Salt and Socialism: A Deconstruction of Tuzla’s Political Identity in the Context of the Bosnian Conflict

Anna Calori

University of Exeter

E-mail address for correspondence: ac594@exeter.ac.uk

Abstract

The “Bosnian Uprising” in February 2014 took its spark from the North-Eastern Bosnian town of Tuzla – a traditionally left-wing city and the only municipality to have actively resisted the “ethnicisation” of politics that scattered the rest of the country during the first multi-party elections of 1990. Historically, Tuzla’s working class has been characterized with a legacy of positive inter-ethnic relations going back as far as the Austro-Hungarian period. The city’s collective memory as a (non-ethnic) unicum, together with its strong Yugoslav identity, finds its codification in the survival of a solid working-class culture. This article will show how Tuzla managed to survive ethnic fragmentation in a time of severe political turmoil. It will be argued that the city displayed considerable immunity to ethnic polarization, primarily by constructing an anti-nationalist, working class narrative around which the citizens collectivized their historical identity.

ISSN: 2048-075X

Ethnopolitics Papers is an initiative of the Specialist Group Ethnopolitics of the Political Studies Association of the UK, published jointly with the Exeter Centre for Ethnopolitical Studies and Centre for the Study of Ethnic Conflict, Queen's University Belfast.

Edited by
Dr Gareth Curless, University of Exeter
Morgane Colleau, University of Exeter
Henry Jarrett, University of Exeter

We welcome contributions and comments on Ethnopolitics Papers to g.m.curless@exeter.ac.uk

Ethnopolitics Papers are available online at https://www.psa.ac.uk/psa-communities/specialist-groups/ethnopolitics/blog
1. Introduction
This paper focuses on the municipality of Tuzla, the third largest city in Bosnia-Hercegovina, with an ethnically mixed population of roughly 130,000 citizens. According to the last census available (from 1991), Tuzla was populated by 48% Bosniaks, 17% Yugoslavs, 15% Croats, 15% Serbs and 5% others. This industrial town, located in the North-Eastern part of the Federation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, has a very peculiar history, particularly in relation with the conflicts that occurred in the region during the 1990s.

Although the analysis of the complex set of explanations for the break-up of Yugoslavia is beyond the purpose of this paper, it is necessary to briefly explain the context within which this analysis takes place. During the 1980s, the Federation of Yugoslavia (composed of six Republics and two autonomous provinces) went through a devastating economic crisis, paralleled with a crisis within the political institutions and the League of Communists. At the political level, the conflict unfolded over the degree of independence from the Federation that each republic was advocating. The Slovenian and Croatian leaderships became increasingly vocal in demanding full independence. This was in contrast particularly with the Serbian leadership, which wanted a stronger, centralised federation. The rise of nationalist parties in each republic, increasingly advocating for independence and ethnic homogeneity, characterised the Yugoslav political landscape across the 1980s and beginning of 1990s. Ethno-political tensions started emerging across the Federation, and were stirred by nationalist leaders. Bosnia had a particularly mixed population, and in this period nationalists pledged allegiance to ethno-nationalist divisions within the Federation. After the first multiparty elections of 1990, Bosnia became increasingly divided amongst its three constituting nationalities: Muslim Bosnjaks, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats. A few months after Slovenia’s and Croatia’s declarations of independence in 1991, Bosnia also held a referendum (boycotted by the Serb population), which ratified its separation from the Yugoslav Federation. After the break-up of Yugoslavia, armed conflicts occurred in Slovenia, firstly, then Croatia and subsequently in Bosnia. Serbian forces managed to gain control over the Yugoslav National Army, and subsequently initiated an armed conflict to secure their territory in Bosnia, backed by Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic. The three main nationalist factions managed to secure military support; particularly, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, who were supported by the nationalist governments of Serbia and Croatia. Between 1992 and 1995, Bosnia experienced an incredibly violent conflict, characterised by ethnic cleansing, crimes

---

1 Hereinafter Bosnia.
2 According to the data available at the Federalni Zavod za Statistiku. The data of the latest census (2013) is not yet available – as of April 2015.
3 Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro
4 Kosovo and Vojvodina
5 The Communist Party of Yugoslavia
6 Although a complete analysis of the complex economic, social and political factors that led to the disruption of Yugoslavia are beyond the purpose and scope of this paper, I broadly refer to: Jović, 2009; Gagnon, 2006; Magaš, 1993; Ramet, 2005.
against humanity and genocide. The Dayton Peace Agreement signed in 1995 has de facto sanctioned the territorial division of Bosnia across ethnic lines.

This article will explore the case of Tuzla, one of the very few instances of inter-ethnic cooperation during the conflict, at the political as well as religious and civil-society level. In the relatively short period between the first (1990) and the second (1996)\(^7\) multiparty elections in Bosnia, three characteristics underlined Tuzla’s specificity. Firstly, it betrayed the precedent of other major towns by becoming the only municipality where non-nationalist and multi-ethnic parties were able to win the 1990 and 1996 elections with a decisive majority and form a municipal government. Secondly, notwithstanding the strong ethnic dis-homogeneity that characterised the city (none of the constituent ethnic groups\(^8\) had an absolute majority), the local administration managed to prevent the political, social and military polarisation that had plagued the dynamics within these ethnicities in other cases (Somor, 2001:136). Indeed, when observing nationalist radicalisation, which featured consistently in the first elections in Bosnia and subsequently played a major role in the violent outcomes of the war, it is meaningful to analyse the case of Tuzla, where violent episodes of mass ethnic cleansing were successfully prevented (Armakolas, 2011:236-237). Finally, the preference accorded to the Social Democratic Party (SDP-BiH), a major candidate representing a cross-national base and orientation (Bose, 2002:209), at the national elections in 1996, can be seen as the consequent approval of Tuzla’s citizens for the political party that managed to preserve Tuzla’s identity as an undivided community. This aspect is particularly relevant if one considers the further radicalisation of Bosnian national politics in the immediate aftermath of the war.

This article will enquire into the distinct political behaviour of Tuzla’s citizens and their representatives throughout the critical period between 1990 and 1996. It will investigate the historical features contributing to the construction of a non-nationalist political orientation and analyse the formation of Tuzla’s narrative as a unique municipality, resisting what was an increasingly enveloping cycle of violence. Through the exploration of the dialogue between citizens and the administration, both the mechanisms of identity formation and reproduction, as well as path-dependency, will be considered as possible explanations for Tuzla’s cohesiveness in a time of crisis (Pierson, 2000; Mahoney, 2000:536).

The findings have been collected through fieldwork in the summer of 2012, in the form of semi-structured, in-depth interviews with workers, citizens, members of the political parties and religious institutions. This has been combined with archival research of local media and official documentation, which corroborates the interviewees’ accounts. The purpose of these interviews was to collect a multiplicity of voices accounting for experiences of civic

---

\(^7\)See, among others, Žilić, 2001; Armakolas, 2007, 2011; Arnautović, 1996.

