

## When philosophy of history meets political philosophy: an Aristotelian interpretation

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### Abstract

*This paper is an abstracted version of one chapter of my research which aims to reconstruct the outlines of philosophy of history in the regards with political philosophy, especially in the regards with an Aristotelian interpretation on the political science, or science of polis in his words, as a 'practical science'. In this paper, as an introduction of the general structure of that research, I will mainly argue that science of history shares a similar fundamental structure with science of polis, in the sense of that both these two disciplines are conducted by the same metaphysics. The tension between past and present concerned as the significance of philosophy of history should be understood as a temporal transition of the non-temporal tension between the citizens and the polis.*

*Since this paper is originally generated as the result of investigating the dominant tradition of philosophies of history in terms of the previous chapter in my whole research, I will firstly conclude the tradition as the epistemological historicization in which possibilities of philosophy of history are limited and even eliminated, so that the need of an alternative metaphysical philosophy of history can be clarified. I will then claim that this metaphysical philosophy of history, namely 'science (epistēmē) of history', is a practical science in terms of the Aristotelian three kinds of science and makes relevance to other two kinds of science. Then I will argue this science of history, being similar to science of polis as also a practical science, contains two primary parts, namely, on physis and on phronēsis/technē.*

*For the first part on physis (by the name of 'on physis' it suggests the interpretations about the natural development of the four causes), I will argue that the developmental process of history accounts to the developmental process of polis, both of which accord the metaphysical developmental process from the material cause to the formal end cause (telos). Science of polis regards the citizens-association as the material cause and the constitution as the formal end cause; similarly, science of history also adopts this process but in a temporal dimension. Historical events performs a chronological process of history, in the sense of that historical events in past as the material cause develops to understandable knowledge of science of history in present as the formal end cause, which accords to the temporal antecedent-succeed logical of the development of the four causes.*

*For the second part on phronēsis/technē, I will argue that, to understand the fundamental Being (to ti ên einai) and the function of both polis and history, we must expand the original ethical philosophy on knowing to the relevance with practical science. That will be a supplement to the understanding of physis. To achieve that, I will demonstrate that the Aristotelian knowing is for itself an action of knowing that applies the virtues phronēsis and technē, and that this practical action of knowing finally conducts historical knowing to historical eudaimonia, just like in science of polis the constitution exists for the reason of actualizing citizens' eudaimonia.*

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<sup>1</sup> For full version with adding a discussion on English translations and transliterations, and bibliography, or the previous and following chapters, please contact me.

*So that finally I will conclude that science of polis and science of history are essentially two actualizations of complex entity in practical science that finally aim to harmonize different telos in practical domains. By meeting political philosophy, philosophy of history may bridge the gap between the real world and the epistemological representations of the real world, just like what a polis does upon a citizen in combining his or her individual eudaimonia to the eudaimonia of a whole in which he or she lives and dies.*

#### Key words

**Aristotelian metaphysics, practical science, four causes, complex entity, *phronēsis/technē*, historical *eudaimonia***

1. Limitation of the epistemological historicization, and introduction of a metaphysical alternative.

Though approaching a metaphysical interpretation of science of history and hence referring to the similarities between science of history and science of *polis*, I must claim that this paper serves to the final end of investigating the significance of historical thinking. According to my previous study on the dominant tradition of philosophies of history, I may argue that the significance of historical thinking **should** posit on **the relation between the historical events being happened in past and the historical thinking in present**, while the dominant philosophies of history, in the form of the epistemological historicization, fail to interpret their philosophies on that significance. The epistemological historicization is at best an attempt of exploring the range of the knowing capacity that concerns history as its subject-matter, that is to say, focuses only on the nature of subjectivism *ego* of historical knowing in present, without any essential concern of the happened in past.

The epistemological historicization results to two limitations on the possibilities of historical thinking. Firstly, the epistemological historicization essentially regards the happened past as an affiliated object of the thinking present, which means that, without the subjectivism thinking activity in current present, mere the past is meaningless and is not plausible to prove the existence of itself. For example, as one of the obvious schemes of the epistemological historicization, the fundamental aim of Hegel's World Spirit is not focused on the diversity and the different identifications of histories in past, but on the self-awareness of the unique modernity namely the freedom, which didn't exist in past histories (for him) and doesn't need to be verified by the past histories but merely serves to the modern, the current present existence of freedom, though the meaning of the notion of freedom is generated as a historical result of itself. The other following philosophies of the epistemological historicization succeed this tendency, that is, a tendency in which the happened past for its self doesn't deliver any character, any structure or any meaning to the historical thinking in present; reversely, it is in the thinking present that philosophers and historians concern the happened past and endow the past with meaningful interpretations – meaningful to the present people rather than people directly involved into the events in past. This phenomenon results to a fact that the epistemological historicization organizes philosophy of history as **a differentiated discipline** into an order **against the natural temporal sequence**: the subjectivism thinking activity in present has priority over all the real happened histories in past.

The first limitation may result to the second one. As far as the epistemological historicization

sets up a priority of historical thinking in present over the real historical events in past, any specific scheme that narrows down historical thinking to a differentiated disciplined philosophy of history is initiated and expanded upon the interpretation of totally present thinking activity in which the 'structure' or the 'essence' of **history** is less possible than the structure or the essence of **historical thinking**. This may be due to a presupposition that, for modern epistemological philosophies, only the present perceptual knowledge from the mental activity is available and achievable. This further results to a limited understanding of the discipline 'philosophy of history', that is, though philosophy of history is named as so, philosophy of history is actually a philosophical thinking **of the historical thinking in present**, rather than a philosophical thinking **of the history in past**. By identifying itself from the speculative and the substantive philosophies, the epistemological historicization actually rules out a kind of discussions on **the essential nature of history** which indeed had been an origin of the broad sense historical thinking in the beginning of philosophy – though in later days it was characterized as a certain and a narrowed sort of the speculative forms by the epistemological historicization.

Therefore, in general and in short, the predicaments of philosophy of history can be sketched as the following two: the ignorance of the structural generating of history in past (in terms of the related historical thinking in present relatively), and thus the ignorance of **knowing** such structural generating of history (in terms of that the aim of a philosophical thinking is focused on the relation between the essence and the knowing of it). In accordance with the subjectivism and individualism principles of the epistemological historicization, the dominant philosophies of history rarely attempt to investigate themes like these two which may regard to the original concerns of the tension between history and philosophy in a temporal dimension, namely in the regards with the tension between past and present. That is to say, an alternative philosophy of history – if we want to enjoy the fruit of the epistemological historicization but also improve the epistemological historicization – has at least two fundamental groups of the questions about history: what is the essential nature of history in past, and how can the present philosopher know the nature in past.

In order to deal with these two groups of the fundamental questions, in the rest of this research, I will refer a traditional political philosophy and adopt it to the domain of philosophy of history. This traditional political philosophy is an Aristotelian 'science of *polis*' but, more importantly, is also an Aristotelian 'practical science', in terms of the Aristotelian three kinds of sciences, namely the theoretical science, the practical science, and the producing science. In the regards with science of *polis*, I'll argue that science of history (a rigorous term of philosophy of history according to metaphysics) is another possible practical science, which, with science of *polis* together, shall be conducted by the 'theoretical science' namely the metaphysics.

2. Preparing discussion: an Aristotelian descriptive metaphysics, rather than a revisionary metaphysics.

In terms of fundamental feature of metaphysics, as the highest mental experiencing of the real world, metaphysics is always generated **after** things happened in the real world. That means, metaphysics neither attempt to predict future, nor offer a better or perfect scheme of given existing-things; it describes only the happened past and happening present. Some contemporary specialists on metaphysics like P. F. Strawson have made clearer demonstrations on this 'falling behind' character (in terms of the real world) of metaphysics by distinguishing two kinds of

metaphysics, that is, the revisionary metaphysics and the descriptive metaphysics. According to Strawson, the revisionary metaphysics, like a Cartesian metaphysics (as the term 'metaphysics' is used in a broad sense), aims to create a better or even a perfect scheme of the real world, which doesn't require concrete reformation of the real world though, does require a revision of the real world in which the structure of the real world is mentally disintegrated and reorganized; whereas the descriptive metaphysics is merely content to "describe the actual structure of our thought about the world."<sup>2</sup> Descriptive metaphysics, as it investigates the actuality of the reality rather than any potentiality, offers the most fundamental groups of concepts and structures which are used to explain the already-given existing world. These groups of concepts and structures for themselves are mere the descriptions and no more, which is to say, any further explanation aiming to a potential or better scheme may be based on these descriptions (since better scheme may also refer to these concepts) but may never be the descriptions themselves: descriptions cannot be made upon any potential and essentially non-existing (at least when the descriptions are being made) things.

Does metaphysics conduct science of *polis*/history in mere the general scope or in every particular case? In the historical or political world where the historical or political events have already happened and become the given realities, different from the revisionary metaphysics that comes from and aims to reform the conceptualized results of the general framework of potentiality, descriptive metaphysics is the conceptualized result of the actuality, the latter of which is formed from the generalizing grasp of the particulars. It is in the particulars that the practical sciences study and work. Like Strawson argued, "each of us is, at any moment, in possession of such a framework – a unified framework of knowledge of particulars, in which we ourselves and, usually, our immediate surroundings have their place, and of which each element is uniquely related to every other and hence to ourselves and our surroundings."<sup>3</sup> In the science of history, though we cannot experience most of historical events in the perceptual sense, we can still investigate the particular knowledge of history, since a descriptive metaphysical framework of history provides us the presupposed condition of epistemological demonstrating and locating ourselves into a certain reference point in the perspective of whole history. It is in this sense that a metaphysical science of history is restricted as a descriptive one rather than the revisionary: a science of history does not create history but only describes history. As long as the real world has already been given – has already been the reality rather than any potentiality in a metaphysical sense – a 'better world' is impossible to become the real.

But why is an Aristotelian philosophy rather than Platonic or Kantian philosophy? In my investigation on the difference between Aristotelian philosophy and others, the most important two points locate on that (1) for Aristotelian philosophy, an experiencing world and a conceptual or 'abstract' world is a same world, especially in terms of a historical world in which historical events as realities have already given: what happened in past is the actuality for the present world rather than any potentiality; and that (2) the scope of an Aristotelian metaphysics covers the broadest sense of the relation between itself and others. And these reasons, though can be concerned as immediate preparations of a science of history, are still needed to relate to a basic problem, that is, (3) whether Aristotle himself had argued a science of history.

