Any room at the inn? The impact of religious elite discourse on immigration attitudes in the UK.

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Abstract
Over the last few decades, and epitomised by the discourse surrounding Brexit, migration in the UK and Europe has been framed as a security threat. To date, scholarship has marginalised the role of elite cues in shaping immigration attitudes. When included, the analytical net has been limited to political elites and political parties. Yet, other sets of actors have the potential to be equally influential in shaping attitudes. This paper employs mixed-methods to analyse the discourse of elite religious actors and attempts to uncover whether this discourse ‘cuts through’ and impacts on the attitudes of ‘their’ audience, in the UK during 2005-2015. The first part of the paper uses discourse analysis to explore the migration messages of the UK’s largest faith, Anglicanism. Preliminary results indicate that non-threat migration frames dominate. The second part of the paper uses data from the European Social Survey (rounds 3-7, 2006-2014) to conduct a regression analysis to gauge whether the elite discourse is ‘cutting through’. The preliminary findings indicate that greater exposure to elite cues, via attendance at religious services, is consistently related to more positive attitudes towards immigration, to a statistically significant degree. Across Europe, the inverse of this relationship is found. This lends support to the notion that, for their ‘flock’, the positive migration messages from the Anglican Church and Anglican elites are acting as a partial bulwark against the ubiquitous security-threat discourse of political elites. Overall, the findings from this paper imply that despite their previous marginalisation, in specific contexts, non-political elite actors have the opportunity and capacity to shape immigration attitudes and therefore de/construct issues of security.
Introduction
Across Europe, migration has become entrenched as a security issue (Bigo, 2006; Huysmans, 2000). In the UK, migration has been at the apex of the political agenda and was at the epicentre of the Brexit debate. Continent-wide, right-wing anti-immigration parties are making political gains, whilst in the UK, UKIP are enjoying unprecedented electoral and polling success. Amidst what has become a divisive and at times toxic debate on immigration, the importance of developing a nuanced understanding of how immigration attitudes are constructed is more pressing than ever.

To date, many individual-level and contextual factors have been explored as potential drivers of immigration attitudes (i.e. Quillian, 1995; Semyonov et al., 2004; Sniderman et al., 2004). However, the potential for elite cues to shape public attitudes has been marginalised. Elite cues have at times been explored as a factor in attitude formation in general, for example toward EU integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2005; McLaren, 2001). But as a propeller of immigration attitudes, attention towards the effects of elite cues has been minimal (Hellwig and Kweon, 2016). In the handful of studies that have included elite messaging in the analysis, cues have been shown to play a significant role in shaping immigration attitudes in specific contexts (Hellwig and Kweon, 2016; Jones and Martin, 2017). Yet, analysis has been limited to the political sphere, with a focus on political elites and political parties. This is despite other societal actors having the potential to wield considerable influence in the process of shaping public attitudes (Karyotis and Patrikios, 2010). Religious elites are one group which are likely to be highly influential.

Not only is migration now established in the ‘moral’ realm (alongside abortion and gay marriage) where religious elites and organisations are taking public positions (Knoll, 2009), the centrality of religion to identity imbues a substantial potential to shape attitudes (Wellman and Kyoto, 2004). Indeed, religion/religiosity has long been accounted as a key determinant of prejudice towards out-groups (Adorno et al., 1950; Allport, 1954). Moreover, religious elites possess an extensive quantity of cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1992) - especially for those who share their identity (Druckman, 2001; Slothuus and de Vreese, 2010) - meaning they have the possibility to generate strong framing effects. This is because, for those of faith, the authority of religious elites is transcendental in that their utterances can be viewed as direct interpretations of God's wisdom and desires (Lausten and Wæver, 2000). However, despite the majority of relationships connecting high religiosity with increased prejudice (Batson et al., 1993; Hunsberger and Jackson, 2005), findings lack uniformity and it is posited “we know relatively little about the impact of religiosity and the role of religious group cues in shaping attitudes towards immigration” (Ben-Nun Bloom et al., 2015: 218) – a lacuna this article attempts to fill.
With migration often presented through the lens of security (Doty, 2007; Huysmans, 1995), the theoretical framework draws upon and extends the Copenhagen School's (CS) Securitisation theory. Securitisation theory has been one of the most innovative and prominent attempts to understand how security issues emerge and dissolve (Karyotis, 2012). Rather than referring to something objectively ‘real’, security is argued to be socially constructed through discourse. For the issue of migration, qualitative studies (see Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002; Karyotis, 2007) have demonstrated that discourse has presented migration and migrants as threatening the core of societal wellbeing (securitising frames).

This article adopts a mixed methods approach, focusing on the migration messages of the Anglican Church and elite Anglican actors in the UK, from 2005-2015. Due to the context of Brexit and the prevailing threat-based messaging that has characterised political elite debate on migration, the UK has been selected as a critical case study (Yin, 2009). The Anglican Church has been chosen as the faith group most prudent to analyse due to 1) its position as the ‘established’ church, providing a formal role in Parliament as well as ensuring the Church and elite church actors are endowed with prominent public roles and platforms and 2) its numerical preponderance - 59% of UK residents identified as Christian in the 2011 census (Office for National Statistics, 2012), the largest constituency being Anglicans. This is a substantial minority cohort that has the potential to be significantly affected by elite messaging. Discourse analysis is used to determine the prevailing migration frames from the Church and church elites. Public opinion data is then employed to investigate the likelihood that, controlling for all other potentially relevant factors, discourse coming from religious elites has had an impact on ‘their’ audience.

The article proceeds in a series of steps. First, the theoretical framework will be outlined, drawing upon Securitisation theory as well as the broad immigration attitudes literature and scholarship that concentrates on religiosity and prejudice towards out-groups/immigrants. Second, the qualitative portion of the mixed-methods research design will be laid out, accompanied by a concise analysis of the prevailing migration discourse from the Anglican Church in the UK. The discourse analysis finds that the hegemonic frames from the Church and Anglican elites present migration as a non-threat (desecuritising frames). Third, the quantitative part of the research design will be outlined and the potential impacts of said discourse will be

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1 The 2011 UK census demonstrated that whilst 25% of the population of England and Wales identified as having no religion, 59% identified as Christian (Office for National Statistics, 2012). Somewhat different figures are given by The British Social Attitudes Survey (NatCen Social Research, 2011). Here, 50% of the population identify as having no religion. Yet, from the remaining 50% who are religious, Anglican (20%) constitutes by far the largest proportion (Roman Catholicism 9%, Non-Christian 6%).
explored using statistical analyses. The results suggest that greater exposure to the desecuritising cues from Anglican elites (using church attendance as a proxy) appear to impact in the expected direction. Last, the implications of the empirical findings will be discussed. Overall, the findings indicate that elite cues of non-political actors can be highly influential in the de/construction of security in terms of shaping public attitudes and that the adoption of mixed methods can be a fruitful addition to the arsenal of both securitisation and immigration/religiosity attitudes research.