\(^8\)Bosnian-Croats, Bosnian-Serbs and Bosnian-Muslims.
unity and anti-nationalism. From the dialogue with the interviewees, an account of the city’s collective effort to diverge from nationalist radicalisation emerges.

2. Historical Roots for Identity Formation

Tuzla’s character as a historically and traditionally multi-ethnic town with a multifaceted demographic composition can be identified as one of the main reasons accounting for the lack of ethnic grievances and intolerance among its citizens.

Since the Austro-Hungarian domination the city has been economically well developed, mainly due to the availability of raw materials, particularly salt and coal. The development of the mining industry in Tuzla attracted migration from all over the Empire (Germans, Hungarians, Italians, Russians and so forth), especially qualified workers, economic experts, clerks and army personnel, who modified the city’s social, national and religious structure (Hadzić & Selimović, 2007). Moreover, imported skilled labour implied that ‘foreigners were the pillars of administration and new economic activity’ (Selimović, 2007:200). Thus, in comparison to the general situation in Bosnia, Tuzla experienced a relative surge in the percentage of migrants and members of various religious minorities, which by 1910 constituted 35.6 per cent of Tuzla’s population (Klapić, 2002:145). This situation remained on track even between the two World Wars, when the percentage of people not affiliated to any of the three major religions (Islam, Orthodox or Catholic Church) increased by 80 per cent.9

The historical roots of ethnic cohesion can be further found in the perceived exceptional response to the Second World War. Although a detailed discussion of the conflict is beyond the purpose of this paper, it is important to note the deep-rooted anti-fascist spirit characterising the city’s historical memory. Having been occupied by the Axis and Ustaše10 forces as a strategic centre for resources and transportation in the region, the city was first liberated in 1943 by the anti-fascist Partisan forces (National Liberation Army). As Zekić & Tihić point out, ‘The biggest significance of this liberation in 1943 is that […] Ustaše […] faced a blow and were never again able to recover. Muslim and Croatian masses started to be politically active and they chose “National Liberation Army” as their side’ (1987:1064-1065).11 At the same time, the Serb community distanced itself from the nationalist Chetnik movement, and brought its support to the anti-fascist forces. The presence of a strong communist resistance movement, and its success in the early liberation of the city, thus mobilised the different ethnic groups around the non-ethnic resistance movement guided by Marshal Josip Broz Tito, the future creator and main political leader of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.12

---

9Most of them belonged to the Jewish religion (Selimović, 2008:93).
10Controlling the NDH, Independent State of Croatia, a de facto fascist puppet state in close alliance with the Third Reich.
11Author’s translation.
12For a detailed literature on this topic, see Lampe, 2000; Tomasevich, 2001.
As such, the fact that the city was under the control of the “People’s Liberation Army” from an early stage not only showed the presence of a strong anti-fascist movement in the Tuzla area, but also contributed to the further strengthening of the consensus directed towards Tito’s Partisans, responsible for the liberation of the city. According to a former partisan, ‘in Tuzla the situation was less violent, although war, in itself, is violence. [At the time] Tuzla was very united, there haven’t been many conflicts between Serbs, Croats and Muslims’.

Besides, *Front Slobode*, the main local newspaper characterised by a rather strong left-wing orientation, started its publication in 1943, thus contributing to the forging of an anti-fascist conscience among Tuzla citizens. According to its former director: ‘their relationship with the newspaper was particularly emotional. The newspaper was part of the cultural identity of the city, it was a mirror of the city’.

Although it would be inaccurate to conclude that during the Second World War Tuzla was free of any ethnic violence or persecution of members of the forces that fought against the “People’s Liberation Army”, it is interesting to note that the protection of Serb citizens by the local Muslim community is often recalled as one of the main explanations for the lack of ethnic division amongst Tuzla citizens. The reverence given by many interviewees to the example of partisans’ resistance and cohesion shows the extent to which this event re-constituted the memory of the Second World War as relatively free from ethnic grievances. This is particularly relevant if one considers that, in the moments leading up to the break-up of Yugoslavia, historical grievances related to ‘Second World War atrocities were recalled and revived by all three ethnic parties’ (Andjelic, 2003:177), and exploited to serve the purpose of nationalist propaganda. Hence, across Yugoslavia the nationalist discourse reinterpreted and recalled a divisive past in order to exacerbate ethno-nationalist tensions. The fact that Tuzla’s historical discourse has been selective of memories of anti-fascist and anti-nationalist struggle somehow isolated the city from this tendency.

The post-Second World War reconstruction, sided with processes of strong industrialization, economic growth and urbanisation, and the development of the Yugoslav economic system, resulted in an impressive population growth, due to the fact that ‘Tuzla […] had developed into the most significant mining and industrial centre of Bosnia’ (Selimović, 2007:201).

The 1950s in Yugoslavia saw most citizens of Tuzla employed as miners, especially in the salt mines, and industrial workers. This encouraged further migration from both within and outside the Yugoslav Federation, attributed to Tuzla’s vibrancy: ‘This is a tradition of continuity of migration, multiculturalism and multi-ethnicity. People are accustomed to

---

14 Interview conducted with S. Alić, 10.07.2012.
living together’. This suggests the interest of both political and religious élites, as well as citizens, in forming a shared narrative exclusive to the perceived identity of Tuzla as a defiantly united city. Tuzla’s early initiation to a multi-ethnic work force has undoubtedly influenced the design of a “Tuzla character”, levelling social stratification and encouraging collaborations between the different cultures, religions and ethnicities. ‘A large number of Tuzlaci liked to emphasise their town’s unusual history of resistance and its multinational character’ (Jansen in Bougarel, Helms & Duijzings, 2007:199). Hence, Tuzla can be seen as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, anti-fascist community rooted in a vibrant historical narrative, which fosters its perception as a unique example of multi-ethnic dialogue. Nonetheless, this particularity needs to be further explored in relation to the presence of a strong industrial workforce.

3. Class

The process of industrialization, urbanization and de-agrarisation had already affected Tuzla at the end of the 19th century. The aforementioned development of salt mines and coalmines, as well as numerous industrial complexes (along with Termoelektrana, one of the biggest power plants in Bosnia), attracted a consistent and varied workforce, thus causing an impressive demographic development of the city. The industry and mining activities were nationalized and further developed during the Yugoslav period, thus becoming the most important sector in the economic growth of the city (Klapić, 2002:193).

Consequently, Tuzla was characterised by a strong industrial and mining workforce, which increasingly outnumbered the workforce employed in other sectors, and which contributed to a character of ‘workers’ resistance and socialist solidarity’ (Jansen in Bougarel, Helms & Duijzings, 2007:197). In particular, the strength and unity of the Tuzla workforce stood against the challenges of the period between 1919 and 1920, when miners participated in the organisation of numerous strikes against their exploitative work conditions, resulting in a month-long armed rebellion, “Husinska Buna”, which was eventually repressed by the National Government. Interestingly, the effect of its memory on the political inclinations of Tuzla’s citizens is still visible as “Husinska Buna” is acknowledged as one of the episodes that contributed to the formation of a left-wing tradition of workers’ unity (Brčić, 1979; Hadžirović, 1979).