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<sup>2</sup> Strawson, P. F., *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics*, London: Methuen & Co Ltd., 2<sup>nd</sup> printed, 1961, 9.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 24.

(1) Different from Plato who demonstrated metaphysics as a reasonable system of a world of *eidōs* ('ideal forms'), Aristotle argued that metaphysics is a natural system of an experiencing world which comprises perceivable entities and one non-perceivable entity as the final reason. In terms of the essence of their metaphysics, both Plato and Aristotle adopted an apriorism structure of metaphysics, which means our conceptual world is **from** – be careful, here is no acting verb – our experience of daily life through a systematic, essentialism and absolutism theoreticalization. This 'from' for Plato is 'abstract', since for him real philosophers (people who own real knowledge rather than opinions) abstract the experience and 'push' the abstracted conceptual world of ideal forms to an opposite position of the experiencing world as a counterpart, which finally generates two different (but related) worlds. While for Aristotle the theoreticalization world and the experiencing world is the same world, since the naturalism system of entities is discovered, described, and demonstrated (anyway, not the 'revisionary' verbs like 'create' or 'established') in our current daily experiencing world. Therefore, as I'm going to establish a metaphysical interpretation of a science of history, of a world of what already happened things which are mentally being studied in present, it is inappropriate even impossible to create an abstracted but different world of ideal forms that exists in an atemporal dimension. The link between past and present, as the fundamental theme of science of history, though accords to the spirit of Platonic philosophy on the tension between the mortals and the eternal immortal, will finally be against to the systematic frameworks of the *eidōs* when philosopher attempts to delicate the tension more detailed demonstrated, since such detailed demonstrated system of *eidōs* regards the atemporal eternal immortal as a higher world than the temporal world, rather than an equal world which can be experientially applied by the temporal beings. Two worlds – one is with eternal atemporal *eidōs*, the other is with temporal beings – may result to conflict when there is a hierarchy among them.

(2) The scope of an Aristotelian metaphysics is beyond usual understandings of metaphysics as a limited or isolated demonstration of a priori. An Aristotelian metaphysics should be investigated under a holistic view crossing the metaphysics itself, the physics (in its classical sense namely 'the science of thing for its own cause and sake') and the theories of practical affairs which comprises the science of ethics, economics (in the classical sense of household rather than modern economics), and politics, and perhaps the science of history which I'm attempting to demonstrate in this research. For an Aristotelian philosophy, metaphysics is not an isolated *epistēmē*; it comprises several interactive relations to the other sciences, which together consist to the fundamental structure of the system of Aristotelian philosophy as a whole, rather than an individually disciplined metaphysics: an Aristotelian metaphysics is the *epistēmē* in a holistic sense of a set of *epistēmē*. I'll expand this point with the relation between the theoretical science and the practical sciences in section 3.

(3) However, it's hard to say that Aristotle himself had already developed any science of history – even in the general sense of philosophical thoughts of history rather than a discipline. Some contemporary specialists have argued that he did have historical theories; but actually most of these 'theories' have been regarded as supplementary demonstrations of the science of politics in an historical form, rather than the 'historiography' or 'philosophy of history' in modern sense.<sup>4</sup> Aristotle himself never say a science of history (even an empirical one); and the historical

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<sup>4</sup> See Raymond Weil's introductory article 'Aristotle's View of History', reissued in Barnes, Jonathan, Malcolm Schofield, and Richard Sorabji ed., *Articles on Aristotle, Vol. 2, Ethics and Politics*, London: Gerald Duckworth,

cases in his writings should be regarded at most as the complementary conceptions of political philosophy, rather than the unchanged historical facts – as realities – from which philosophy of history begins.

But it does not mean that we cannot explore the nature of a possible science of history upon an Aristotelian philosophy. Our discussion in this research is investigating the fundamental nature of the science of history rather than history itself, which means that if there is a discussion about the nature or the meaning, it is definitely the nature or the meaning of the science studied by **philosophers** who concern history comprehensively (so that it develops to the science) by the present thinking; it is not the nature or the meaning of the subject-matters of history, namely mere historical events, studied by **historians** who concern only the given or located circumstances in its own time and place. If I establish a theoretical investigation in an Aristotelian sense and define it as studying the nature or the meaning of science of history, such nature or meaning is not the nature or meaning of particular history or histories, even not of a general history; it is the nature or the meaning for the science itself. Therefore, though Aristotle himself never developed any ‘science of history’ in a rigours sense of a discipline, we can in the broadest sense demonstrate a science of history in accordance with an Aristotelian philosophy of a science, since those principles are applied to a science itself, not to the subject-matters of the science.

3. Science of history as a practical science but also concerning the theoretical science/metaphysics: the primary structure.

Now, a metaphysical interpretation of a science of history based upon those preparations can be introduced. As I’ve argued, the fundamental character of such science of history is that it is a practical science, especially in terms of that it **studies** the practical affairs but also **concerns** the theoretical structures. The relation between practical science and theoretical science may be concluded as, in short, the theoretical science conducts the practical science(s), and reversely the practical science(s) accounts to the theoretical science. Therefore, what is a ‘practical science’ on earth? And In what sense it accounts to theoretical science?

Aristotle was the first one<sup>5</sup> who made rigours division but also mutual relevance between the ‘theoretical science’, the ‘practical science’ and the ‘productive science’. (*Metaphysics*, 1025b18 and 1026b4)<sup>6</sup> In short, theoretical science,<sup>7</sup> also known as ‘primary philosophy’, studies being *qua* being, whereas practical and productive sciences study the principles of motion in which the reason of motion is either inside or outside of the originator of motion respectively. Now I’m going to argue the characterized differences in detail, by regarding the theoretical and the practical science as differing (1) in subject-matter, (2) in aim, (3) in the faculty employed, and (4) in method.<sup>8</sup> Then I’ll move to the relevance.

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1977, 202.

<sup>5</sup> Aristotle’s division may possibly be inherited from Plato, who distinguished cognitive sciences from practical sciences, though with the ambiguity on the definition of each and the boundary between each. See Newman, W. L., *The Politics of Aristotle, Vol. 1, Introduction*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1887, 4-5.

<sup>6</sup> All the citations from Aristotle’s works are partly re-translated by me with concerns of different versions of current translations. Please see the bibliography. And due to the different versions, all the citations accord to the ‘Bekker (August Immanuel Bekker) number’.

<sup>7</sup> The knowledge of such theoretical science, namely the ἐπιστήμη (*epistēmē*), is often translated into ‘scientific knowledge’ in various versions like Loeb’s. Actually the translation itself is no problem but please remember its different context from the contemporary one, and its relevance to the other notions in the metaphysical system.

<sup>8</sup> I agree with Newman’s conclusions and make my own analysis followed each. Newman, W. L., *The Politics of Aristotle, Vol. 1, Introduction*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1887, 6-10.

### 3.1. Characters of the practical science as differing from the theoretical science.

(1) In subject-matter. The final aim of this research is establishing a new interpretation of history with the consideration of political philosophy. History, being similar to politics, is the history of and by mankind, just like the politics of and by mankind; but which science is the one that **the science of mankind** should belong to? A common answer may be the practical science, since mankind, according to the common understanding of the definition of the practical science, has the agency to act and does really act which accords to the subject-matter of practical science apparently. However, this answer misses some implicitly characterized theoretical elements which are located inside the practical science. To illustrate the theoretical elements of a practical science, I should firstly clarify three different theoretical sciences. According to Aristotle, there are three different sub-disciplines of the theoretical science, that is, the 'things self-existent, unchangeable and separable from matter' namely the metaphysics, the 'things unchangeable and separable from matter only in logical conception' namely the mathematics, and the 'things inseparable from matter and subject to change' namely the physics. (*Metaphysics*, 1026a5) By investigating its definition, it can be found that the science of nature, physics, has apparently the shortest distance to the practical science, since though the principles of physics is within and not outside itself, the character of subject-matter of physics is changeable, which is in accordance with the practical science that deals with the changeable things acted by mankind. Meanwhile, one more important thing of such science of nature, the physics, is that mankind themselves is also the subject-matter of physics. This point can be understood by one of the principles of the physics, that is, the source of nutrition and growth, which is the inner cause of mankind, is accounted to physics. However, when a man takes an action, he or she as an originator of such action is not the subject-matter of physics, since the principles of the action is outside such action: the principles of an action belong to the man, not the action itself. Therefore, the man who is at the immediate point of acting is the subject-matter of practical science. But we should be very careful. It's not to suggest any 'progress' from the theoretical science to the practical science to understand the acting agency of mankind; rather, it's saying that, the argument, that the man who has taken action (no matter what it is on earth) cannot be understood on the theoretical extent any more, is misunderstood. If politics and history are two of the subject-matters of sciences of mankind, the *to ti ên einai* or the Being of politics and history, should be the subject-matters of theoretical science, and the agency of man of (in) politics and history should belong to the practical science, since the latter accounts to the purpose of the completeness of human goodness. Hence a science of politics or history concerns both theoretical and practical science, though it belongs to the latter, and directly studies the latter.

(2) In aim. The practical science can be distinguished from the theoretical science by their different aims, as Aristotle argued:

*Our present study [the practical science], unlike the other branches of philosophy, has a practical aim (for we are not investigating the nature of virtue for the sake of knowing what it is, but in order that we may become good, without which result our investigation would be of no use), we have consequently to carry our enquiry into the region of conduct, and to ask how we are to act rightly (bonus); since our actions, as we have said, determine the quality of our dispositions. (Nicomachean Ethics, 1103b26-29)*

From this famous argument above, it can be seen that the final aim of the practical science

is prompting the good (*bonum*), especially the particular good since it accounts to each of the particular action. But it's not saying that the practical science concerns only the particular action; on the contrary, "it is the special mark of one who studies any subject philosophically, and not solely with regard to its practical aspect, that he does not overlook or omit any point", (*Politics*, 1279b12-14) which means that, as a practical science investigating affairs of mankind, the science of *polis* or history does not only concern the particular sense of an action that a *polis* has been generated or a history has been given, but also call for the theoretical presuppositions of it, that is about the **knowledge** of a 'rightly' action, which belongs to the domain of metaphysics and physics in the general sense. The theoretical science including metaphysics and physics (and even mathematics) aims to the general knowledge of things; whereas a practical science aims to promote the particular good, though without a pre-understanding of the theoretical science it is incomplete.