**Theoretical Framework**

In recent decades, debates over the definition of ‘security’ between the ‘traditional’ and ‘new security thinking’ approaches have been at the epicentre of the sub-discipline of Security Studies (see Walt, 1991). Rooted in realism, the traditional state-military conceptualisation of security has been argued to be both too narrow and too shallow (Buzan, 1983). Securitisation theory, devised by the CS, has been one of the most influential alternatives in redefining security (Karyotis, 2012). The CS adopts a social constructionist approach: security does not refer to something objectively ‘real’ but is brought into being through discursive action (Buzan et al., 1998). Security is thus a “speech act” where “[b]y uttering ‘security,’ a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it” (Wæver, 1995: 55). The use of the word ‘security’ itself is not required. Instead, the CS states that “[w]hat is essential is the designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action or special measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience.”

With security constructed through discourse, the task of the analyst is to trace the discursive interventions of elite actors that attempt to frame an issue as one of security (a securitising move) or otherwise (a desecuritising move) (Buzan et al., 1998). Yet, despite the CS’s theoretical innovation, Securitisation theory suffers from several theoretical weaknesses – two of which are addressed in this study.

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2 Whether a successful securitisation requires emergency measures to be implemented or merely that they are “possible to legitimize” (Buzan et al., 1998: 25) (the CS at times state both contradictory positions) forms a key debate in securitisation research (Balzacq et al., 2016; Floyd, 2016). Whilst this article does not engage directly with this debate, using public opinion data to determine the impact of elite discourse may offer one way of conceptualising ‘success’. This would fit with attempts to theorise security as having different dimensions of success i.e. moving along a continuum from rhetoric to public acceptance and finally to emergency measures (see, for example, Roe, 2008; Salter, 2008, 2011; Vuori, 2008).
The first weakness of Securitisation theory is that there been an empirical overemphasis on traditional security actors (political and security elites) (Karyotis and Patrikios, 2010). Theoretically there are not any specific criteria one must meet in order to become a securitising actor. For Wæver (1995: 57) however, “[s]ecurity is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites.” This elite-centrism is rooted in the concept of ‘cultural capital’ (Bourdieu, 1992). It is postulated that elites possess greater quantities of cultural capital which is endowed via status, authority, or ‘expertise’ that acts to ‘legitimise’ security moves. The CS’s tendency to concentrate on political elites has been criticised and shown to have theoretical/empirical shortcomings (see Doty, 2007; Karyotis and Patrikios, 2010) and normative limitations (i.e. Hansen, 2000; McDonald 2008). For example, Karyotis and Patrikios’ (2010) study of the securitisation of migration in Greece demonstrated that religious elites were able to entrench the issue as one of security, despite contrary attempts from political actors. It is anticipated that religious elites are potentially powerful actors in the de/construction of security for two reasons.

Initially, the centrality of religion to identity imbues a substantial potential to shape attitudes (Brewer et al., 2010; Wellman and Kyoto, 2004). Indeed, religion has historically been accounted as a key determinant of prejudice towards out-groups (Adorno et al., 1950), whilst attitudinal conformity has been found to be prominent in Churches, as certain values are promoted at the expense of others (Wald et al., 1988). Second, the potential power religious elites have as de/securitising actors is also supported by the framing literature. Numerous empirical studies have shown that the source of the frame can significantly impact upon the strength of framing effects (Hartman and Weber, 2009; Joslyn and Haider-Markel, 2006). A central factor is whether the source is credible (Druckman, 2001). Yet, ‘credibility’ can be subjective – stronger framing effects are found when there is an ideological alignment between source and recipient (Slothuus, 2010). The stronger effects from partisan sponsorship may be rooted in ‘motivated reasoning’: individuals feelings toward the source (positive or negative) make them (more or less) predisposed to internalise the frame (Slothuus and de Vreese, 2010). These findings demonstrate the power that religious elites can potentially have on ‘their’ audience. Moreover, effects are stronger if there is a partisan conflict on an issue as powerful group identities are triggered (Slothuus and de Vreese, 2010). Whilst Slothuus and de Vreese’s (2010) study related to conflict between parties, in this study the prevailing frames of the Church are in conflict with the dominant societal discourse (i.e. all parties). Thus, invoking the group identity of Christians should make Anglicans even more likely to internalise the frame.
It is perennial question as to whether religion is a force of intolerance and exclusion (Brewer et al., 2010), a source of peace and unity (Little, 2007) or has a Janus-face (Appleby, 1999). Yet, studies that have sought to explore the role of religion and religiosity in shaping attitudes have produced mixed results. Reviewing the literature on religion and prejudice towards out-groups between 1940 and 1990, Batson et al. (1993) show that in 37/47 cases there is a positive relationship between religiosity and prejudice, whilst the inverse relationship arose twice. A more recent review from 1990-2003 also found the vast majority of relationships to be in line with this trend (Hunsberger and Jackson, 2005). For immigration attitudes in particular, findings are also somewhat mixed. Scheepers et al.’s (2002) cross-national study of attitudes towards ethnic minorities in eleven European countries found that in all cases the religious are more prejudiced than the non-religious (for similar results see Eisinga et al., 1990; McDaniel et al., 2011; Tolsma et al., 2008; Van Dalen and Henkens, 2005). In contrast, in a cross-national study on Euroscepticism, Boomgaard and Freire (2009) found that religiosity depresses anti-immigration attitudes. Similar effects were found by Lubbers et al. (2006) regarding opposition to the opening of Asylum Seeker Centres in the Netherlands, and Knoll’s (2009) analysis of immigration policy preferences in the U.S. Thus whilst the majority of literature shows religiosity to be associated with prejudice toward out-groups, including immigrants, the results are not uniform.