After the creation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1945, Tuzla’s economy flourished as migrants poured in, due to a constant growth of GDP. Interestingly, however, these processes characterised other major industrial and urban centres in the region – such as Zenica and Banja Luka – where urbanisation, industrialisation and economic

---

15 According to an interview conducted with Professor S.Selimović, on 09.07.2012.
16 As mentioned in Front Slobode, Tuzla’s main newspaper at the time, on 26.06.1963. (Hereinafter, Front Slobode).
17 Citizens of Tuzla.
18 Sarajevo is here excluded from the comparison for it presents rather incomparable characteristics, derived from the fact that it’s the capital of the Republic.
growth had also occurred (Andjelic, 2003:28-29). Nevertheless, Tuzla presented four main characteristics that account for its difference, in both economic and social terms: a high rate of worker migration; economic prosperity; a low rate of unemployment; and the strong presence of workers’ councils.

Firstly, the economic importance of the city’s industrial structure is illustrated by the fact that the Tuzla area experienced, according to data from 1981, the strongest workers’ migration on a daily basis in the whole region, approximately as many as three big regional centres put together, which allowed for a higher degree of contact between Tuzla and the surrounding villages. Moreover, the transfer of agrarian population to non-agrarian sectors was very dynamic. For example, Tuzla had the largest increase in the percentage of industrial workers in the period between 1968 and 1973, as can be seen in the graph below.

![% Industry and mining workers over total](image)

**Figure I: Industry and mining workers percentage over total, 1968 and 1974 (data from Opsti Podaci, 1974:252-256)**

Secondly, although it ranked as only the second or third strongest business centre in Bosnia in terms of GDP, after Zenica, ‘Tuzla’s gross national product during two decades—from 1970 to 1990 (rate 6,1 per cent) - grew more dynamically than both the overall level

---

19 Tuzla had 9,565 daily migrants; Zenica 5,115; Banja Luka 2,805; and Mostar 2,019 (Klapić, 2002:175).
in Bosnia (5.7 per cent) and the two regional centres, Banja Luka (4.8 per cent) and Zenica (3.5 per cent) (Klapić, 2002:210).

Thirdly, regarding unemployment, it has to be noted that the city experienced a low level in comparison with other major industrial cities. This is particularly important in relation to Susan Woodward’s argument (1995) on the disruptive force of unemployment in the Socialist Federation. As highlighted in her study, due to ideological and political factors, the socialist leadership somehow ignored the presence of a consistent level of unemployment, even when it became a more pressing issue throughout the economic crisis in the 1980s. Within the League of Yugoslav Communists, the ‘approach to unemployment was to segregate the political world of the employed from that of the unemployed’ (1995:320-321). This political and social invisibility of the unemployed often became the cause for an escalation in social and political frictions. According to Woodward, in the context of a mounting economic crisis, an increased number of those unemployed struggled to voice their discontent within the established leadership, and thus turned to the emerging nationalist political figures.

In this respect, high employment rates helped Tuzla evade this problem, by maintaining a higher degree of social cohesion. Although Tuzla was far from being immune to the economic crisis, it was still ranked as the best regional centre in terms of employment, before Zenica and Banja Luka. Hence, social upheavals stemming from employment divisions were less likely which, in turn, helped maintain the political unity of Tuzla’s industrial working class.

Fourthly, the creation of new workers’ councils, as issued by the 1963 Constitution, allowed for a stronger presence of workers in the Municipal Assemblies (Woodward, 1995:84-85). Hence, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, in the major industrial cities in Bosnia, delegates chosen from the industrial sector still maintained a relative majority within the local ranks of the League of Communists. As such, the socialist ideological character of the state implied a renewed political attention towards the working class. These factors cemented a working-class solidarity, which was reflected in the workers’ enhanced self-perception as part of a cohesive collective, indirectly embracing the city’s community.

4. The Yugoslav Tradition
The picture of the compact Tuzla workforce and its tightknit social fabric matches the accounts of the interviewees. According to a former miner: ‘We couldn’t determine the nationality of our colleagues, we didn’t care’. The existence of a strong Yugoslav identity, commonly understood as the identification with a multi-ethnic, socialist society of equals, is

---

20 Author’s translation.
21 299 out of 625 delegates (Front Slobode, 22.05.1963).
22 Interview conducted with D.H. (Informant18) on 29.07.2012.
often given as an explanation for the lack of ethnic divisions in Tuzla. Again, the background of such a strong rooted identity has to be found in the traditional presence of an industrial and multi-ethnic working class, to which the Yugoslav model suited best. In fact, the ideological model of “Brotherhood and Unity”, which downgraded national and ethnic particularities in favour of a ‘socialist demand for solidarity, equality and fraternity among the Yugoslav peoples’ (Jović, in Djokić, 2003:160), was particularly appealing to Tuzla’s community. In the words of a former trade unionist: ‘I was born as a Yugoslav communist, and I will remain a Yugoslav communist [...] the condition of the workers was amazing, [before the 1990s] you had all the chances to be privileged.’

At the same time, the aforementioned anti-fascist tradition allowed for the development of a sense of allegiance to Tito’s Yugoslavia as the legitimate outcome of such a movement. ‘It looks like we just believed in Tito, that’s it. We actually believed in “Brotherhood and Unity”.’

Moreover, this attempt at resisting nationalist and ethnic divisions also resulted in the protection of other minorities, which had been historically present in the city. According to the interviews conducted with members of the Jewish and Roma community in Tuzla, the positive experience of the Yugoslav period (when, for example, 96 per cent of Roma people were employed) contributed to the homogenisation of Tuzla as a “Yugoslav city”. The Yugoslav identity was not perceived as an imposition possibly because the model mirrored the existing demographic, as well as the socio-economic lineament of the city, and therefore it was possible to integrate the Tuzla identity into the Yugoslav ideology where ‘class was invariably more significant than nation’ (Schopflin, in McGarry & O’Leary, 1995:179).

The fact that the majority of the interviewees recall Yugoslavia’s socio-economic conditions with a sense of nostalgia suggests that there is a strong disposition for the idealisation of the past, consequently accounting for the enduring existence of a sense of “Yugoslavness” among Tuzla’s citizens. The strength of a Yugoslav identity became numerically visible following the results of the 1991 census, when Tuzla registered the highest proportion of people declaring themselves Yugoslav; in addition, it recorded the highest increment of such number since the previous census in 1981, in comparison with the other major urban and industrial centres in Bosnia.