(3) In the faculty employed. According to the division made by Aristotle (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1139a1-15), the soul of man can be divided into two parts, rational and irrational. And the rational part of soul contains also two parts. One is 'scientific' (ἐπιστήμη) which deals with the unchangeable existence, namely the subject-matters of theoretical science; and the other is 'calculative'<sup>9</sup> which deals with changeable existence, namely the subject-matters of practical science. The faculties employed in the two sciences are relatively correspondent to the two parts of rational soul, which determines the order of the two sciences themselves. Firstly, both theoretical and practical sciences are achieving true knowledge; however, the truth of theoretical science is pure and unconditional, whereas the truth of latter should be of a true corresponding of the right desire, namely, be conditional in the circumstance. (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1139a30, and the three elements in the soul in 1139a 18-20) Secondly, theoretical science is merely about the intellect, since it is without any relevance to any action; whereas practical science accounts to both intellect and desire, since "man, as an originator of action, is a union of desire and intellect", (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1139b5-7), and hence needs the scientific part of rational soul but belongs to the calculative part of rational soul. These two steps of the faculty of soul, for both Aristotle and Aristotelian philosophies, have successfully established an order between the theoretical science and practical sciences in a deeper sense that enhances the former two points. The aim of the theoretical science is restricted into itself by the faculty of its part of soul; therefore theoretical science can exist alone and the intellect ration of the soul to which theoretical science belongs is superior. Whereas the aim of a practical science is outside itself for the accordance with its part of soul: the principles of an action are belonged to the originator; therefore any research of the action should be taken upon the research outside itself, namely upon the originator, who has been the subject-matter of the theoretical science since its inner causes, *physis* is the subject-matter of physics. Then the practical science must regard the theoretical science as its foundation, and the calculative ration of the soul to which a practical science belongs is inferior, which is also demonstrated in the tenth book of *Nicomachean Ethics*: the life of intellect faculty, or speculative wisdom, or contemplation, in other words, is the highest life (even higher than the life of man!); (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1177a19-25 and 1177b27) and "the life of moral virtue is happy only in a secondary degree". (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1178a12)

(4) In method. In the theoretical science, the study of an intellect entity is merely a study of itself as an already-given definition: though we can investigate the generating process of a

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<sup>9</sup> Aristotle says it is equal to 'deliberation'.

definition, we don't necessarily need such process to support any determinative metaphysical argument, since it is not a science of the history of thoughts or concepts but mere a science of logics. But in the practical science, we must concern the whole process from the point when the originator was taking an action to the point when the action has been generated, since the cause of the action is outside itself but belongs to the subject-matter of a practical science namely the mankind. For Aristotle, the study of the theoretical science begins from the study of the four causes, namely the material cause (matter), the formal cause (form), the power cause, and the end cause (*telos*),<sup>10</sup> and then moves to the essence or the being *qua* being of entity, as knowledge in general sense. But these four causes cannot be arranged into one linear process, since they are intellect definitions of an entity which is used to describe the entity rather than determine the entity. That is to say, these four causes will **not** disappear even after the generating of an entity has already been done. For example, how to understand such a sentence "a seed is the material cause of a tree"? When the tree has grown up, this seed itself disappears. Is this to suggest the disappearance of the material cause of this tree? The answer is no, because the disappeared seed is still one of the reasons of the tree's current being. For the tree that has generated, the seed is its eternal cause and should be studied in a static sense that relates to the general knowledge of the theoretical definitions. On the contrary, the study of practical science begins from the study of generating process of an entity. It is analysed that the entity has become its current being by what action has been done or was done. Therefore, the knowledge of such finished or still finishing action, namely the results of theoretical science especially the physics, is required **before** we discuss how to achieve the good (*bonum*) by endowing the action with meanings. The order between 'to know' and 'to do' does really exist; and for Aristotelian tradition, 'to know' is logically and temporally superior to 'to do'. Theoretical science stops at the exploring of knowing, whereas practical science should account to both knowing and practice.

### 3.2. Fundamental relevance between the theoretical science and practical sciences.

For Aristotelian philosophies, and somehow for the broadest sense philosophers that investigate the tension between the temporal mortals and the eternal immortal, no matter of differing the theoretical science and practical sciences shown above, the ultimate aim (rather than the immediate aim presented in the previous sub-section) of all the kinds of science, including both unchangeable and changeable knowledge, is *eudaimonia*, namely the 'final good' or the 'ultimate good'.

To demonstrate the meaning of *eudaimonia*, Aristotle preliminarily introduced a concept of the **function** (*ergon*) of human beings as achieving the good life, which is explicated in the level of both the theoretical science and practical sciences. In general, continuing the topic on the difference between the first instances and the second instances of *ousia*, the function of human beings in the domain of practical science, like politics, is the only perceivable basement by which the first instances of the Being of such domain can be grasped, though such function is essentially the second instances of the Being rather than the first, since it presents *physis* and *phronēsis* rather than *ousia* of the practical domain, the latter of which is rigours limited into the domain of the theoretical science. However, it is not saying the function of human beings in practical

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<sup>10</sup> Aristotle also claimed that last three causes can be united into one cause, for "the essential nature of a thing and the purpose for which it is produced are often identical (so that the final cause coincides with the formal), and moreover the power cause must bear some resemblance in 'form' to the effect (so that the power cause too must, so far, coincide with the formal)". (*Physics*, 198a25-29)

sciences is irrelevant to the theoretical science:<sup>11</sup>

*Ousia*, or the entity in the sense of first instances, is the most basic reality in the world, and it becomes what it is due to its form rather than its matter. The form of a natural *ousia* is the reason of the characterized function of such *ousia*, and this form is presented by its structural relevance to the others, rather than its apparent structure itself.<sup>12</sup> Therefore, this reason of such natural *ousia* applies not only to the natural itself but also to human beings, since the structural relevance of form is also presented by the function of human beings, especially in the sense of that, according to Aristotle, for human beings the soul is form of the living body and the body is the matter (*De Anima*,<sup>13</sup> 412a16-21), and the ultimate goal of such human beings entity is the *eudaimonia* of him or herself which is presented by the soul as form. For Aristotle, soul as the *ousia* of a human being in the essential sense endows the meaning of a necessary need to material body and provides the functional end (achieving the *eudaimonia*) to material body, so that soul and body “are causally relevant to a teleological explanation of the movement of a living organism.”<sup>14</sup>

In short, function of human beings belongs to practical science, whereas theme of *ousia* belongs to metaphysics; however *eudaimonia* makes them meet up together. For Aristotle, as far as the soul is the *ousia* of living beings, the desire of *eudaimonia* is thus a part of the human *ousia*, since whether the desire is rational defines whether an *ousia* is human *ousia* or just animal *ousia*: only the one for *eudaimonia* is rational. *Eudaimonia* is explicated in the meaning of a comprehensive or overall good which is probably not better than other good at current circumstance but must be considered for the whole of the living life. It may not be satisfied by the goal of an individual good arising from immediate experience, but may be satisfied by the goal of a good which includes other goals of others’ goods arising from not only the immediate experience but also the knowledge – the knowledge of not only the particulars but also the general. For Aristotle, the *ousia* of animals, namely their souls, fail to present such rational ability as the fundamental function of achieving non-immediate good for the overall or ultimate good for themselves, and are without any knowledge of the general; and rather than the apparent descriptions, it can be seen that Aristotle – and broad sense the Aristotelians as succeeding this principle – actually regarded the ethics of human beings as firstly differing from the function of animals, which means that the different functions of practical entities are given not for their own sake, but for the *ousia* that fundamentally beneath them. Therefore, referring to practical sciences like science of *polis* and history, to understand them in terms of not only the subject-matters of them but the comprehensive structure of themselves, namely how the science studies rather than what the science studies, we must investigate the fundamental regulations of the *ousia* of them.

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<sup>11</sup> For a famous example, T. H. Irwin, ‘The Metaphysical and Psychological Basis of Aristotle’s Ethics’, in Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg ed., *Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics*, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980, 35. Some scholars who are not specialists on Aristotle also make similar suggestions on the relevance between metaphysics and practical science, for example, see Reiner Schurmann’s short analysis on Aristotle in a footnote of his research of Heidegger. Schurmann, Reiner, *Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy*, Christine-Marie Gros transl., Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990, Chapter 5, Footnote 32, 328-329.

<sup>12</sup> Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg ed., *Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics*, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980, 38.

<sup>13</sup> Namely *On the Soul*. Here and hereafter I follow the Latin translation of this book which may be accepted more widely than the English translation among the specialists of Aristotle.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 43.

### 3.3. General characters of practical science: science of *polis* as an example, and possible science of history.

According to the basic principles of practical science above, a practical science should be established in the most comprehensive sense that concerns both the metaphysical regulations of it and its own practical subject-matters. In terms of its structure, it should aim to the *ousia* of the domain of itself, like the *ousia* of *polis* in the political science, or the *ousia* of history in the science of history, though it doesn't need to directly explicate the definition of such *ousia* since *ousia cannot be defined by others but only defines the others* in the sense of referring the first instances of *ousia*. This implicit indicating to the *ousia* should be explicated by investigating its functional-leading presentations of *eudaimonia*, which belongs to the interpretation of the second instances of *ousia*, and, should be expanded upon the discussion of *physis* and *phronēsis* of the *ousia* when the *ousia* is applied beyond the theoretical science but to practical sciences.