However, religion and religiosity are not unitary concepts. It has become widely accepted that ‘religion’ is a multifaceted phenomenon comprised of three components: Behaviour, Belief and Belonging, the ‘Three B’s’ (Smidt et al., 2009; Wald and Smidt, 1993). The social Behaviour element captures participation in organised religious communities, including church attendance. The Belief aspect refers to the framework of core beliefs, values and symbols that underpin the understanding of the ‘Devine’ and that particular religion’s God. The Belonging component is typically viewed to encompass membership of a major religious denomination/tradition, fostering shared values, beliefs, symbols and myths between adherents (Ben-Nun Bloom et al., 2015). The necessity of separating these different elements of religion is demonstrated by their differing effects on public attitudes (Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan 2012a, 2012b). Whilst studies and results have varied widely, relying on insights from Social Identity theory, the Behaviour and Belonging components are expected to trigger in-group-out-group discrimination and prejudice. In contrast, within all of the world’s major religious traditions, there can be found sections where qualities such as benevolence, charity, solidarity and compassion are preached (Ben Nun Bloom et al., 2015). But, studies have demonstrated that these attitudes often lack a universalism and are
constrained to the in-group: love thy neighbour if thy neighbour is similar to us (Ben Nun Bloom et al., 2015; Saroglou et al., 2004; Schwartz and Huismans, 1995).

This article, however, is not designed to explore which facets of religiosity are driving immigration attitudes and is instead focused upon the previously ignored role of elite cues. Indeed, Djupe and Calfano (2012: 4) state that:

We have probably learned as much as we can from the typical measures of religiosity, broad religious attachments and religious beliefs. Instead, this literature needs to bear witness to how religious contexts shape the sociology and psychology of how people interact with and think about out-groups…

This dictates a focus on information provision from, especially, religious elites who report conveying just the values we inquire about with some frequency.

Yet, to this point, “we know relatively little about the impact of religiosity and the role of religious group cues in shaping attitudes towards immigration” (Ben-Nun Bloom et al., 2015: 218). Djupe and Calfano (2012: 2) show that “exposure to inclusive religious values encourages people to reduce the sense of threat they feel toward the group they most dislike, which fuels tolerance of their political presence.” This would indicate that even though Behaviour can foster in-group/out-group prejudice, Behaviour (church attendance) may offer a platform to prime Belief (via elite messages).\(^3\) Djupe and Calfano (2012: 4) remind the reader that Tajfel (1970) showed that a sense of threat/dislike can be easily manipulated – they “suspect that clergy are especially important cue givers who can prime inclusion or exclusion and thus weaken or reinforce in-group identities”. This suspicion is supported by the framing literature outlined above. Overall, religious actors and the ‘official position’ of the Church could be highly influential as part of the de/securitising process in shaping public attitudes. Moreover, the previous marginalisation of elite cues may be one key factor underpinning the inconsistency regarding the effects of religion and religiosity on attitudes towards immigrants and out-groups.

In contrast to the literature that concentrates on religiosity, some scholarship looking at public attitudes more broadly does attempt to incorporate the influence of elite cues. For example, several studies have demonstrated that elite cues can effect public attitudes regarding

\(^3\) Echoing Knoll (2009), it cannot be conclusively argued that any difference in attitudes detected does not arise from the Belief element (i.e. ‘love thy neighbour’). Whilst this may indeed be a factor, to uncover the role of Belief would require assumptions to be made about the appropriate political application of the religious doctrine. In short, it is not possible to determine whether ‘loving thy neighbour’ means backing open borders, a guest-worker program as a path to citizenship, encouraging potential migrants to respect immigration laws and procedures, or encouraging potential migrants to stay and ‘improve their current home countries’. 
European integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2005; McLaren, 2001; Steenbergen et al., 2007; Vossing, 2015). For immigration attitudes specifically, scholars have demonstrated that elite cues can impact upon public attitudes in specific contexts (Jones and Martin, 2017; Hellwig and Kweon, 2016). Consistently, party affiliation/ideological alignment (i.e. who the source is) is pivotal. Thus there is a recognition that public attitudes can be shaped from ‘top down’ processes. Yet, what unites both sets of studies is the focus upon traditional actors – political elites and political parties. This article seeks to widen the analytical net to unpack the attitudinal effects of elite cues more precisely.

The second weakness of Securitisation theory is that the CS present discourse analysis as the “obvious method” to study security (Buzan et al., 1998: 176), marginalising the audience. To reiterate, the de/construction of security for the CS is “an essentially intersubjective process” (Buzan et al., 1998: 30) between the de/securitising actor and the audience receiving the message. The use of the word ‘security’ itself is not required: “[w]hat is essential is the designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action or special measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience” (Buzan et al., 1998: 27). An “issue is securitized only if and when the audience accept it as such” (Buzan et al., 1998: 25). However, discourse analysis is not overly well equipped to investigate questions of audience acceptance/rejection. Hansen (2011: 360) suggests that the audience, as enmeshed in discourse, may have their opinion “detected through surveys, polls or elections.” Something similar is posited by Wilkinson (2011: 100) who argues that an externalist, sociological understanding of securitisation explicitly “allows for a mixed methods approach that can accommodate both qualitative and quantitative data collection/generation methods such as surveys, various types of interview, discourse and textual analysis, participant observation and ethnographic methods.” Indeed, in one study tracking attitudes towards immigration in Greece, Karyotis and Patrikios (2010) used statistical analysis alongside discourse analysis in an attempt to gauge whether the audience internalised the de/securitising frames of elite actors. This study builds on the above calls and empirical findings, through incorporation of survey evidence in the attempt ‘bring the

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4 Whether securitisation is a purely rhetorical phenomenon (the so-called internalist or philosophical stance) or also relies on non-discursive practices (the so-called externalist or sociological position) has sparked intense debate (see Balzacq, 2005, 2011; Bigo, 2002; Case Collective, 2006; Stritzel, 2007, 2012). Hansen (2011) argues that the philosophical view does not exclude non-discursive, contextual factors – an assumption, it is posited, based upon a misunderstanding of the poststructuralist view of discourse. It appears that both ‘camps’ are in agreement that a pure focus on rhetoric, devoid of any contextual understanding is insufficient. Hence this study accounts for ‘external’ factors, namely the cultural capital religious actors possess and the subsequent greater likelihood of fellow ideologues (those who share an identity as Anglicans) internalising frames from this source.
audience back into’ the securitisation process by tracking whether public opinion is in/out of line with elite de/securitising frames.