23 Interview conducted with S.A. (Informant 15) on 27.07.2012.
25 Interview conducted with M.Rainer, on 03.07.2012.
26 Interview conducted with S.Mujić, on 13.07.2012.
What is striking about these figures is that Tuzla stood in contrast to the overall rejection of a Yugoslav identity between 1981 and 1991, when a crumbling Yugoslavia saw a relatively large decline in the number of people declaring themselves as Yugoslavs (6 per cent at a national level[^27]), thus assessing for a widespread phenomenon of ethnic polarisation (Somer, 2001:143). This reflected the combination of pressing economic and political crises within the Yugoslav Federation, which saw the surge of nationalist movements advocating the country’s fragmentation across ethno-nationalist lines. In a context of increasingly vocal critiques[^28] to the founding principles of Yugoslavia (ethno-national and social equality, socialism and anti-fascism), it is significant to note how Tuzla’s citizens appealed to their sense of collective “Yugoslavness” in contrast to mounting nationalism.

The particularity of Tuzla became evident during and immediately after the first multi-party political elections in 1990, when tensions among the three main constituent nationalities in Bosnia came to be spearheaded by their corresponding nationalist parties: the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), the Bosnjak Party of Democratic Action (SDA), and the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ), each seeking ethnic dominance within their territories (International Crisis Group, 1996:2). The political opposition to such nationalist forces was represented by multi-ethnic parties: the former League of Communists (SKBiH-SDP), Ante Marković’s Reformists (SRSJ) and the Democratic Alliance of Socialists (DSS). The Reformists were particularly successful and popular in Bosnia because they offered a

[^27]: According to the 1991 census (Federalni Zavod za Statistiku, 2009).
'recentralised Yugoslavia and a federal economic program' (Karadjis, 2000:47). Their leader, former Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Marković, had attempted to solve the profound political, social and economic crisis by introducing a set of economic reforms and advocating political pluralism. In the brief period of his cabinet (1989-1991), he managed to curb skyrocketing inflation and bring about economic recovery by initiating privatisation and market reforms. Although his successes were met with increased consensus by the general public, he faced greater opposition within the party, particularly from the Serbian leader Milosevic (Jovic, 2009:353-356). Marković’s attempt at mobilising popular consensus around his Reformist Party, and his programme to reform Yugoslavia without disrupting its unity, was, however, hindered by organisational problems: ‘the Reformists lacked political determination; the party covered an array of political opinions and failed to take a position on the future of Yugoslavia.’(Caspersen, 2004:2).

With respect to this, it is interesting to consider that Tuzla remained the only municipality where the coalition of Reformists and the ‘Leftist Bloc’ obtained an overall majority of votes (Arnautović, 1996:116-117). Contrarily to the rest of the country, nationalist parties formed the opposition in Tuzla’s municipal assembly:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Mandates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reformists</td>
<td>21,961</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leftist Bloc (SK-BiHSDP)</td>
<td>17,233</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>9,983</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>5,312</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDZ</td>
<td>2,917</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1 The 1990 municipal election results in Tuzla (Armakolas, 2007:44)*

Thus, Reformist candidates obtained the highest percentage of mandates during the first multi-party elections in Tuzla and elected a multi-ethnic cabinet led by Mayor Selim Bešlagić. The material collected offers loose explanations for Tuzla’s non-nationalist stance during the 1990 elections: ‘Here in Tuzla there is the background of worker industry philosophy, so people inherited such thinking, and also […] many people were part of the partisans, part of the communist party […] so they voted for Reformists’.

For Tuzla voters, Marković’s economic reforms, proposing the ‘privatisation […] of Yugoslav industry, by giving shares in firms to the workers and managers’, had been considered successful and preferred over the nationalist parties (Karadjis, 2000:45). Moreover, the majority of the members of the Reformist party and the Leftist Bloc (SKBiH-

---

29 Interview conducted with Z. Banović on 18.07.2012.
SDP) were former members of the Communist Party, and seemingly influential among the community (Armakolas, 2007:41).

Finally, interviewees conjugated Tuzla’s anti-nationalism in civic terms, thus resembling the model of anti-nationalist resistance found in the relatively affluent and multicultural cities in the former Yugoslavia – Beograd, Zagreb, and Sarajevo (Jansen, 2008:3). This spirit is ascribable even to a sense of “Yugoslavness” and multicultural openness; however, in this specific case it seems to have been led by workers rather than an urban, intellectual middle class. People were more likely to vote for a multi-ethnic and non-nationalist coalition for it best represented the composition of their society. With respect to this, the increment of people identifying themselves as Yugoslavs can be interpreted as both a re-affirmation of a pre-existing and already strong Yugoslav identity, and a reaction to the disruption of a state, its ideological model and its certain way of life.

Nevertheless, the political choices of Tuzla suggest a second level of explanation: the construction of the city’s common narrative as historically bound to its multi-ethnic and working-class roots. Here, the pride of perceiving the city as different is interlaced with the necessity of preserving its peculiarity. Approaching conflict, the traditional consensus towards the socialist regime was also sided by a process of negative voting – that is to vote for a party ‘only in order to prevent the victory of some other’ (Burg & Shoup, 1999:57), implying that Tuzla voters might have preferred the Reformist and the Leftist Bloc simply for serving as an alternative to the “other” (i.e. the nationalist parties against whom they defined their identity). Interestingly, while the country was falling in a downward spiral of ethno-nationalist “othering”, in Tuzla this process was reversed. In this case, the political and social “other”, against which citizens mobilised and voted, was nationalism itself.

5. The Bosnian War: Preservation of a civic unity
The first multiparty elections in 1990 sanctioned the predominance of nationalist politics across the Federation. In Tuzla, the multi-ethnic, civic orientation of the coalition government was first challenged by events leading up to the violent outbreak of war on 6 April 1992, a month after the referendum that made Bosnia an independent state. The pattern of military aggression and the extreme threat represented by newly-formed and increasingly strong paramilitary forces, as well as the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) which was de facto under direct Serbian control, became evident with the events that characterised the conflict in Croatia. There, the withdrawal of the JNA forces from the newly-independent Republic resulted in several episodes of ethnic cleansing (Malcolm, 1996:237). Bosnia was facing a similarly critical situation, where the Army of Republika

30 As also mentioned in the interviews conducted with S.Bukvarević on 02.07.2012; D.Liščić on 27.07.2012; N.Slavuljica on 29.06.2012.
31 See also Jansen, 2011; Bilić, 2011.
32 Front Slobode, 23.02.1990.
Srpska (mainly Serbian), the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) and the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) were clashing over internal control, particularly of certain ethnically mixed or disputed areas. Thus, when the military operation against Bosnia began, the necessity of preventing the JNA forces from obtaining such control was urgent. This was also the case of the Tuzla municipality, where the possibility of an armed attack against the city resulted in the organisation and mobilisation of the legal forces in charge of guaranteeing protection of the citizens, regardless of their ethnicity (Žilić, 2001:87).