In the domain of science of *polis*, this featured structure of practical science may be able to be explicated by interpreting Aristotle's *Politics* with a metaphysical concern, as far as Aristotle's own interpretation on ethics is mere an initial application in terms of the practical applications of the metaphysics. Metaphysical foundation of ethics needs to be expanded and then be investigated in a wider and deeper domain of mankind's practical affairs, that is, politics and history. Indeed there is an opinion that the writing process of *Politics* was a long process in which Aristotle did change the original aim and scheme for several times,<sup>15</sup> but actually in this research (and in the researches by broad sense Aristotelians) the significance is not how *Politics* was written; rather, the significance is how his political philosophy was established as a whole. It is in this sense of a holism interpretation of Aristotle's thoughts and Aristotelian philosophies that his works present a productive comprehensiveness in terms of both structure and contents, which further requires a cross-disciplines-boundaries investigation rather than several mutual-irrelevant researches on different particular themes, though the latter have indeed promoted the academic development and lead to the differentiated modern sciences. For those I've referred in above (though they've not argued clearly) and for me, this comprehensiveness or wholeness of *Politics* is conducted by the metaphysical principles of *polis*, following which three fundamental parts of *Politics* can be clarified: the pure natural constitution (in accordance with *physis* of *polis*), the adjusted *polis* by *phronēsis* (in terms of *polis* itself) and *technē* (in terms of citizens), and the harmonizing work namely *eudaimonia* between the former two. In particular, *physis* of *polis* denotes a scheme that the citizens association<sup>16</sup> of freeman is the material cause of a *polis*, and that the constitution is the formal cause of the *polis*, which the two together consist to the whole process of the *physis* of *polis* but in mere the pure sense. (*Politics*, Book I-III) This pure process of the *physis* of *polis* needs to be adjusted by *technē/phronēsis* since a pure *physis* cannot maintain itself eternally and has potentiality to destruct itself (in terms of the 'perverted regimes'). (*Politics*, Book IV-VI) And these two parts of a *polis* should be harmonized in the final sense that the *bonum* (good) of an individual freeman as a citizen should be combined with the *bonum* of the *polis* by educating the citizens. This principle is meaningful for the both, especially due to the fact that when the *polis* is generated, it will have its own *telos* and its own *bonum*, rather than

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<sup>15</sup> See Jaeger, Wilhelm Werner, *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development*, New York: AMS Press, 1999; and his supporters.

<sup>16</sup> Namely κοινωvία. The Latin transliteration is *koinónia*. Some alternative English translations may include 'participation', 'communion', and 'fellowship'. I personally think 'society' is **not** a good translation due to its modern background and context.

directly adopt the *bonum* of citizens. (*Politics*, Book VII & VIII)

Similarly, a science of history can be established as a practical science by clarifying its characters as that, on one hand, such a science of history is a science of and by mankind so that it is a practical science by definition and it deals with temporal practical affairs like historical events and experience in given circumstance, just like the science of *polis* dealing with non-temporal but practical affairs; on the other hand, a science of history fundamentally accords the essential regulations of a practical science, that is, again, like the science of *polis*, the *ousia* of history itself is grasped by presenting its function, the latter of which contains a part on the natural generating process of itself and a part on the mankind's understanding and adjusting of such process. Therefore, a science of history in such a sense should be established and researched by investigating, **firstly, *physis* of its *ousia* in the pure theoretical and metaphysical level as foundation, and then, secondly, *technê/phronēsis* of its *ousia* in the practical level relating to the mankind's understanding and adjusting of it.** With these two fundamental steps, a science of history will finally respond the enquiry on the tension between the *bonum* of history itself and the *bonum* of human beings by conducting and then harmonizing them into a historical *eudaimonia*. Under such a scheme, if a science of history is a practical science which calls for a theoretical research on the fundamental nature of its 'Beingness', then it is not only a 'philo-sophy' in terms of the original meaning namely 'love-wisdom', but also in Platonic sense a true 'knowledge' in terms of differing from 'opinions', since such a science of history is not an intellect pleasure for few philosophers who have curiosity on the theme of history, but a necessary theme for the majority of philosophers who have the willing of understanding human beings. "It is on the essence that the philosopher must grasp the first principles and causes." (*Metaphysics*, 1003b19)

4. On *physis* of science of history: the one of the two secondary structures.

(In my original research, this and the next sections will be expanded into chapter 3 and chapter 4 respectively. Sections in this chapter/paper are the basic descriptions – in accordance with the descriptive metaphysics – of the principal regulations of science of history as a practical science, which will be expanded into detailed descriptions of *physis* and *technê/phronēsis* of science of history in next two chapters respectively.)

This section is about the *physis* of history and science of history in a general descriptive structure. Actually this explanation on the meaning of the term *physis* was argued by Aristotle in his *Physics* but not very conclusively clear, and was re-examined and re-expressed in accordance with its original Greek contexts by Heidegger. That is, *physis*, as one of the second instances denoting the function of *ousia* of an entity, means **being the entity itself** and suggests **a process of becoming and remaining itself**, which is observable and understandable for us, the human beings.<sup>17</sup> For Aristotle and broad sense Aristotelians, this concept in its most general perspective indicates a **combination of the material cause and the formal end cause** (*Metaphysics*, 1026a31), which should be interpreted and understood as both **a dynamic developmental process of being** and **a static status of being**. And these two principal interpretations of *physis* can be the metaphysical foundations of science of history, just like the metaphysical structure conducting science of *polis*.

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<sup>17</sup> See Heidegger's interpretation on the term *physis*. M. Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, R. Manheim transl., New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959, 14.

Problem comes soon after. Why there are two kinds of interpretation? The reason lies to the ways of the combination of the material cause and the formal end cause. Most of the investigations on the mutual relevance of the four causes begin from the nature of *epistêmai*, namely the theoretical knowledge, that is, *epistêmai* deals with the formal cause rather than the material cause, since the formal cause is unchangeable when it becomes actuality, whereas the material cause is changeable and mere potentiality. No matter what the subject-matter of a science on earth is, the knowledge of science must be the knowledge of actuality. Therefore, if I'm going to study the *ousia* of history as a theme of a practical science but also concerning theoretical knowledge (since history is a practical affair but *ousia* belongs to theoretical/metaphysical knowledge), what I will study is actually the actuality of science of history, since only when history becomes actuality it can be grasped by mankind's knowing activity.

However, it is in the way the potentiality becomes the actuality that interpretation gets difficult. By saying difficult, I think that the real case of such way is more complicated than what we would image, the latter of which supposes 'a simpler case' (as Aristotle's own words, *Metaphysics*, 1045a24), that is, for a single entity, 'from the material cause to the formal end cause' is equal to 'from the potentiality to the actuality'. Giving conclusion firstly, this simpler case indicates a development of the generating process by simply regarding the material cause as the beginning and the formal end cause as the result, which cannot be very appropriate to fully applied into science of history, since history is not a single entity but a complex entity (I'll explain the reason in 4.2). But it's not saying that the development from the material cause to the formal end cause is a mistaken interpretation of the generating process of an entity like history; rather, this developmental interpretation is the first step of a full understanding of *physis* of a complex entity. Without the developmental interpretation, the next one discussing the static status, namely the case that the above two 'from and to' are not equal to each other, cannot stand. Anyway, in the regarding with the combination of the material cause and the formal end cause to investigate *physis*, no matter in general sense or in particular sense, existence of history is not a given result of existence of particular historical events, since historical events provide only the material causes of history: by mere the historical events in past a history cannot be understood in present.

Therefore, in this section, I will describe two relevant interpretations on the combination of the material cause and the formal end cause. I will firstly argue that a generating process of science of history is a metaphysical development from the material cause (namely the historical events in past) to the formal end cause (namely the science of history in present). Then I'll argue that such science of history in present is a crossing-time complex entity combining science/knowledge of history in present (namely the developmental result of itself) **and** historical events in past (which should be mere the material causes in the previous interpretation but, in this one, still exist even after the formal end cause is generated). And finally I'll suggest that they support the understanding of *physis* together as a whole.

#### 4.1. Developmental interpretation: from the material cause to the formal end cause.

The first thing that I need to mention is the using of the term 'formal cause' and the term 'formal end cause' since I've already used them many times without any clarification. Actually they are same thing. Though Aristotle argued four causes, namely the material cause (matter),

the power cause, the formal cause (form), and the final-leading/purpose cause (*telos*), as the reason of any growing and self-movement of an entity, the latter three causes can be concluded as one cause, as I've mentioned, the formal end cause, like Aristotle himself argued, "in many cases three of these causes coincide; for the essential nature of a thing and the purpose for which it is produced are often identical (so that the final cause coincides with the formal cause), and moreover the efficient cause must bear some resemblance in 'form' to the effect (so that the efficient cause too must, so far, coincide with the formal)". (*Physics*, 198a25-27)

Describing the development from the material cause to the formal cause in general is relatively easier than describing the static status, since in this case 'the material cause becomes the formal end cause' is very equal to 'the potentiality becomes the actuality', which suggests that the material cause is the potentiality and the formal end cause is the actuality. This accordance and its process consist to the foundation of *epistēmai*, since *epistēmai*, firstly, deals with formal cause which is unchangeable, and secondly, the formal cause comes from the material cause. For the first one that science directly deals with the form rather than the matter, for example, in science of *polis*, the maintaining of a *polis* depends on whether the constitution of such *polis* for its self is firm, rather than whether the citizens of the *polis* support the *polis*. And in this sense a science of *polis*, namely *epistēmai* of *polis*, is actually and finally a science of the formal cause of *polis*, namely a science of constitution. So does a science of history. Science of history, if it is designed as a practical science, will be essentially about the formal cause of history, namely the one which is investigated as the result in present, since it denotes the philosophical spirit of time, rather than the material causes, namely the historical events in past that merely presented the existence of itself respectively without any meaning for present people. However, for the second one that the form comes from the matter, formal cause cannot become itself by itself: any science of formal cause must be initiated by investigating the beginning of the formal cause, that is, the material cause. Even a science of history aims to the history as the formal end, it needs to be investigated from the beginning, since the nature of the end is within the beginning. This process is in accordance with the mankind's knowing process – in Aristotelian philosophy – that knowing begins from particular materials rather than general forms, which is called as 'induction'.<sup>18</sup> Therefore, any investigation that relates to the essence of the formation of knowledge, though in the domain of practical science, like the essence of constitution, or the essence of historical thinking, will be inevitably initiated by investigating its metaphysical principle: how the material cause become the formal end cause?