Yet, which ‘public’ the analyst should concentrate on is unclear. The concept of the audience in securitisation theory has been “radically underdeveloped” (Williams, 2011: 213) with Wæver (2003: 26) himself acknowledging that what is meant by the ‘audience’ “requires a better definition and probably differentiation.” This is due to the fact that the audience is rarely the entire population. Hence, several scholars have proposed disaggregating the audience (for example, Balzacq, 2005; Léonard and Kaunert, 2011; Roe, 2008; Vuori, 2008). Thus, depending on the issue, actor and context, what the actor is aiming to achieve (and/or who the actor is principally trying to engage), the relevant audience differs (Balzacq et al., 2016; Klüfers, 2014). Hence, in this article, it is recognised that Anglican elites, whilst conscious of engaging a wider audience are 1) predominantly addressing ‘their flock’ and 2) in line with the framing literature, are also likely to have the most influence on the attitudes of said flock (also see Balzacq, 2011).

In sum, the effects of religion/religiosity on immigration attitudes have produced mixed results, despite the dominance of the relationship between religion and increased prejudice. Yet, the effects of elite discourse as a specific explanatory variable have been marginalised – and when included, the lens has been restricted to political elites and political parties. Similarly, in the literature that concentrates on the effects of religiosity on attitudes specifically, there is a nascent recognition that the dominant paradigm (the three B’s model) has been largely exhausted and that it is essential to try and account for the effects of elites and elite messaging. Failure to open up the black box of elite discourse will provide another set of findings that cannot unpack the complexity and contradictory findings of the Three B’s literature. Again, the failure to account for elite cues may offer one explanation for the previously contrasting results. If Behaviour can be associated with negative attitudes towards outgroups and Belief can be associated with more positive attitudes, it is critical whether religious elites evoke certain ‘Beliefs’ (universal compassion/hospitality to the vulnerable or the importance of religious uniformity/the danger of religious pluralism) with regards to immigration or not. Finally, the article also seeks to contribute to Securitisation research by 1) making a theoretical contribution in terms of broadening the analytical lens to focus on non-traditional security actors and 2) making a theoretical and methodological contribution through the introduction of quantitative methods to gauge whether elite messages have ‘cut through’ to their audience.
Anglican Church and Elite Discourse
This section outlines the approach taken to analysing elite discourse for the purposes of this paper before discussing the results of that analysis. The following section of the paper then investigates the likelihood that messages from elites were likely to be received.

Underpinning the security-migration nexus is the CS’s concept of ‘societal security’ - where societal identity is presented as being existentially threatened. “At its most basic, societal identity is what enables the word ‘we’ to be used” (Wæver, 1993:17). In short, a “successful securitisation of an identity involves precisely the capacity to decide on the limits of a given identity, to oppose it to what it is not, to cast this as a relationship of threat or even enmity, and to have this decision and declaration accepted by the relevant group” (Williams, 2003: 519-20). Thus the CS are not arguing that society has an objective, singular character, rather that notions of existential threat founded upon Schmittian friend/enemy logic (Williams, 2003), that are integral to a securitisation, are a (false) image conveyed by securitising actors who desire to unify a society/relevant audience (Wæver, 1993).

Thus ‘societal security’ suppresses identities into a simplified and unitary form. Hence the discourse analysis in this study sought to trace whether Anglican elites framed migrants/migration as a threat (a securitising discourse) or a non-threat (a desecuritising discourse) to ‘us’ as Britain/British. Borrowing from Gamson and Modigliani (1989), was “the essence of the [migration] issue” presented as threatening or not? It is posited that the ‘threat’ posed by migration is articulated around four axes: Identitarian, Securitarian; Economic, and Political (see Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002; Karyotis, 2007). Each axis percolates around a different referent object: societal/national identity (Identitarian); border security/sovereignty and individual safety from crime (Securitarian); economic security, covering both labour (employment, wages etc.) and welfare (Economic); and political stability (Political). The 4-axes model provided an analytical framework to structure the discourse analysis and to locate which aspect of migration an actor utilised to de/securitise the issue.

The analysis spans a 10 year period between 2005-2015. In the wake of Brexit, the centrality of immigration to political debate and the rise of right-wing anti-immigration populism, the UK has been selected as a critical case study (Yin, 2009). The decision to focus upon the Anglican Church is based on its position as being both the largest faith and the ‘established’ church. Thus, it has the potential to affect a relatively large audience. The repository of potential sources included official Church literature that engages with migration, including documents that

outline the foundations of what should guide the Church’s response to migration, alongside public interventions into the migration debate from high ranking Anglican officials (Archbishops, former Archbishops, and Senior Bishops etc.). Church publications were analysed to gain a clear insight into the ‘official line’ and the Church’s key messages regarding migration – threat or non-threat. The hierarchical nature of the Church informs the assumption that the official Church position would be communicated by the majority of Church actors. To improve confidence in this assumption, the public interventions of high ranking elites were analysed to provide insight into the extent to which the ‘official line’ was reflected in elite messaging. Whilst it is not possible to be certain, there are good theoretical (hierarchy) and empirical (public elite interventions) grounds to assume that these elite messages will be reflective of the frames that the average church goer will be exposed to.

The findings of the discourse analysis are summarised in Table 1. Despite two actors (Michael Nazir-Ali, Bishop of Rochester, and George Carey, former Archbishop of Canterbury – the latter being far more prominent), promoting securitising threat frames, across all four axes, desecuritising actors are far more numerous and, crucially, the ‘official’ Church line is explicitly one that attempts to promulgate non-threat-based messages. Interestingly, the identitarian axis dominates. The political axis is the next most prominent, however, content was often rooted in identitarian concerns around ‘our’ political culture becoming populated by far-right anti-immigration parties and rhetoric. The economic and securitarian axis were sparsely referenced. This indicates that the religious elites are far more content to operate within discourses surrounding the ‘morality’ of migration, paying less attention to the more ‘day-to-day’ discourse of cost/benefit economic and security analysis. Limited space dictates that a full account of the analysis cannot be provided. Thus, there will be a brief summary of the official documents and elite messages, accompanied by illustrative examples.