Furthermore, the turning point for the effective organisation of the defence of the municipality came when the local government decided on 4 April 1992 to assert its executive power over the local Police forces (MUP) and the Territorial Defence (TO), and to prevent the possible disintegration of security forces (Dulić & Kostić, 2010:1066). Hence, the ‘ethnic security dilemma’ (Posen, 199333), resulting in a downward spiral of mutual distrust and an arms race, was thwarted by the local government’s measures of civilian inclusiveness. To decrease the risk of a violent aftermath, the local government prevented any military (JNA) and paramilitary forces to access weapon deposits or to arm themselves illegally, and confiscated the city’s weapons cache, collecting and submitting them to the local authorities. Moreover, citizens were mobilised on a voluntary basis and put in informal reservist units under the command of the Municipal People’s Defence Council.34 Finally, a “Crisis Committee” was created and authorized to govern the municipal defence system in case of war35; this eventually reasserted and reinforced the municipal government’s legal control over any military activity, creating the space for Tuzla’s multi-ethnic narrative to perpetuate itself from the top down. According to a former Police spokesman: ‘Tuzla was defended by Croats and Serbs and Bosnjaks […] what is even more important for the war is that Tuzla didn’t have those small local wild armies like in Sarajevo, because the Police had everything under control from the beginning’.36

The decision to confiscate weapons and to maintain the rule of legal institutions also involved scrutinising the reliability of the new personnel, and quelling the spread of political rumours that could deceive people’s perception about their own security. As stated in the appeal from the Council of People’s Defence: ‘We are convinced that we are united, and with trust in each other we can and we will get through this difficult trial for all people and nationalities that live in this town’.37 The population was also reassured that the MUP and the TO were the only legal formation, and that they would not line up with the JNA or the

33See also Roe, 2004; Rose, 2000.
36Interview conducted with N.Slavuljica on 29.06.2012.
37As published on Front Slobode, 10.04.1992, author’s translation.
pro-Muslim paramilitary formations (Pašić, 1996:244-247). According to the former Mayor of Tuzla, Selim Bešlagić:

‘We never had paramilitary groups. Since the beginning we organized the Police with certain specific tasks to implement: the defence of citizens without differences, outside and inside the city. We established that the Army should have defended and freed the territories outside the city, while the Police had to assure the maintaining of the internal security, and that the relationship between the Army and the Police should have been synchronised.’

As Jasmin Imamović, the former President of the Crisis Committee, added:

‘We did everything that, in case of war, municipal authorities are committed to do: organize citizens’ lives and the functioning of political organs [...] In conditions of war we dedicated our attention to citizens belonging to minorities, for their situation was particular, in war times members of minorities are more scared.’

The fact that the Police and TO forces were prepared for the eventuality of an attack allowed them to maintain control over the city and avoid the siege and destruction of Tuzla by JNA forces, as unfortunately occurred in other cities. According to a doctor working for the World Health Organisation at the time: ‘In Sarajevo authorities failed to do what they were supposed to do to organize themselves and people... here authorities were on that since the beginning and everything, from the Police to the government, was organized well’.

On 15 May 1992 the first clash between the former JNA forces was successfully thwarted by these ‘civic’ forces (Armakolas, 2011:239). Thereafter, the municipality took control over the facilities of the former JNA and started a proper reorganization of the military forces.

Throughout the conflict the city was under control of a local alliance between the Bosnian Army (ARBiH) and the Croat Forces (HVO), and was mainly attacked by Bosnian Serb forces. What is particularly interesting in this case is the varied ethnic composition of the brigades defending the city. The highest ranks of the Tuzla Brigade were assigned to

---

39 Interview with Selim Bešlagić on 30.06.2012.
40 Interview with Jasmin Imamović on 19.07.2012.
41 Interview conducted with A.A (Informant 3) on 25.07.2012.
43 For example, the national composition of the 2nd Brigade was as follows: 70% Muslims, 17% Croats, 1.1% Serbs, 9.94% Bosnians and 3.72% others; the 3rd brigade had 77.3% Muslims, 8.3% Croats, 3% Serbs, 7.1% Bosnians, 4.3% others (According to Armija Ljiljana, the main military publication, n.19, December 1992). A strong number of Roma people joined Armija BiH in Tuzla as well (S. Mujić, 13.07.2012).
officials from different ethnic backgrounds. Interviewees confirmed the remarkable degree of multi-ethnic variety that characterised the Police forces and the Territorial Defence, where most of the Bosnian Serbs were eager to join the defence of the city. According to a former sergeant who fought in the JNA, then joined ARBiH and eventually HVO: ‘There were more Serbs in ARBiH than in any other part of Bosnia […] everyone was against us because we were united’.

Moreover, the undivided local Police, controlled by a local government was also in charge of security inside the city, allowing for the effective maintenance of trust and security between the citizens. According to a former ARBiH soldier: ‘If you were a soldier, and you came home for rest, you left the weapons outside the city, on the frontlines, with the Army. And in the city you were a normal civilian, with no weapons.’

As such, it can be said that the Tuzla government’s measures were aimed for the collective defence of the city rather than the protection of a singular ethnic group. This was perhaps due to the leadership’s anti-nationalist stance, derived from their ideological, cultural and political background.

Several other significant factors aided the case for Tuzla’s preservation as an undivided city. The aforementioned measures taken by the local leadership were supported by a variety of provisions stemming from dialogue between the authorities, citizens, and other (non-political) institutions. Firstly, the rejection of ethno-nationalist division was sided with the arguably spontaneous mobilisation of workers; secondly, the local media contributed to this attempt by responsibly refuting dangerous nationalist propaganda; thirdly, the religious and civic institutions (Forum of Citizens) tried to foster a dialogue aimed at preserving the city’s collective unity.

At first, due to the ethnically intermixed character of the population, with a high degree of mixed marriages, Tuzla already stood in opposition to the idea of partition along ethnic lines. In fact, both the Serbian part in 1991 and the Croatian part in 1994 attempted to proclaim an independent municipality, but did not manage to find a consensus among the population. The failure of such attempts at both institutional and social levels prevented the structure of the city’s community to be divided along ethnic lines. This is particularly meaningful if one considers that in Bosnia ‘in municipalities where Serbs were a minority, Serb municipal officials, councillors, policemen and TO officers abandoned the common Bosnian organs to set up exclusively Serb counterparts in Serb-majority […] neighbourhoods’ (Hoare, in Ramet, 2010:124).

---

44According to former members of the army interviewed, the commander of the Second Corpus of the Brigade was Croat, his first deputy was Bosnjak and his second was Serb.