In general, a world of given existence of formal end causes, namely a world of *telos*, is the world of the relevance of forms. This relevance suggests a mutual correspondence between the material cause and the formal cause, and, more important, a mutual correspondence between the potentiality and the actuality (though these two correspondences are equal mere in the case of single entity). On one hand, the formal cause is the end, *telos*, of the material cause, which means such *telos* is the necessary destination of the material cause. On the other hand, the material cause is the necessary condition of the formal end cause, which means, without the material cause, the formal end cause can never become the actuality. By the mental action of induction, the knowledge of, for example, *polis*, can be generated as the process in which the

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<sup>18</sup> This is one of the features of traditional philosophy which have been attacked by variety of modern philosophies. For a famous example, Hobbes, as an influential philosopher against the Aristotelian tradition not only in the domain of ontology or epistemology but also in political philosophy, argued that the 'real' knowing process is 'deduction'.

material cause/potentiality develops to the formal end cause/actuality. This process is not a concept based upon logical hypothesis of given descriptions; rather, this process is based on the real sort of the description of movement. It is by clarifying the nature of movement that the development from materials to form can be clarified whether it is a necessary development or just a development by chance. As Aristotle argued, "it is clear when the physicists [philosophers of *physis*] discuss the necessity, they should limit the term to what is inherent in the material cause, and should recognize the movement towards *telos* imposed on the material cause as a distinct addition to its inherent qualities." (*Physics*, 200a31-33) In science of *polis*, when the movement of a *polis*, namely the movement in which the constitution has been generated, naturally comes from the movement of the citizens, namely the movement in which a freeman becomes a citizen by ethically relating to other freeman and thus forms association of citizens, then it can be said such formal end cause, the constitution, is from the material cause, the citizens. But this accordance doesn't always happen on the right movement of the material cause. Movement can be generated also from the slaves and then prohibits the natural development towards constitution due to the lack of freemen's ethicalness. In this latter case of a *polis* though it still has a formal end cause (since it still has a constitution of slaves), such formal end cause doesn't accord to the movement of a natural association of freemen, and thus is not from the right material cause. Therefore, besides the material cause itself, movement, or more precisely speaking, 'right' movement that naturally links the material cause to the formal end cause, is the necessary condition for the right accordance between the material cause/potentiality and the formal end cause/actuality. And this right movement is the development of *physis* of an entity (though in this case it's merely about the single entity).

Problem comes soon. Is this movement a movement *sua sponte* (prompting oneself in accordance to its own), namely inside the material cause, or a movement the prompter of which is outside the material cause? This question relates to the clarification of *physis*, since the former, namely the promoter of a movement is the movement itself, is definitely in accordance to the definition of *physis*, whereas the latter is not in – at least by definition. However, this argument on the clarification of a natural movement (the movement in accordance with *physis*) doesn't necessarily result to the conflict between natural and unnatural movements, since this clarification is merely set up upon the definition rather than the application in circumstance. Some Aristotle specialists like Ernest Barker argued that, no matter whether the promoter is inside the movement and hence no matter whether the movement is natural/ in accordance with *physis*, *physis* for its own self cannot generate movement, and movement for its own self is not the direct result of *physis*.<sup>19</sup> Rather, *physis* internally exists inside the material cause and is going to be developed by the movement which begins from the material cause. And in this sense, *physis* is actually a process of a thing or, precisely speaking, an entity: it is constituted by the step of a natural material cause, the step of a movement from the natural material cause to the formal end cause, and the step of a natural formal end cause.

This understanding of *physis* as a developmental process is very important for us, especially in the sense of that we are going to investigate the metaphysical structure of practical sciences. In science of *polis*, by defining a natural formal end cause is developed from a natural material cause and its natural movement, it can be argued that, the only real beginning of a *polis* is necessarily a citizens-association, since only a citizens-association, as an ethically mutual-related

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<sup>19</sup> Barker, Ernest, *The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle*, New York: Dover Publications, 1959, 221.

unity of the freemen, is for its own self natural. Slaves, isolated person, even householder (which is widely believed as the so-called 'natural' beginning of a *polis* by commons) are impossible to be the material cause of a *polis*, since they metaphysically disobey the regulation of a material cause. A citizens-association naturally requires the development from itself to a *polis*, since it by its essence as a unity of freemen attempt to pursue *eudaimonia* which can be actualized necessarily by a *polis*. And such a *polis* coming from natural material cause and natural movement will be definitely natural – though it may but also may not maintain its natural essence.

Similarly, a science of history should also concern its *physis* as a natural developmental process, if it is going to establish its *epistēmai* by investigating its own nature firstly. Like science of *polis*, as far as *epistēmai* investigates the knowledge of form rather than matters, science of history investigates the understandable generated form of history which exists as a result in present, rather than historical events in past that present only the characters of their own time or circumstances. In science of history, historical events in past are at best the material causes of the generated history in present, the latter of which is the formal end cause of such developmental process. And in this sense it can be defined that the historical events, the movement from historical events to a history as a form in present, and the understandable knowledge of the history in present, are the three steps of the natural generating process of a history which denotes *physis* of such history.

In particular, this specifically characterized *physis* of history can be defined as *Ordnungszeit*, which means the time in which things are ordered. *Ordnungszeit* suggests the temporal structure as the nature of history, since the relation between historical events in past and history as form in present is at first a temporal relation, that is to say, events in past can never be the formal cause which is generated in present. This basic temporal regulation of *physis* of history, or the *Ordnungszeit*, is a metaphysical description of the chronological character of history, based on which some secondary interpretations on the logical position and logical reason of historical events and history can be expanded, though they still need another understanding on *physis* as introduced in below.

#### 4.2. Understanding the formal end cause: not only the result of the development.

I've described and suggested that the relatively simpler perspective of *physis*, for a single entity, is that 'from the material cause to the formal end cause' is equal to 'from the potentiality to the actuality'. In this developmental process the function of a formal end cause (*telos*) can be clarified as it naturally conducts the generating of an entity. In such a developmental interpretation, the meaning of the material cause depends on the meaning of the formal end cause, which suggests that the latter is superior to the former by both definition and chronology. By definition, for example, a seed cannot be defined without a tree that has already grown up: we never speak "this is a tree of 'xxx seed'" but speak "this is a seed of xxx tree". Also, for the Aristotelians, the common life cannot be defined without the understanding of *eudaimonia*: life is meaningless if it doesn't pursue *eudaimonia*. In this sense we define things by their forms rather than their materials. By chronology, an embryo as the material cause of an animal cannot be generated without the mature animal as the formal end: it is always a mature animal that generates the embryo, rather than reversely. Indeed people may argue that the natural developmental process from an embryo to a mature animal could suggest that the mature animal is chronologically after the embryo. But this is not saying the embryo hence has logical priority

over the mature animal; rather, what an Aristotelian metaphysics emphasizes is that the embryo is not necessarily about to be the animal. An embryo is possible to be a mature animal, and also not to be. The significance is that, reversely speaking, when a mature animal exists as its own being, it necessarily comes from the embryo, and in such case the mature animal is chronologically after the embryo, and necessarily has the logical priority over the embryo. In other case that the embryo doesn't develop to a mature animal, there is no formal end cause or movement of *physis*, hence needless to say which one is superior to the other.

However, most entities exist as not a single form but a complex form. Only by investigating the correspondences between the material cause and the potentiality and between the formal end cause and the actuality are not enough to support the final actualization of a complex entity, since these correspondences cannot explain, for complex entity, the reason that the material cause still exists even after the formal end cause is generated. Different from a single entity for which the material cause will eliminate when the entity comes into being, **a complex entity is the complexity of the materials AND the form**, which means that the former material cause will become part of the components of the generated result (namely the actualization), and will with the form together make the generated result being a complexity, though the complexity is still an individual existence.

Let's make this argument clearer by referring to science of *polis*, as this argument is very important to understand the essence of most of practical affairs like *polis* due to their qualities of being complex entity. In developmental interpretation of *physis* (like I've described in above sub-section), a constitution is the natural end of the natural movement initiated by citizens association for their own natural purpose (achieving the *eudaimonia*), and hence presents the *telos* of itself as the end of such natural developmental process. The *telos* is the destination of the movement of the material cause, and hence leads the movement to an enclosed process rather than any other possibilities. In other words, the developmental interpretation can explain the generating, the process, the components, even the meaning of a *polis*; however, it cannot explain the reason of the actualization of the *polis*: the citizens association, from which a *polis* generates, will not eliminate even after the *polis* comes into being. Rather, the citizens association will become part of the *polis*. Therefore, though by definition the science of *polis* investigates the knowledge of the constitution as form rather than the knowledge of the material citizens, now it has to investigate also the constitution's relation to the citizens, since the citizens may have impact on the constitution as far as they still exist even after generate the constitution. And this is the reason that in later parts of *Politics* Aristotle discussed why a constitution perverts and the methods avoiding pervert.

This example in science of *polis* is a practical representative of metaphysical regulations of complex entity. As I've argued, an entity comprises both primary instances (namely the 'Beingness') and secondary instances, and emphasizes especially on the secondary ones like *physis* and *phronēsis* which support the descriptive structure of the function of such entity. By describing a practical example of complex entity, we more or less can understand why – in terms of not only the practical affairs but the metaphysics – the correspondences between the material cause and the potentiality and between the formal end cause and the actuality do not necessarily happen. In his metaphysics and theories of ethics and *physis* (rather than mere the book *Metaphysics*), Aristotle argued four kinds of the existence of entity, that is, the existence by being one's self (*to ti ên einai*), the existence by accidentality, the existence by truth (or false), and the

existence by potentiality and actuality, and also argued that the existence of a complex entity accords to the principles of the last one, namely by potentiality and actuality. For the case of a complex entity, the material cause has a quality of 'will be', which means that, on one hand the material cause will become the formal cause, but on the other hand by arguing its quality the material cause for its own self is already an actuality. For an example – even not an example of complex entity but of general sense entity – a boy is the material cause of a man, and for the man the boy is the potentiality, whereas for the boy himself the boy is the actuality: the boy is not a conceptual hypothesis of the man but a real existing boy. For a single entity this example seems not necessary to demonstrate those applied metaphysical principles of *physis*; however for a complex entity it does matter, since we can't say 'the citizens are not the actuality since they've developed to a constitution': both the citizens and the constitution exist as one combined actuality.

Similar to the developmental interpretation in which the formal end cause is superior to the material cause by both definition and chronology, in this interpretation – I may define it as 'essential interpretation' as far as it finally investigates the reason of existence – the actuality is superior to the potentiality also by both definition and chronology. Indeed I may plus the third, that is, by existence. The argument that the actuality is superior to the potentiality may mean to that, in the very exact status that an actuality has already been generated, the actuality can exist without any potentiality, since all the potentialities at this moment do not exist any longer; however, reversely speaking, without the actuality, any potentiality is meaningless and can never exist. This principle may exactly be applied to complex entity. A complex entity comes its own being by the only form of itself, and such form as an individual is the reason of its existence as an actuality. For example, a *polis* as a complex entity may have people, trade, tax, troops, rulers, land, and many other things which in the view of the moderns are the components of a 'city-state'; however, only by having a constitution a *polis* can be defined as an existing *polis* as actuality. Those components are mere the potentialities of the *polis*. Without the constitution, those components are nothing.