Table 1: Four Axes: Hegemonic Frames from the Anglican Church and Elites in the UK

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<th>Identitarian</th>
<th>Securitarian</th>
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<td><strong>Official Church Position:</strong></td>
<td>Desecuritising/Non-Threat</td>
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<td>Desecuritising/Non-Threat</td>
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<td><strong>Hegemonic Frame from Actors:</strong></td>
<td>Desecuritising/Non-Threat</td>
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<td>Desecuritising/Non-Threat</td>
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<th>Economic</th>
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<td><strong>Official Church Position:</strong></td>
<td>Desecuritising/Non-Threat</td>
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Beginning with the official Church literature, there are seven key documents that give a clear insight into the Church’s position on the issue of migration. From these documents, three key points emerge. First, there are relatively consistent themes which persist throughout. These centre on: the fundamental notion of a universal humanity rooted in Christian teaching (‘we are all God’s children’); clear attempts to deconstruct unitary, homogenous notions of identity, placing emphasis on the evolution and syncretism of identities, the positive impacts garnered through diversity and presenting diversity as a good in and of itself; the Christian duty to care for the vulnerable and show compassion – directed at both the public and politicians/the government (‘the Good Samaritan’); and explicit criticism of parties which pursue divisive, racist, and/or anti-immigration politics. The second important point concerns the stability of the framing of migration: during the period of analysis, the ‘official line’ of the Anglican Church remained constant. The third point of note is the official line itself: overall, there is clear and consistent non-threat (desecuritising) framing of the issue of migration.

An indicative example of these desecuritising cues comes from the 2015 election letter. When discussing identity and migration, the document draws upon the parable of the Good Samaritan asking, “who counts as ‘we’?” (The Church of England, 2015: 43). It goes on,

The politics of migration has, too often, been framed in crude terms of “us” and “them” with scant regard for the Christian traditions of neighbourliness and hospitality. The way we talk about migration, with ethnically identifiable communities being treated as ‘the problem’ has, deliberately or inadvertently, created an ugly undercurrent of racism in every debate about immigration. Crude stereotyping is incompatible with a Christian understanding of human social relationships (p. 44).

To reiterate, securitising migration relies on Wæver’s (1993) concept of societal security, where the identities of the host population and migrants are simplified into unitary and homogenous blocs, portrayed as being incompatible and existing in conflict. In the above extract, and

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6 The first four are specifically Church documents, including: the Church’s open letter for the 2015 General Election (GE) (The Church of England, 2015); a “guidance note” on “Countering far right political parties, extremist groups and racist politics” administered following the 2009 EU elections and prior to the 2010 GE (The Church of England, 2010); the Church’s “Position Statement” on refugees (The Church of England, 2014); and the 2009 General Synod (carried) motion on asylum seekers (The Church of England, 2009). The other three documents are also open letters on election-guidance for: the 2005 GE (Williams, 2005); the 2009 European Elections (Williams and Sentamu, 2009); and the 2010 GE (Williams and Sentamu, 2010). However in these earlier elections, letters were penned by the Archbishop on behalf of the Church, rather than the ‘Church’ itself issuing an election letter, as in 2015. However, the similarities between the two (pre-election advice) makes it logical to group them together.
throughout the election letter, there is a deliberate attempt to challenge ideas of a homogenous ‘us’ and ‘them’ undermining notions of unified groups by pointing to their inaccuracy (“crude stereotyping”). Note also the invocation of religious symbolism (“Good Samaritan”). This is significant as, following Lausten and Wæver (2000), invoking the ‘Word of God’ is a powerful rhetorical device – and available to religious actors in a way that it is not for politicians or security professionals. Moreover, this explicit ideological/identity marker is important for identifying with the audience and subsequently generating a framing effect (Slothuus and de Vreese, 2010).

In addition to the official public documents, 22 public interventions from elite actors were analysed (Table 2). The themes at the centre of the discursive interventions broadly mirrored those from Church itself. Moreover, in line with the hegemonic Church frames, desecuritising actors and messages were dominant. However, unlike the official documents, the field was marginally contested as securitising threat frames did appear. To give an illustrative example of this minority frame, the former Archbishop, George Carey (2010), argues that:

The sheer number of migrants from within Europe and elsewhere put the resources of Britain under enormous pressure, but also threaten the very DNA of our nation.

Here, the identity of ‘our nation’ is conveyed through the metaphor of DNA. DNA, and subsequently British society, is presented in a way that conjures an image of stability over time - fixed, deep rooted and foundational - not to be tampered with. Overall, Carey’s intervention portrays identity in an essentialist way, placing no emphasis on the historically (and continuing) evolutionary nature of cultural norms and values (i.e. Anderson, 1991; Lohrmann, 2000). Yet, it is important to note that George Carey held the position of Archbishop from 1991 until 2001, prior to the period of analysis. Thus, whilst as a former Archbishop Carey will wield substantial cultural capital, he no longer possesses the power to speak ‘for the Church’. Moreover, the messages of the two serving Archbishops during the period of analysis, Rowan Williams (2001-2011) and Justin Welby (2011-Present), are centred on desecuritising non-threat frames.
In contrast to Carey, and indicative of the dominant, desecuritising non-threat frames from Anglican elites, Rowan Williams (2010) notes:

[O]ne of the mainsprings of Christian self-understanding in the formative years of the Church's life was the idea that the believer was essentially a 'migrant'… the believer would be involved in discovering what in that society could be endorsed and celebrated and what should be challenged. The Christian, you could say, was present precisely as someone who was under an obligation to extend or enrich the argument…It does no harm for us to be ‘made strange’ to ourselves…Arguments are enriched when people join in that don’t usually share a group’s story but learn the language well enough to bring to it something fresh.

Williams is framing the evolution of society, via the influence of the believer (migrant), as a positive. Initially, the identity of the society is portrayed in non-fixed manner, open to and constructed by, change. The believer, due to his/her unfamiliarity and difference, naturally

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7 Archbishop of Canterbury.
challenges norms or practices. Importantly, this is posited as being necessary for a society to mature, improve and become ‘better’. It is not framed as a threat where ‘our ways’, understood in essentialist terms and as implicitly ‘good’, are being undermined or contaminated by ‘their’ less good or ‘bad’ ways. ‘Society’ is thus portrayed in an inclusive sense, where the ‘us’, rather than being in a conflictual relationship with the ‘them’, takes on a universal form. In sum, the believer, or more precisely the migrant, is presented as a key ingredient to societal health – a clear desecuritising frame.