At the same time, the provisions for the work obligation were particularly severe in Tuzla, in comparison with the overall national level.\(^{48}\) In fact, when some people left the city before the first attack, the municipality ordered for the immediate sacking of any worker found to be absent from the workplace without justification. These measures were controversial, for they not only discouraged people from returning, but they also punished those (mainly Serbs) who had decided to leave. Still, the fact that work was used as a deterrent for the departure of citizens\(^{49}\) shows how the political authorities were aware of its significance in citizens’ lives. According to Bešlagić: ‘The most important thing we had to do at that time was defending human rights, with no discrimination over the nationality: we had to evaluate citizens as workers or non-workers the connection with them remained continuously for the whole time.’\(^{50}\)

With respect to this, it is worth noting that the participation of Tuzla’s workers in the defence of the city is acknowledged as a further reason for the successful preservation of unity amongst the citizens. ‘Most of my Serb colleagues remained here during the war, and we went together to the front-line to fight against nationalists.’\(^{51}\)

Secondly, the regulation of information in the media played a vital role in maintaining solidarity. During the first months of the conflict, the administration tried to prevent the media being exploited for propaganda purposes. The local media were forbidden from publishing any announcements by political parties,\(^{52}\) and the local radio-television stations (Radio Tuzla and TV FS3) were ordered to turn off the signal from the Serbian surroundings,\(^{53}\) at a time when Serbian propaganda was spreading a sense of fear and insecurity among the Bosnian Serb population in Tuzla (Thompson, 1999:215). According to a citizen who lived near the local stadium: ‘The news reported that more than 500 Serbs had been collected in the stadium in order to be murdered, but I live on the 13\(^{th}\) floor, and I could see that the stadium was empty’.\(^{54}\)

Although it is not possible here to give a thorough analysis of the role of the local media in supressing nationalist propaganda, it is still worth noting that the most popular and followed local newspaper (\textit{Front Slobode}) had a traditionally left-wing orientation. According to its director at that time: ‘it was part of the cultural identity of the city, it was a mirror of it. Here nationalist parties and their propaganda didn’t have space and we

\(^{48}\)There was only one, general, provision in Bosnia-Herzegovina, obliging workers to maintain their position in the case of declaration of war condition, Službeni glasnik BiH, n.19, p.529, November 1992.

\(^{49}\)Službeni glasnik, n.3, pp.74-75, 25.05.1992; Ibid., n.4, p.93, 25.05.1992; Ibid., n.3, p.77, 25.05.1992; Ibid., n.4, p.109, 8.07.1992.

\(^{50}\)Interview conducted with S. Bešlagić on 30.06.2012.

\(^{51}\)See interview conducted with D.H. (Informant 18) on 29.07.2012. D.H was a miner and soldier in ARBiH, who referred to the unity of citizens and workers in the defence of the city against the ‘nationalist’ aggressor.

\(^{52}\)Službeni glasnik, n.4., pp.99-100, 20.06.1992.


\(^{54}\)Interview conducted with D.M. (Informant 25) on 27.07.2012.
contributed to the diffusion of an idea of democracy, in a place where nationalist parties have always been a minority.\textsuperscript{55}

Thirdly and finally, these defining institutional features were also supported by non-institutional subjects (Sekulić et al., 2006). Interviews with the then representatives of the local Muslim Community and the Catholic Church were conducted in order to test the account of an undivided society given by members of the local authorities. Although the version of the representative of the Orthodox Church could add depth to such picture, its absence is not casual: Tuzla did not have such a representative throughout the war since the controversial Episkop Vasilje Kačavenda had fled the city before it was attacked in May 1992.\textsuperscript{56} He was eventually replaced, but only at the end of the war. However, the fact that the Serb-Orthodox community lacked a religious representative undoubtedly affected the situation of the remaining Serb minority in Tuzla:

‘The Episkop left at the beginning of the war with all the clergy...Can you imagine how it is for people not to have their spiritual leaders and representatives in such a moment? […] The priest who came in 1995 had to reconcile and “amortise” the negative situation Kačavenda left in the community here’.\textsuperscript{57}

Apart from the remonstrance linked to the suspect behaviour of representatives of the Orthodox Church, the main religious figures, citizens and members of the authorities, describe the situation in Tuzla during the war as characterised by fervent and continuous inter-religious dialogue. Collective prayers and general gatherings against the war were organised in the local mosque, Orthodox and Catholic Church, and saw a strong participation of Tuzla citizens.\textsuperscript{58} The inter-religious dialogue was encouraged by the joint initiatives of the local Efendi (the Muslim leader) and the Abbot of the Franciscan Monastery, who also collaborated with the local government’s efforts aimed at maintaining cohesion. Such unusual collaboration, which triggered some hostilities within their religious circles,\textsuperscript{59} undoubtedly protected Tuzla’s community from a widespread ‘wave of […] national-religious euphoria’ (Bougarel, in Dyker & Vejvoda, 1997:95). The shared conviction, as stated by Abbot Matanović, that ‘Religion has nothing to do with nationality’,\textsuperscript{60} expresses a rather uncommon attitude towards otherwise divisive issues.

As such, the lack of inter-ethnic divisions among Tuzla’s citizens can also be seen as deriving from the high degree of openness of religious representatives. This tendency was proven particularly solid in the citizens’ united reaction to what undoubtedly was the most

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{55}Interview conducted with S. Alić on 02.07.2012.
\textsuperscript{56}See also Radoja (2011);
\textsuperscript{57}Interview conducted with M. Trakilović on 23.07.2012.
\textsuperscript{58}Front Slobode 04.02.1992; Front Slobode 07.02.1992.
\textsuperscript{59}As mentioned in the interview with Efendi M.Lugavić on 03.07.2012; this opinion was also shared by Fra P. Matanović in his interview on 04.07.2012.
\textsuperscript{60}Interview conducted with Fra P, Matanović on 04.07.2012.
\end{flushleft}
tragic war event – the single artillery shot (launched by Serb positions) that hit Tuzla’s main square on 25 May 1995, killing 74 people. However, this tragedy, thanks to the extremely composed attitude of citizens, authorities and religious representatives, did not result in any consistent worsening of the inter-ethnic relations. Nationalist upheavals were strongly contrasted by the religious and political authorities, which managed to remain unified and strongly participated in commemorations (Armakolas, 2007: 184-185).

At the same time, the Forum of Tuzla Citizens, which was the first and main non-institutional organisation that aimed to mobilise and organise a civic and anti-nationalist movement, was also pivotal in curbing divisions. According to its founder Vehid Šehić, the Forum was born in 1993 as a citizens’ initiative against a nationalist war, aimed at preserving Tuzla’s unity. This approach went hand in hand with the attention reserved for minorities:

“At the time, it probably wasn’t simple to be a Serb or a Croat here, but they were supported by the Forum, which was a multi-ethnic association with Muslims, Serbs and Croats and minorities and former Yugoslavs […] but I wasn’t protecting Serbs or Croats or Muslims, I was protecting people, who at that time needed help.”

With respect to this final remark, it is necessary to note that, despite these attempts at maintaining civic unity, ethnic divisions were still perceived within the city. Minority groups (particularly Serbs) were not completely immune from a sense of insecurity and a few challenging events threatened the civic solidarity of the city. The first attack against Tuzla on May 15th, 1992 saw a huge number of people leave, mainly towards Serb-populated areas. Even though the exact record of how many Serb citizens left Tuzla is disputed, the interviews conducted with several members of the Serbian population account for the Serb departures as a tragic outcome of the war rather than the result of pre-existing unsolved ethnic divides: ‘The JNA spread propaganda and panic among the Serb population, they told them they would have been killed, so the Serbs started to panic and feel threatened because of this propaganda’.