Not only science of *polis*, a science of history may also apply this metaphysical design especially in terms of that the knowledge of history in present is also a complex entity. On the one hand that in the view of a developmental interpretation, it will be easily demonstrated that, according to the metaphysical regulations of *physis* of an entity, a science of history is a developmental process in which a historical event in past is the material cause and a understandable knowledge of a history in present is the formal end cause, and the developmental movement from the former to the latter denotes the natural character of history as *Ordnungszeit* of history. On the other hand, however, it cannot be dismissed that the historical events which were happening in past are currently also the subject-matters for a science of history in the sense of that those events may deliver the uniqueness of their time in every different past to the understanding in present, hence generates the tension between past and present which accords the philosophical spirit of historical thinking. Therefore the difficulty is that the philosophical understandings directly applied upon those historical events in past are also need to be theoreticalized into rigours science of history, or in other words, need to be embedded into the science of history which naturally investigates the knowledge only of the formal cause, namely the knowledge of a history in present. To accord the basic metaphysical regulation of *epistēmai* that investigates only the formal cause, historical event must be

conducted as a combined element with the formal end history together, as far as the event on one hand is the material cause of a history which means it has the quality of ‘will be’, but on the other hand is the actuality of itself. Somehow, I may define this essential interpretation that investigates the essence of history as a complex entity, in the regards with temporal character, as *Geschehenszeit*, which means the time in which history happened. *Geschehenszeit* is hence also the character of *physis* of history but emphasizing more on the final actualization of science of history that investigates both the present form and the past events, especially in terms of that rather than the *Ordnungszeit* that focuses only on the development.

#### 4.3. Relation between the developmental and the essential interpretations, and their historical applications (*Ordnungszeit* and *Geschehenszeit*) in general.

By arguing a developmental interpretation and an essential interpretation, I’ve sketched two main perspectives of the combination of the material cause and the formal end cause. The first suggests a dynamic developmental process of a being that investigates the material cause, the movement, and the formal end cause of the being; while the latter suggests a static status of the being especially in the case that the being is actualized by combining the material cause and the formal end cause. When these two interpretations are applied into practical science like science of history, the developmental one will denote a quality of a temporally ordering sequence of historical events that further generate the *physis* of history which may be defined as *Ordnungszeit*, and the essential one will be presented as a description of the static relation between happened historical events in past and understood history in present which can be called as *Geschehenszeit*. These two interpretations on *physis* of history, though still in the level of structure, can be concluded as:

<i>Physis</i> of history	Developmental interpretation	Essential interpretation
It emphasizes on...	The process from the material cause to the formal end cause.	The status of the complex entity of the material and the formal cause.
It supposes...	Historical events in past is the material cause; science of history as understandable knowledge is the formal end cause.	Events will not disappear even after the science of history has generated. Rather, events and the science together as a whole get actualized.
It can be characterized as...	Dynamic and progressive.	Static.
Its temporal application can be presented as...	<i>Ordnungszeit</i> (time in which historical events are ordered).	<i>Geschehenszeit</i> (time in which history happened).

On the final actualization of an entity especially in terms of a practical entity, I may add one clarification. Indeed, besides the final actuality that makes the complex entity being itself, there are still other actualities that come from different potentialities. For the example of science of *polis*, those actualities may be the rulers of a *polis* who indeed rule the *polis* and present the function of the constitution, which is in accordance with the metaphysical regulation that the essence of the being (in the sense of the primary instances) is presented by the function of the being (in the sense of the secondary instances) namely the formal cause. However, only one pair of potentiality and actuality is the highest and the fundamental existence of an entity – no matter whether it is a single or a complex entity – that is, the pair that makes the entity comes into being

by itself, since it is that pair of potentiality and actuality that provides *to ti ên einai* to the entity. In science of history, though historical events provide understandable knowledge to the present historical thinking by being temporally combined with the present science of history, they on earth are not the fundamental pair of potentiality and actuality that actualizes a history, since they for themselves are essentially individual existence in past and don't aim to a generating of a history in 'future' (in terms of the events in past).

But it is by arguing two interpretations of *physis* that I might be thought to give an inappropriate suggestion. Am I suggesting that the essential interpretation is a supplement of the developmental interpretation, since the former investigates more complicate cases than the latter, in terms of the complex than the single? Actually I'd rather argue that these two interpretations are independent (but not separated) from each other, and hence together make an enclosed perspective of *physis*. The suggestion that the essential is more complicate than the developmental one might inevitably indicate that the former is superior to the latter. For the example of science of *polis*, the highest good, or *eudaimonia*, of a *polis* is **not** supposed by a developmental interpretation and then demonstrated by an essential interpretation – if it were, then it would have not been a descriptive metaphysical philosophy. In other words, an essential interpretation doesn't demonstrate the generating process of an entity but merely – and importantly – demonstrate the reason of the existence of the entity: the reason that a *polis* becomes itself is unequal to, even independent from, the process that the *polis* comes from the citizens-association and forms the constitution, which actually denotes that the book *Politics* aimed not only to 'how does politics run' but also to 'what is politics'. So does a science of history. By investigating both the developmental and the essential perspectives of *physis* of history, I'm not going to suppose then demonstrate a highest aim of history; rather, the essential interpretation of *physis* of history is about to demonstrate the **reason** of the current existence of an understandable knowledge of history. It should be always remembered that science of history is a practical science which means the originator of history is mankind, which further requires that, just like science of *polis*, the research of *physis* of history finally serves to the understanding of human beings themselves, rather than the theoretical knowledge of metaphysics: somehow supposing and demonstrating a logical concept is a returning to the theoretical science since it is not merely about to describe the structure of the knowledge but about to create new metaphysical relevance of the knowledge.

So far I've sketched the first perspective of a metaphysical structure of science of history. It is based on two independent but not separated interpretations on *physis*. These two interpretations, the developmental and the essential interpretation, structurally regulate further applications on science of history. But as I've argued, *physis* is mere the first aspect of the functional grasp of *ousia*. Any investigation on a complete perspective of *ousia* of a practical science must be also concerned in the domain of practice itself, that is, it must also investigate the *technê/phronēsis* of such *ousia* by doing which such practical science can return to its essential quality of being a science of and by mankind.

##### 5. On *technê/phronēsis* of science of history: the other one of the two secondary structures.

This pair of concepts, *technê* and *phronēsis*, is another fundament of practical science. Different from *physis* which regulates practical science in the theoretical level, *technê* and *phronēsis* emphasize on the practical applications of the theoretical regulations. In this section,

I'll generally introduce the position and the meaning of *technê* and *phronêsis*, and then describe their functions by referring to science of *polis* as an example, so that it can be sketched that how can a science of history as also a practical science be designed.

Again, different from *physis* that calls for two independent but mutually related interpretations, *technê* and *phronêsis* will be interpreted in a relatively single perspective, that is, they together are the virtues related to the mankind's activities as a whole. Defining *technê* and *phronêsis* may be easy, as that the former is the virtue involved in the producing activity in which the producer is not equal to the production, whereas the latter is the virtue involved in the practice activity in which the one who practises for him or herself is the end of the practising activity. However, this definition is meaningful only when its general position, with its relevance to *physis*, is beforehand clarified, especially for us who need to investigate the relation between the theoretical and the practical science in the general scope.

### 5.1. The relative position of *technê/phronêsis* in terms of *physis*.

It is well-known that in Aristotle's philosophical system, *technê* and *phronêsis* are the last two of the five virtues by which the soul approaches the true knowledge. In general, the first three virtues, namely *sophia*, *epistêmê*, *noûs*, are applied to the grasp of the theoretical knowledge and hence deal with the knowledge that naturally generates from itself, namely according its own *physis*, no matter whether mankind is about to know. While the last two virtues, *technê* and *phronêsis*, are directly applied to the knowledge which generates from mankind's activities. In this sense, in accordance to Aristotelian philosophy that concerns the tension between the eternal and the human beings, I may define that these last two virtues are applied as the 'supplement' to *physis*.

In the previous section, I've argued that the generating process of a practical entity is conducted by *physis* (in both the developmental and the essential sense), and such process for itself is an **enclosed** process with clear beginning and end. However, I've never argued that due to its quality of being enclosed it is thus **complete and self-consistent**. A natural development is self-consistent **only** when it aims and does achieve the final *eudaimonia* of human beings. That is to say, if a development, which is natural and hence complete though, doesn't achieve *eudaimonia*, then it is not fully-beneficial to the welfare of human beings, hence not self-consistent, since by claiming complete and self-consistent it must be consistent to the end of human beings and thus forms the completeness of human beings. And by only *physis* this completeness is achieved accidentally rather than necessarily. Why? Why a natural result doesn't necessarily aim to *eudaimonia*? That's because of that when a natural result is generated, it becomes an entity with its own *telos* which is logical different from the *telos* of the generator of the entity. For example, a *polis* is the natural result of the *telos* of citizens since it is by achieving *eudaimonia* that the citizens generate the *polis*. However, when the *polis* comes into being as an individual actualization of its own self, it will have its own *telos*, that is, maintaining the existence of its form, the constitution, rather than the *telos* of citizens, their *eudaimonia*. Therefore, there is a logical distinction between the *telos* of citizens and the *telos* of *polis*, and in this practical example it emerges that the need of 'something' harmonizing the two *telos*. And that 'something', for Aristotelian philosophy, is the virtues of *technê* and *phronêsis*.

Speaking in accordance to the application of science of history, therefore, *technê* and *phronêsis* are needed to deal with the inconsistency between the historical events in past and the

science of history as a form of knowledge in present – yes, this gap or bridge between the past and the present appears again and makes significant impact on the understandings of such science itself, since it is on this gap, again, just like the essential interpretation of a complex entity that combines the same two, that, besides *physis* of history emerging in the natural process, the mankind's grasp of *physis* of history also locates, by regarding the mankind's understanding as a **knowing action** that relates to both *technê* and *phronêsis*.

Further demonstration is needed. If it is argued as above, then it can be suggested that a science of history as a form of knowledge in present cannot necessarily maintain its natural result of itself, and hence needs *technê/phronêsis* as 'supplement' to the natural result. But the logical problem is, if the generating process of a history from events to present form is all natural, why such a history as a natural result cannot necessarily maintain its quality of being natural or of according *physis*? The reason relates to the essential interpretation. As I've argued, a complex entity in science of history is the complexity of historical events and the present knowledge of the science itself, the latter of which is generated from the former. Therefore, whether the final actualization of science of history is natural depends on whether the material cause, the movement, and the formal cause are natural – so far it is same to the developmental interpretation – **and** whether the combined historical events, which are essentially the combined material causes as also the actualities, are natural. Apparently that seems like a tautology since the material cause has been argued twice respectively in the developmental process and in the static combination. However, though it may be same thing, it is depending on the different interpretation that the logical and the philosophical position of the material cause is able to be thoroughly investigated, especially in the case that the final actualization of an entity is not necessarily natural due to the possibility that the combined material cause may pervert.