In sum, the discourse analysis of the Anglican Church and elite Anglican actors in the UK has found that desecuritising non-threat messages are hegemonic. Whilst there were a limited number of security frames, these were very much in the minority and crucially, the official Church line universally promoted non-threat messages. As such, the following hypothesis is derived: Greater exposure to religious elite cues (via church attendance) will be associated with more positive immigration attitudes.

**Message Received? The Impact of Elite Messaging on Attitudes to Immigration**

To explore this hypothesis quantitative methods are introduced. The data utilised are based on the European Social Survey (ESS), rounds 3-7 (2006-2014). First, bivariate correlations are investigated to test the relationship between the dependent variable, immigration attitudes, and religiosity. The bivariate analysis is cross-national, designed to illuminate any general trends between immigration attitudes and religiosity in Europe and the UK. Further bivariate relationships are investigated for UK Anglicans specifically. Following McLaren (2012) and others, three questions designed to tap into both the economic and cultural facets of immigration, and that appear consistently in each round of the survey, have been combined into a single ‘Immigration Attitudes Index’. The Immigration Attitudes Index is measured on an 11-point scale, where 0 is the most negative attitude towards immigrants, and 10 is the most positive. Accounting for the need to disaggregate ‘religiosity’, three different measures have been investigated. These relate to frequency of attendance at religious services (Attendance), frequency of prayer outside of religious services (Prayer) and how religious a person feels (Religious

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8 All questions from the multivariate analysis are listed in the appendix.
Feeling). Attendance and Prayer are measured on an 8-point scale, where: 1 = Never, 2 = Less often 3 = Only on special holy days, 4 = At least once a month, 5 = Once a week, 6 = More than once a week, and 7 = Every day. Religious Feeling is measured on an 11-point scale where 0 is not at all religious and 10 is very religious. Attendance is utilised as a proxy for exposure to elite messaging, backed by the aforementioned assumptions (hierarchical structure of the church) and the findings from the discourse analysis (the dominance of non-threat desecuritising frames).

Second, multivariate analysis using linear regression is investigated. In line with the immigration attitudes literature, relevant demographic controls are introduced, namely: Gender, Age, being Unemployed, Citizenship status, and level of Education. Further individual-level controls are included to capture: Political Ideology (Left-Right Self-Placement and Party Identification); Political Awareness (Political TV Programming Consumption and Interest in Politics); Life Satisfaction; Social Trust; Personal Economic Satisfaction; Country-Level Economic Satisfaction and Contact.

The regression was comprised of three models. Model 1 contains the three measures of religiosity: Attendance; Prayer; and Religious Feeling. With Attendance acting as a proxy for exposure to elite religious cues, the other two measures are included to act as a form of control, to determine whether, rather than exposure to elite cues, it is in fact religiosity in general that is having an effect on immigration attitudes. Model 2 and Model 3 bring in the demographic and non-demographic controls, respectively.

Bivariate correlations were investigated between the Immigration Attitudes Index and the three measures of religiosity for 31 European countries. Results showed that the majority of relationships were negative and that on the whole, the negative relationships are stronger. In short, higher levels of religiosity correlate with more negative attitudes towards immigrants. Second, for most countries, Attendance tends to have the weakest effects compared to the other two measures of religiosity. In both instances the UK does not fit this majority position – religiosity correlates with more positive immigration attitudes and Attendance produces the

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9 This coding has been reversed from the original format such that higher values represent greater religiosity.

10 Round 3, 2006, is not included as there is no data on religious denomination in the UK.

11 Intergroup contact was investigated; however, the relevant data was only available in Round 7 of the ESS. Yet, as contact has strong theoretical and empirical support as a powerful predictor of immigration attitudes (Hewstone and Swart, 2011; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006), it was deemed prudent to test its effects. As such, a separate round-by-round regression was carried out, where Round 7 included and excluded Contact. The results of the key independent variables, the religiosity measures, were not affected; therefore this extra analysis has been excluded from this paper.
strongest relationship. Overall, the contrasting relationships between religiosity and immigration attitudes fits the conflictual findings of previous research, indicating that there is nothing ‘special’ about religion/religiosity in and of itself and that domestic context is paramount.

When UK Anglicans are analysed independently, Attendance (.239**) again has the most powerful relationship compared to the other two measures of religiosity (Prayer, .98**; Religious Feeling, .150**). Moreover the correlation itself is greater than that for the sum of all UK religions (.144**), indicating an especially strong effect for Attendance for Anglicans. This seems to suggest that religiosity in the UK may be serving to desecuritise the issue of immigration, and this is in stark contrast to many other European countries, where religion or religiosity may, in fact, be contributing to the securitisation of immigration and immigrants. This provides initial support for the hypothesis that elite discourse, captured via Attendance, is having a positive effect on immigration attitudes.

Yet, the bivariate correlations do not reveal whether the relationships will hold once other potentially powerful explanatory variables are considered. Equally, they are limited in enabling an exploration of what may be underpinning the effects of religiosity, and Attendance in particular (i.e. Djupe and Calfano, 2012). Below outlines the results of the multivariate analysis designed to further unpack the central hypothesis: after controlling for all other potentially relevant factors, do Anglican elite cues appear to have an effect on the immigration attitudes of ‘their’ audience in the expected direction.

The results are displayed in Table 3. Beginning with Model 1, there is a statistically significant positive relationship between Attendance and immigration attitudes (p.>.001). Attendance maintains the same level of significance in Model 2 when the demographic controls are introduced, and in Model 3, when all variables have been entered. These results buttress those from the bivariate analysis, providing further support for the hypothesis: that exposure, and anticipated receptiveness to, desecuritising, non-threat cues from Anglican elites, measured via church Attendance, is having an effect on the immigration attitudes of Anglicans.