The Serb interviewees who decided to remain, or did not have the option to leave, rarely manifested major grievances towards their fellow citizens. Despite mentioning certain provocations, they did not describe their experience in Tuzla during the war as

---

61 Interviewed on 29.06.2012; see also the Forum Gradani Tuzle statute available on the official website.
62 Interview conducted with V. Šehić, on 11.07.2012.
63 On Front Slobode 03.11.1994 it was “estimated that 11000 Serbs (almost 2/3 of the overall Serb population in Tuzla) left the city in the period between 1992 and 1994”; Bojic (2003:259) reports that “Between 1992 and 1995, 32,000 Serbs out of 35,000 […] left Tuzla.”; an exact figure, however, is not available for the municipality of Tuzla. It has been calculated that, after the war, “Tuzla’s Serb population dropped from over 80,000 to an estimated 15,000 (UNHCR, 1995:8)” (Rose, Thomas & Tumler, 2000:2).
64 According to the interview conducted with M.P. (Informant 17) on the 25.07.2012, a resident of a Serb neighbourhood; also reported in Front Slobode 05.06.1992.
irremediably affected by the fact they belonged to a different nationality: ‘I don’t think that people in Tuzla had to leave because of their ethnicity […] you might have been treated differently but your life wasn’t in danger.’

At the same time, tensions inevitably broke out between the other two ethnic groups when, after 1993, the Croat and Muslim forces started fighting in central Bosnia. The controversial relations between the two armies affected Tuzla, especially when the general command of ARBiH ordered the cancellation of the Croatian defence “Zrinski” brigade, perceived as a guarantor of security for the Croat minority. Although, as stated by the head of the ARBiH Command in the region, ‘there were no fights between ARBiH and HVO’, this decision undoubtedly spread a sense of insecurity amongst the Croat population. In order to sturb its impact, the Mayor of Tuzla ‘visited every last corner where Croats were living in order to explain to the people that the affair had been falsely represented as a threat to their safety’ (Bešlagić, 1998:589). Furthermore, according to Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in the former Yugoslavia, ‘Serbs and Croats in Tuzla were not subjected to harassment at levels comparable to other groups in Bosnia’ (Burg & Shoup, 1999:178; Mazowiecki, 1996).

Hence, interviewees and reports confirmed the condition of diffused unity amongst citizens in a chaotic war situation. Though controversies and grievances between citizens of different ethnic backgrounds were, unfortunately, far from absent, their relevance has been overshadowed by the necessity of maintaining a civic unity. This is further reflected in the community’s need of preserving its inter-ethnic character by inadvertently re-framing the collective memory around the description of a challenged, and yet resistant, citizens’ unity.

### 6. Conclusions: The Perpetuation of the Tuzla Narrative

The Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995 gave Bosnia an inextricably complex set of political institutions. The Republic has been divided in two entities, the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The latter has been further divided in ten different cantons, each of which with a central city. In the cantonal assemblies of the newly-formed entity of Federation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, the first post-war elections of 1996 served ‘merely to legitimise the results of wartime ethnic cleansing’ (Manning, 2010:64) by granting victories to nationalist parties corresponding to the ethnic majority in each canton. In the Tuzla canton, however, the coalition of non-nationalist parties (Joint List) came second after the nationalist Party of Democratic Action (SDA). According to Front

---

65 Emphasis added by the interviewee, Interview conducted with A.A. (Informant 3) on 25.07.2012.
67 As declared on Armija Ljiljana, n. 49, 26.3.1994.
68 Even though, according to a representative of HDZ (Z.Banovic, interview conducted on 18.07.2012) the party did not call for people to leave Tuzla.
69 This has not happened in any other canton where first and second places were reserved for SDA or HDZ.
Slobode, ‘Tuzla votes were decisive for a good result of the Joint List. [...] Tuzla again has all conditions to preserve the image of a town where national parties don’t hold power.’

In the 1997 municipality elections, contrary to the national tendency, Tuzla again chose the anti-nationalist coalition. Tuzla municipality registered the highest rank of non-nationalist vote (61 per cent) characterized by a strong cross-ethnic consensus, with a percentage of over 50 per cent gained by the Joint List-SDP in the Tuzla urban area (Pugh & Cobble, 2001:35-36). Thus, the non-nationalist and “civic” option, embodied in the popular and respected figure of the Tuzla mayor, saw its reconfirmation in the post-war elections. Tuzla’s electoral body recognised that political pluralism and a legal and democratic state were the main factors behind the particular situation experienced by the city during the war.

There was indeed a general degree of satisfaction among the population in acknowledging the merits of the local government in the implementation of measures aimed at preserving Tuzla as an undivided community. As such, it can be argued that Tuzla’s political life was characterised by path-dependence dynamics where ‘tendencies toward positive feed-back characterize […] processes central to political environments: collective action […] the exercise of authority, and social interpretations […] can trigger a self-reinforcing dynamic.’ (Pierson, 2000:260).

The outcome of the political elections in Tuzla indeed suggests that the war did not result, as was generally the case in Bosnia, in an ‘ossification of ethnic divisions’ (Bakke et al. 2009:231) among citizens. Nevertheless, this is somehow not surprising, for it confirms the already existing consensus towards a non-nationalist, pan-ethnic political.

Tuzla’s political authorities preferred to mobilise people towards a civic project, which better reflected the preferences of citizens as they were less inclined towards ethno-national or religious divisions and more disposed to support a programme that reasserted the particularity of their undivided city. This was achieved not only through inter-ethnic and inter-religious dialogue, but most of all by maintaining a legal framework that could guarantee people (especially members of minorities) a certain degree of safety and security. Additionally, there was an emphasis on human and citizens’ rights, as a way of mobilising people in non-ethnic terms and reassuring them that the local government’s efforts would be inclusive.

Thus, Tuzla’s political authorities upheld an influential grip over citizens by maintaining control over the military and the media, as well as mobilising people in order to retain consensus and power. This suggests that Tuzla’s authorities did not completely distance

———

70 Front Slobode 07.10.1996, author’s translation.
71 Front Slobode 02.08.1996.
themselves from a general pattern of élite manipulation. However, contrary to the general tendency of ‘social and political institutions in forming individuals’ ethnic identities’ (Somer, 2001:145), Tuzla continued to move in non-ethnic terms. This is mainly because of a twofold awareness orientation. On one hand, the political authorities were conscious of the traditionally left-wing and non-nationalist orientation of their electoral body; therefore ‘the process of ethnic outbidding by élites and rational ethnic voting by individuals [as] an instrumental use of ethnicity in which the political process is shaped by ethnicity and the political process in turn shapes ethnic identity’ (Majstorović, 1997:174) proved less likely to occur. On the other hand, as the interviews suggest, the narrative of Tuzla’s uniqueness, as permeating through a varied spectrum of society, meant that the political authorities felt supported, if not complied, in engaging in a constructive dialogue with the community. The political authorities and institutions acknowledged for the necessity of sustaining and reinforcing Tuzla’s narrative as an undivided city. This suggests the presence of a process of internal identification and external categorisation where different subjects in the social structure perpetually reinforced a civic (rather than ethnic) identity (Jenkins, 1994).

