Hierarchies and networks in the governance of Russia

Network governance, involving cooperative ventures between state and non-state actors to solve difficult problems, is seen as an increasing phenomenon in democratic states worldwide. However, the concept of network governance has not been considered fruitful for studying authoritarian and semi-authoritarian states.  Yet our research shows that network-style governing arrangements do operate in Russia and that conceptual tools used to study governance in the West can usefully be applied there. Even with increasing authoritarianism, authorities involve non-state actors in everyday decision-making.

The findings from the Norwegian-Russian “Network Governance in Russia” project are available in two peer-reviewed journals, and a book is forthcoming. A symposium in East European Politics explores four policy areas in the regions of St Petersburg, Samara, Krasnodar and Irkutsk.  We highlight six main findings:

1. The Russian state does not always act as a unitary, hierarchical command-like unit

Despite the fact that Russia features a “centralized party-based subnational authoritarianism” today; leaders at different territorial levels do not necessarily share the same policy positions when it comes to concrete decisions.

Professor Sabine Kropp of the Freie Univeristät Berlin, exploring environmental impact assessments in Russia, argues that even if Russian authorities resort to coercion, they do not always succeed. Our case studies revealed that international regimes and organizations, multinational companies and international environmental NGOs have an impact on Russian environmental politics by counteracting state attempts to turn horizontal governance into pure vertical governance.

2. Russian authorities selectively involve non-state actors in everyday decision-making

In addition to exercising imperfect control, Russian authorities seek to involve non-state actors in everyday environmental decision-making to acquire time-specific and place-specific knowledge about natural resources, and to acquire more knowledge about the specific interests of local communities. Scenarios that depict Russian governance as exclusively dominated by command, coercion and informal, “dark” power networks seem exaggerated. This finding clears the ground for a rethinking of governance in non-democratic regimes.

3. State-based actors operate as active “gatekeepers” in networks

An article by Marthe Handå Myhre of the University of Oslo and Mikkel Berg-Nordlie of the Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research (NIBR) at the Oslo and Akershus University of Applied Sciences delves into Russian media discourse on the inclusion of non-state actors in governance. They find a general pro-networking position in Russian media, a hegemonic idea about the relationship between state and civil society in Russia that revolves around mutual dependency and necessary cooperation to solve complex social problems.

We find that the Russian media frequently points out that the state is the only and rightful organizer of civil society’s involvement. This reads defensively as expressing an innate fear of non-state takeover from the side of the state, but perhaps more realistically because of worries that the Russian populace might perceive the state as losing control because of the need to involve non-state actors in an increasing range of policy areas.

We argue that this underscoring of the Russian state’s ultimate authority also reflects the type of network governance model that exists in Russia. State-based actors operate as network controllers seeking to maintain control over the reins of decision-making, and the power to pick and choose partners from civil society.  This finding reflects much of the experience in Western European governance studies.

4. Non-state actors in the environmental field are often considered “troublemakers”

In case studies focused on projects with a large environmental impact, high economic value, and strategic importance, the incentive to avoid civil society participation and prevent opposition are greater. They show that civil society organisations seldom get acknowledgment as equal partners, but are in the majority of cases viewed as troublemakers, impeding the realisation of economic interests. Sometimes, NGOs can negotiate concessions, as they did for example around construction plans for the Winter Sochi Olympics.  This insight lends us a deeper understanding of how “power vertical” shapes Russian multi-level governance and how it relates to governance networks at subnational levels. Governments and administrations at the regional and federal levels act according to the principle of expediency, which means they are not always fully aligned.

5. Non-state actors are more motivated to participate in governance networks than state actors

Aadne Aasland and Berg-Nordlie at NIBR dive into the subject matter with case studies in three areas of welfare policy in St. Petersburg and the Samara region. In their article, co-authored with Elena Bogdanova from the Center for Independent Social Research in St. Petersburg, they argue that non-state actors display stronger motivation for network participation than state actors. Participation gives them direct and legitimate access to authorities. It also delivers some important benefits, which we found in three distinct policy arenas: integration of migrants, prevention of drug use and child protection. Benefits to NGO participants included impact on policy, subsidies, information exchange, enhanced professional networks and heightened symbolic status.

In many cases, the resources and input provided were also valuable to authorities for solving complex social problems. In a country with an unaccountable executive power, governance networks also give legitimacy to state decisions and an impression of popular involvement. This confirms that networks play a role in the policy system, but also that this role is limited, and always subject to the goodwill of the state.

6. Tools used to study other regions and contexts could be useful in studies of Russian politics

The premise of our research, finally, was that one could fruitfully study Russia by employing concepts familiar in the study of governance worldwide, including the tools of network analysis. We question the widely held notions of Russian exceptionalism as regards its state–society relations. We make the case that the Russian political system is not unique. The reform of the public sector strengthens the case for re-examining Russian state–civil society cooperation through a cautious reading of network governance theory. We cast light on poorly understood practices of interaction, or networking, between the state and domestic civil society groups. The seemingly authoritarian and paternalistic mode of governance in Russia includes a host of different interactive practices, including co-optation, negotiation, and networking between state and non-state actors. It is this observation that leads us to focus not on what differentiates Russia, but rather what it might have in common with other countries in seeking to handle policy challenges through more or less authentic interactions with civil society.

This piece is based on an article from the Oslo and Akershus University of Applied Sciences.

Jonathan S. Davies is Professor of Critical Policy Studies at the De Montfort University, Leicester.  He tweets @profjsdavies. Aadne Aasland is a Senior Researcher and the project lead at the Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research, Oslo and Akershus University of Applied Sciences (@nibr_no). Jan-Tore  is a Senior Adviser at the Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research, Oslo and Akershus University of Applied Sciences Berghei

The Norwegian-Russian Network Governance in Russia project was funded by the Research Council of Norway, and was coordinated by the Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research. The project has contributions from thirteen researchers from four different countries.

Image: Alex Block