Importantly, despite all three measures of religiosity having positive bivariate correlations, Attendance is the only measure to be consistently associated with more positive immigration attitudes. Prayer did not garner any statistically significant relationships, whilst

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12 The regression was also split by ESS round and there is almost no variation in which variables are statistically significant. Attendance is statistically significant in all 3 Models in 3/4 rounds (2008, 2012, 2014). There are no effects found for Prayer and just two effects for Religious Feeling (Model 2 of Round 4 and 7). These round-by-round findings further support the central hypothesis.
effects were only found for Religious Feeling in Model 2, before disappearing in Model 3. This indicates that it is not religion or religiosity in and of itself that is having an effect on attitudes, or it would be expected that each measure of religiosity would produce similar effects. To reiterate, the contrasting correlations between religiosity and immigration attitudes found in the cross-national bivariate analysis, from exceedingly negative to highly positive, gives Belief itself limited explanatory power. Thus whilst imbued with limitations, the elite cues argument (i.e. the important element is priming certain Beliefs) can be viewed as more powerful if policy positions of religious elites/organisations are clear – which they are for the Anglican Church/Church elites in the UK (see Knoll, 2009). As such, it is suggested that it is not religiosity that may be serving to desecuritise the issue of immigration in the UK, as indicated by the bivariate results. Rather, those of high religiosity (in terms of Attendance) are being exposed more consistently to desecuritising elite messaging. Thus it is this discourse that may be acting as a shield against the hegemonic security threat-based frames that have characterised political elite discourse in the UK.

For studies that seek to understand the drivers of immigration attitudes, these findings demonstrate that not only can elite cues play an important role in attitude formation, but that previously marginalised non-political elite actors require greater attention. Depending on the question being asked, finding a way to account for elite discourse in statistical models may be essential to gain a more holistic understanding of what is driving immigration attitudes. This also substantiates Djupe and Calfano’s (2012) call that when untangling the effects of religiosity on attitudes, it is essential to account for elite discourse due to its potential to wield a powerful influence. Moreover, when investigating the effects of religion/religiosity, the importance of accounting for the 3B’s, as opposed to conceptualising religion/religiosity as a unitary concept, has again been reinforced. From the perspective of Securitisation theory, these findings provide empirical support for the hypothesis that non-traditional actors can be influential in the construction and deconstruction of security issues in terms of shaping attitudes. Furthermore, it highlights the effectiveness of disaggregating the audience and accounting for context in terms of who the actor is trying to reach and is most likely to reach. Third, it has demonstrated that introducing quantitative methods to dovetail with discourse analysis can be a valuable addition to securitisation research and for unpacking whether an audience appears to have ‘accepted’ the de/securitising messages from ‘their’ elites.
Table 3: Regression Investigating the Effects of Anglican Church and Anglican Elite Discourse in the UK (ESS Rounds 4-7).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Church Attendance</td>
<td>0.337*** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.198*** (0.039)</td>
<td>0.186*** (0.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of Prayer</td>
<td>-0.036 (0.026)</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.025)</td>
<td>-0.028 (0.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Feeling</td>
<td>0.048 (0.028)</td>
<td>0.078** (0.027)</td>
<td>0.029 (0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>0.2 (0.135)</td>
<td>0.371** (0.143)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democrats</td>
<td>0.923*** (0.196)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKIP</td>
<td>-1.871*** (0.254)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.568*** (0.241)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>0.345 (0.535)</td>
<td>0.462 (0.507)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNP</td>
<td>-2.684 (1.98)</td>
<td>-2.378 (1.876)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plaid Cymru</td>
<td>-0.123 (0.812)</td>
<td>-0.464 (0.768)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Party</td>
<td>0.352 (0.633)</td>
<td>0.542 (0.597)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Party</td>
<td>-0.196 (0.114)</td>
<td>0.088 (0.116)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.323*** (0.098)</td>
<td>-0.271*** (0.093)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.008* (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.015*** (0.003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.255 (0.286)</td>
<td>0.357 (0.272)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Citizen</td>
<td>1.61*** (0.404)</td>
<td>1.587*** (0.38)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.255*** (0.031)</td>
<td>0.171*** (0.031)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Trust</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.322*** (0.029)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Satisfaction</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.04 (0.024)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country-Level Economic Satisfaction</td>
<td>0.177*** (0.022)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income Satisfaction</td>
<td>-0.146* (0.065)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right Ideology</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.026 (0.028)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Awareness (TV Consumption)</td>
<td>0.09 (0.033)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Awareness (Interest in Politics)</td>
<td>0.211*** (0.056)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj R2</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>0.255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.35*** (0.13)</td>
<td>3.303*** (0.273)</td>
<td>1.396*** (0.412)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1857</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dependent Variable: Immigration Attitudes Index
Excluded Dummies: Party ID = Conservative; Citizenship = Citizen; Gender = Male
Significance Levels: * ≤ 0.05 ** ≤ 0.01 *** ≤ 0.001

To briefly summarise the remainder of the results, for the demographic controls introduced in Model 2, political allegiance to the Liberal Democrats is associated with more positive immigration attitudes – with effects holding in Model 3. For UKIP, in both models, the reverse effects arise. The only instance a statistically significant relationship occurs for Labour affiliation is in Model 3 – the relationship being positive but not as strong as that of the Liberal
Democrat variable. Older individuals (Age) are consistently more negative in their attitudes. In contrast, increased levels of Education, being a Non-Citizen and being female (Gender) are related with more positive attitudes. All of these effects hold in Model 3 and are in line with expectations based on the literature. No effects are found for Unemployment, failing to support self-interest theories on drivers of immigration attitudes. For the variables introduced in Model 3, more positive immigration attitudes are associated with higher levels of Social Trust (p.>0.001), Country-Level Economic Satisfaction (p.>0.001) and satisfaction with Household Income (p.>0.5). Here, self-interest theories do receive statistical support. Again, these findings are congruent with previous research. Greater Political Awareness, measured via Political TV Programming Consumption (p.>0.01) and Interest in Politics (p.>0.001), is also associated with more positive immigration attitudes. No effects are found for Life Satisfaction or Left-Right Political Ideology.

**Conclusion/Discussion**

This article has principally utilised Securitisation theory to explore the migration discourse of the Anglican Church and Anglican elites in the UK from 2005-2015 and has attempted to gauge whether messages have ‘cut through’ and subsequently influenced the attitudes of ‘their’ audience (church attendees). The discourse analysis revealed that the dominant frames from both the Church and Church elites presented migration as a non-threat – a desecuritising discourse. Using this information, it was hypothesised that increased exposure to the desecuritising elite messaging would be associated with more positive immigration attitudes. The results from the analysis support this hypothesis. Overall, this indicates that it is not religion or religiosity in and of itself that is having an effect on attitudes. Instead, the elite messaging that those of high religiosity (in terms of church attendance) are exposed to may be acting as a bulwark against the hegemonic security threat-based frames that have constituted much of political elite discourse in the UK.

