It is fair to say that many did not hold out a great deal of hope for Sir John Chilcot’s report, which was released yesterday. More than seven years after the inquiry was announced by then Prime Minister Gordon Brown, and with the last private hearing concluding in May 2011, the delay in publication led many to question what the Chilcot inquiry would conclude. The fear was that the delay was a precursor for a whitewash, that the delay was being deliberately orchestrated in order to allow the key players to gradually retire from public life. The Maxwellisation of the report, where key players criticised in a report are allowed to respond to those criticisms prior to publication, also raised concerns about the inquiry and its ability to really get to the truth without fear or favour. It is fair to say that the report which Chilcot delivered yesterday was nothing short of an atom bomb, wrapped very carefully in a silk pillowcase – innocent and elegant on the surface but deadly for those within its vicinity.

Interestingly, the Chilcot inquiry tells the media, academics and the public very little that they didn’t already know. It has long been widely accepted that the case for war in Iraq in 2003 was fatally flawed, that Blair and the British government misled the British public and that the fallout from that was devastating, for the British troops sent to Iraq, their families and the people of Iraq, who have suffered immeasurably because of the actions of the British and Americans in 2003 and since. However, the Chilcot inquiry added a considerable amount of meat to the bones of these accusations. While Blair and Alistair Campbell might cling to the conclusion that they did not wilfully lie to the British people, neither they, nor numerous individuals within Whitehall, Westminster and the Armed Services come out of the report well. Indeed the inquiry team paint a picture of a wide group of individuals who collectively convinced themselves that Iraq had a wide range of biological and chemical weapons and systematically attempted to convince all non-believers, in the face of considerable evidence to the contrary. Chilcot has made it clear that regime change in Iraq was already being seriously discussed in December 2001, and that military action was not the ‘last resort’ but was entered into before more peaceful methods had had time to work effectively. War was desired, not reluctantly entered into. Blair’s ‘sofa style’ of government, meant to create an easy working environment, cutting through the red tape of Whitehall, seems to have instead created a situation where key individuals could decide policy with little or no consideration of Cabinet, Parliament or the people. The arrogance which is required to convince yourself that ‘you know best’ and that you are doing the work of a UN too blind to see the reality of the situation in Iraq is breath-taking, even in the rarefied air of Downing Street. The report presents Blair not as a liar, but as a zealot, perhaps even more damaging to his reputation. There is now no doubt that Blair believed what he said, but what does that tell us? How damaging a conclusion, that Blair convinced himself of an argument and then sent young men and women to die on the basis of his faith in that argument.

The report describes an astonishing lack of planning in Whitehall and the inevitable repercussions of this lack of planning. Chilcot indicates that the British government simply failed to understand the time, money, dedication, planning and resources necessary to invade and occupy a large country in the Middle East, instead believing that the UN, particularly UN Security Council member nations, would simply clear up the mess being made, participating in the occupation and authorising a government to run Iraq immediately after the conflict. Britain would ‘cut and run’, leaving the restoration work to the US and the UN, a plan which was, at best, completely unrealistic, and at worst, fantasy. This fantasy led to chronic shortages of equipment, while the Ministry of Defence continually planned for a phased withdrawal from Iraq, which was considerably slower in coming than they had hoped, meaning the lives of troops were continually and repeatedly put in danger. An increase in violence in Afghanistan meant that Britain was eventually fighting on two different fronts, a situation there appears to have been no planning for and certainly not enough resources to successfully execute. This situation was, Chilcot argues, entirely predictable, and did not require the clarity of hindsight. While there is no question that British troops fought valiantly and bravely in Iraq (and Afghanistan) it is clear from the report that they were let down at many governmental levels by those charged with their safety, and many troops and their families are having to deal with the repercussions of those decisions. While the Chilcot inquiry may not improve their lives or ease their suffering, it will at least provide them with some answers.

And what of the all-important relationship between the US and the UK, the basis of the action? It is clear to everyone in Britain that the government rate this ‘special relationship’ extremely highly, and it is also clear that Blair felt a great deal of pressure to maintain this relationship by acquiescing to many of the US government’s plans. Chilcot notes that Blair’s influence in Washington was far less than he anticipated, but Blair’s correspondence argues that he could not allow the US to ‘go it alone’. By playing the Greeks to the (US) Romans, Blair paints himself, both in correspondence as well as in his own imagination, as the curtailing force on the US administration. Were this to true, the question has to be asked, how much worse could the Iraq war have been if the UK had not participated? It is difficult to see how Blair and the British curtailed or minimised the actions of the US, and if they did, how dangerous a force was the US in 2003? Certainly too dangerous to work with successfully. Therefore it appears that Blair was labouring under a misapprehension, painting himself as essential to the US war effort when he was, in fact, a bit player.

While the Chilcot inquiry findings might not be surprising, the findings are none the less, explosive. While academics like myself may spend our lives drawing logical and sensible conclusions about Blair’s motives and plans, we are often forced to make leaps of faith. We do not have a window into men’s souls and we don’t have direct access to many of the key players. Nor do the families of dead soldiers, troops who served in Iraq or those affected by the war on the group in Baghdad and Fallujah. The Chilcot report has, in quiet, measured language, provided a forensic breakdown of the litany of bad decisions, inadequate plans and intellectual leaps made in the selling of this war to the public. The report, all 12 volumes and 2.6 million words of it, describe a form of government which many of us, even those who have long suspected it, struggle to believe existed in the Blair era. Chilcot describes a government where the Cabinet were never actually allowed to discuss the issue of war generally in Iraq, something which Clare Short indicated in her autobiography, but still seems extraordinary. The prevalence of ‘group think’ and the reinforcement of belief from within a small group within government and Whitehall is extraordinary, but not surprising. While Chilcot may not have uncovered a new truth, his report confirms a truth which was long suspected but often dismissed. It can no longer be dismissed, and undoubtedly, as individuals wade through the full report, more explosive details will become clear over the coming days. Blair has already apologised, while attempting to justify his position. Many will argue that, liar or zealot, that simply isn’t enough.

Victoria Honeyman is Lecturer in British Politics at the University of Leeds. She tweets @VHoneymanLeeds.

Image: The U.S. Army