This metaphysical principle is easier to understand by referring to the example of science of *polis* as Aristotle himself did study the reason and 'rectification' of pervert constitutions in *Politics*. A natural constitution (no matter whether ruled by one, or few, or majority) as the formal end cause is the natural result of the generating process given rise by the citizens-association who aims to pursue *eudaimonia*. But when the constitution is generated the citizens-association doesn't eliminate; rather, it is combined with the constitution together and hence needs to be harmonized its own *eudaimonia* with the *telos* of the constitution by physical and musical education (in the accordance to the body and the soul). If it is harmonized well as citizens' *eudaimonia* is exactly as same as the end of the constitution, then the constitution can be regarded as a natural actualization which maintains its internal self-consistence. However, if the citizens-association is about to pervert even after the constitution is generated, though the constitution has come from the citizens who used to be natural, the final actualization of such complex entity is not natural any longer, since the combined element, the citizens, is not natural any longer. The reason that the citizens pervert is various, mostly due to the confliction between the citizens' understanding of the natural justice and the justice according to *nomos* (it may be translated into 'artificial laws and traditions' as it emphasizes that it doesn't occur naturally<sup>20</sup>). (*Politics*, 1301a27-b6) Therefore, in general, though the generating process from the citizens to the constitution is conducted by *physis*, it is the citizens-association that determinatively effects

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<sup>20</sup> This perhaps is a linguistic reason that Aristotle argued that *nomisma* (money) comes from *nomos*. See *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1133a29-32; and *Politics*, 1256b31. Though he also argued that *nomisma* is not against to *physis* when it aims to help people achieving *eudaimonia*.

whether the final actualization of the constitution as a complex entity is natural. If the citizens fall pervert, the constitution, as already combined with the citizens, will pervert as follow, and thus needs *technê/phronēsis* to rectify and to return to the natural. In science of *polis*, *technê* and *phronēsis* are also various but generally aim to deal with the confliction between *physis* and *nomos*. For example, one of the famous ‘political *technê*’ is keeping apparent democracy to maintain essential monarchy. (*Politics*, 1294a3-16) Therefore, by referring the political example it may be claimed that *technê* and *phronēsis* together serve to the understanding of complex entity in practical science.

The position of *technê/phronēsis* in a science of history may also be demonstrated by following the similar logic. Though a science of history as a understandable knowledge in present is the formal end cause that generates from historical events in past, historical events will not eliminate but will temporally combine with the present science of history. However, it is due to this that the science of history in present is not necessarily natural, since historical events may also pervert like citizens, that is, the misunderstandings of historical events, just like different understandings of the natural justice and the justice of *nomos*. The logic – in accordance to all practical science – can be grasped as follow:

- (1) If historical events as the material cause are natural namely generates from their own selves **AND** are able to maintain the quality of being natural namely being rightly understood without distortion, then the present science of history as the formal end cause will be necessarily natural, **and** the complex entity of the formal end and the events will be necessarily natural and be actualized rightly. In this case there is no place for *technê* and *phronēsis*.
- (2) If historical events are natural **BUT** cannot maintain its quality of being natural, then the present science of history will be necessarily natural, **but** the complex entity of the formal end and the events will be necessarily unnatural due to the combination of the natural and the unnatural, and thus will not be actualized rightly. In this case *technê/phronēsis* is needed to rectify the unnatural understandings of the events.

Therefore, it can be seen that in this sense of science of history the essential function of *technê/phronēsis* is about the understanding, or the knowing action of human beings, especially about the historical applications of the metaphysical principles of the knowing action, namely the historical deliberation. But before I introduce the application of *technê/phronēsis* in the form of historical deliberation, I’d like to clarify one more preliminary theme, that is, the relation between ‘I’ and the activities applying *technê/phronēsis*, since it is ‘I’ who essentially grasp the understandable knowledge of science of history.

## 5.2. Am I a producer applying *technê*, or a practiser applying *phronēsis*?

For Aristotelian philosophies, and even for the broad sense philosophies that succeed Aristotelian philosophical principles more or less like Heidegger’s and Arendt’s philosophy, clarifying *technê* and *phronēsis* is directly related to the definition of *poiesis* (‘produce/make’) and *praxis* (‘practice’). This distinguishing can be valued as one of the most influential arguments that regulate the way philosophers establish theories on acting or conduction of human being. According to Aristotle’s own definition, it is easy to differ the two by arguing that the end or the reason of producing is the producer and is outside the production, whereas the end or the reason of practising is the practiser him or herself. Reversely speaking, the cause, or the reason of

the existence, of a production is due to the purpose of the producer rather than the production itself, whereas for a practising activity there is no difference between the practiser and the be-practised. And the virtues, *technê* and *phronêsis*, are applied into the producing activity and the practising activity respectively.

However, this clarification doesn't mean that the practical **science** applies only *phronêsis* and the producing science applies only *technê*. Even in terms of a single activity, it is only the second half, 'the producing activity applies only *technê*', that makes hundred percents sense: a practising activity applies not only *phronêsis* but also *technê*. And speaking in the wideness of practical science rather than single practical activity, this character that practice applies not only *phronêsis* gets more obvious and offers significance to the whole structure of practical science. Firstly Aristotle's own argument should be re-examined. Again, it's about the general position of the virtues, as he said:

*The class of things that admit of change<sup>21</sup> includes both things produced and actions practised. But producing is different from practising, the distinction of which we may accept from extraneous discourses. Therefore, the rational quality concerned with practising is different from the rational quality concerned with producing. Nor is one of them a part of the other, for practising is not a form of producing, nor producing a form of practising ... It follows that a *technê* is the same thing as a rational quality, concerned with producing, that reasons truly. **All *technê* deals with bringing something into existence; to pursue a *technê* means to study how to bring into existence a thing which may either exist or not, and the efficient cause of which lies in the producer and not in the thing produced, for *technê* does not deal with things that exist or come into existence of necessity, or according to *physis*, since these have their efficient cause in themselves. But as practising and producing are distinct, it follows that *technê*, being concerned with producing, is not concerned with practising. And in the sense of that *technê* deals with the same objects as chance, as Agathon says "Chance is beloved of *technê* and *technê* of Chance", *technê*, therefore, as has been said, is a rational quality, concerned with producing, that reasons truly. Lack of *technê*, is a rational quality, concerned with producing, that reasons falsely. Both deal with that which admits of change. (Nicomachean Ethics, 1140a1-24)<sup>22</sup>***

This famous citation may suggest two important points to us:

(1) In the purely natural domain in which things generate in the rigours – thus simple – accordance with *physis* from the material cause to the formal end cause, there is no obvious need of *technê*, needless to say *phronêsis*. But this rigours and simple principle becomes complex when it is applied into practical science. In science of *polis*, it is citizens who generate the constitution and thus, in the view of the citizens, it is the citizens who produce the constitution by applying their virtues of producing, that is, *technê*. Therefore, though a *polis* for its own self can be said that it generates and becomes itself in the rigours accordance with *physis* since its material cause, movement, and final form are all natural, a *polis* is also the result of mankind's activity, which inevitably leads to an apparent paradox that even a natural domain with only

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<sup>21</sup> It means the things that exclude unchangeable theoretical knowledge.

<sup>22</sup> Bold type is made by me. This citation is translated partly by me with consideration of Rackham's translation (in *Loeb Classic*), and Ross's translation, and Robert C. Bartlett & Susan D. Collins's new one in 2011. Please see the bibliography. Besides, I have to say that, in my own opinion, 'practice/se' may be a better translation of *πράξη* than 'action/act'. Another problem of the choice between 'make' and 'produce' is not so significant.

*physis* also needs the rectified understanding by *technê*. Similarly, in science of history (if what I assume about such metaphysical science of history is possible), it is real people rather than concept of human beings who generate historical events, and hence from the very being namely the material cause are the part of the natural generating process of history. Therefore it also results to the apparent paradox that even in pure natural domain, again, *physis* needs *technê*.

By speaking 'apparent', actually it is not a real paradox since it applies different angles of the perspective of complex entity. On one hand, in the views of citizens or people in historical events, they logically stand 'outside' *polis* or history, since it is the citizens or the people who **produce** *polis* or history respectively. On the other hand, in the view of such *polis* or history, citizens are the material causes of the *polis* and are combined with the constitution together thus form the complex entity, so do the people in historical events combining with the present knowledge of history, both of which hardly indicates that citizens stand outside *polis* or people outside history, but suggests they are 'inside' such *polis* or history. In this sense of the 'inside' and being the material causes, citizens or people in events do not require any outside efficient/powerful cause as the promoter of the development towards *eudaimonia*: citizens-association generates the constitution *causa sui*, or, events with those within-people generates history *causa sui*. Therefore, logically speaking, a pure natural constitution or a present understandable knowledge of history doesn't require an outside *technê* since it finishes itself *causa sui*. However, it is in this sense that I must argue, in science of *polis* as example, a constitution as a natural result satisfies the end **only** of itself, rather than of itself **and** citizens, though the original aim of citizens that producing the constitution is to satisfy the end of themselves. Why? The reason is that the constitution of *polis* is a natural result, which means that it has **its own end** beyond **the end of its producer**. Therefore, for Aristotle, the reason of further discussion about unnatural regimes in *Politics* may emerge: the end of a constitution is not necessarily equal to the end(s) of its citizens. And in this point, *technê* is needed to rectify the heterogeneity between the natural and the unnatural. In a rigours but also direct angle, the scope of *technê* is wider than the scope of *physis*, and *technê* is excluded from *physis*, since the result of *physis* is only the natural constitution (in the domain of politics), whereas the objects of *technê* comprise many possibilities as accidentalities, just in accordance with Aristotle's regulation about accidentalities: accidentalities are more than necessities. This is to say, though *technê* is for the aim of maintaining or returning to *physis*, there is no room inside *physis* for *technê*.