Several implications arise from the research design and consequent empirical findings. First, unlike previous research that has focused upon the effects of cues from political elites and political parties, this article has demonstrated that, for specific societal constituencies, non-political elite actors can play a pivotal role in shaping immigration attitudes. For issues such as migration, this presents both an opportunity and a danger for those with a normative agenda. For scholars attempting to grapple with migration politics – especially in light of the sharp rise in anti-immigration rhetoric, policy and attitudes following the so-called ‘migration crisis’ in Europe – the role being played by religious elites and institutions may be in need of greater attention.
How these actors are framing the issue of migration (securitising threat or desecuritising non-threat) may be vitally important. This is perhaps especially true in states where religious and national identities are deeply entwined.

Second, the findings also have consequences for the religiosity and attitudes and immigration attitudes literatures. Regarding the former, the findings substantiate Djupe and Calfano’s (2012) call to account for elite discourse to untangle the contradictory findings arising from research that utilises the 3B’s model. The previous neglect of elite cues may underpin a considerable degree of the inconsistency in the effects that religiosity has been found to have on attitudes. For the latter, it has highlighted the importance of acknowledging the 3B’s, as opposed to conceptualising religion/religiosity as a unitary concept. Moreover depending on the question being asked, finding a way to incorporate elite discourse in statistical models may be essential to gain a more holistic understanding of what is driving immigration attitudes.

Third, for Securitisation theory, alongside highlighting the value in expanding the analytical net beyond traditional security actors, the article has highlighted the effectiveness of disaggregating the audience and engaging with context to identify which audience(s) the actor is primarily trying to engage and is most likely to reach. This opens up the possibility that other factors that are integral to identity (like religion), that have an institutional framework, and that have capital-endowed elite actors, may also have the potential to influence attitudes. Last, a central argument this paper makes is that synthesising quantitative methods with discourse analysis can be a valuable addition to securitisation research as a means of identifying whether or not the de/securitising messages of elites have been accepted/rejected. Thus studies have the capacity to move beyond an analysis of de/securitising attempts (discursive interventions) and can develop a more comprehensive understanding of the securitisation process in its entirety.
Appendix

All questions are taken from the European Social Survey and are listed in order of appearance.

**Immigration Attitudes Index:** An index was created from the following three questions. “Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?” (0 = bad for the economy; 10 = good for the economy) [Rounds 3-5 B38; Rounds 6-7 B32]. “Would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?” (0 = cultural life undermined; 10 = cultural life enriched) [Rounds 3-5 B39; Rounds 6-7 B33]. “Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?” (0 = worse place to live; 10 = better place to live) [Rounds 3-5 B408; Rounds 6-7 B33].

**Frequency of Church Attendance:** “Apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services nowadays?” [Original coding reversed] (1 = never; 2 = less often; 3 = once a week; 4 = only on special holy days; 5 = at least once a month; 6 = more than once a week; 7 = every day) [Rounds 3-5 C22; Rounds 6-7 C14].

**Frequency of Prayer:** “Apart from when you are at religious services, how often, if at all, do you pray?” [Original coding reversed] (1 = never; 2 = less often; 3 = once a week; 4 = only on special holy days; 5 = at least once a week; 6 = more than once a week; 7 = every day) [Rounds 3-5 C25; Rounds 6-7 C15].

**Religious Feeling:** “Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?” (0 = not at all religious; 10 = very religious) [Rounds 3-5 C21; Rounds 6-7 C13].

**Party Respondent Feels Closest Too:** Two variables were merged due to different coding in survey rounds. “Which one [party feeling closest to]?” [Rounds 4-5 B206GB; Rounds 6-7 B18bGB].

**Gender:** Coded by interviewer [F21].

**Age:** “In what year were you born?” [F31a].

**Unemployment:** The variable was constructed by merging the two questions related to unemployment. “Using this card, which of these descriptions applies to what you have been doing for the last 7 days?” Unemployed and actively looking for a job (0 = not marked; 1 = marked) “Using this card, which of these descriptions applies to what you have been doing for the last 7 days? Unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for a job (0 = not marked; 1 = marked) [Rounds 4 F8a, Rounds 5-7 F17a].

**Citizenship:** “Are you a citizen of [country]?” [Rounds 4-5 C26; Rounds 6-7 C18].

**Education:** “What is the highest level of education you have achieved?” (0 = not possible to harmonise into 5-level ISCED; 1 = less than lower secondary education (ISCED 0-1); 2 = lower secondary education completed (ISCED 2); 3 = upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3); 4 = post-secondary non-tertiary education completed (ISCED 4); 5 = tertiary education completed (ISCED 5-6). [Round 4 F6; Rounds 5-7 F15].

**Social Trust:** An index was created from the following three questions. “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” (0 = you can’t be too careful; 10 = most people can be trusted) [Rounds 4-5 A8; Rounds 6-7A3]. “Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?” (0 = most people try to take advantage of me; 10 = most people try to be fair) [Rounds 4-5 A9; Rounds 6-7 A4]. “Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?” (0 = people mostly look out for themselves; 10 = people mostly try to be helpful) [Rounds 4-5 A10; Rounds 6-7 A5].

**Life Satisfaction:** “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?” (0 = extremely dissatisfied; 10 = extremely satisfied) [Rounds 4-5 B24; Rounds 6-7 B20].

**Country-Level Economic Satisfaction:** “On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in [country]?” (0 = extremely dissatisfied; 10 = extremely satisfied) [Rounds 4-5 B25; Rounds 6-7 B21].

**Feeling about Household Income:** “Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household’s income nowadays?” (1 = living comfortably on present income; 2 = coping on present income; 3 = difficult on present income; 4 = very difficult on present income) [Round 4 F33; Rounds 5-7 F42].

**Political Ideology:** “In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale?” (0 = Left; 10 = Right) [Rounds 4-5 B23, 6-7 B19].

**Political Awareness:** Two questions were used. “On an average weekday, how much of your time watching television is spent watching news or programmes about politics and current affairs?” (0 = no time at all; 1 = less than 0.5 hour; 2 = 0.5 hour to 1 hour; 3 = more than 1 hour, up to 1.5 hours; 4 = more than 1.5 hours, up to 2 hours; 5 = more than 2 hours, up to 2.5 hours; 6 = more than 2.5 hours, up to 3 hours; 7 = more than 3 hours) [A2]. “How interested would you say you are in politics?” [Original coding reversed] (1 = not at all interested; 2 = hardly interested; 3 = quite interested; 4 = very interested) [B1].
Bibliography


