingly, little work has been done to examine intra-camp electoral competition, in particular, in pro-government camp, in authoritarian elections. Our article is one of the first to make such attempt.

In this article, we argue that moderate and coordinated pro-government intra-camp electoral competition could exist. In contrast, due to poorer institutionalization and insufficient access to resources, opposition camp suffered from coordination problem
(Olson 1965) and thus they face severe competition. The consequence of the difference in intra-camp electoral competition between the two camps is that pro-government camp can take advantage of the fragmented opposition. We have provided evidences with the case of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council elections to support the claims.

This research has profound impact to ongoing research on authoritarian elections and the electoral coordination. Conceptually, we identified the advantages of pro-government intra-camp electoral competition to the longevity of authoritarian regimes and explained why autocrats allow its existence. Methodologically, we contributed a novel way to examine the electoral competitiveness and electoral performance. We call for more research using cross-national comparison to examine electoral competition in the future.
References


Reuter, Ora John, and Graeme B. Robertson. 2015. “Legislatures, Cooptation, and


## Intra-camp electoral competitiveness ratio

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Political Camp</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Hong Kong Island</th>
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