(2) It can be also noticed that *technê* is the virtue of producing (*poiesis*) rather than practising (*praxis*). It has been argued many times that the biggest difference between them is whether the cause of a changeable thing is *causa sui*. Production is for the end not of itself but of the producer, whereas practice is for the end of its own self. Therefore, by arguing so, I immediately have to deal with a predicament when interpreting the complex entity in practical science: if 'participating politics', or 'living historically', is a practice the cause of which is inside the political participators or the historical people and the end of which is also for the end of the participators or the people themselves, then it seems no problem that political or historical *phronêsis* is functionally as same as political or historical *technê*, since political or historical *technê* is for the aim of maintaining and returning the natural sense constitution or present knowledge of history that satisfies *eudaimonia* of citizens or historical people. But if this description is true, then, is this to say that practice is essentially as same as producing? Why we still need the distinguishing between *poiesis* and *praxis* in a practical science?

Reason relates to the previous argument on the different angles. In science of *polis*, the description ‘participating politics is a political action which virtue is *phronēsis*’ is true **only** when this description is taken under the angle of the citizens themselves, namely, under the angle that citizens regard themselves as being about to generate constitution. In other words, this description is true since the only reason for citizens to participate politics is posited upon citizens themselves. However, this description stands on the position of individual person rather than of *polis*, which suggests that it essentially belongs to science of ethics like *Nicomachean Ethics* (which concerns politics ultimately for the good of individual person) rather than science of *polis* like *Politics* (which concerns politics ultimately for the good of *polis* and citizens-association in a collective sense). When we discuss the natural process from the material cause to the formal end cause of a *polis*, what we actually deal with is not posited upon the angle of individual, namely, not the angle of internal citizens; it is actually posited upon the external observation of a *polis* as a whole. Therefore, the previous true description about a ‘political practice’ is actually a *technē* for such *polis*, since the promoter of a constitutional *polis* is actually producing the constitution, if we put our sight upon the *polis* rather than the citizens. Moreover, in a *polis*, every citizen can practise for his or her own good, and such practice requires the application of the virtue *phronēsis*; however, only the statesman, or the ruler, who has both the theoretical knowledge of *polis* and the practical knowledge of being a citizen as the fact that he or she has been a freeman in such *polis*, is able to judge whether and why such *polis* is no longer natural, and thus able to find proper *technē* to return the *physis* of it. For this statesman, political activity is not only a *praxis* (‘practice’ for one’s own good/end) like the one done by citizens to achieve their own but individual good, but also a *poiesis* (‘produce’ for the good of the producer rather than the production) which is done to achieve the good of the whole of *polis* beyond the individual good of the statesman. And for such reason, politics is both practical and productive science for him, whereas it is only practical for the other citizens.<sup>23</sup>

Similarly, as a practical science, science of history aims to *eudaimonia* of human beings in the historical dimension, that is, the completeness of historical knowledge, rather than the partial knowledge of historical events generated by people in past. That is to say, if a person in present applies some certain *technē* to maintain the partial knowledge of historical events in past, what he or she actually attempts to maintain is not the completeness of the generated history as a whole in present but the *bonum* of past – in the form of separated historical events. That person could accidentally be aware of the present science of history as a whole perspective; but also could not be so since that person doesn’t aim to the present understanding but to the separated knowledge of events in past. Only in present the understandable knowledge of history as a form of science the person’s own historical consciousness will make effort on the maintaining of such history: he or she for his or her own self is practically deliberating the history. Therefore, it can be argued that such a person is a historian. In science of history, a historian owns both the theoretical knowledge of the generating process namely *physis* of history from past to present, and the practical knowledge of being a person who is about to knowing the history in present. When a historian learns about the theoretical knowledge of history, he or she will not achieve only the separated knowledge of events in past, but also the knowledge of the whole – no matter

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<sup>23</sup> Some specialists of Aristotle like Reeve has also argued that politics is an architectonic virtual science that all theoretical, productive and practical combine together. Though for him politics is the only one. See Reeve, C. D. C., *Practices of Reason: Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992, section 12.

whether he or she can, the historian pursue the completeness of historical knowledge.

Therefore, for any practical science that concerns theoretical knowledge but studies practical affairs (for Aristotle himself the science of *polis* and the science of ethics are the only two, but for me it includes science of history), to understand the relation between *poiesis* and *praxis*, and between *technê* and *phronêsis*, is to understand the distinguished but related two angles of a changeable practical entity. *Technê* and *phronêsis* are not totally opposed to each other in the practical science that deals with both human beings themselves and their natural result comprising the human beings; they depend on different angles by which the aim of a science may establish: science of ethics is established upon the angle of individuals, whereas science of *polis* is established upon the angle of the natural result of those individuals, namely a *polis*, while these two angles actually refer to the same process of a development from citizens-association to *polis*. Therefore, it's not true to say that science of *polis*, or science of history established in a similar way, concerns only the virtue of *phronêsis*, though *phronêsis* is regarded as the practical virtue of *eudaimonia*-aiming life in public or temporal sense. As far as people start to **study** the science of their public or temporal life, rather than merely **live** their public or temporal life, life is considered with not only *phronêsis* but also *technê* since it is descriptively produced as a science.

#### 6. Conclusion: actualizing historical *eudaimonia*.

So far I've described the general structure of a metaphysical science of history as a substitution of the epistemological historicization. Philosophies of history, even including the epistemological historicization, in the broadest sense aim to investigate the gap between past and present, especially between the happened historical events in past and the understandable knowledge of history generated in present. A metaphysical science of history also follows this fundamental regulation.

In this chapter/paper, I firstly claim that this metaphysical interpretation concerns science of history as a 'practical science' in terms of Aristotelian philosophy on the three kinds of science, in the sense of which I adopt Aristotle's political science (science of *polis*) as an another but also the most relevant practical science to help with interpreting. In the regards with the metaphysical regulations, I demonstrate that an entity (*ousia*) shall be understood as, firstly, in the primary instances that denotes the fundamental Being (*to ti ên einai*) of the entity, then, and in the secondary instances that denotes the function of the entity. But since the fundamental Being cannot be defined by others but can only define others, the primary instances cannot be grasped directly but only be known by investigating the secondary instances. The secondary instances of entity are established upon the interpretation of *physis* and *technê/phronêsis* of entity.

Therefore, next I argue that a metaphysical science of history as a practical science shall be constructed upon two levels, on *physis* of history and on *technê/phronêsis* of history. In the part of *physis* of history, I suggest that the development from historical events in past to knowledge of history in present is conducted by the metaphysical principle of the development from the material cause to the formal end cause, just like that in science of *polis* the citizens-association is the material cause and the constitution is the formal end cause. But mere this developmental interpretation is not enough to sketch the whole perspective of historical thinking since historical events as the material causes don't eliminated even after the knowledge of history in present is generated; rather, an essential interpretation that investigates the combination of past events

and present knowledge is also needed. This interpretation demonstrates that historical events and the science of history together form the understandable historical thinking as a whole and hence gets actualized.

In the part of *technê/phronēsis* I argue that these two virtues are needed as the supplement to the maintaining of *physis* by providing the way human beings indeed grasp the *physis* of history, that is, by applying *technê/phronēsis* human beings regard historical knowing as a practical action. And this practical action of knowing finally conducts historical knowing to historical *eudaimonia*, just like in science of *polis* the constitution exists for the reason of actualizing citizens' *eudaimonia*.

It should be emphasized again that, for Aristotelian philosophy, all the practical sciences finally aim to achieve *eudaimonia* of human beings, rather than the finalization of the science itself. *Eudaimonia* is the ultimate and best end (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1094a14-16 and 1176b30-31), and is also the unconditional end (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1097b1 and 1139b1-4) of all the practical sciences and of human beings. In science of *polis*, like I've argued, since the end of citizens and the end of the generated *polis* are not necessarily coincident to each other, *technê* and *phronēsis* are applied to harmonize the two different *telos* by educating the citizens who have been combined with *polis* but may still hold the unnatural opinions on justice which come not from *physis* but from *nomos*.

In science of history, this harmonizing work will be done not by educating but by actualizing historical *eudaimonia*. As a similarly constructed practical science but in the regards with the temporal and chronological nature (*Ordnungszeit*), science of history expands the political and ethical perspective of *eudaimonia* to a temporal dimension, which means science of history that investigates the relation between the happened events in past and the historical thinking in present is a temporal transition of political science that investigates the relation between citizens and *polis*. Political and ethical *eudaimonia* is an approach that actualizes the theoretical knowledge of the highest good of mankind's life by emphasizing the quality of conducting particular knowledge of different good into a general knowledge as a whole, in the process of which the five virtues are applied and the theoretical science is harmonized with practical affairs in the actualization of every different circumstance. And this process towards *eudaimonia* can thus be understood as pursuing the completeness of knowledgeable life of human beings. These characteristics presented by science of *polis* shall be understood as being presented by the general structure of practical science and hence shall be adopted by science of history. Science of history also pursues the completeness of knowledge but specifically focuses on the historical knowledge of human beings' themselves. In this sense, historical *eudaimonia* indicates an attempt that, by deliberating the past to the present mind, the present historians may re-enact the past as a present understandable knowledge and hence regard the process from the past to the present as a relatively complete history.

Finally, retrospectively speaking, in the regards with the most significant spirit of historical thinking, the notion of historical *eudaimonia* may be a good alternative that makes us overcoming the limitation of the epistemological historicization. The epistemological historicization brings two fundamental predicaments to the essence of historical thinking, that is, the ignorance of the structural generating of history in past (in terms of the related historical thinking in present relatively), and thus the ignorance of knowing such structural generating of history in past (in terms of that the aim of a philosophical thinking is focused on the relation

between the essence and the knowing of it). In short, these two predicaments of the epistemological historicization are somehow due to that the epistemological historicization pays attention merely on the thinking activity applied upon historical knowledge and doesn't aim to solve or just investigate the highest, philosophically, relation between the temporal mortals and the eternal immortal beings. While the notion of historical *eudaimonia* emphasizes on that the thinking of historical knowledge – as practical knowledge – finally aims to the *bonum* of human beings who take the activity of thinking rather than the thinking itself. That is to say, the notion of historical *eudaimonia*, and also metaphysical science of history, returns to the beginning of philosophy and ask the original question again: is a philosophy necessarily a historical thinking? Or reversely, is a historical thinking necessarily philosophical? By asking questions like these, philosophies of history – now, I'm referring to the most common sense of this term – may be reinvestigated: not reinvestigate the subject-matter of such philosophy, but reinvestigate the reason of studying history.