Finally, the lack of ethno-politicisation can be explained by the fact that the political relevance of ethnic identities was strongly influenced by the wider social context (Eriksen, in Mujikic, 2007:116). The consolidated characteristics of a multi-ethnic and non-nationalist, left wing society, as well as the reproduction of a shared narrative accounting for them, prevented Tuzla’s society from developing disruptive oppositions along ethnic lines. Conversely, in the broader context of an increasingly fragmented society, Tuzla was not immune from mechanisms of self-identification within a defined group. The stress on group boundaries, implying ‘defence mechanisms necessary for the preservation of internal equilibrium’ (Conversi, 1999:556), is indeed visible in the accounts given by interviewees. The very fact that such ‘internal equilibrium’ was retrospectively acknowledged as that of a multi-ethnic society implied the consolidation of a perceived boundary, dividing the figure of Tuzla’s (non-nationalist) citizen from that of the (nationalist) other.

7. Bibliography

7.1 Primary Sources

*Interviews*

A.A. (Informant 3) (2012) Interview with the author, Tuzla, 25th July [A.A is a doctor, and was working for the World Health Organisation in Tuzla during the war].

A.H. (Informant 1) (2012) Interview with the author, Tuzla, 25th July [A.H was a sergeant in the JNA, ARBiH and HVO forces in the period between 1991 and 1994].

72See Sekulić et al., 2006; Gagnon, 2004; Bose, 2002:6.
Alić, S. (2012) Interview with the author, Tuzla, 2nd July [Sinan Alić is the former Editor and Director of Front Slobode, Tuzla].

A.R. (Informant 13) (2012) Interview with the author, Tuzla, 26th July [A.R was a soldier in ARBiH in Tuzla during the war].

A.V. (Informant 14) (2012) Interview with the author, Tuzla, 21st July [A.V was a worker in Tuzla during the war period].

Banović, Z. (2012) Interview with the author, Tuzla, 18th July [Zvonimir Banović was the secretary of the HDZ Municipal Board in 1992. Since then, he has been a member of HDZ Tuzla].

Bešlagić, S. (2012) Interview with the author, Tuzla, 30th June [Selim Bešlagić was the former Mayor of Tuzla between 1990 and 1996].

Blagoević, Z. (2012) Interview with the author, Tuzla, 4th July [Zoran Blagoević has been a soldier in ARBiH and is currently the local SDP spokesperson].

Bukvarević, S. (2012) Interview with the author, Tuzla, 2nd July [Salko Bukvarević is the former president of a local section of SDA].

D.H. (Informant 18) (2012) Interview with the author, Lipnica, 29th July [D.H., a former trade unionist, was a worker in the Tuzla mines. During the war, he was a soldier in ARBiH].

D.M. (Informant 25) (2012) Interview with the author, Tuzla, 27th July [D.M. was born and lived in Slatina, a borough near Tuzla well known for its particular peaceful inter-ethnic coexistence].

Imamović, J. (2012) Interview with the author, Tuzla, 19th July [Jasmin Imamović, the current Mayor of Tuzla, was the President of the Crisis Committee during the war].

Liščić, D. (2012) Interview with the author, Tuzla, 27th July [Duško Liščić is a former MUP Inspector, and is currently vice-president of the Serbian Civic Council].


Matanović, P. (2012) Interview with the author, Brcko, 4th July [Fra Petar Matanović is the former Abbot of the Tuzla Franciscan Monastery].
Muhammed Effendi Lugavić (2012) Interview with the author, Tuzla, 3rd July [Effendi Lugavić is the former Effendi of the Tuzla Muslim Community].

M.K. (Informant 22) (2012) Interview with the author, Tuzla, 26th July [M.K. is a refugee from Doboj who studied in Tuzla before the war and now lives there].

M.M. (Informant 27) (2012) Interview with the author, Tuzla, 23rd July [M.M is a member of the local SNSD, the Serbian National Party].

M.P. (Informant 17) (2012) Interview with the author, Tuzla, 25th July [M.P. is a self-employed worked in Tuzla; she is also President of the Social Democratic Union-BiH in Tuzla].

Mujić, S. (2012) Interview with the author, Tuzla, 13th July [Sasan Mujić is the President of the NGO “Sae Roma”, the biggest NGO dealing with the Roma population in Tuzla].

N.B. (Informant 19) (2012) Interview with the author, Tuzla, 25th July [N.B. is a former member of the local SDA (Party of Democratic Action) and was a member of the War Presidency of the Municipality of Zvornik, placed in Tuzla during the war. He now works as a vice-archivist in Tuzla’s archive].

Rainer, M. (2012) Interview with the author, Tuzla, 3rd July [Marina Rainer is the current President of the Jewish Community in Tuzla].

R.M. (Informant 6) (2012) Interview with the author, Tuzla, 18th July [R.M. was a former Partisan in the People’s Liberation Army between 1941 and 1945].

Selimović, S. (2012) Interview with the author, Tuzla, 9th July [Sead Selimović is a current History Professor at the University of Tuzla].

Slavuljica, N. (2012) Interview with the author, Tuzla, 29th June [Nikola Slavuljica is a former Police spokesman and a member of the Reformist-SDP coalition. He is also president of the Josip Broz Tito Society].

Šabotić, I. (2012) Interview with the author, Tuzla, 10th July [Izet Sabotić is a History Professor at Tuzla University and former director of Tuzla archive]

Šehić, V. (2012) Interview with the author, Tuzla, 29th June and 11th July [Vehid Šehić is the founder and President of the Forum of Tuzla Citizens (FGT)].

S.A. (Informant 15) (2012) Interview with the author, Tuzla, 17th July [S.A., a former trade unionist, has been a worker in one of the major industries in Tuzla (AIDA) since 1982].
S.B. (Informant 23) (2012) Interview with the author, Tuzla, 14th July [S.B, originally from Macedonia, now lives and works in Tuzla].

S.T. (Informant 20) (2012) Interview with the author, Tuzla, 26th July [S.T. is a retired primary school teacher].

Trakilović, M. (2012) Interview with the author, Tuzla, 23rd July [Miomir Trakilović is now the president of SNSD, the Serbian Nationalist Party, Tuzla].

Documents and Statistics


Newspapers and online articles


Front Slobode – Tuzla’s main local newspaper. The newspaper was issued mostly daily until the war started. During the war, it was generally published every two to three days, if not weekly. By the end of the war, it was sometimes issued every two weeks. Most of the numbers issued between January 1990 and July 1995 have been consulted. The issues consulted belong to the period between 22.05.1963 and 07.10.1996 [Available and accessed in the Tuzla Municipal Archive between June, 28th 2012 and July, 31st 2012].


Oslobodjenje, 25.09.1996.

7.2 Secondary Sources

Books and journal articles


Klapić, M. (2002), Tuzla kao razvojni centar Severoistočne Bosne, Tuzla: Ekonomski Institut


